Caste

 

 Caste

In South Asia the caste system has been a dominating aspect of social organization for thousands of years. A caste, generally designated by the term jati (“birth”), refers to a strictly regulated social community into which one is born. Some jatis have occupational names, but the connection between caste and occupational specialization is limited. In general, a person is expected to marry someone within the same jati, follow a particular set of rules for proper behaviour (in such matters as kinship, occupation, and diet), and interact with other jatis according to the group’s position in the social hierarchy. Based on names alone, it is possible to identify more than 2,000 jatis. However, it is common for there to be several distinct groups bearing the same name that are not part of the same marriage network or local caste system.

In India virtually all nontribal Hindus and many adherents of other faiths (even Muslims, for whom caste is theoretically anathema) recognize their membership in one of those hereditary social communities. Among Hindus, jatis are usually assigned to one of four large caste clusters, called varnas, each of which has a traditional social function: Brahmans (priests), at the top of the social hierarchy, and, in descending prestige, Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (originally peasants but later merchants), and Shudras (artisans and labourers). The particular varna in which a jati is ranked depends in part on its relative level of “impurity,” determined by the group’s traditional contact with any of a number of “pollutants,” including blood, menstrual flow, saliva, dung, leather, dirt, and hair. Intercaste restrictions were established to prevent the relative purity of a particular jati from being corrupted by the pollution of a lower caste.

A fifth group, the Panchamas (from Sanskrit panch, “five”), theoretically were excluded from the system because their occupations and ways of life typically brought them in contact with such impurities. They were formerly called the untouchables (because their touch, believed by the upper castes to transmit pollution, was avoided), but the nationalist leader Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi referred to them as Harijan (“Children of God”), a name that for a time gained popular usage. More recently, members of that class have adopted the term Dalit (“Oppressed”) to describe themselves. Officially, such groups are referred to as Scheduled Castes. Those in Scheduled Castes, collectively accounting for roughly one-sixth of India’s total population, are generally landless and perform most of the agricultural labour, as well as a number of ritually polluting caste occupations (e.g., leatherwork, among the Chamars, the largest Scheduled Caste).

India’s many tribal peoples—officially designated as Scheduled Tribes—have also been given status similar to that of the Scheduled Castes. Tribal peoples are concentrated mainly in the northeast (notably Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland) and, to a lesser extent, in the northeast-central (Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha) regions of the country, as well as in the Lakshadweep and Dadra and Nagar Haveli union territories.

While inherently nonegalitarian, jatis provide Indians with social support and, at least in theory, a sense of having a secure and well-defined social and economic role. In most parts of India, there is one or perhaps there are several dominant castes that own the majority of land, are politically most powerful, and set a cultural tone for a particular region. A dominant jati typically forms anywhere from one-eighth to one-third of the total rural population but may in some areas account for a clear majority (e.g., Sikh Jats in central Punjab, Marathas in parts of Maharashtra, or Rajputs in northwestern Uttar Pradesh). The second most numerous jati is usually from one of the Scheduled Castes. Depending on its size, a village typically will have between 5 and 25 jatis, each of which might be represented by anywhere from 1 to more than 100 households.

Although it is not as visible as it is among Hindus, caste is found among Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, and Jews. In the 1990s the Dalit movement began adopting a more aggressive approach to ending caste discrimination, and many converted to other religions, especially Buddhism, as a means of rejecting the social premises of Hindu society. At the same time, the officially designated “Other Backward Classes” (other social and tribal groups traditionally excluded) also began to claim their rights under the constitution. There has been some relaxation of caste distinction among young urban dwellers and those living abroad, but caste identity has remained strong—especially since groups such as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have a guaranteed percentage of representation in national and state legislatures.

Population density

Only a tiny fraction of India’s surface area is uninhabited. More than half of it is cultivated, with little left fallow in any given year. Most of the area classified as forest—roughly one-fifth of the total—is used for grazing, for gathering firewood and other forest products, for commercial forestry, and, in tribal areas, for shifting cultivation (often in defiance of the law) and hunting. The areas too dry for growing crops without irrigation are largely used for grazing. The higher elevations of the Himalayas are the only places with substantial continuous areas not in use by humans. Although India’s population is predominantly rural, the country has three of the largest urban areas in the world—Mumbai, Kolkata (Calcutta), and Delhi—and those and other large Indian cities have some of the world’s highest population densities.

Communal well, Hoshiarpur, Punjab, India.Shostal Associates

Most Indians reside in the areas of continuous cultivation, including the towns and cities they encompass. Within such areas, differences in population density are largely a function of water availability (whether directly from rainfall or from irrigation) and soil fertility. Areas receiving more than 60 inches (1,500 mm) of annual precipitation are generally capable of, for example, growing two crops per year, even without irrigation, and thus can support a high population density. More than three-fifths of the total population lives either on the fertile alluvial soils of the Indo-Gangetic Plain and the deltaic regions of the eastern coast or on the mixed alluvial and marine soils along India’s western coast. Within those agriculturally productive areas—for example, parts of the eastern Gangetic Plain and of the state of Kerala—densities exceed 2,000 persons per square mile (800 persons per square km).

Rural settlement

Much of India’s rural population lives in nucleated villages, which most commonly have a settlement form described as a shapeless agglomerate. Such settlements, though unplanned, are divided by caste into distinct wards and grow outward from a recognizable core area. The dominant and higher castes tend to live in the core area, while the lower artisan and service castes, as well as Muslim groups, generally occupy more peripheral localities. When the centrally located castes increase in population, they either subdivide their existing, often initially large, residential compounds, add second and even third stories on their existing houses (a common expedient in Punjab), leapfrog over lower-caste wards to a new area on the village periphery, or, in rare cases where land is available, found a completely new village.

Within the shapeless agglomerated villages, streets are typically narrow, twisting, and unpaved, often ending in culs-de-sac. There are usually a few open spaces where people gather: adjacent to a temple or mosque, at the main village well, in areas where grain is threshed or where grain and oilseeds are milled, and in front of the homes of the leading families of the village. In such spaces, depending on the size of the village, might be found the panchayat (village council) hall, a few shops, a tea stall, a public radio hooked up to a loudspeaker, a small post office, or perhaps a dharmshala (a free guest house for travelers). The village school is usually on the edge of the village in order to provide pupils with adequate playing space. Another common feature along the margin of a village is a grove of mango or other trees, which provides shade for people and animals and often contains a large well.

Madurai, Tamil Nadu, IndiaTime-lapse video of Madurai, a city in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, featuring the shrines and pillared halls of the Hindu Meenakshi Amman (Minakshi-Sundareshwara) Temple.Carl Finkbeiner/visualmondo.com (A Britannica Publishing Partner)See all videos for this article

There are many regional variants from the simple agglomerated-villages pattern. Hamlets, each containing only one or a few castes, commonly surround villages in the eastern Gangetic Plain; Scheduled Castes and herding castes are likely to occupy such hamlets. In southern India, especially Tamil Nadu, and in Gujarat, villages have a more planned layout, with streets running north-south and east-west in straight lines. In many tribal areas (or areas that were tribal until relatively recently) the typical village consists of rows of houses along a single street or perhaps two or three parallel streets. In areas of rugged terrain, where relatively level spaces for building are limited, settlements often conform in shape to ridge lines, and few grow to be larger than hamlets. Finally, in particularly aquatic environments, such as the Gangetic delta region and the tidal backwater region of Kerala, agglomerations of even hamlet size are rare; most rural families instead live singly or in clusters of only a few households on their individual plots of owned or rented land.

Most village houses are small, simple one-story mud (kacha) structures, housing both people and livestock in one or just a few rooms. Roofs typically are flat and made of mud in dry regions, but in areas with considerable precipitation they generally are sloped for drainage and made of rice straw, other thatching material, or clay tiles. The wetter the region, the greater the pitch of the roof. In some wet regions, especially in tribal areas, bamboo walls are more common than those of mud, and houses often stand on piles above ground level. The houses usually are windowless and contain a minimum of furniture, a storage space for food, water, and implements, a few shelves and pegs for other possessions, a niche in the wall to serve as the household altar, and often a few decorations, such as pictures of gods or film heroes, family photographs, a calendar, or perhaps some memento of a pilgrimage. In one corner of the house or in an exterior court is the earthen hearth on which all meals are cooked. Electricity, running water, and toilet facilities generally are absent. Relatively secluded spots on the edge of the village serve the latter need.

Almost everywhere in India, the dwellings of the more affluent households are larger and usually built of more durable (pakka) materials, such as brick or stone. Their roofs are also of sturdier construction, sometimes of corrugated iron, and often rest on sturdy timbers or even steel I beams. Windows, usually barred for security, are common. The number of rooms, the furnishings, and the interior and exterior decor, especially the entrance gate, generally reflect the wealth of the family. There is typically an interior compound where much of the harvest will be stored. Within the compound there may be a private well or even a hand pump, an area for bathing, and a walled latrine enclosure, which is periodically cleaned by the village sweeper. Animal stalls, granaries, and farm equipment are in spaces distinct from those occupied by people.

Nomadic groups may be found in most parts of India. Some are small bands of wandering entertainers, ironworkers, and animal traders who may congregate in communities called tandas. A group variously known as the Banjari or Vanjari (also called Labhani), originally from Rajasthan and related to the Roma (Gypsies) of Europe, roams over large areas of central India and the Deccan, largely as agricultural labourers and construction workers. Many tribal peoples practice similar occupations seasonally. Shepherds, largely of the Gujar caste, practice transhumance in the western Himalayas. In the semiarid and arid regions where agriculture is either impossible or precarious, herders of cattle, sheep, goats, and camels live in a symbiotic relationship with local or nearby cultivators.

Hyderabad, India: Labhani womenBanjari (Labhani) women in festive dress, near Hyderabad, Telangana, India.© John Isaac

Urban settlement

Although less than one-third of India’s people live in towns and cities, more than 6,100 places are classified as urban. In general, the proportion is higher in the agriculturally prosperous regions of the northwest, west, and south than in the northeastern rice-growing parts of the country, where the population capacity is limited by generally meagre crop surpluses.

India: Urban-ruralEncyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

In India large cities long have been growing at faster rates than small cities and towns. The major metropolitan agglomerations have the fastest rates of all, even where, as in Kolkata, there is a high degree of congestion within the central city. Major contributors to urban growth are the burgeoning of the bureaucracy, the increasing commercialization of the agricultural economy, and the spread of factory industry and services.

In many cities dating from the precolonial period, such as Delhi and Agra, the urban core is an exceedingly congested area within an old city wall, portions of which may still stand. In those “old cities,” residential segregation by religion and caste and the layout of streets and open places are, except for scale, not greatly dissimilar from what was described above for shapeless agglomerated villages. In contrast to many Western cities, affluent families commonly occupy houses in the heart of the most congested urban wards. Specialized bazaar streets selling sweets, grain, cloth, metalware, jewelry, books and stationery, and other commodities are characteristic of the old city. In such streets it is common for a single building to be at once a workshop, a retail outlet for what the workshop produces, and the residence for the artisan’s family and employees.

The Pearl Mosque (Moti Masjid) and the fort at Agra, Uttar Pradesh, India.Picturepoint, London

Moderately old, highly congested urban cores also characterize many cities that grew up in the wake of British occupation. Of those, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Chennai are the most notable examples. In such cases, however, there are usually a few broad major thoroughfares, some degree of regularity to the street pattern, space reserved for parks, and a central business district, including old government offices, high-rise commercial office buildings, banks, elite shopping establishments, restaurants, hotels, museums, a few churches, and other reminders of the former colonial presence.

Associated with a great many cities are special sections created originally for the needs of the British: largely residential areas known as civil lines, where the families of resident European administrators occupied spacious bungalows, with adjoining outbuildings for their servants, nearby shopping facilities, and a gymkhana (a combined sports and social club); cantonments, where military personnel of all ranks were quartered, together with adjacent parade grounds, polo fields, and firing ranges; and industrial zones, including not only the modern mills but also the adjacent “factory lines,” reminiscent of 19th-century company housing in Britain but even more squalid.

In the postindependence period, with the acceleration of urban growth and the consequent need for urban planning, new forms arose. The millions of refugees from Pakistan, for example, led to the establishment of many “model” (i.e., planned) towns on the edges of the existing cities. The subsequent steady influx of job seekers, together with the natural growth of the already settled population, gave rise to many planned residential areas, typically called “colonies,” usually consisting of four- or five-story apartment blocks, a small shopping centre, schools, and playgrounds and other recreational spaces. In general, commuting from colonies to jobs in the inner city is by either bus or bicycle.

For poorer immigrants, residence in those urban colonies was not an option. Some could afford to move into slum flats, often sharing space with earlier immigrants from their native villages. Others, however, had no recourse but to find shelter in bastis (shantytowns), clusters of anywhere from a few to many hundreds of makeshift dwellings, which are commonly found along the edges of railroad yards and parks, outside the walls of factories, along the banks of rivers, and wherever else the urban authorities might tolerate their presence. Finally, there are the street dwellers, mainly single men in search of temporary employment, who lack even the meagre shelter that the bastis afford.

A special type of urban place to which British rule gave rise were the hill stations, such as Shimla (Simla) and Darjiling (Darjeeling). Those were erected at elevations high enough to provide cool retreats for the dependents of Europeans stationed in India and, in the summer months, to serve as seasonal capitals of the central or provincial governments. Hotels, guest houses, boarding schools, clubs, and other recreational facilities characterize those settlements. Since independence, affluent Indians have come to depend on the hill stations no less than did the British.

Demographic trends

India’s population is young. Its birth and death rates are both near the global average. More than half the population is under age 30 and less than one-fourth is age 45 or older. Life expectancy is about 68 for men and 70 for women.

India: Age breakdownEncyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

A population explosion in India commenced following the great influenza epidemic of 1918–19. In subsequent decades there was a steadily accelerating rate of growth up to the census of 1961, after which the rate leveled off (though it remained high). The total population in 1921 within the present borders of India (i.e., excluding what is now Pakistan and Bangladesh) was 251 million, and in 1947, at the time of independence, it was about 340 million. India’s population doubled between 1947 and the 1981 census, and by the 2001 census it had surpassed one billion. The increase between 1991 and 2001 alone—more than 182 million—was greater than the total present-day population of all but the world’s most-populous countries, and that value was matched by the increase between 2001 and 2011. Although there has been a considerable drop in the birth rate, a much more rapid decline in the death rate has accounted for the rise in the country’s rate of population growth. Moreover, the increasing proportion of females attaining and living through their childbearing years continues to inhibit a marked reduction in the birth rate.

The effect of emigration from or immigration to India on the overall growth of population has been negligible throughout modern history. Within India, however, migration from relatively impoverished regions to areas, especially cities, offering some promise of economic betterment has been largely responsible for the differential growth rates from one state or region to another. In general, the larger a city, the greater its proportion of migrants to the total population and the more cosmopolitan its population mix. In Mumbai, for example, more than half of the population speaks languages other than Marathi, the principal language of the state of Maharashtra. The rates of migration to Indian cities severely tax their capacity to cope with the newcomers’ needs for housing, safe drinking water, and sanitary facilities, not to mention amenities. The result is that many migrants live in conditions of appalling squalor in bastis or, even worse, with no permanent shelter at all.

India: crowdCrowd of pilgrims in India.© TheFinalMiracle/Fotolia

Refugees constitute another class of migrants. Some date from the 1947 partition of India and many others, especially in Assam and West Bengal, from the violent separation in 1971 of Bangladesh from Pakistan. Still others are internal refugees from the communal violence and other forms of ethnic strife that periodically beset many parts of India.

Economy

rupee; India: economyHow a currency swap in India in 2016 disrupted an economy it was meant to help modernize.© CCTV America (A Britannica Publishing Partner)See all videos for this article

India has one of the largest, most highly diversified economies in the world, but, because of its enormous population, it is—in terms of income and gross national product (GNP) per capita—one of the poorest countries on Earth. Since independence, India has promoted a mixed economic system in which the government, constitutionally defined as “socialist,” plays a major role as central planner, regulator, investor, manager, and producer. Starting in 1951, the government based its economic planning on a series of five-year plans influenced by the Soviet model. Initially, the attempt was to boost the domestic savings rate, which more than doubled in the half century following the First Five-Year Plan (1951–55). With the Second Five-Year Plan (1956–61), the focus began to shift to import-substituting industrialization, with an emphasis on capital goods. A broad and diversified industrial base developed. However, with the collapse of the Soviet system in the early 1990s, India adopted a series of free-market reforms that fueled the growth of its middle class, and its highly educated and well-trained workforce made India one of the global centres of the high-technology boom that began in the late 20th century and produced significant annual growth rates. The agricultural sector remains the country’s main employer (about half of the workforce), though, with about one-fifth of the gross domestic product (GDP), it is no longer the largest contributor to GDP. Manufacturing remains another solid component of GDP. However, the major growth has been in trade, finance, and other services, which, collectively, are by far the largest component of GDP.

Many of the government’s decisions are highly political, especially its attempts to invest equitably among the various states of the union. Despite the government’s pervasive economic role, large corporate undertakings dominate many spheres of modern economic activity, while tens of millions of generally small agricultural holdings and petty commercial, service, and craft enterprises account for the great bulk of employment. The range of technology runs the gamut from the most traditional to the most sophisticated.

There are few things that India cannot produce, though much of what it does manufacture would not be economically competitive without the protection offered by tariffs on imported goods, which have remained high despite liberalization. In absolute terms and in relation to GDP, foreign trade traditionally has been low. Despite continued government regulation (which has remained strong in many sectors), trade expanded greatly beginning in the 1990s.

Probably no more than one-fifth of India’s vast labour force is employed in the so-called “organized” sector of the economy (e.g., mining, plantation agriculture, factory industry, utilities, and modern transportation, commercial, and service enterprises), but that small fraction generates a disproportionate share of GDP, supports most of the middle- and upper-class population, and generates most of the economic growth. It is the organized sector to which most government regulatory activity applies and in which trade unions, chambers of commerce, professional associations, and other institutions of modern capitalist economies play a significant role. Apart from rank-and-file labourers, the organized sector engages most of India’s professionals and virtually all of its vast pool of scientists and technicians.

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing

Agriculture

Roughly half of all Indians still derive their livelihood directly from agriculture. That proportion only relatively recently has been declining from levels that were fairly consistent throughout the 20th century. The area cultivated, however, has risen steadily and has come to encompass considerably more than half of the country’s total area, a proportion matched by few other countries in the world. In the more fertile regions, such as the Indo-Gangetic Plain or the deltas of the eastern coast, the proportion of cultivated to total land often exceeds nine-tenths.

Milling sugarcane in a small village near Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh, India.© Robert Frerck/Odyssey Productions

Water availability varies greatly with climate. In all but a small part of the country, the supply of water for agriculture is highly seasonal and depends on the often fickle southwest monsoon. As a result, farmers are able to raise only one crop per year in areas that lack irrigation, and the risk of crop failure is fairly high in many locales. The prospects and actual development of irrigation also vary greatly from one part of the country to another. They are particularly favourable on the Indo-Gangetic Plain, in part because of the relatively even flow of the rivers issuing from the Himalayas and in part because of the vast reserves of groundwater in the thousands of feet of alluvial deposits underlying the region. In peninsular India, however, surface-water availability relies on the region’s highly seasonal rainfall regime, and, in many areas, hard rock formations make it difficult to sink wells and severely curtail access to the groundwater that is present.

For such a predominantly agricultural country as India, resources of cultivable soil and water are of crucial importance. Although India does possess extensive areas of fertile alluvial soils, especially on the Indo-Gangetic Plain, and other substantial areas of relatively productive soils, such as the black (regur) soils of the Deccan lava plateau, the red-to-yellow lateritic soils that predominate over most of the remainder of the country are low in fertility. Overall, the per capita availability of cultivable area is low, and less than half of the cultivable land is of high quality. Moreover, many areas have lost much of their fertility because of erosion, alkalinization (caused by excessive irrigation without proper drainage), the subsurface formation of impenetrable hardpans, and protracted cultivation without restoring depleted plant nutrients.

Although the average farm size is only about 5 acres (2 hectares) and is declining, that figure masks the markedly skewed distribution of landholdings. More than half of all farms are less than 3 acres (1.2 hectares) in size, while much of the remainder is controlled by a small number of relatively affluent peasants and landlords. Most cultivators own farms that provide little more than a bare subsistence for their families; given fluctuations in the agricultural market and the fickle nature of the annual monsoon, the farm failure rate often has been quite high, particularly among smallholders. Further, nearly one-third of all agricultural households own no land at all and, along with many submarginal landowners, must work for the larger landholders or must supplement their earnings from some subsidiary occupation, often the one traditionally associated with their caste.

Karnataka, India: farmersFarmers plowing a field near Mysuru (Mysore), southern Karnataka, India.Christina Gascoigne/Robert Harding Picture Library

Agricultural technology has undergone rapid change in India. Government-sponsored large-scale irrigation canal projects, begun by the British in the mid-19th century, were greatly extended after independence. Emphasis then shifted toward deep wells (called tube wells in India), often privately owned, from which water was raised either by electric or diesel pumps; however, in many places these wells have depleted local groundwater reserves, and efforts have been directed at replenishing aquifers and utilizing rainwater. Tank irrigation, a method by which water is drawn from small reservoirs created along the courses of minor streams, is important in several parts of India, especially the southeast.

The demand for chemical fertilizers also has been steadily increasing, although since the late 1960s the introduction of new, high-yielding hybrid varieties of seeds (HYVs), mainly for wheat and secondarily for rice, has brought about the most dramatic increases in production, especially in Punjab (where their adoption is virtually universal), Haryana, western Uttar Pradesh, and Gujarat. So great has been the success of the so-called Green Revolution that India was able to build up buffer stocks of grain sufficient for the country to weather several years of disastrously bad monsoons with virtually no imports or starvation and even to become, in some years, a modest net food exporter. During the same period, the production of coarse grains and pulses, which were less in demand than rice and wheat, either did not increase significantly or decreased. Hence, the total per capita grain production has been notably less than that suggested by many protagonists of the Green Revolution, and the threat of major food scarcity has not been eliminated.

Farmers returning from their fields near Yamunanagar, Haryana, India.© Robert Frerck/Odyssey Productions

Crops

Most Indian farms grow little besides food crops, especially cereal grains, and these account for more than three-fifths of the area under cultivation. Foremost among the grains, in terms of both area sown and total yield, is rice, the crop of choice in almost all areas with more than 40 inches (1,000 mm) of average annual precipitation, as well as in some irrigated areas. Wheat ranks second in both area sown and total yield and, because of the use of HYVs, leads all grains in yield per acre. Wheat is grown mainly on the fertile soils of northern and northwestern India in areas with 15 to 40 inches (380 to 1,000 mm) of average annual precipitation, often with supplementary irrigation. Unlike rice, which is mainly grown during the kharif (summer) season, wheat is primarily a rabi (cool-season) crop. Other important cereals, in descending order of sown acreage, are sorghum (called jowar in India), pearl millet (bajra), corn (maize), and finger millet (ragi). All these typically are grown on relatively infertile soils unsuitable for rice or wheat, while corn cultivation is also favoured in hilly and mountainous regions. After cereals, pulses are the most important category of food crop. These ubiquitous leguminous crops—of which the chickpea (gram) is the most important—are the main source of protein for most Indians, for whom the consumption of animal products is an expensive luxury or is proscribed on religious grounds.

Millet field near Satara, Maharashtra, India.B. Bhansali/Shostal Associates

Nonstaple food crops, eaten in only small amounts by most Indians, include potatoes, onions, various greens, eggplants, okra, squashes, and other vegetables, as well as such fruits as mangoes, bananas, mandarin oranges, papayas, and melons. Sugarcane is widely cultivated, especially in areas near processing mills. Sugar is also obtained by tapping the trunks of toddy palms (Caryota urens), which are abundant in southern India, but much of this syrup is fermented, often illegally, to make an alcoholic beverage. A wide variety of crops—mainly peanuts (groundnuts), coconuts, mustard, cottonseed, and rapeseed—are grown as sources of cooking oil. Others, such as the ubiquitous chilies, turmeric, and ginger, are raised to provide condiments or, in the case of betel leaf (of the pan plant) and betel (areca nut), digestives. Tea is grown, largely for export, on plantations in Assam, West Bengal, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, while coffee is grown almost exclusively in southern India, mainly in Karnataka. Tobacco is cultivated chiefly in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh.

Workers picking tea leaves near Darjiling, West Bengal, India.Gerald Cubitt

Spices and pulses for sale at an Indian market.© JeremyRichards/Fotolia

Foremost among the commercial industrial crops is cotton. Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Punjab are the principal cotton-growing states. Jute, mainly from West Bengal, Assam, and Bihar, is the second leading natural fibre. Much of it is exported in processed form, largely as burlap. An even coarser fibre is derived from coir, the outer husk of the coconut, the processing of which forms the basis for an important cottage industry in Kerala. Coconuts and oilseeds are also important for the extraction of industrial oils.

Livestock

Despite the fact that Indians eat little meat, livestock raising plays an important role in the agricultural economy. India has by far the largest bovine population of any country in the world. Cattle and buffalo are used mainly as draft animals but also serve many other purposes—to provide milk, as sources of meat (for those, including Muslims, Christians, and Scheduled Castes, for whom beef eating is not taboo), and as sources of fertilizer, cooking fuel (from dried cow-dung cakes), and leather. Milk yields from Indian cattle and buffaloes are quite low, although milk from buffaloes is somewhat better and richer on average than from cattle. Because cow slaughter is illegal in many states, scarcely any cattle are raised expressly for providing meat, and most of what little beef is consumed comes from animals that die from natural causes. Rather than being slaughtered, cattle that outlive their usefulness may be sent to goshalas (homes for aged cattle maintained by contributions from devout Hindus) or allowed to roam as strays. In either case, they compete with humans for scarce vegetal resources.

While many orthodox Indians are vegetarians, others will eat goat, mutton, poultry, eggs, and fish, all of which are produced in modest quantities. Sheep are raised for both wool and meat. Pork is taboo to members of several faiths, including Muslims and most Hindus, but pigs, which serve as village scavengers, are raised and freely eaten by several Scheduled Castes.

Forestry

Commercial forestry is not highly developed in India. Nevertheless, the annual cutting of hardwoods is among the highest of any country in the world. Species that are sources of timber, pulp, plywoods, veneers, and matchwood include teak, deodar (a type of cedar), sal (Shorea robusta), sissoo (Dalbergia sissoo), and chir pine (Pinus roxburghii). Virtually any woody vegetation is used for firewood, much of it illegally gathered, and substantial amounts go into making charcoal. Minor forest products include bamboo, cane, gum, resins, dyes, tanning agents, lac, and medicinal plants.

The principal areas for commercial forestry, in order of importance, are the Western Ghats, the western Himalayas, and the hill regions of central India. In an effort to counteract forest depletion, the central and state governments have vigorously supported small-scale afforestation projects; these have met with mixed success, both economically and ecologically.

Population growth has, over the centuries, resulted in a continuous diminution of forest land. Most of India’s formerly forested area has been converted to agricultural use (though some of that land is no longer productive), and other large areas have been effectively turned into wasteland from either overgrazing or overexploitation for timber and firewood. The problem of obtaining sufficient firewood, mainly for cooking, is particularly acute. In many areas forests have ceased to exist, and the only trees of consequence are found in protected village groves, often planted with mangoes or other fruit trees, where people and animals can seek shade from the fierce summer sun. In some areas, especially the northeast, bamboo thickets provide an important substitute for wood for structural purposes. Official figures on the amount of forested land (roughly one-fifth of India’s total area) are virtually meaningless, as much of the area officially classified as forest contains little but scrub. Among the ecological consequences of deforestation in India are the reduced groundwater retentiveness, a concomitant rapid runoff of monsoon rains, a higher incidence of flooding, accelerated erosion and siltation, and an exacerbated problem of water scarcity.

Fishing

Fishing is practiced along the entire length of India’s coastline and on virtually all of its many rivers. Production from marine and freshwater fisheries has become roughly equivalent. Because few fishing craft are mechanized, total catches are low, and annual per capita fish consumption is modest. The shift to mechanization and modern processing, however, has been inexorable. Thus, an increasingly large part of the catch now comes from fishing grounds that the small craft of coastal fishing families are unable to reach. The problem is most severe in Kerala, the leading fishing state. Major marine catches include sardine and mackerel; freshwater catches are dominated by carp. Intensive inland aquaculture, for both fish and shrimp (the latter of which has become an important export), has increased significantly.

Fishing boats in the harbour at Panaji, Goa.Gerald Cubitt

Resources and power

Although India possesses a wide range of minerals and other natural resources, its per capita endowment of such critical resources as cultivable land, water, timber, and known petroleum reserves is relatively low. Nevertheless, the diversity of resources, especially of minerals, exceeds that of all but a few countries and gives India a distinct advantage in its industrial development.

Domestically supplied minerals form an important underpinning for India’s diversified manufacturing industry, as well as a source of modest export revenues. Nationalizing many foreign and domestic enterprises and government initiation and management of others gave the Indian government a predominant role in the mining industry. However, government involvement has been gradually reduced as private investment has grown.

Among mineral resources, iron ore (generally of high quality) and ferroalloys—notably manganese and chromite—are particularly abundant, and all are widely distributed over peninsular India. Other exploitable metallic minerals include copper, bauxite (the principal ore of aluminum), zinc, lead, gold, and silver. Among important nonmetallic and nonfuel minerals are limestone, dolomite, rock phosphate, building stones, ceramic clays, mica, gypsum, fluorspar, magnesite, graphite, and diamonds.

Of the many metals produced, iron—mined principally in Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Goa, Karnataka, and Orissa—ranks first in value. Copper, derived mainly from Rajasthan and Bihar, is a distant second. Gold, zinc and lead (often mined together), the ferroalloys (chiefly manganese and chromite), and bauxite also are important. Noteworthy nonmetallic minerals include limestone, dolomite, rock phosphate, gypsum, building stone, and ceramic clays.

In terms of the value of production, fuel minerals far exceed all others combined. Among the fuels, petroleum ranks first in value, followed by coal (including lignite). India produces only a portion of its petroleum needs but produces a slight exportable surplus of coal. Virtually all of India’s petroleum comes from the offshore Bombay High Field and from Gujarat and Assam, while coal comes from some 500 mines, both surface and deep-pit, distributed over a number of states. By far the most important coal-producing region is along the Damodar River, including the Jharia and Raniganj fields in Bihar and West Bengal, which account for about half the nation’s output and virtually all the coal of coking quality. Natural gas is of little importance. Uranium is produced in modest quantities in Bihar.

Among the fossil fuels, India is well endowed with coal and modestly so with lignite. Coal supplies are widespread but are especially abundant and easy to mine in the Chota Nagpur Plateau, which is the principal source area for coking coal. Domestic reserves of petroleum and natural gas, though abundant, do not meet the country’s large demand. Petroleum fields are located in eastern Assam (India’s oldest production region) and in Gujarat and offshore in the Arabian Sea on an undersea structure known as the Bombay High. Several other onshore and offshore petroleum reserves have been discovered, including sites in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Arunachal Pradesh.

The country’s utilities, overwhelmingly in government hands, are barely able to keep pace with the rapidly rising demand for various types of service. Electricity consumption, for example, increased 16-fold between 1951 and 1980 and more than quadrupled again in the next quarter century. The bulk of all electricity generated is from widely dispersed coal-powered thermal plants; most of the remainder is from hydroelectric plants, built mainly in mountainous regions or along major escarpments; and only a tiny amount comes from a few nuclear installations. Power outages and rationing are frequently necessary in periods of peak demand, since growing demand often outstrips installed capacity in many locales. More than half of all electricity is industrially used. Agricultural use, largely for raising irrigation water from deep wells, exceeds domestic consumption. Rural electrification is increasing rapidly, and the great bulk of all villages are now tied into some distribution grid.

India: Breakdown of renewable energy by sourceEncyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Manufacturing

India’s manufacturing industry is highly diversified. A substantial majority of all industrial workers are employed in the millions of small-scale handicraft enterprises. These mainly household industries—such as spinning, weaving, pottery making, metalworking, and woodworking—largely serve the local needs of the villages where they are situated.

Steel foundry at the Tata truck works, Jamshedpur, Jharkhand, India.© Robert Frerck/Odyssey Productions

In terms of total output and value added, however, mechanized factory production predominates. Many factories, especially those manufacturing producers’ goods (e.g., basic metals, machinery, fertilizers, and other heavy chemicals), are publicly owned and operated by either the central or the state governments. There also are thousands of private producers, including a number of large and diversified industrial conglomerates. The steel industry, for example, is one in which a privately owned corporation, the Tata Iron and Steel Company (Tata Steel), at Jamshedpur (production began in 1911), is among the largest and most successful producers. In the Middle East, East Africa, and Southeast Asia, some Indian corporations have established “turnkey operations,” which are turned over to local management after a stipulated period. Foreign corporations, however, have been slow to invest in Indian industry because of excessive regulation (subsequently relaxed) and rules limiting foreign ownership of controlling shares.

The long-established textile industries—especially cotton but also jute, wool, silk, and synthetic fibres—account for the greatest share of manufacturing employment. Few large cities are without at least one cotton mill. Jute milling, unlike cotton, is highly concentrated in “Hugliside,” the string of cities along the Hugli (Hooghly) River just north of Kolkata. Even more widespread than textile mills are initial processing plants for agricultural and mining products. In general, these are fairly small, seasonal enterprises located close to places of primary production. They include plants for cotton ginning, oil pressing, peanut shelling, sugar refining, drying and cold storage of foodstuffs, and crushing and initial smelting of ores. Consumer goods industries, though widely dispersed, are largely concentrated in large cities. To spread the benefits of development regionally and to alleviate metropolitan congestion, state governments have sponsored numerous industrial parks (or estates), for which entrepreneurs are offered various concessions, including cheap land and reduced taxes. Such programs have been fairly successful.

Among the heavy industries, metallurgical plants, such as iron and steel mills, typically are located close either to raw materials or to coal, depending on the relative mix of materials needed and transportation costs. India is fortunate in having several sites, especially in the Chota Nagpur Plateau, where abundant coal supplies are in close proximity to high-grade iron ore. Within easy reach of the Kolkata market, the Chota Nagpur Plateau has become India’s principal area for heavy industry, including many interconnected chemical and engineering enterprises. Production of heavy transportation equipment, such as locomotives and trucks, is also concentrated there.

Finance

India’s government-regulated and largely government-owned banking system is well developed. Its principal institution is the Reserve Bank of India (founded 1935), which regulates the circulation of banknotes, manages the country’s reserves of foreign exchange, and operates the currency and credit system. With the nationalization of the country’s 14 largest commercial banks in 1969 and further nationalizations in 1980, most commercial banking passed into the public sector. In 1975 the government instituted a system of regional rural banks, the principal purpose of which was to meet the credit needs of small farmers and tenants. This has gone a long way toward lessening the strength of rapacious village moneylenders, whose rates of interest were typically so exorbitant that their borrowers were left interminably in their debt. Other banks have been established by the central government to provide credits promoting various types of industry and foreign trade. Many foreign banks maintain branch offices in India, and Indian banks maintain offices in numerous foreign countries.

Stock exchanges do not play the prominent role in India that they do in more affluent capitalist societies. Nevertheless, they do exist in most of the largest Indian cities and facilitate the flow of capital in the form of securities under rules set down by the Ministry of Finance.

Trade

The volume of India’s foreign trade, given the diversity of its economic base, is low. There is, moreover, a chronic and large foreign trade deficit, which is aggravated by substantial imports of smuggled goods, mostly luxuries.

Among the wide range of exports, no single type of commodity occupies a dominant position. In terms of value, gems and jewelry (particularly for the Middle Eastern market) long held the leading position, followed by ready-made garments (reflecting India’s large pool of cheap labour) and leather and leather products (owing to both cheap labour and the country’s large number of cattle). However, since the turn of the 21st century, engineering products have become the leading export, and chemicals and chemical products and food and agricultural products have slipped in behind gems and jewelry. Imports are highly diverse and include petroleum and petroleum products, precious metals, and chemicals and chemical products.

India’s trade links are worldwide. The United States and the former Soviet Union were long the principal destinations for India’s exports (often, in the latter case, under barter arrangements). The United States remains a major destination for Indian goods, and China (including Hong Kong) and the United Arab Emirates also are important. The main import sources are China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States.

India: Major export destinationsEncyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Services

Like most countries with a socialist tradition, India has an extensive bureaucracy, but it is also one that has contributed significantly to social and economic growth. The country’s economic growth, for instance, has been greatly facilitated by its considerable engineering expertise. Most large-scale building activities—such as the construction of railroads, national and state highways, harbours, hydroelectric and irrigation projects, and government-owned factories and hotels—have been built by government-managed construction agencies, the largest of which is the Central Department of Public Works.

Beginning in the 1990s, the private sector contributed greatly to the growth of services with the establishment of a robust computer software and services industry, located largely in the urban areas of Bengaluru (Bangalore) and Hyderabad. With a large number of English speakers, India also emerged as a low-cost alternative for U.S. telecommunications companies and other enterprises to establish telephone call centres. India has remained a prime destination for tourists from both Europe and the Americas, and tourism has been a major source of foreign exchange.

Labour and taxation

Much of the organized sector is unionized, and strikes are frequent and often protracted. Many of the unions are affiliated with one of a number of government-recognized and regulated all-India “central” trade union organizations, several of which have membership in the millions. The more important of these are affiliated with national political parties.

Taxes are levied in India at the federal, state, and local levels. At the national level, the Union government collects income tax, customs duties, and tariffs and assesses value-added taxes such as sales tax. The states raise much of their revenue through the collection of stamp taxes (for the issuance of various licenses) and through the collection of agricultural tax. Local governments collect income in the form of property taxes and fees for services.

Transportation and telecommunications

At independence, India had a transportation system superior to that of any other large postcolonial region. In the decades that followed, it built steadily on that base, and railroads in particular formed the sinews that initially bound the new nation together. Although railroads have continued to carry the bulk of goods traffic, there has been a steady increase in the relative dependence on roads and motorized transport, and all modes of transport—from human porters and animal traction (India still has millions of bullock carts) to the most modern aircraft—find niches in which they are the preferred and sometimes the sole means for moving people and goods.

Railways and roads

With some 39,000 miles (62,800 km) of track length, India’s rail system, entirely government-owned, is one of the most extensive in the world, while in terms of the distance traveled each year by passengers it is the world’s most heavily used system. India’s mountain railways were collectively designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 2008. Railway administration is handled through nine regional subsystems. Routes are mainly broad-gauge (5.5 feet [1.68 metres]) single-track lines, and the remaining metre and narrow-gauge routes are being converted to the broad-gauge standard. There has also been conversion to double-track lines, as well as a shift from steam locomotives to diesel-electric or electric power. Electrified lines have become especially important for urban commuter traffic, and in 1989 South Asia’s first subway line began operation in Kolkata. Delhi followed with a new system in the early 21st century.

Although relatively few new rail routes have been built since independence, the length and capacity of the road system and the volume of road traffic by truck, bus, and automobile have all undergone phenomenal expansion. The length of hard-surfaced roads, for example, has increased from only 66,000 to some 950,000 miles (106,000 to 1,530,000 km) since 1947, but this still represented less than half of the national total of all roads. During the same period, the increased volume of road traffic for both passengers and goods was even more dramatic, increasing exponentially. A relatively small number of villages (almost entirely in tribal regions) are still situated more than a few hours’ walk from the nearest bus transport. Bus service is largely owned and controlled by state governments, which also build and maintain most hard-surfaced routes. The grid of national highways connects virtually all Indian cities.

Water and air transport

A small number of major ports, led by Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai, are centrally managed by the Indian government, while a much larger number of intermediate and minor ports are state-managed. The former handle the great bulk of the country’s maritime traffic. Of the country’s shipping companies engaged in either overseas or coastal trade, the largest is the publicly owned Shipping Corporation of India. Only about one-third of India’s more than 3,100 miles (5,000 km) of navigable inland waterways, including both rivers and a few short stretches of canals, are commercially used, and those no longer carry a significant volume of traffic.

Civil aviation, once entirely in private hands, was nationalized in 1953 into two government-owned companies: Air India, for major international routes from airports at New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai; and Indian Airlines, for routes within India and neighbouring countries. The government has tightly restricted access to Indian air routes for foreign carriers, and several small domestic airlines have attempted to service short-haul, low-capacity routes. The networks and volume of traffic are expanding rapidly, and all large and most medium-size cities now have regular air service.

Delhi: Indira Gandhi International AirportIndira Gandhi International Airport, Delhi.Krokodyl (CC-BY-3.0) (A Britannica Publishing Partner)

Telecommunications

The telecommunications sector has traditionally been dominated by the state; even after the liberalization of the 1990s, the government—through several state-owned or operated companies and the Department of Telecommunications—has continued to control the industry. Although telephone service is quite dense in some urban areas, throughout the country as a whole there are relatively few main lines per capita. Many rural towns and villages have no telephone service. Cellular telephone service is available in major urban centres through a number of private vendors. The state dominates television and radio broadcasting through the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The number of personal computers—though large in raw numbers—is relatively small given the country’s population. Although many individuals have Internet service subscriptions, cybercafes located in most major urban areas provide access for a great proportion of users.

Government And Society

Constitutional framework

The architects of India’s constitution, though drawing on many external sources, were most heavily influenced by the British model of parliamentary democracy. In addition, a number of principles were adopted from the Constitution of the United States of America, including the separation of powers among the major branches of government, the establishment of a supreme court, and the adoption, albeit in modified form, of a federal structure (a constitutional division of power between the union [central] and state governments). The mechanical details for running the central government, however, were largely carried over from the Government of India Act of 1935, passed by the British Parliament, which served as India’s constitution in the waning days of British colonial rule.

The new constitution promulgated on January 26, 1950, proclaimed India “a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic.” With 395 articles, 10 (later 12) schedules (each clarifying and expanding upon a number of articles), and more than 90 amendments, it is one of the longest and most detailed constitutions in the world. The constitution includes a detailed list of “fundamental rights,” a lengthy list of “directive principles of state policy” (goals that the state is obligated to promote, though with no specified timetable for their accomplishment [an idea taken from the Irish constitution]), and a much shorter list of “fundamental duties” of the citizen.

The remainder of the constitution outlines in great detail the structure, powers, and manner of operation of the union (central) and state governments. It also includes provisions for protecting the rights and promoting the interests of certain classes of citizens (e.g., disadvantaged social groups, officially designated as “Scheduled Castes” and “Scheduled Tribes”) and the process for constitutional amendment. The extraordinary specificity of India’s constitution is such that amendments, which average nearly two per year, have frequently been required to deal with issues that in other countries would be handled by routine legislation. With a few exceptions, the passage of an amendment requires only a simple majority of both houses of parliament, but this majority must form two-thirds of those present and voting.

Constitutional structure

The three lists contained in the constitution’s seventh schedule detail the areas in which the union and state governments may legislate. The union list outlines the areas in which the union government has exclusive authority, which include foreign policy, defense, communications, currency, taxation on corporations and nonagricultural income, and railroads. State governments have the sole power to legislate on such subjects as law and order, public health and sanitation, local government, betting and gambling, and taxation on agricultural income, entertainment, and alcoholic beverages. The items on the concurrent list include those on which both the union government and state governments may legislate, though a union law generally takes precedence; among these areas are criminal law, marriage and divorce, contracts, economic and social planning, population control and family planning, trade unions, social security, and education. Matters requiring legislation that are not specifically covered in the listed powers lie within the exclusive domain of the central government.

An exceedingly important power of the union government is that of creating new states, combining states, changing state boundaries, and terminating a state’s existence. The union government may also create and dissolve any of the union territories, whose powers are more limited than those of the states. Although the states exercise either sole or joint control over a substantial range of issues, the constitution establishes a more dominant role for the union government.

Union government

The three branches of the union government are charged with different responsibilities, but the constitution also provides a fair degree of interdependence. The executive branch consists of the president, vice president, and a Council of Ministers, led by the prime minister. Within the legislative branch are the two houses of parliament—the lower house, or Lok Sabha (House of the People), and the upper house, or Rajya Sabha (Council of States). The president of India is also considered part of parliament. At the apex of the judicial branch is the Supreme Court, whose decisions are binding on the higher and lower courts of the state governments.

Executive branch

India’s head of state is the president who is elected to a five-year renewable term by an electoral college consisting of the elected members of both houses of parliament and the elected members of the legislative assemblies of all the states. The vice president, chosen by an electoral college made up of only the two houses of parliament, presides over the Rajya Sabha. If the president dies or otherwise leaves office, the vice president assumes the position until an election can be held.

 The Presidential House (Rashtrapati Bhavan), formerly the Viceroy's House, New Delhi, India, designed by Sir Edwin Lutyens, constructed 1913–30.Lutyens Trust Photographic Archive; photograph, Andrew W. Barnett

The powers of the president are largely nominal and ceremonial, except in times of emergency, and the president normally acts on the advice of the prime minister. The proper limits of the president’s power are sometimes a matter for debate. The president may, however, proclaim a national state of emergency when there is perceived to be a grave threat to the country’s security or impose direct presidential rule at the state level when it is thought that a particular state legislative assembly has become incapable of functioning effectively. The president may also dissolve the Lok Sabha and call for new parliamentary elections after a prime minister loses a vote of confidence.

Effective executive power rests with the Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister, who is chosen by the majority party or coalition in the Lok Sabha and is formally appointed by the president. The Council of Ministers, also formally appointed by the president, is selected by the prime minister. The most important group within the council is the cabinet. Cabinet portfolios are assigned partly on the basis of interest and competence but also on the basis of demonstrated loyalty to the ruling party or party leader and on the implicit need to represent the country’s major regions and population groups (e.g., based on religion, language, caste, and gender). The prime minister and the Council of Ministers remain in power throughout the term of the Lok Sabha, unless they lose a vote of confidence.

Legislative branch

Of the two houses of parliament, the more powerful is the Lok Sabha, in which the prime minister leads the ruling party or coalition. The constitution limits the number of elected members of the Lok Sabha to 530 from the states and 20 from the union territories, allotted roughly in proportion to their population. The president may also nominate two members of the Anglo-Indian community if it appears that this community is not being adequately represented. Members of the Lok Sabha serve for terms of five years, unless the house is dissolved before that.

Membership in the Rajya Sabha is not to exceed 250. Of these members, 12 are nominated by the president to represent literature, science, art, and social service, and the balance are proportionally elected by the state legislative assemblies. The Rajya Sabha is not subject to dissolution, but one-third of its members retire at the end of every second year. Legislative bills may originate in either house—except for financial bills, which may originate only in the Lok Sabha—and require passage by simple majorities in both houses in order to become law.

Bureaucracy

The day-to-day functioning of the government is performed by permanent ministries and other public service agencies. These are led by members of the Indian Administrative Service and other specialized services, who are chosen by competitive examination. Rules of recruitment and retirement and conditions of service are determined by the Union Public Service Commission (or, for state governments, by state public service commissions). There has been a steady proliferation of agencies and growth in the size of the bureaucracy since independence, with a concomitant increase in regulations, which often impede—rather than facilitate—administration.

Foreign policy

India’s foreign policy has been officially one of nonalignment with any of the world’s major power blocs. The country was a founding member of the Nonaligned Movement during the Cold War. India has also been a major player among the group of more than 100 low-income countries, loosely described as the “Global South,” that have sought to deal collectively in economic matters with the industrialized states of the “Global North.”

India has maintained its membership in the Commonwealth (formerly the British Commonwealth of Nations), and in 1950 it became the first Commonwealth country to change from a dominion to a republic. It was a charter member, even though not yet independent, of the United Nations (as it was of the earlier League of Nations) and has played an active role in virtually all the organs within the United Nations system. In 1985 India joined six neighbouring countries in launching the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

State and local governments

The government structure of the states, defined by the constitution, closely resembles that of the union. The executive branch is composed of a governor—like the president, a mostly nominal and ceremonial post—and a council of ministers, led by the chief minister.

 The Palace of Assembly in Chandigarh, India, designed by Le Corbusier.Frederick M. Asher

All states have a Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Assembly), popularly elected for terms of up to five years, while a small (and declining) number of states also have an upper house, the Vidhan Parishad (Legislative Council), roughly comparable to the Rajya Sabha, with memberships that may not be more than one-third the size of the assemblies. In these councils, one-sixth of the members are nominated by the governor, and the remainder are elected by various categories of specially qualified voters. State governors are also regarded as members of the legislative assemblies, which they may suspend or dissolve when no party is able to muster a working majority.

 Bengaluru, India: Vidhana SoudhaParkland between the High Court building (Attara Kacheri) and the legislative building Vidhana Soudha (centre background), Bengaluru (Bangalore), Karnataka, India.© Ajay Bhaskar/Shutterstock.com

Each Indian state is organized into a number of districts, which are divided for certain administrative purposes into units variously known as tahsils, taluqs, or subdivisions. These are further divided into community development blocks, each typically consisting of about 100 villages. Superimposed on these units is a three-tiered system of local government. At the lowest level, each village elects its own governing council (gram pancayat). The chairman of a gram pancayat is also the village representative on the council of the community development block (pancayat samiti). Each pancayat samiti, in turn, selects a representative to the district-level council (zila parishad). Separate from this system are the municipalities, which generally are governed by their own elected councils.

From the state down to the village, government appointees administer the various government departments and agencies. Financial grants from higher levels, often made on a matching basis, provide developmental incentives and facilitate the execution of desired projects. Approving, withholding, or manipulating grants, however, often serves as a lever for the accumulation of personal power and as a vehicle of corruption.

Justice

The tradition of an independent judiciary has taken strong root in India. The Supreme Court, whose presidentially appointed judges may serve until the age of 65, determines the constitutional validity of union government legislation, adjudicates disputes between the union and the states (as well as disputes between two or more states), and handles appeals from lower-level courts. Each state has a high court and a number of lower courts. The high courts may rule on the constitutionality of state laws, issue a variety of writs, and serve as courts of appeal from the lower courts, over which they exercise general oversight.

Political process

Oversight of the electoral process is vested in the Election Commission. There is universal adult suffrage, and the age of eligibility is 18. Seats are allocated from constituencies of roughly equal population. A certain number of constituencies in each state are reserved for members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes based on their proportion of the total state population. Those reserved constituencies shift from one election to the next. As candidates do not have to be and frequently are not residents of the areas they seek to represent, none runs the risk of losing a seat solely by virtue of the allocation procedure.

The Indian party system is complex. Based on performance in past elections, some parties are recognized as national parties and others as state parties. Parties are allocated symbols (e.g., a cow or a hammer and sickle), and ballots are printed with these symbols to help illiterate voters. The only party that has enjoyed a nationwide following continuously from the time of independence (in fact, since its founding in 1885) is the Indian National Congress. There have been several party schisms, however, and the Indian National Congress–Indira, or simply the Congress (I)—created in 1978 by the former prime minister Indira Gandhi and her supporters—has been by far the most successful of its derivative entities. Parties to the left of the Congress have included not only the Communist Party of India, which generally followed the lead of the Soviet Union, and the subsequently formed Communist Party of India (Marxist), more inclined toward policies espoused by China, but also an assortment of small, mainly short-lived Marxist and socialist groups. Parties to the right of the Congress have largely appealed either to Hindu sentiments (such as the Bharatiya Janata [“Indian People’s”] Party; BJP) or those of other communally defined groups, and some have sought to further the interests of landed constituencies (the preindependence princely families or the more recently affluent peasant factions).

Over time there has been a steady increase in the number and power of parties promoting the parochial interests of individual states. As a result, political bargains and alliances between parties with widely divergent platforms are made and dissolved frequently. Moreover, expedient defections from one party to another in pursuit of personal political ambitions have become a feature of the political system. Legislation aimed at discouraging this practice has had only limited success.

Security

Most police functions in India are handled through the states. There are, however, a number of centrally controlled police forces, including the Central Bureau of Investigation (to deal with certain breaches of union laws), the Border Security Force, the volunteer auxiliary force of Home Guards (to help in times of emergency, such as riots or natural disasters), the Central Reserve Police Force, and the Central Industrial Security Force. There are also several paramilitary forces deployed to provide internal security and border defense.

The combined Indian armed forces—comprising the army, navy, coast guard, and air force—are among the largest in the world. The army is the largest of these, with more than four-fifths of military personnel. Each of the services consists solely of volunteers and is led by a well-trained, professional corps of officers that historically has eschewed interfering with domestic politics.

Much of the military’s equipment was obtained from the former Soviet Union. The army has several thousand main battle tanks (though many are relatively antiquated), a comparable number of artillery pieces (both towed and self-propelled), and large numbers of armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. The air force is equipped with numerous high-performance aircraft, including fighters and fighter/ground-attack jets, helicopters, and various fixed-wing support aircraft. The navy has a large submarine fleet and boasts a single aircraft carrier, but its remaining surface vessels consist mainly of smaller craft such as destroyers, frigates, and patrol craft. The country’s nuclear arsenal—thought to consist of several dozen relatively small devices—is controlled by Strategic Forces Command; the military also deploys short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

Health and welfare

India’s medical and public health services have improved dramatically since independence. As a result, average life expectancy at birth has risen by more than 25 years since World War II, although it still lags behind expectancies in the world’s more affluent societies.

While death from starvation has become rare, malnutrition has remained widespread. Much of the population lacks access to safe drinking water, seasonally if not year-round. Dysentery and other diseases caused by waterborne organisms are major killers, especially of children. Poorly treated and improperly disposed sewage pose serious health problems. Most diseases endemic to tropical regions are significant causes of morbidity in India. The rate of tuberculosis is high, and the incidence of blindness, mainly caused by trachoma, is even higher. Great strides, however, have been made in combating certain diseases. Smallpox, once a leading cause of death, was declared eradicated in 1977. The vigorous National Malaria Eradication Programme, launched in 1958, almost succeeded in ridding India of this once very common disease, but the development of resistance to DDT among mosquitoes caused a resurgence of the problem. This led to renewed public health efforts and, subsequently, to a slow but steady decline in the number of affected individuals. AIDS and HIV infection have increased; although the overall proportion of the population affected is quite tiny, the number of people infected is one of the highest for any country in the world.

Apart from numerous programs directed against specific diseases, there has been a considerable expansion in the number of union- and state-maintained hospitals and rural primary health centres. The latter generally are staffed by minimally trained paramedical personnel and are poorly equipped. Many are visited each week by a trained government doctor. Supplementing these government services are private medical practitioners, a great many of whom follow a variety of traditional medical systems. Of these, the ancient Ayurvedic system is by far the most widespread. Several dozen colleges teach Ayurvedic medicine, often with government support. Throughout India, the government uses its network of hospitals and clinics for immunizing children against various diseases and for promoting family planning. Family planning efforts, including the encouragement of voluntary sterilization of both males and females, have met with mixed success.

Welfare services have proliferated in number and type since independence. Many programs target specific sections of the population, such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, nomadic populations, women, children, and the disabled. The resources for such services, however, are inadequate, and a large proportion of the budgets for specific programs goes toward maintaining the service staff and their generally meagre facilities. Pension plans for retirees exist only for government workers and a portion of the organized sector of the economy.

Housing

Existing housing stock does not meet India’s current needs and is continually challenged by the country’s growing population. Homelessness is common, particularly in major urban centres, and large numbers of city dwellers reside in unregistered and makeshift slums. Housing prices in the largest cities—Delhi, Kolkata, and Mumbai—are among the highest in the world, and even modest apartments are beyond the means of many residents. Despite government efforts to alleviate these problems, relatively few government housing projects have been undertaken.

 Mumbai, India: Dhobi GhatDhobi Ghat, an outdoor laundromat in Mumbai (Bombay), India.Dennis Jarvis (CC-BY-2.0) (A Britannica Publishing Partner)

Rural housing is somewhat less pressed, despite the fact that most of the country’s population continues to live in the countryside. Traditional building materials vary from region to region; adobe edifices are common in arid regions, for example, and high-roofed thatch buildings are standard in areas with greater annual precipitation. These are often augmented with walls and roofs made of such materials as sheet metal, cinder blocks, or stone. Throughout the country, the use of materials such as concrete, blocks, and stucco has become common in more affluent villages, towns, and cities.

Piped water is mainly limited to large towns and cities, but even there it seldom reaches all neighbourhoods and cannot be depended on in all seasons. Otherwise, reliance is on wells, rivers, reservoirs, and tanks (usually inundated borrow pits), with minimal, if any, treatment. Sewage facilities are even more limited. Professional scavengers, publicly and privately employed, fill the need for waste disposal in most urban areas and, along with pigs, in many villages as well. Piped gas is a rarity. Those who cook with gas generally rely on purchased gas cylinders. An increasing number of villages, however, have installed simple cow-dung gas plants, which enable them to generate methane and still utilize the fermented dung for fertilizer.

Education

 India: educationLearn about India's efforts to improve its education system, 2009 film.Contunico © ZDF Enterprises GmbH, MainzSee all videos for this article

The provision of free and compulsory education for all children up to age 14 is among the directive principles of the Indian constitution. The overall rate of literacy has increased markedly since the late 20th century, but a noticeable disparity has remained between males and females (roughly three-fourths and about half, respectively). There is also a considerable disparity in literacy rates between the states. The state of Kerala has the highest rate, where nearly all are literate, in contrast to Bihar, where the proportion is about half.

 Library building of Punjab University, Chandigarh, India.© Robert Frerck/Odyssey Productions

Preuniversity education generally consists of five years of primary education (classes I through V), normally for pupils aged 6 to 11; middle level (classes VI through VIII); lower secondary (classes IX and X); and higher secondary (classes XI to XII). The great majority of all children of primary-school age are enrolled, though many, especially girls, may not attend regularly. Enrollment thereafter falls off precipitously, to about half of all children aged 11 to 14, despite the fact that education is free in most states for students of both sexes at least until class X.

Formerly a state responsibility, education was made a joint responsibility of the union and state governments by constitutional amendment. The union government has subsequently played a larger role in promoting the education of girls and other socially disadvantaged groups, largely through fiscal grants for the support of particular programs (e.g., reimbursement of tuition, where it is charged, for girls in classes IX–XII), and in launching a variety of progressive educational initiatives. In addition to publicly financed schools, there are at all levels private and church-run schools (largely by Christian missions), for which tuition is required. Entrance into these often prestigious, predominantly English-language institutions is eagerly sought for the children of those parents who can afford them.

Numerous key universities, institutes of technology, and other specialized institutions of higher education are under union government control, while a much larger number of universities are controlled by the state governments. A disproportionate share of India’s total educational budget goes toward higher education. The number of universities and equivalent institutions increased more than sevenfold in the first four decades after independence, while the number of students enrolled increased more than 15 times during the same period. Each of those numbers has continued to grow dramatically since then. At the same time, funding for libraries, laboratories, and other facilities has been a constant and serious problem. Critics of the unabated growth of higher education have asserted that the quality of university education has steadily declined and have noted the increasingly large proportion of graduates who are unable to find employment, especially among those with liberal arts degrees. Among the established universities are three founded by the British in 1857, at Kolkata, Mumbai, and Chennai.

The Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda at Vadodara, Gujarat, India.Vidyavrata

Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, India, designed by Louis Kahn.Frederick M. Asher

In the past, virtually all higher instruction was in English, but, as new universities and their thousands of affiliated colleges have spread out to smaller cities and towns, state languages increasingly have been used, notwithstanding the paucity of textbooks in such languages. Reserved quotas in universities and lower admission standards for members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes—whose prior education often has been less than adequate—have put additional stress on the system. The fact that India’s best students often take their higher degrees abroad, many never to return, further exacerbates the problem of quality. Nevertheless, elite institutions continue to exist, and, in absolute terms, the output of well-educated individuals is substantial.

Cultural Life

Cultural milieu

India is a large and diverse polyglot nation whose tempo of life varies from region to region and from community to community. By the early 21st century the lifestyle of middle-class and affluent urban families differed little from that of urbanites in Europe, East Asia, or the Americas. For the most part, however, the flow of rural life continued much as it always had. Many small villages remained isolated from most forms of media and communications, and work was largely done by hand or by the use of animal power. Traditional forms of work and recreation only slowly have given way to habits and pastimes imported from the outside world. The pace of globalization was slow in much of rural India, and even in urban areas Western tastes in food, dress, and entertainment were adopted with discrimination. Indian fashions have remained the norm; Indians have continued to prefer traditional cuisine to Western fare; and, though Indian youths are as obsessed as those in the West with pop culture, Indians produce their own films and music (albeit, strongly influenced by Western styles), which have been extremely popular domestically and have been successfully marketed abroad.

Throughout India, custom and religious ritual are still widely observed and practiced. Among Hindus, religious and social custom follows the samskara, a series of personal sacraments and rites conducted at various stages throughout life. Observant members of other confessional communities follow their own rites and rituals. Among all groups, caste protocols have continued to play a role in enforcing norms and values, despite decades of state legislation to alleviate caste bias.

Daily life and social customs

Family and kinship

For almost all Indians the family is the most important social unit. There is a strong preference for extended families, consisting of two or more married couples (often of more than a single generation), who share finances and a common kitchen. Marriage is virtually universal, divorce rare, and virtually every marriage produces children. Almost all marriages are arranged by family elders on the basis of caste, degree of consanguinity, economic status, education (if any), and astrology. A bride traditionally moves to her husband’s house. However, nonarranged “love marriages” are increasingly common in cities.

 Chariot Festival, Jagannatha temple, Puri, IndiaThe Chariot Festival of the Jagannatha temple, Puri, Odisha, India.© Dinodia/Dinodia Photo Library

Within families, there is a clear order of social precedence and influence based on gender, age, and, in the case of a woman, the number of her male children. The senior male of the household—whether father, grandfather, or uncle—typically is the recognized family head, and his wife is the person who regulates the tasks assigned to female family members. Males enjoy higher status than females; boys are often pampered while girls are relatively neglected. This is reflected in significantly different rates of mortality and morbidity between the sexes, allegedly (though reliable statistics are lacking) in occasional female infanticide, and increasingly in the abortion of female fetuses following prenatal gender testing. This pattern of preference is largely connected to the institution of dowry, since the family’s obligation to provide a suitable dowry to the bride’s new family represents a major financial liability. Traditionally, women were expected to treat their husbands as if they were gods, and obedience of wives to husbands has remained a strong social norm. This expectation of devotion may follow a husband to the grave; within some caste groups, widows are not allowed to remarry even if they are bereaved at a young age.

Hindu marriage has traditionally been viewed as the “gift of a maiden” (kanyadan) from the bride’s father to the household of the groom. This gift is also accompanied by a dowry, which generally consists of items suitable to start a young couple in married life. In some cases, however, dowries demanded by grooms and their families have become quite extravagant, and some families appear to regard them as means of enrichment. There are instances, a few of which have been highly publicized, wherein young brides have been treated abusively—even tortured and murdered—in an effort to extract more wealth from the bride’s father. The “dowry deaths” of such young women have contributed to a reaction against the dowry in some modern urban families.

A Muslim marriage is considered to be a contractual relationship—contracted by the bride’s father or guardian—and, though there are often dowries, there is formal reciprocity, in which the groom promises a mahr, a commitment to provide his bride with wealth in her lifetime.

Beyond the family the most important unit is the caste. Within a village all members of a single caste recognize a fictive kinship relation and a sense of mutual obligation, but ideas of fictive kinship extend also to the village as a whole. Thus, for example, a woman who marries and goes to another village never ceases to be regarded as a daughter of her village. If she is badly treated in her husband’s village, it may become a matter of collective concern for her natal village, not merely for those of her own caste.

Festivals and holidays

Virtually all regions of India have their distinctive places of pilgrimage, local saints and folk heroes, religious festivals, and associated fairs. There are also innumerable festivals associated with individual villages or temples or with specific castes and cults. The most popular of the religious festivals celebrated over the greater part of India are Vasantpanchami (generally in February, the exact date determined by the Hindu lunar calendar), in honour of Sarasvati, the goddess of learning; Holi (February–March), a time when traditional hierarchical relationships are forgotten and celebrants throw coloured water and powder at one another; Dussehra (September–October), when the story of the Ramayana is reenacted; and Diwali (Divali; October–November), a time for lighting lamps and exchanging gifts. The major secular holidays are Independence Day (August 15) and Republic Day (January 26).

Children celebrating Holi in Kolkata, India.Kaushik Sengupta/AP Images

Quit India Movement anniversaryIndian schoolchildren waving flags in Bhopal, India, on August 9, 2001, to mark the anniversary of the founding (1942) of the Quit India Movement, the campaign that led to Indian independence in 1947.Prakash Hatvalne/AP Images

Cuisine

Although there is considerable regional variation in Indian cuisine, the day-to-day diet of most Indians lacks variety. Depending on income, two or three meals generally are consumed. The bulk of almost all meals is whatever the regional staple might be: rice throughout most of the east and south, flat wheat bread (chapati) in the north and northwest, and bread made from pearl millet (bajra) in Maharashtra. This is usually supplemented with the puree of a legume (called dal), a few vegetables, and, for those who can afford it, a small bowl of yogurt. Chilies and other spices add zest to this simple fare. For most Indians, meat is a rarity, except on festive occasions—the cow is considered sacred in Hinduism (see sanctity of the cow). Fish, fresh milk, and fruits and vegetables, however, are more widely consumed, subject to regional and seasonal availability. In general, tea is the preferred beverage in northern and eastern India, while coffee is more common in the south.

Clothing

Clothing for most Indians is also quite simple and typically untailored. Men (especially in rural areas) frequently wear little more than a broadcloth dhoti, worn as a loose skirtlike loincloth, or, in parts of the south and east, the tighter wraparound lungi. In both cases the body remains bare above the waist, except in cooler weather, when a shawl also may be worn, or in hot weather, when the head may be protected by a turban. The more-affluent and higher-caste men are likely to wear a tailored shirt, increasingly of Western style. Muslims, Sikhs, and urban dwellers generally are more inclined to wear tailored clothing, including various types of trousers, jackets, and vests.

 Indian men wearing dhotis, from a 19th-century painting.Courtesy of the Victoria and Albert Museum, London

Although throughout most of India women wear saris and short blouses, the way in which a sari is wrapped varies greatly from one region to another. In Punjab, as well as among older female students and many city dwellers, the characteristic dress is the shalwar-kamiz, a combination of pajama-like trousers and a long-tailed shirt (saris being reserved for special occasions). Billowing ankle-length skirts and blouses are the typical female dress of Rajasthan and parts of Gujarat. Most rural Indians, especially females, do not wear shoes and, when footwear is necessary, prefer sandals.

Indian woman wearing a sari, detail of a gouache painting on mica from Tiruchchirappalli, India, c. 1850.Courtesy of the Victoria and Albert Museum, London

The modes of dress of tribal Indians are exceedingly varied and can be, as among certain Naga groups, quite ornate. Throughout India, however, Western dress is increasingly in vogue, especially among urban and educated males, and Western-style school uniforms are worn by both sexes in many schools, even in rural India.

The arts

Few areas of the world can claim an artistic heritage comparable to that developed in India over the course of more than four millennia. For a detailed discussion of Indian literature, music, dance, theatre, and visual arts, see South Asian arts.

Architecture

 Subterranean Ghosts: India's Disappearing StepwellsStepwells are spectacular subterranean edifices “like skyscrapers sunk into the earth,” explains Victoria Lautman in the video Subterranean Ghosts: India's Disappearing Stepwells (2013), produced and edited by Matthew Cunningham.Written and photographed by Victoria S. Lautman; Produced and edited by Matthew Cunningham (A Britannica Publishing Partner)See all videos for this article

Architecture is perhaps India’s greatest glory. Among the most-renowned monuments are many cave temples hewn from rock (of which those at Ajanta and Ellora are most noteworthy); the Sun Temple at Konarak (Konarka); the vast temple complexes at Bhubaneshwar, Khajuraho, and Kanchipuram (Conjeeveram); such Mughal masterpieces as Humayun’s tomb and the Taj Mahal; and, from the 20th century, buildings such as the High Court in the planned city of Chandigarh, designed by the Swiss-born architect Le Corbusier, and the Bhopal State Assembly building in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, designed by the Indian architect and urban planner Charles Correa. Also notable are stepwells, such as the Rani ki Vav (“Queen’s Stepwell”) in Patan (northern Gujarat), now a UNESCO World Heritage site.

Kailasa Temple, Ellora Caves, Maharashtra state, India.Frederick M. Asher

Cave temple, Ajanta Caves, Maharashtra state, India.Frederick M. Asher

Surya DeulaSurya Deula (Sun Temple), Konark, Odisha, eastern India.Frederick M. Asher

Lakshmana temple, Khajuraho, Madhya Pradesh, India.Frederick M. Asher

The tomb of Humāyūn, the second Mughal emperor, mid-16th century, Delhi.Frederick M. Asher

Kailasanatha Temple, Kanchipuram, Tamil Nadu state, India.Frederick M. Asher

Other traditional art forms in India—painting, embroidery, pottery, ornamental woodworking and metalworking, sculpture, lacquerware, and jewelry—are also well represented. Much of the best work resulted from patronage by the court (often being produced in royally endowed workshops), by temples, and by wealthy individuals. Vigorous folk traditions have a very long history, as witnessed by the ancient rock paintings found in scores of caves across India.

Radha; KrishnaRadha and Krishna, detail of a Kishangarh painting, mid-18th century; in a private collection.P. Chandra

Dance and music

The performing arts also have a long and distinguished tradition. Bharata natyam, the classical dance form originating in southern India, expresses Hindu religious themes that date at least to the 4th century CE (see Natya-shastra). Other regional styles include odissi (from Orissa), manipuri (Manipur), kathakali (Kerala), kuchipudi (Andhra Pradesh), and kathak (Islamicized northern India). In addition, there are numerous regional folk dance traditions. One of these is bhangra, a Punjabi dance form that, along with its musical accompaniment, has achieved growing national and international popularity since the 1970s. Indian dance was popularized in the West by dancer and choreographer Uday Shankar.

Bharata natyam, a traditional dance drama of India.Mohan Khokar

In Indian classical dance, male and female kathakali dancers.Foto Features

Kathak school dancer, in Mughal costume, performing Indian classical dance.Mohan Khokar

Manipuri-style performance of Indian classical dance.Mohan Khokar

Traditional Indian music is divided between the Hindustani (northern) and Carnatic (southern) schools. (The Hindustani style is influenced by musical traditions of the Persian-speaking world.) Instrumental and vocal music is also quite varied and frequently is played or sung in concert (usually by small ensembles). It is a popular mode of religious expression, as well as an essential accompaniment to many social festivities, including dances and the narration of bardic and other folk narratives. Some virtuosos, most notably Ravi Shankar (composer and sitar player) and Ali Akbar Khan (composer and sarod player), have gained world renown. The most popular dramatic classical performances, which are sometimes choreographed, relate to the great Hindu epics the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. Regional variations of classical and folk music abound. All of these genres have remained popular—as has devotional Hindu music—but interest in Indian popular music has grown rapidly since the late 20th century, buoyed by the great success of motion picture musicals. Western classical music is represented by such institutions as the Symphony Orchestra of India, based in Mumbai, and some individuals (notably conductor Zubin Mehta) have achieved international renown.

Theatre, film, and literature

In modern times, Bengali playwrights—especially Nobel Prize winner Rabindranath Tagore, who was also a philosopher, poet, songwriter, choreographer, essayist, and painter—have given new life to the Indian theatre. Playwrights from a number of other regions also have gained popularity.

 Chopra, PriyankaWatch an interview with Indian actress Priyanka Chopra.© CCTV America (A Britannica Publishing Partner)See all videos for this article

To a great extent, however, Indian interest in theatre has been replaced by the Indian motion-picture industry, which now ranks as the most popular form of mass entertainment. In some years India—whose film industry is centred in Mumbai (Bombay), thus earning the entire movie-making industry the sobriquet “Bollywood” in honour of Hollywood, its U.S. counterpart—makes more feature-length films than any other country in the world. The lives of film heroes and heroines, as portrayed in film magazines and other media, are subjects of great popular interest. While most films are formulaic escapist pastiches of drama, comedy, music, and dance, some of India’s best cinematographers, such as Satyajit Ray, are internationally acclaimed. Others, such as filmmakers Ismail Merchant, M. Night Shyamalan (Manoj Shyamalan), and Mira Nair, gained their greatest success making films abroad. Radio, television and Internet broadcasts, and digital and videocassette recordings are popular among those affluent enough to afford them.

The corpus of Indian literature is vast, especially in religion and philosophy. The roots of Indian literary tradition are found in the Vedas, a collection of religious hymns probably dating from the mid-2nd millennium BCE but not written down until many centuries later. Many of the ancient texts still provide core elements of Hindu rituals and, despite their great length, are memorized in their entirety by Brahman priests and scholars.

Literature languished during much of the period of British rule, but it experienced a new awakening with the so-called Hindu Renaissance, centred in Bengal and beginning in the mid-19th century. Bankim Chandra Chatterjee established the novel, previously unknown in India, as a literary genre. Chatterjee wrote in Bengali, and most of his literary successors, including the popular Hindi novelist Prem Chand (pseudonym of Dhanpat Rai Srivastava), also preferred to write in Indian languages; however, many others, including Tagore, were no less comfortable writing in English. The works of some Indian authors—such as the contemporary novelists Mulk Raj Anand, Bharati Mukherjee, Anita Desai, Kamala Markandaya, and R.K. Narayan; the essayist Nirad C. Chaudhuri; the poet and novelist Vikram Seth; Booker Prize winners Salman Rushdie (1981), Arundhati Roy (1997), and Kiran Desai (2006); as well as the novelist Vikram Chandra and the poets Meena Alexander and Kamala Das—are exclusively or almost exclusively in English.

Cultural institutions

Although India abounds in museums (many in proximity to major architectural and archaeological sites) and has numerous theatres and libraries, few, if any, are world famous. Art galleries are confined almost exclusively to major cities and cater to a small, affluent, often foreign clientele. Among learned societies, the most prominent is the Asiatic Society, founded in Kolkata in 1784.

Sports and recreation

The history of sports in India dates to thousands of years ago, and numerous games, including chess, wrestling, and archery, are thought to have originated there. Contemporary Indian sport is a diverse mix, with traditional games, such as kabaddi and kho-kho, and those introduced by the British, especially cricket, football (soccer), and field hockey, enjoying great popularity.

Kabaddi, primarily an Indian game, is believed to be some 4,000 years old. Combining elements of wrestling and rugby, the team sport has been a regular part of the Asian Games since 1990. Kho-kho, a form of tag, ranks as one of the most popular traditional sports in India, and its first national championship was held in the early 1960s.

Indians are passionate about cricket, which probably appeared on the subcontinent in the early 18th century. The country competed in its first official test in 1932 and in 1983—led by captain Kapil Dev, one of the most successful cricketers in history—won the Cricket World Cup. The Indian team repeated as World Cup champions in 2011, captained by Mahendra Singh Dhoni.

 Tendulkar, SachinIndian cricketer Sachin Tendulkar playing in the Cricket World Cup final match between Sri Lanka and India in Mumbai, India, April 2, 2011.Gurinder Osan/AP

Golf is also played throughout India. The Royal Calcutta Golf Club, established in Kolkata in 1829, is the oldest golf club in India and the first outside Great Britain.

India made its Olympic Games debut at the 1920 Games in Antwerp, though it did not form an Olympic association until 1927. The following year, in Amsterdam, India competed in field hockey, its national game, for the first time. The national team’s victory that year was the first of six consecutive gold medals in the event between 1928 and 1956; they won again in 1964 and 1980.

Media and publishing

Several thousand daily newspapers are published in India. Although English-language dailies and journals remain highly influential, the role of the vernacular press is increasing steadily in absolute and relative importance. Among the largest-circulating dailies are The Times of India and Hindustan Times (both in English), the Hindustan and the Navbharat Times (Hindi), and the Anandabazar Patrika (Bengali). Book publishing is a thriving industry. Academic titles account for a large portion of all works published, but there is also a considerable market for literature. On the whole, the press functions with little government censorship, and serious controls have been imposed only in matters of national security, in times of emergency, or when it is deemed necessary to avoid inflaming passions (e.g., after communal riots or comparable disturbances). The country’s largest news agency, the Press Trust of India, was founded in 1947. The United News of India was founded in 1961.

Radio broadcasting began privately in 1927 but became a monopoly of the colonial government in 1930. In 1936 it was given its current name, All India Radio, and since 1957 it also has been known as Akashvani. The union government provides radio service throughout the country via hundreds of transmitters. Television was introduced experimentally by Akashvani in 1959, and regular broadcasting commenced in 1965. In 1976 it was made a separate service under the name Doordarshan, later changed to Doordarshan India (“Television India”). Television and educational programming are transmitted via the Indian National Satellite (INSAT) system. The country’s first Hindi-language cable channel, Zee TV, was established in 1992, and this was followed by other cable and satellite services.

There is relatively dense telephone service in most urban areas, but many rural areas remain isolated. The same is true of cellular telephones, which are common in major cities. Internet cafés can be found in many affluent areas, and millions of Indian households are connected to the Internet via telephone and cable connections. There are numerous high-technology centres in the country, and India is connected to the outside world via international cables and across satellite networks.

Joseph E. Schwartzberg

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica

History

The Indian subcontinent, the great landmass of South Asia, is the home of one of the world’s oldest and most influential civilizations. In this article, the subcontinent, which for historical purposes is usually called simply “India,” is understood to comprise the areas of not only the present-day Republic of India but also the republics of Pakistan (partitioned from India in 1947) and Bangladesh (which formed the eastern part of Pakistan until its independence in 1971). For the histories of these latter two countries since their creation, see Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Since early times the Indian subcontinent appears to have provided an attractive habitat for human occupation. Toward the south it is effectively sheltered by wide expanses of ocean, which tended to isolate it culturally in ancient times, while to the north it is protected by the massive ranges of the Himalayas, which also sheltered it from the Arctic winds and the air currents of Central Asia. Only in the northwest and northeast is there easier access by land, and it was through those two sectors that most of the early contacts with the outside world took place.

Within the framework of hills and mountains represented by the Indo-Iranian borderlands on the west, the Indo-Myanmar borderlands in the east, and the Himalayas to the north, the subcontinent may in broadest terms be divided into two major divisions: in the north, the basins of the Indus and Ganges (Ganga) rivers (the Indo-Gangetic Plain) and, to the south, the block of Archean rocks that forms the Deccan plateau region. The expansive alluvial plain of the river basins provided the environment and focus for the rise of two great phases of city life: the civilization of the Indus valley, known as the Indus civilization, during the 3rd millennium BCE; and, during the 1st millennium BCE, that of the Ganges. To the south of this zone, and separating it from the peninsula proper, is a belt of hills and forests, running generally from west to east and to this day largely inhabited by tribal people. This belt has played mainly a negative role throughout Indian history in that it remained relatively thinly populated and did not form the focal point of any of the principal regional cultural developments of South Asia. However, it is traversed by various routes linking the more-attractive areas north and south of it. The Narmada (Narbada) River flows through this belt toward the west, mostly along the Vindhya Range, which has long been regarded as the symbolic boundary between northern and southern India.

The northern parts of India represent a series of contrasting regions, each with its own distinctive cultural history and its own distinctive population. In the northwest the valleys of the Baluchistan uplands (now largely in Balochistan, Pak.) are a low-rainfall area, producing mainly wheat and barley and having a low density of population. Its residents, mainly tribal people, are in many respects closely akin to their Iranian neighbours. The adjacent Indus plains are also an area of extremely low rainfall, but the annual flooding of the river in ancient times and the exploitation of its waters by canal irrigation in the modern period have enhanced agricultural productivity, and the population is correspondingly denser than that of Baluchistan. The Indus valley may be divided into three parts: in the north are the plains of the five tributary rivers of the Punjab (Persian: Panjāb, “Five Waters”); in the centre the consolidated waters of the Indus and its tributaries flow through the alluvial plains of Sind; and in the south the waters pass naturally into the Indus delta. East of the latter is the Great Indian, or Thar, Desert, which is in turn bounded on the east by a hill system known as the Aravali Range, the northernmost extent of the Deccan plateau region. Beyond them is the hilly region of Rajasthan and the Malwa Plateau. To the south is the Kathiawar Peninsula, forming both geographically and culturally an extension of Rajasthan. All of these regions have a relatively denser population than the preceding group, but for topographical reasons they have tended to be somewhat isolated, at least during historical times.

East of the Punjab and Rajasthan, northern India develops into a series of belts running broadly west to east and following the line of the foothills of the Himalayan ranges in the north. The southern belt consists of a hilly, forested area broken by the numerous escarpments in close association with the Vindhya Range, including the Bhander, Rewa, and Kaimur plateaus. Between the hills of central India and the Himalayas lies the Ganges River valley proper, constituting an area of high-density population, moderate rainfall, and high agricultural productivity. Archaeology suggests that, from the beginning of the 1st millennium BCE, rice cultivation has played a large part in supporting this population. The Ganges valley divides into three major parts: to the west is the Ganges-Yamuna Doab (the land area that is formed by the confluence of the two rivers); east of the confluence lies the middle Ganges valley, in which population tends to increase and cultivation of rice predominates; and to the southeast lies the extensive delta of the combined Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers. The Brahmaputra flows from the northeast, rising from the Tibetan Himalayas and emerging from the mountains into the Assam valley, being bounded on the east by the Patkai Bum Range and the Naga Hills and on the south by the Mikir, Khasi, Jaintia, and Garo hills. There is plenty of evidence that influences reached India from the northeast in ancient times, even if they are less prominent than those that arrived from the northwest.

Along the Deccan plateau there is a gradual eastward declivity, which dispenses its major river systems—the Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna, and Kaveri (Cauvery)—into the Bay of Bengal. Rising some 3,000 feet (1,000 metres) or more along the western edge of the Deccan, the escarpment known as the Western Ghats traps the moisture of winds from the Arabian Sea, most notably during the southwest monsoon, creating a tropical monsoon climate along the narrow western littoral and depriving the Deccan of significant precipitation. The absence of snowpack in the south Indian uplands makes the region dependent entirely on rainfall for its streamflow. The arrival of the southwest monsoon in June is thus a pivotal annual event in peninsular culture.

India from the Paleolithic Period to the decline of the Indus civilization

The earliest periods of Indian history are known only through reconstructions from archaeological evidence. Since the late 20th century, much new data has emerged, allowing a far fuller reconstruction than was formerly possible. This section will discuss five major periods: (1) the early prehistoric period (before the 8th millennium BCE), (2) the period of the prehistoric agriculturalists and pastoralists (approximately the 8th to the mid-4th millennium BCE), (3) the Early Indus, or Early Harappan, Period (so named for the excavated city of Harappa in eastern Pakistan), witnessing the emergence of the first cities in the Indus River system (c. 3500–2600 BCE), (4) the Indus, or Harappan, civilization (c. 2600–2000 BCE, or perhaps ending as late as 1750 BCE), and (5) the Post-Urban Period, which follows the Indus civilization and precedes the rise of cities in northern India during the second quarter of the 1st millennium BCE (c. 1750–750 BCE).

The materials available for a reconstruction of the history of India prior to the 3rd century BCE are almost entirely the products of archaeological research. Traditional and textual sources, transmitted orally for many centuries, are available from the closing centuries of the 2nd millennium BCE, but their use depends largely on the extent to which any passage can be dated or associated with archaeological evidence. For the rise of civilization in the Indus valley and for contemporary events in other parts of the subcontinent, the evidence of archaeology is still the principal source of information. Even when it becomes possible to read the short inscriptions of the Harappan seals, it is unlikely that they will provide much information to supplement other sources. In those circumstances it is necessary to approach the early history of India largely through the eyes of the archaeologists, and it will be wise to retain a balance between an objective assessment of archaeological data and its synthetic interpretation.

The early prehistoric period

In the mid-19th century, archaeologists in southern India identified hand axes comparable to those of Stone Age Europe. For nearly a century thereafter, evaluation of a burgeoning body of evidence consisted in the attempt to correlate Indian chronologies with the well-documented European and Mediterranean chronologies. As the vast majority of early finds were from surface sites, they long remained without precise dates or cultural contexts. More recently, however, the excavation of numerous cave and dune sites has yielded artifacts in association with organic material that can be dated using the carbon-14 method, and the techniques of thermoluminescent and paleomagnetic analysis now permit dating of pottery fragments and other inorganic materials. Research beginning in the late 20th century has focused on the unique environment of the subcontinent as the context for a cultural evolution analogous to, but not uniform with, that of other regions. Increasing understanding of plate tectonics, to cite one development, has greatly advanced this endeavour.

Most outlines of Indian prehistory have employed nomenclature once thought to reflect a worldwide sequence of human cultural evolution. The European concept of the Old Stone Age, or Paleolithic Period (comprising Lower, Middle, and Upper stages), remains useful with regard to South Asia in identifying levels of technology, apart from any universal time line. Similarly, what has been called the Indian Mesolithic Period (Middle Stone Age) corresponds in general typological terms to that of Europe. For the subsequent periods, the designations Neolithic Period (New Stone Age) and Chalcolithic Age (Copper-Stone Age) also are applied, but increasingly, as archaeology has yielded more-detailed cultural profiles for those periods, scholars have come to emphasize the subsistence bases of early societies—e.g., hunting and gathering, pastoralism, and agriculture. The terms Early Harappan and Harappan (from the site where remains of a major city of the Indus civilization were discovered in 1921) are used primarily in a chronological way but also loosely in a cultural sense, relating respectively to periods or cultures that preceded the appearance of city life in the Indus valley and to the Indus civilization itself.

The Indian Paleolithic

The oldest artifacts yet found on the subcontinent, marking what may be called the beginning of the Indian Lower Paleolithic, come from the western end of the Shiwalik Range, near Rawalpindi in northern Pakistan. These quartzite pebble tools and flakes date to about two million years ago, according to paleomagnetic analysis, and represent a pre-hand-ax industry of a type that appears to have persisted for an extensive period thereafter. The artifacts are associated with extremely rich sedimentary evidence and fossil fauna, but thus far no correlative hominin (i.e., members of the human lineage) remains have been found. In the same region the earliest hand axes (of the type commonly associated with Acheulean industry) have been dated paleomagnetically to about 500,000 years ago.

The Great Indian Desert, straddling what is now the southern half of the India-Pakistan border, supplied significant archaeological materials in the late 20th century. Hand axes found at Didwana, Rajasthan, similar to those from the Shiwalik Range, yield slightly younger dates of about 400,000 years ago. Examination of the desert soil strata and other evidence has revealed a correlation between prevailing climates and the successive levels of technology that constitute the Paleolithic. For example, a prolonged humid phase, as attested by reddish brown soil with a deep profile, appears to have commenced some 140,000 years ago and lasted until about 25,000 years ago, roughly the extent of the Middle Paleolithic Period. During that time the area of the present desert provided a rich environment for hunting. The Rohri Hills, located at the Indus River margins of the desert, contain a group of sites associated with sources of chert, a type of stone that is a principal raw material for making tools and weapons. Evidence surrounding these chert bands—in an alluvial plain otherwise largely devoid of stone—suggests their development as a major factory centre during the Middle Paleolithic. The transition in this same region to a drier climate during the period from about 40,000 to about 25,000 years ago coincides with the onset of the Upper Paleolithic, which lasted until about 15,000 years ago. The basic innovation marking this stage is the production of parallel-sided blades from a prepared core. Also, tools of the Upper Paleolithic exhibit adaptations for working particular materials, such as leather, wood, and bone. The earliest rock paintings yet discovered in the region date to the Upper Paleolithic.

Other important Paleolithic sites that have been excavated include those at Hunsgi in Karnataka state, at Sanghao cave in North-West Frontier Province, Pak., and in the Vindhya Range separating the Ganges basin from the Deccan plateau. At the latter, local workers readily identified a weathered Upper Paleolithic limestone carving as a representation of a mother goddess.

Mesolithic hunters

The progressive diminution in the size of stone artifacts that began in the Middle Paleolithic reached its climax in the small parallel-sided blades and microliths of what has been called the Indian Mesolithic. A great proliferation of Mesolithic cultures is evident throughout India, although they are known almost exclusively from surface collections of tools. Cultures of this period exhibited a wide variety of subsistence patterns, including hunting and gathering, fishing, and, at least for part of the period, some herding and small-scale agriculture. It may be inferred from numerous examples that hunting cultures frequently coexisted and interacted with agricultural and pastoral communities. These relationships must have continually varied from region to region as a result of environmental and other factors. Strikingly, such patterns of interaction persisted in the subcontinent throughout the remainder of the prehistoric period and long into the historic, with vestiges still discernible in some areas in the 20th century.

Thus, chronologically, the Mesolithic cultures cover an enormous span. In Sri Lanka several Mesolithic sites have been dated to as early as about 30,000 years ago, the oldest yet recorded for the period in South Asia. At the other end of the subcontinent, in caves of the Hindu Kush in northern Afghanistan, evidence of occupation dating to between 15,000 and 10,000 BCE represents the Epipaleolithic Stage, which may be considered to fall within the Mesolithic. The domestication of sheep and goats is thought to have begun in this region and period.

Many of the caves and rock shelters of central India contain rock paintings depicting a variety of subjects, including game animals and such human activities as hunting, honey collecting, and dancing. This art appears to have developed from Upper Paleolithic precursors and reveals much about life in the period. Along with the art have come increasingly clear indications that some of the caves were sites of religious activity.

The earliest agriculturalists and pastoralists

Neolithic agriculture in the Indus valley and Baluchistan

The Indo-Iranian borderlands form the eastern extension of the Iranian plateau and in some ways mirror the environment of the Fertile Crescent (the arc of agricultural lands extending from the Tigris-Euphrates river system to the Nile valley) in the Middle East. Across the plateau, lines of communication existed from early antiquity, which would suggest a broad parallelism of developments at both the eastern and western extremities. During the late 20th century, knowledge of early settlements on the borders of the Indus system and Baluchistan was revolutionized by excavations at Mehrgarh and elsewhere.

Principal sites of the Indus civilization.Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

The group of sites at Mehrgarh provides evidence of some five or six thousand years of occupation comprising two major periods, the first from the 8th through the 6th millennium BCE and the second from the 5th through the 4th (and possibly the 3rd) millennium. The earliest evidence occurs in a mound 23 feet (7 metres) deep discovered beneath massive alluvial deposits. Two subphases of Period I are apparent from the mound artifacts.

Phase IA, dating to the 8th–7th millennium BCE, was an aceramic (i.e., lacking pottery) Neolithic occupation. The main tools were stone blades, including lunates and triangles, some probably mounted in wooden hafts with bitumen mastic; a relatively small number of ground stone axes have been found. Domestication of wheat and barley apparently reached the area sometime during this phase, as did that of sheep and goats, although the preponderance of gazelle bones among the animal remains suggests continued dependence on hunting. Houses of mud brick date from the beginning of this phase and continue throughout the occupation. Accompaniments to the simple burial of human remains included shell or stone-bead necklaces, baskets, and occasionally young caprids (both sheep and goats) slaughtered for the purpose.

Phase 1B, dating to the 7th–6th millennium, is characterized by the emergence of pottery and improvements in agriculture. By the beginning of Phase 1B, cattle (apparently Bos indicus, the Indian humped variety) had come to predominate over game animals, as well as over sheep and goats. A new type of building, the small regular compartments of which identify it almost certainly as a granary, first appeared during this phase and became prevalent in Period II, indicating the frequent occurrence of crop surpluses. Burial took a more elaborate form—a funerary chamber was dug at one end of a pit, and, after inhumation, the chamber was sealed by a mud brick wall. From the latter phase of Period I also come the first small, hand-modeled female figurines of unburned clay.

The Period I evidence at Mehrgarh provides a clear picture of an early agricultural settlement exhibiting domestic architecture and a variety of well-established crafts. The use of seashells and of various semiprecious stones, including turquoise and lapis lazuli, indicates the existence of trade networks extending from the coast and perhaps also from Central Asia.

Striking changes characterize Period II. It appears that some major tectonic event took place at the beginning of the period (c. 5500 BCE), causing the deposition of great quantities of silt on the plain, almost completely burying the original mound at Mehrgarh. Nearly all features of the earlier culture persisted, though in altered form. There was an increase in the use of pottery. The granary structures proliferated, sometimes on a larger scale. The remains of several massive brick walls and platforms suggest something approaching monumental architecture. Evidence appears of several new crafts, including the first examples of the use of copper and ivory. The area of the settlement appears to have grown to accommodate an increasing population.

While the settlement at Mehrgarh merits extensive consideration, it should not be perceived as a unique site. There are indications (not yet fully explored) that other equally early sites may exist in other parts of Baluchistan and elsewhere on the Indo-Iranian borderlands.

In the northern parts of the Indus system, the earliest known settlements are substantially later than Mehrgarh. For example, at Sarai Khola (near the ruins of Taxila in the Pakistan Punjab) the earliest occupation dates from the end of the 4th millennium and clearly represents a tradition quite distinct from that of contemporary Sind or Balochistan, with ground stone axes and plain burnished red-brown pottery. The same is the case at Burzahom in the Vale of Kashmir, where deep pit dwellings are associated with ground stone axes, bone tools, and gray burnished pottery. Evidence of the “aceramic Neolithic” stage is reported at Gufkral, another site in the Kashmir region, which has been dated by radiocarbon to the 3rd millennium and later.

Developments in the Ganges basin

In the hills to the south of the Ganges (Ganga) valley, a group of sites has been assigned to the “Vindhya Neolithic”; for at least one of these, Koldihwa, dates as early as the 7th millennium have been reported. The sites contain circular huts made of timber posts and thatch; associated implements and vessels include stone blades, ground stone axes, bone tools, and crude handmade pottery, often bearing the marks of cords or baskets used in shaping the clay. In one case a small cattle pen has been excavated. Rice husks occur, though whether from wild or cultivated varieties remains to be determined. There exists considerable uncertainty about the chronology of these settlements; very few radiocarbon dates penetrate further than the 2nd millennium.

Earliest settlements in peninsular India

The earliest dates recorded for settlements in peninsular India belong to the opening centuries of the 3rd millennium. A pastoral character dominates the evidence. In the northern parts of Karnataka, the nucleus from which stone-ax-using pastoralists appear to have spread to many parts of the southern peninsula has been located. The earliest radiocarbon dates obtained in this area are from ash mounds formed by the burning on these sites of great masses of cow dung inside cattle pens. These indicate that the first settlers were seminomadic and that they had large herds of Brahman (zebu) cattle. The earliest known settlements, which were located at Kodekal and Utnur, date to about 2900 BCE. Other important sites are Brahmagiri and Tekkalkota in Karnataka and Utnur and Nagarajunikonda in Andhra Pradesh. At Tekkalkota three gold ornaments were excavated, indicating exploitation of local ore deposits, but no other metal objects have been found, suggesting a relative scarcity of metals. These early sites produced distinctive burnished gray pottery, smaller quantities of black-on-red painted pottery, stone axes, and bone points, and in some instances evidence of a stone-blade industry. The axes have a generally oval section and triangular form with pointed butts. Among bone remains, those of cattle are in the majority, while those of sheep or goats are also present. Other settlements have been excavated in recent years in this region, but so far they have produced dates from the 2nd millennium, suggesting that the culture continued with little change for many centuries. Stone axes of a generally similar form have been found widely throughout the southern peninsula and may be taken as indications of the spread of pastoralists throughout the region during the 2nd millennium BCE.

Earliest settlements in eastern India

Archaeologists have long postulated the existence of Neolithic settlements in the eastern border regions of South Asia on the basis of widespread collections of ground stone axes and adzes, often of distinctive forms, comparable to those of Southeast Asia and south China. There is, however, little substantial evidence for the date of these collections or for the culture of the people who made them. Excavations at one site, Sarutaru, near the city of Guwahati, revealed stone axes and shouldered celts (one of the distinctive tool types of the Neolithic) in association with cord- or basket-marked pottery.

The rise of urbanism in the Indus valley

From about 5000 BCE, increasing numbers of settlements began to appear throughout the Indo-Iranian borderlands. These, as far as can be judged, were village communities of settled agriculturalists, employing common means of subsistence in the cultivation of wheat, barley, and other crops and in the keeping of cattle, sheep, and goats; there was a broadly common level of technology based on the use of stone for some artifacts and copper and bronze for others. Comparison and contrast of the high-quality painted pottery of the period suggest distinct groupings among the communities.

At a somewhat later date, probably toward the middle of the 4th millennium BCE, agricultural settlements began to spread more widely in the Indus valley itself. The earliest of these provide clear links with the cultures along or beyond the western margins of the Indus valley. In the course of time, a remarkable change took place in the form of the Indus settlements, suggesting that some kind of closer interaction was developing, often over considerable distances, and that a process of convergence was under way. This continued for approximately 500 years and can now be identified as marking a transition toward the full urban society that emerged at Harappa and similar sites about 2600 BCE. For this reason, this stage has been named the Early Harappan, or Early Indus, culture.

Extent and chronology of Early Harappan culture

It is now clear that sites assignable to the Early Harappan Period extend over an immense area: from the Indus delta in the south, southeastward into Saurashtra; up the Indus valley to western Punjab in the northwest; eastward past Harappa to the Bahawalpur region of Pakistan; and, in the northeast, into the Indian states of Punjab and Haryana. In short, the area of the Early Harappan culture was nearly coextensive with that of the mature Indus civilization.

Radiocarbon dating of artifacts from a number of the excavated sites provides a fairly consistent chronological picture. The Early Harappan Period began in the mid-4th millennium BCE and continued until the mid-3rd millennium, when the mature Indus civilization displaced it in many regions. In some regions, notably in Punjab, the mature urban style seems never to have been fully established, and in these areas the Early Harappan style continued with little or no outward sign of mature Harappan contact until about 2000 BCE.

Principal sites

One of the most significant features of the Early Harappan settlements is the evidence for a hierarchy among the sites, culminating in a number of substantial walled towns. The first site to be recognized as belonging to the Early Harappan Period was Amri in 1929. In 1948 the British archaeologist Sir Mortimer Wheeler discovered a small deposit of pottery stratified below the remains of the mature Indus city at Harappa. The next site to be excavated with a view to uncovering the Early Harappan Period was Kot Diji (in present-day Sind province, Pakistan). A stone rubble wall surrounded this settlement, which appears to date to about 3000 BCE. An even earlier example is Rehman Dheri, near Dera Ismail Khan, which appears to have achieved its walled status during the last centuries of the 4th millennium. There the roughly rectangular, grid-patterned settlement was surrounded by a massive wall of mud brick. Early Harappan Kalibangan (Kali Banga) in Rajasthan resembled Rehman Dheri in form. It later served as the basis for an expanded settlement of the mature Indus civilization. Still farther east in the eastern Punjab and in Haryana are many other Early Harappan sites. Among them several have been excavated, notably Banawali and Mitathal. Another example of a walled settlement of the period is Tharro in southern Sind. This was probably originally a coastal site, although it is now many miles from the sea. There the surrounding wall and the extant traces of houses are of local stone.

Subsistence and technology

Many of the excavated sites mentioned above have yet to be fully studied and the findings published, and knowledge of the various features of the life and economy of their inhabitants remains somewhat scanty. All the evidence indicates that the subsistence base of Early Harappan economy remained much as it had already developed at Mehrgarh some two millennia earlier; cattle, sheep, and goats constituted the principal domestic animals, and wheat and barley formed the staple crops. From Kalibangan and several other sites in Bahawalpur and Punjab comes intriguing evidence concerning the use of the plow. At the former site, excavators discovered what appeared to be a plowed field surface preserved beneath buildings from the mature Indus period. The pattern of crisscrossed furrows was virtually identical to that still employed in the region, the wider furrows in one direction being used for taller crops, such as peas, and the narrow perpendicular rows being used for oilseed plants such as those of the genus Sesamum (sesame). From Banawali and sites in the desiccated Sarasvati River valley came terra-cotta models of plows, supporting the earlier interpretation of the field pattern.

The evidence for the various Early Harappan crafts and their products also calls for further publication and detail before a firm picture can be obtained. Thus far, only a small number of copper tools have been found, and little can yet be confirmed regarding their sources and manufacture. A number of the settlement sites lie far from any sources of stone, and thus the regular appearance of a stone-blade industry, producing small, plain or serrated blades from prepared stone cores, implies that the raw materials must have been imported, often from considerable distances. The same assumption applies to the larger stones employed as rubbers or grinders, but in the absence of detailed research, no firm conclusions are possible. Related evidence does indicate that some contemporary sites, such as Lewan and Tarakai Qila in the Bannu basin, were large-scale factories, producing many types of tools from carefully selected stones collected and brought in from neighbouring areas. These same sites also appear to have been centres for the manufacture of beads of various semiprecious stones.

Culture and religion

It may be concluded on the basis of pottery decoration that major changes were taking place in the intellectual life of the whole region during the Early Harappan Period. At a number of sites the pottery bears a variety of incised or painted marks, some superficially resembling script. The significance of these marks is not clear, but most probably they represent owners’ marks, applied at the time of manufacture. Although it would be an exaggeration to regard these marks as actual writing, they suggest that the need for a script was beginning to arise.

Among the painted decorations found on the pottery, some appear to carry a distinctly religious symbolism. The clearest instance of this is in the widespread occurrence of the buffalo-head motif, characterized by elongated horns and in some cases sprouting pipal (Ficus religiosa) branches or other plant forms. These have been interpreted as representing a “buffalo deity.” A painted bowl from Lewan displays a pair of such heads, one a buffalo and the other a Bos indicus, each adorned with pipal foliage. Other devices from the painted pottery may also have religious significance, particularly the pipal leaves that occur as independent motifs. Other examples include fish forms and the fish-scale pattern that later appears as a common decoration on the mature Indus pottery. Throughout the region, evidence supports a “convergence” of form and decoration in anticipation of the more conservative Indus style.

The remains discussed above, considered collectively, suggest that four or five millennia of uninterrupted agricultural life in the Indus region set the stage for the final emergence of an indigenous Indus civilization about 2600 BCE. It could also be argued, however, that the substantial Early Harappan walled towns constituted cities. Much research, excavation, and comparative analysis are required before this fertile and provocative period can be understood.

The Indus civilization

Character and significance

While the Indus (or Harappan) civilization may be considered the culmination of a long process indigenous to the Indus valley, a number of parallels exist between developments on the Indus River and the rise of civilization in Mesopotamia. It is striking to compare the Indus with this better-known and more fully documented region and to see how closely the two coincide with respect to the emergence of cities and of such major concomitants of civilization as writing, standardized weights and measures, and monumental architecture. Yet nearly all the earlier writers have sensed the Indian-ness of the civilization, even when they were largely unable to articulate it. Thus, historian V. Gordon Childe wrote that:

India confronts Egypt and Babylonia by the 3rd millennium with a thoroughly individual and independent civilization of her own, technically the peer of the rest. And plainly it is deeply rooted in Indian soil. The Indus civilization represents a very perfect adjustment of human life to a specific environment. And it has endured; it is already specifically Indian and forms the basis of modern Indian culture. (New Light on the Most Ancient East, 4th ed., 1952.)

The force of Childe’s words can be appreciated even without an examination of the Indus valley script found on seals; the attention paid to domestic bathrooms, the drains, and the Great Bath at Mohenjo-daro can all be compared to elements in the later Indian civilization. The bullock carts with a framed canopy, called ikkas, and boats are little changed to this day. The absence of pins and the love of bangles and of elaborate nose ornaments are all peculiarly South Asian. The religion of the Indus also is replete with suggestions of traits known from later India. The significance of the bull, the tiger, and the elephant; the composite animals; the seated yogi god of the seals; the tree spirits and the objects resembling the Shiva linga (a phallus symbolic of the god Shiva) of later times—all these are suggestive of enduring forms in later Indian civilization.

It is still impossible to do more than guess at the social organization or the political and administrative control implied by this vast area of cultural uniformity. The evidence of widespread trade in many commodities, the apparent uniformity of weights and measures, the common script, and the uniformity—almost common currency—of the seals all indicate some measure of political and economic control and point to the great cities Mohenjo-daro and Harappa as their centres. The presence of the great granaries on the citadel mounds in these cities and of the citadels themselves suggests—partly on the analogies of the cities of Mesopotamia—the existence of priest-kings, or at least a priestly oligarchy, that controlled the economy and civil government. The intellectual mechanism of this government and the striking degree of control implicit in it are still matters of speculation. Nor can scholars yet speak with any certainty regarding relations between the cities and surrounding villages. Much more research needs to be done, on many such topics, before the full character of the Indus civilization can be revealed.

Chronology

The first serious attempt at establishing a chronology for the Indus civilization relied on cross-dating with Mesopotamia. In this way, Cyril John Gadd cited the period of Sargon of Akkad (2334–2279 BCE) and the subsequent Isin-Larsa Period (2017–1794 BCE) as the time when trade between ancient India and Mesopotamia was at its height. Calibration of the ever-growing number of radiocarbon dates provides a reasonably consistent series from site to site. The broad picture thus obtained suggests that the mature Indus civilization emerged between 2600 and 2500 BCE and continued in full glory to about 2000 BCE.

Thereafter the evidence is still somewhat unclear, but the late stage of the mature culture probably continued until about 1700 BCE, by which time it is probably accurate to speak of the Post-Urban, or Post-Harappan, stage.

Extent

All the earlier writers have stressed the remarkable uniformity of the products of the Harappan civilization, and for this reason they provide a definite hallmark for its settlements. The more-recent evidence suggests that, if the outermost sites are joined by lines, the area enclosed will be a little less than about 500,000 square miles (1,300,000 square km)—considerably larger than present-day Pakistan—and if, as is generally inferred, this cultural uniformity coincided with some sort of political and administrative unity, the size of the resulting “empire” is truly vast. Within this area, several hundred sites have been identified, the great majority of which are on the plains of the Indus or its tributaries or on the now dry course of the ancient Saraswati River, which flowed south of the Sutlej River and then, perhaps, southward to the Indian Ocean, east of the main course of the Indus itself. Outside the Indus system a few sites occur on the Makran Coast, the westernmost of which is at Sutkagen Dor, near the present-day frontier with Iran. These sites were probably ports or trading posts, supporting the sea trade with the Persian Gulf, and were established in what otherwise remained a largely separate cultural region. The uplands of Baluchistan, while showing clear evidence of trade and contact with the Indus civilization, appear to have remained outside the direct Harappan rule.

To the east of the Indus delta, other coastal sites are found beyond the marshy salt flats of the Rann of Kachchh (Kutch) and in the interior of the Kathiawar Peninsula (Saurashtra). These include the estuarine trading post at Lothal on the Gulf of Khambhat (Cambay), as well as many other sites, some of which are major. West of the Indus River a number of important sites are situated on the alluvial Kachchhi desert region of Balochistan, Pak., toward Sibi and Quetta. East of the Indus system, toward the north, a number of sites occur right up to the edge of the Himalayan foothills, where at Alamgirpur, north of Delhi, the easternmost Harappan (or perhaps, more properly, Late Harappan) settlement has been discovered and partly excavated. If the area covered by these sites is compared with that of the Early Harappan settlements, it will be seen that there is an expansion in several directions, along the coast to both the west and the east and eastward through the Punjab toward the Ganges-Yamuna Doab.

Planning and architecture

The Harappan sites range from extensive cities to small villages or outposts. The two largest are Mohenjo-daro and Harappa, each perhaps originally about a mile square in overall dimensions. Each shares a characteristic layout, oriented roughly north-south with a great fortified “citadel” mound to the west and a larger “lower city” to the east. A similar layout is also discernible in the somewhat smaller town of Kalibangan, and several other major settlements appear to have shared this scheme. Other major sites include Dholavira and Surkotada near the Rann of Kachchh; Nausharo Firoz in Balochistan, Pak.; Shortughai in northern Afghanistan; Amri, Chanhu-daro, and Judeirjo-daro in Sind; and Sandhanawala in Bahawalpur. Among the smaller sites, special interest attaches to Lothal, where a number of unique and problematic features were discovered in excavations. Of all the sites, Harappa, Mohenjo-daro, Kalibangan, and Lothal have been most extensively excavated, and more can be said of their original layout and planning. Thus, they are considered in greater detail below.

Stupalike stone tower, Mohenjo-daro, eastern Pakistan.Frederick M. Asher

At three of the excavated major sites, the citadel mound is on a north-south axis and about twice as long as it is broad. The lower city is laid out in a grid pattern of streets; at Kalibangan these were of regularly controlled widths, with the major streets running through, while the minor lanes were sometimes offset, creating different sizes of blocks. At all three sites the citadel was protected by a massive defensive wall of brick, which at Kalibangan was strengthened at intervals by square or rectangular bastions. At Kalibangan, traces of a somewhat less substantial wall around the lower town have also been discovered. In all three cases the city was situated near a river, although these courses are now extinct.

The most common building material at every site was brick, but the proportions of burned brick to unburned mud brick vary. Mohenjo-daro employs burned brick, perhaps because timber was more readily available, while mud brick was reserved for fillings and mass work. Kalibangan, on the other hand, reserved burned brick for bathrooms, wells, and drains. Most of the domestic architecture at Kalibangan was in mud brick. Brick was generally bonded in courses of alternate headers and stretchers—the so-called English bond. Stone was rarely, if ever, employed structurally. Timber was occasionally used as a lacing for brickwork, particularly in large-scale work such as the defenses or the granary at Mohenjo-daro. The common bricks were made in an open mold, but for special purposes sawed bricks were also employed. Timber was used for the universal flat roofs, and in some instances the sockets indicate square-cut beams with spans of as much as 14 feet (4.5 metres).

The houses were invariably entered from the side lanes, with the walls to the main streets presenting a blank brick facade broken only by the drainage chutes. Apart from domestic structures, a wide range of shops and craft workshops have been encountered, including potters’ kilns, dyers’ vats, and the shops of metalworkers, shell workers, and bead makers. There is surprisingly little evidence of public places of worship, although at Mohenjo-daro a number of possible temples were unearthed in the lower city, and other buildings of a ritual character were reported in the citadel. The size of houses varies considerably. At the one extreme are single-roomed barracks, with cooking and bathing areas formed within by partition walls, and at the other are large houses around a central courtyard or sometimes with a set of intersecting courtyards, each with its own adjoining rooms. Nearly all the larger houses had private wells. In many cases brick stairways led to what must have been upper stories or flat roofs. The bathrooms were usually indicated by the fine quality of the brickwork in the floor and by waste drains.

Important sites

Mohenjo-daro

The mounds of Mohenjo-daro lie near the right bank of the Indus in the Larkana district of Sind province. The excavations revealed that the lowest level of former occupation was covered by deposits of alluvial silt to a depth of about 30 feet (10 metres), attributable to annual flooding. The lowest levels are thus below the present-day water table and are still largely unexcavated. As noted above, the main features of the layout of Mohenjo-daro are a citadel to the west and a lower city and grid of streets to the east. Enough has been said of the general features of the lower city to make it unnecessary to say more of the considerable areas excavated in that part. The citadel, however, demands further attention. In the citadel the English archaeologist Sir John Hubert Marshall discovered a massive platform of mud brick and clay approximately 20 feet (6 metres) in depth, above which were six main building levels. Under this platform lay the remains of the early period. It is probable, but by no means certain, that the platform was raised as protection against floods. Both it and the great brick defensive wall around the perimeter were built at the beginning of the intermediate period.

Site overview of Mohenjo-daro, eastern Pakistan.Frederick M. Asher

The main buildings of the citadel all apparently belong to the same period. The most striking of these is the Great Bath, which occupies a central position in the better-preserved northern half of the citadel. It is built of fine brickwork, measures 897 square feet (83 square metres), and is 8 feet (2.5 metres) lower than the surrounding pavement. The floor of the bath consists of two skins of sawed brick set on edge in gypsum mortar, with a layer of bitumen sealer sandwiched between the skins. Water was evidently supplied by a large well in an adjacent room, and an outlet in one corner of the bath led to a high corbeled drain disgorging on the west side of the mound. The bath was reached by flights of steps at either end, originally finished with timbered treads set in bitumen. The significance of this extraordinary structure can only be guessed at, but it has generally been thought that it is linked with some sort of ritual bathing. To the north and east of the bath were groups of rooms that evidently were also designed for some special function, probably associated with the group of administrators or priests who controlled not only the city but also the great state that it dominated. To the west of the bath a complex of brick platforms about 5 feet (1.5 metres) high and separated from each other by narrow passages formed a podium of some 150 by 75 feet (45 by 22 metres), which has been identified by Wheeler as the base of a great granary similar to that known at Harappa. Below the granary were brick loading bays. In the southern part of the mound an oblong “assembly hall” was discovered, having four rows of fine brick plinths, presumably to take wooden columns. In a room adjacent to this hall, a stone sculpture of a seated male figure was discovered, and nearby a number of large worked-stone rings, possibly of some architectural significance. It seems certain that this area was invested with some special significance and may well have been a temple or connected with some religious cult.

The Great Bath, Mohenjo-daro, eastern Pakistan.Frederick M. Asher

Harappa

The vast mounds at Harappa stand on the left bank of the now dry course of the Ravi River in the Punjab. They were excavated between 1920 and 1934 by the Archaeological Survey of India, in 1946 by Wheeler, and in the late 20th century by an American and Pakistani team. When first discovered, the extensive surviving brick ramparts led to the site’s being described as a ruined brick castle. The lower city is partly occupied by a modern village, and it has been seriously disturbed by erosion and brick robbers. The citadel, to the west, is roughly a parallelogram on plan, measuring approximately 1,300 by 650 feet (400 by 200 metres). Excavation there revealed a great platform of mud brick about 20 feet (6 metres) in thickness, with a massive brick wall around the perimeter. Below the defenses were discovered traces of the Early Harappan Period. The excavations were not extensive enough to reveal the layout of the interior, but about six building periods were discovered above the platform. The most interesting remains were discovered immediately north of the citadel, close to the bed of the river: there were a series of circular platforms evidently intended to hold mortars for pounding grain; a remarkable series of brick plinths, which are inferred to have formed the podium for two rows of six granary buildings, each 50 by 20 feet (15 by 6 metres) and of a different design from those at Mohenjo-daro; a series of pear-shaped furnaces, apparently used for metallurgy; and two rows of single-roomed barracks, which are generally thought to have been occupied by servants. Two other discoveries at Harappa were made to the south of the citadel. There two cemeteries were found—“R. 37,” belonging to the Harappan Period, and “H,” dating from the Late or even Post-Harappan Period. These contained different styles of burial and will be discussed below.

Harappan wellAncient Harappan well, Harappa, Pakistan.© Jupiterimages/Photos.com/Thinkstock

Kalibangan

Third in importance among excavated Harappan sites is Kalibangan, which stands on the left bank of the dry bed of the Saraswati River in northern Rajasthan. As mentioned above, an Early Harappan settlement lies beneath the later remains, and the main Harappan township has a layout strikingly similar to that of Mohenjo-daro and Harappa. In the lower town, excavation has revealed as many as nine building phases. The citadel mound is a parallelogram on a plan of about 430 feet (130 metres) on the east-west axis and 850 feet (260 metres) on the north-south. The whole site has been drastically reduced by brick robbers, but careful excavation has revealed the foundation courses of an accurately laid rhomboid central section with oblong bastions at each corner and smaller bastions on the north and south walls. The principal access was from the south via a flight of steps. Access from the north was via a narrow postern reached by a stairway, beyond which was a further rhomboid section, having an inset gateway in the northwest corner, near the riverbank. Traces of a brick wall around the lower town were also encountered. The central sector of the citadel contained a series of high brick platforms divided by narrow passages. The upper parts of these platforms had been seriously damaged, and their function is mysterious, but they do not appear to have been the foundation for a granary. The northern sector contained normal domestic housing. A cemetery was discovered a short distance to the west of the town. It may be expected that, when the excavation of this site is published, it will add greatly to knowledge of the Indus civilization.

Lothal

One other excavated site deserves special attention; this is Lothal, a small settlement built on low-lying ground near a tributary of the Sabarmati River on the west side of the Gulf of Khambhat. It appears to have served as a port or trading station. Its layout is distinctive: the site is roughly rectangular, measuring about 1,180 feet (360 metres) on the long north-south axis and 690 feet (210 metres) on the east-west. It was surrounded by a massive brick wall, which was probably used for flood protection. The southeastern quadrant takes the form of a great platform of brick with earth filling, rising to a height of about 13 feet (4 metres). On this were built a series of further smaller platforms with intersecting air channels, reminiscent of the granary at Mohenjo-daro, with overall dimensions of about 159 by 139 feet (48 by 42 metres). Behind this block were other buildings including a row of 12 bathrooms with connected drains, also strongly reminiscent of those found on the citadel at Mohenjo-daro. The remaining enclosed area was evidently taken up by houses and shops. Among the significant finds were a bead maker’s factory and the shops of goldsmiths and coppersmiths. The main street ran from north to south.

The most unexpected discovery at Lothal, however, was a great brick basin measuring some 718 by 121 feet (219 by 37 metres) with extant brick walls of 15 feet (4.5 metres) in height. This lay east of the settlement, alongside the platform on which the granary block stood. At one end of the basin was a small sluice or spillway with a locking device. The excavator has inferred that the basin was a dock to which ships could be brought from the nearby estuary via an artificial channel that would have been kept clear of silt by controlling the flow of water from the spillway. This view has not been universally accepted; another view is that it provided a source of fresh water for drinking or agriculture. A cemetery was found outside the perimeter of the wall, west of the site.

Other important sites

A growing number of other sites have been excavated, each important in its own way. On the coast near Las Bela in Balochistan, materials suggesting a substantial shell-working industry have been found at Balakot. Not far from Mehrgarh, at the head of the Kachchhi desert region in Balochistan, the small settlement of Naushahro Firoz provides valuable evidence of the actual transformation of Early Harappan into mature Harappan. Near the Rann of Kachchh, Surkotada is a small settlement with an oblong fortification wall of stone. Also in Kachchh is Dholavira, which appears to be among the largest Harappan settlements so far identified; a nine-year excavation at the site completed in 2001 yielded a walled Indus valley city that dated to the mid-3rd millennium BCE and covered some 3.5 acres (1.4 hectares). The Archaeological Survey of India team uncovered a sophisticated water-management system with a series of giant reservoirs—the largest 265 by 40 feet (80 by 12 metres) wide and 23 feet (7 metres) deep—used to conserve rainwater. Of excavated sites in Punjab, Banawali is an important major settlement, surrounded by massive brick defenses. One of the most surprising discoveries, far outside the central area of the Indus civilization, is Shortughai in the Amu Darya (Oxus River) valley, in northern Afghanistan. There the remains of a small Harappan colony, presumably sited so as to provide control of the lapis lazuli export trade originating in neighbouring Badakhshan, have been excavated by a French team.

Population

There have been two independent estimates of the population of Mohenjo-daro. Both are based on an estimation of the original area covered and the density of the people living there, using traditional settlements in the region in the present day for comparison. Hugh Trevor Lambrick proposed a figure of 35,000 for Mohenjo-daro and a roughly similar figure for Harappa, while Walter A. Fairservis estimated the former at about 41,250 and the latter about 23,500. These figures are probably conservative. It would be possible to produce estimates of the population for other sites along similar lines—notably for Kalibangan, of which the lower city has an area about one-fifth that of Mohenjo-daro.

Agriculture and animal husbandry

It is certain that such great concentrations of population had never been seen in the Indian subcontinent before that date. Clearly the exploitation of the Indus River floodplains and the use of the plow attested in Early Harappan times by finds in Kalibangan were matters of supreme importance. The Indus is at a minimum during the winter months and rises steadily during the spring and early summer, reaching a maximum in midsummer and then subsiding. Lambrick has shown how the traditional exploitation of the floods could provide a simple means of growing the principal crops without even plowing, manuring, or using major irrigation. The main cereals would be sown at the end of the inundation on land that had recently emerged from the floods, and the crop would be harvested in March or April. Other crops might be sown in embanked fields at the beginning of the floods so that they could receive necessary water while growing and be harvested in the autumn. Wheat samples from the Indus cities have been identified as belonging to Triticum sphaerococcum and two subspecies of T. sativum—vulgare and compactum. Barley is also found, of the species Hordeum vulgare, variety nudum and variety hexastichum. Rice is recorded in Harappan times at Lothal in Gujarat, but whether it was wild or cultivated is not yet clear. Other crops include dates, melon, sesame, and varieties of leguminous plants, such as field peas. From Chanhu-daro, seeds of mustard (most probably Brassica juncea) were obtained. Finally, there is evidence that cotton was cultivated and used for textiles.

A number of domesticated animal species have been found in excavations at the Harappan cities. The Indian humped cattle (Bos indicus) were most frequently encountered, though whether along with a humpless variety, such as that shown on the seals, is not clearly established. The buffalo (B. bubalis) is less common and may have been wild. Sheep and goats occur, as does the Indian pig (Sus cristatus). The camel is present, as well as the ass (Equus asinus). Bones of domestic fowl are not uncommon; these fowl were domesticated from the indigenous jungle fowl. Finally, the cat and the dog were both evidently domesticated. Present, but not necessarily as a domesticated species, is the elephant. The horse is possibly present but extremely rare and apparently only present in the last stages of the Harappan Period.

Communications

It is clear that, to achieve the degree of uniformity of material culture evidenced in the excavations, considerable contact must have been maintained between the towns and cities of the Indus state. Such contact may have been by both land and river, just as the foreign trade must have employed both overland and sea routes. For land travel the predominant means was probably the pack bullock, camel, or ass. All these animals are still, or were until recently, used for pack transport in the more-remote country districts of the subcontinent. For travel on the flat alluvial plains, the bullock cart was probably the main vehicle. Terra-cotta models of such carts, apparently very little different from the modern Indian cart, are frequently encountered. For the transport of persons, smaller carts, with a body raised above the level of the axle and a framed canopy (much like the modern ikka), are known from small bronze models. Several representations of boats also occur. They are mostly of simple design without masts or sails and would be more suitable for river travel than for sea travel. A terra-cotta model of another type of boat with a socket for mast and eye holes for rigging was discovered at Lothal. This appears to be a somewhat more seaworthy vessel. The dock basin at Lothal may have provided berth for ships of the size of the country craft that still ply between India and the Persian Gulf. Heavy pierced stones discovered in the vicinity of the dock basin at Lothal were assumed by the excavator to be similar to stones still used by the local boatmen as anchors.

Craft and technology

The Indus civilization exhibits a wide range of crafts and technical skills. As Childe remarked, these depended on the same basic discoveries as those exploited in Egypt or Mesopotamia, but in each case the crafts acquired a significance of their own. More-recent research at Mohenjo-daro has shown that different quarters of the lower city appeared to house the families who specialized in different crafts; such evidence strengthens the view that occupational specialization was firmly established.

Copper and bronze were the principal metals used for making tools and implements. These include flat oblong axes, chisels, knives, spears, arrowheads (of a kind that was evidently exported to neighbouring hunting tribes), small saws, and razors. All these could be made by simple casting, chiseling, and hammering. Bronze is less common than copper, and it is notably rarer in the lower levels. Four main varieties of metal have been found: crude copper lumps in the state in which they left the smelting furnace; refined copper, containing trace elements of arsenic and antimony; an alloy of copper with 2 to 5 percent of arsenic; and bronze with a tin alloy, often of as much as 11 to 13 percent. The copper and bronze vessels of the Harappans are among their finest products, formed by hammering sheets of metal. Casting of copper and bronze was understood, and figurines of men and animals were made by the lost-wax process. These too are technically outstanding, though the overall level of copper-bronze technology is not considered to have reached the level attained in Mesopotamia.

Other metals used were gold, silver, and lead. The latter was employed occasionally for making small vases and such objects as plumb bobs. Silver is relatively more common than gold, and more than a few vessels are known, generally in forms similar to copper and bronze examples. Gold is by no means common and was generally reserved for such small objects as beads, pendants, and brooches.

Other special crafts include the manufacture of faience (earthenware decorated with coloured glazes)—for making beads, amulets, sealings, and small vessels—and the working of stone for bead manufacture and for seals. The seals were generally cut from steatite (soapstone) and were carved in intaglio or incised with a copper burin (cutting tool). Beads were made from a variety of substances, but the carnelians are particularly noteworthy. They include several varieties of etched carnelian and long barrel beads made with extraordinary skill and accuracy. Shell and ivory were also worked and were used for beads, inlays, combs, bracelets, and the like.

The pottery of the Indus cities has all the marks of mass production. A substantial proportion is thrown on the wheel (probably the same kind of footwheel that is still found in the Indus region and to the west to this day, as distinguished from the Indian spun wheel common throughout the remaining parts of the subcontinent). The majority of the pottery is competent plain ware, well formed and fired but lacking in aesthetic appeal. A substantial portion of the pottery has a red slip and is painted with black decoration. Larger pots were probably built up on a turntable. Among the painted designs, conventionalized vegetable patterns are common, and the elaborate geometric designs of the painted pottery of Baluchistan give way to simpler motifs, such as intersecting circles or a scale pattern. Birds, animals, fish, and more-interesting scenes are comparatively rare. Of the vessel forms, a shallow platter on a tall stand (known as the offering stand) is noteworthy, as is a tall cylindrical vessel perforated with small holes over its entire length and often open at top and bottom. The function of this latter vessel remains a mystery.

Although little has survived, very great interest attaches to the fragments of cotton textiles recovered at Mohenjo-daro. These provide the earliest evidence of a crop and industry for which India has long been famous. It is assumed that the raw cotton must have been brought in bales to the cities to be spun, woven, and perhaps dyed, as the presence of dyers’ vats would seem to indicate.

Stone, although largely absent from the great alluvial plain of the Indus, played a major role in Harappan material culture. Scattered sources, mostly on the periphery, were exploited as major factory sites. Thus, the stone blades found in great numbers at Mohenjo-daro originated in the flint quarries at Sukkur, where they were probably struck in quantity from prepared cores.

Trade and external contacts

It has been seen above that the area covered by the Indus civilization had a remarkably uniform level of material culture. This suggests a closely knit and integrated administration and implies internal trade within the state. Evidence of the actual exportation of objects is not always easy to find, but the wide diffusion of chert blades made of the characteristic Sukkur stone and the enormous scale of the factory at the Sukkur site strongly suggest trade. Other items also appear to indicate trade, such as the almost identical bronze carts discovered at Chanhu-daro and Harappa, for which a common origin must be postulated.

The wide range of crafts and special materials employed must also have caused the establishment of economic relations with peoples living outside the Harappan state. Such trade may be considered to be of two kinds: first, the obtaining of raw materials and other goods from the village communities or forest tribes in regions adjoining the Indus culture area; and second, trade with the cities and empires of Mesopotamia. There is ample indication of the former type, even if the regions from which specific materials were derived are not easy to pinpoint. Gold was almost certainly imported from the group of settlements that sprang up in the vicinity of the goldfields of northern Karnataka, and copper could have come from several sources—principally from Rajasthan. Lead may have come from Rajasthan or elsewhere in India. Lapis lazuli was probably imported from Iran rather than directly from the mines at Badakhshan, and turquoise probably also came from Iran. Among others were fuchsite (a chromium-rich variety of muscovite) from Karnataka, alabaster from Iran, amethyst from Maharashtra, and jade from Central Asia. There is little evidence of what the Harappans gave in exchange for these materials—possibly nondurable goods such as cotton textiles and probably various types of beads. They may have also bartered tools or weapons of copper.

For the trade with Mesopotamia there is both literary and archaeological evidence. The Harappan seals were evidently used to seal bundles of merchandise, as clay seal impressions with cord or sack marks on the reverse side testify. The presence of a number of Indus seals at Ur and other Mesopotamian cities and the discovery of a “Persian Gulf” type of seal at Lothal—otherwise known from the Persian Gulf ports of Dilmun (present-day Bahrain) and Faylakah, as well as from Mesopotamia—provide convincing corroboration of the sea trade suggested by the Lothal dock. Timber and precious woods, ivory, lapis lazuli, gold, and luxury goods such as carnelian beads, pearls, and shell and bone inlays, including the distinctly Indian kidney shape, were among the goods sent to Mesopotamia in exchange for silver, tin, woolen textiles, and grains and other foods. Copper ingots appear to have been imported to Lothal from a place known as Magan (possibly in present-day Oman). Other probable trade items include products originating exclusively in each respective region, such as bitumen, occurring naturally in Mesopotamia, and cotton textiles and chickens, major products of the Indus region not native to Mesopotamia.

Mesopotamian trade documents, lists of goods, and official inscriptions mentioning Meluhha (the ancient Akkadian name for the Indus region) supplement Harappan seals and archaeological finds. Literary references to Meluhhan trade date from the Akkadian, Ur III, and Isin-Larsa periods (i.e., c. 2350–1794 BCE), but, as texts and archaeological data indicate, the trade probably started in the Early Dynastic Period (c. 2600 BCE). During the Akkadian Period, Meluhhan vessels sailed directly to Mesopotamian ports, but by the Isin-Larsa Period, Dilmun was the entrepôt for Meluhhan and Mesopotamian traders. By the subsequent Old Babylonian Period, trade between the two cultures evidently had ceased entirely.

Language and scripts, weights and measures

The maintenance of so extensive a set of relations as those implicit in the size and uniformity of the Harappan state and the extent of trade contacts must have called for a well-developed means of communication. The Harappan script has long defied attempts to read it, and therefore the language remains unknown. Relatively recent analyses of the order of the signs on the inscriptions have led several scholars to the view that the language is not of the Indo-European family, nor is it close to Sumerian, Hurrian, or Elamite. If it is related to any modern language family, it appears to be the Dravidian, presently spoken throughout the southern part of the Indian peninsula; an isolated member of this group, the Brahui language, is spoken in western Pakistan, an area closer to those regions of Harappan culture. The script, which was written from right to left, is known from the 2,000-odd short inscriptions so far recovered, ranging from single characters to inscriptions of about 20 characters. There are more than 500 signs, many appearing to be compounds of two or more other signs, but it is not yet clear whether these signs are ideographic, logographic, or other. Numerous studies of the inscriptions have been made during the past decades, including those by a Russian team under Yury Valentinovich Knorozov and a Finnish group led by Asko Parpola. Despite various claims to have read the script, there is still no general agreement.

The Harappans also employed regular systems of weights and measures. An early analysis of a fair number of the well-formed chert cuboid weights suggested that they followed a binary system for the lower denominations—1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64—and a decimal system for the larger weights—160, 200, 320, 640, 1,600, 3,200, 6,400, 8,000, and 12,800—with the unit of weight being calculated as 0.8565 gram (0.0302 ounce). However, a more recent analysis, which included additional weights from Lothal, suggests a rather different system, with weights belonging to two series. In both series the underlying principle was decimal, with each decimal number multiplied and divided by two, giving for the main series ratios of 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500(?). This suggests that there is still much work to be done to understand the full complexity of the weight system. Several scales of measurement were found in the excavations. One was a decimal scale of 1.32 inches (3.35 cm) rising probably to 13.2 inches (33.5 cm), apparently corresponding to the “foot” that was widespread in western Asia; another is a bronze rod marked in lengths of 0.367 inch (0.93 cm), apparently half a digit of a “cubit” of 20.7 inches (52.6 cm), also widespread in western Asia and Egypt. Measurements from some of the structures show that these units were accurately applied in practice.

It has also been suggested that certain curious objects may have been accurately made optical squares with which surveyors might offset right angles. In view of the accuracy of so much of the architectural work, this theory appears quite plausible.

Social and political system

Despite a growing body of archaeological evidence, the social and political structures of the Indus “state” remain objects of conjecture. The apparent craft specialization and localized craft groupings at Mohenjo-daro, along with the great divergence in house types and size, point toward some degree of social stratification. Trade was extensive and apparently well-regulated, providing imported raw materials for use at internal production centres, distributing finished goods throughout the region, and arguably culminating in the establishment of Harappan “colonies” in both Mesopotamia and Badakhshan. The remarkable uniformity of weights and measures throughout the Indus lands, as well as the development of such presumably civic works as the great granaries, implies a strong degree of political and administrative control over a wide area. Further, the widespread occurrence of inscriptions in the Harappan script almost certainly indicates the use of a single lingua franca. Nevertheless, in the absence of inscriptions that can be read and interpreted, it is inevitable that far less is known of these aspects of the Indus civilization than those of contemporaneous Mesopotamia.

Art

The excavations of the Indus cities have produced much evidence of artistic activity. Such finds are important, because they provide an insight into the minds, lives, and religious beliefs of their creators. Stone sculpture is extremely rare, and much of it is quite crude. The total repertoire cannot compare to the work done in Mesopotamia during the same periods. The figures are apparently all intended as images for worship. Such figures include seated men, recumbent composite animals, or—in unique instances (from Harappa)—a standing nude male and a dancing figure. The finest pieces are of excellent quality. There is also a small but notable repertoire of cast-bronze figures, including several fragments and complete examples of dancing girls, small chariots, carts, and animals. The technical excellence of the bronzes suggests a highly developed art, but the number of examples is still small. They appear to be Indian workmanship rather than imports.

The popular art of the Harappans was in the form of terra-cotta figurines. The majority are of standing females, often heavily laden with jewelry, but standing males—some with beard and horns—are also present. It has been generally agreed that these figures are largely deities (perhaps a Great Mother and a Great God), but some small figures of mothers with children or of domestic activities are probably toys. There are varieties of terra-cotta animals, carts, and toys—such as monkeys pierced to climb a string and cattle that nod their heads. Painted pottery is the only evidence that there was a tradition of painting. Much of the work is executed with boldness and delicacy of feeling, but the restrictions of the art do not leave much scope for creativity.

The steatite seals, to whose manufacture reference was made above, form the most extensive series of objects of art in the civilization. The great majority show a humpless “unicorn” or bull in profile, while others show the Indian humped bull, elephant, bison, rhinoceros, or tiger. The animal frequently stands before a ritual object, variously identified as a standard, a manger, or even an incense burner. A considerable number of the seals contain scenes of obvious mythological or religious significance. The interpretation of these seals is, however, often highly problematic. The seals were certainly more widely diffused than other artistic artifacts and show a much higher level of workmanship. Probably they functioned as amulets, as well as more-practical devices to identify merchandise.

Religion and burial customs

In spite of the unread inscriptions, there is a considerable body of evidence that allows for conjecture concerning the religious beliefs of the Harappans. First, there are the buildings identified as temples or as possessing a ritual function, such as the Great Bath at Mohenjo-daro. Then there are the stone sculptures found to a large extent associated with these buildings. Finally, there are the terra-cotta figures, as well as the seals and amulets that depict scenes with evident mythological or religious content. The interpretation of such data necessarily involves a largely subjective element, but most commentators have thought that they indicate a religious system that was already distinctly Indian. It is assumed that there was a Great God, who had many of the attributes later associated with the Hindu god Shiva, and a Great Mother, who was the Great God’s spouse and shared the attributes of Shiva’s wife Durga-Parvati. Evidence also exists of some sort of animal cult, related particularly to the bull, the buffalo, and the tiger. Mythological animals include a composite bull-elephant. Some seals suggest influence from or at least traits held in common with Mesopotamia; among these are the Gilgamesh (Mesopotamian epic) motif of a man grappling with a pair of tigers and the bull-man Enkidu (a human with horns, tail, and rear hooves of a bull). Among the most interesting of the seals are those that depict cult scenes or symbols; a god, seated in a yogic (meditative) posture and surrounded by beasts, with a horned headdress and erect phallus; the tree spirit with a tiger standing before it; the horned tree spirit confronted by a worshiper; a composite beast with a line of seven figures standing before it; the pipal leaf motif; and the swastika (a symbol still widely used by Hindus, Jains, and Buddhists).

Many burials have been discovered, giving clear indication of belief in an afterlife. The cemeteries excavated at Harappa, Lothal, and Kalibangan are clearly separated from the settlement and show that the predominant rite was extended inhumation, with the body lying on its back and the head generally positioned to the north. Quantities of pottery were placed in the graves, and sometimes personal ornaments adorned the bodies. Some graves took the form of brick chambers within which the body was placed. At Lothal several pairs of skeletons were found in the same grave, and it has been suggested that this is an indication of some form of suttee (a later Hindu custom in which wives end their lives after the death of the husband).

The end of the Indus civilization

There is no general agreement regarding the causes of the breakdown of Harappan urban society. Broadly speaking, the principal theories thus far proposed fall under four headings. The first is gradual environmental change, such as a shift in climatic patterns and consequent agricultural disaster, perhaps resulting from excessive environmental stress caused by population growth and overexploitation of resources. Second, some scholars have postulated more-precipitous environmental changes, such as tectonic events leading to the flooding of Mohenjo-daro, the drying up of the Sarawati River, or other such calamities. Third, it is conceivable that human activities, such as invasions of tribespeople from the hills to the west of the Indus valley, perhaps even Indo-Aryans, contributed to the breakdown of Indus external trade links or more directly disrupted the cities. The fourth theory posits the occurrence of an epidemic or a similar agent of devastation. It appears likely that some complex of natural forces compromised the fabric of society and that subsequent human intervention hastened its complete breakdown.

Post-Harappan developments

The Post-Urban Period in northwestern India

It is still far from certain at what date the urban society broke down. The decline probably occurred in several stages, perhaps over a century or more; the period between about 2000 and 1750 BCE is a reasonable estimation. The collapse of the urban system does not necessarily imply a complete breakdown in the lifestyle of the population in all parts of the Indus region, but it seems to have involved the end of whatever system of social and political control had preceded it. After that date the cities, as such, and many of their distinctively urban traits—the use of writing and of seals and a number of the specialized urban crafts—disappear. The succeeding era, which lasted until about 750 BCE, may be considered as Post-Harappan or, perhaps better, as “Post-Urban.”

In Pakistan’s Sind province the Post-Urban phase is recognizable in the Jhukar culture at Chanhu-daro and other sites. There certain copper or bronze weapons and tools appear to be of “foreign” type and may be compared to examples from farther west (Iran and Central Asia); a different but parallel change is seen at Pirak, not far from Mehrgarh. In the Kachchh and Saurashtra regions there appears to have been a steady increase in the number of settlements, but all are small and none can compare with such undoubtedly Harappan cities as Dholavira. In this region, however, the distinctive foreign metal elements are less prominent.

An intriguing development occurs along the Saraswati valley: there the early Post-Urban stage is associated with the pottery known from the Cemetery H at Harappa. This coincides with a major reduction in both the number and size of settlements, suggesting a deterioration in the environment. In the eastern Punjab too there is a disappearance of the larger, urban sites but no comparable reduction in the number of smaller settlements. This is also true of the settlements farther east in the Ganges-Yamuna valleys. It is probably correct to conclude that, in each of these areas during the Post-Urban Period, material culture exhibited some tendency to develop regional variations, sometimes showing continuations of features already present during the Pre-Urban and Urban phases.

The appearance of Indo-Aryan speakers

Scholars have traditionally agreed that a people speaking Old Indo-Aryan dialects of the Indo-Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family arrived in the Indian subcontinent during the late 3rd and 2nd millennia BCE. These newcomers purportedly came from the steppes to the north and east of the Caspian Sea, moving first southward into the southern parts of Central Asia and from there fanning out across the Iranian plateau and spreading throughout northern India, disrupting the established sedentary culture and driving its Dravidian-speaking inhabitants of the Indus civilization southward. The movement itself remains hypothetical, but evidence from cemeteries at Sibri and south of Mehrgarh, near the mouth of the Bolan Pass, shows striking parallels—including foreign copper and bronze tools and weapons and typical pottery forms—with that from cemeteries of the Sapalli-Tepe group in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This correspondence suggests a date of about 2000 BCE for the presence of these people on the borders of the Indus system.

However, it is even more difficult to identify traces that may be associated with the movement of Indo-Aryan speakers into the central Indus plains or to determine whether the occasional copper or bronze weapons of foreign type found in late contexts at Mohenjo-daro or Chanhu-daro are evidence of their presence there. Moreover, even if Indo-Aryans actually conquered some of the Indus cities and established hegemony over the local population, it has to be explained why they appear to have given up many of their distinctive material products while presumably retaining their distinctive speech.

One hypothesis is that between about 2000 and 1500 BCE not an invasion but a continuing spread of Indo-Aryan speakers occurred, carrying them much farther into India, to the east and south, and coinciding with a growing cultural interaction between the native population and the new arrivals. From these processes a new cultural synthesis emerged, giving rise by the end of the 2nd millennium to the conscious expressions of Aryan ethnicity found in the Rigveda, particularly in the later hymns (see Early Vedic Period).

A more recent and controversial theory put forward by such scholars as American Jim G. Shaffer and Indian B.B. Lal suggests that Aryan civilization did not migrate to the subcontinent but was an original ethnic and linguistic element of pre-Vedic India. This theory would explain the dearth of physical signs of any putative Aryan conquest and is supported by the high degree of physical continuity between Harappan and Post-Harappan society.

The late 2nd millennium and the reemergence of urbanism

Toward the end of the 2nd millennium there appears to have been a further deterioration in the environment throughout the Indus system. Many of the Post-Urban settlements seem to have been abandoned, and traces are found of temporary settlements that were probably associated with nomadic pastoral groups and distinguished by the poverty of their material culture. Along the Saraswati there is further evidence of the drying up of the Derawar oasis, with a further decline in the number and size of settlements. As yet, these events are not properly dated, but they may tentatively be assigned to a period from about 1200–800 BCE. In Saurashtra a similar if less extreme decline in the number of settlements is also evident. Even much farther south, in Maharashtra, the opening of the 1st millennium seems to have coincided with a period of desiccation, in which the flourishing agricultural settlements at sites such as Inamgaon declined; temporary encampments of pastoral nomads indicate a general deterioration in the standard of living.

To the north, in Punjab, Haryana, and the upper Gangetic plain, such deterioration is less apparent, perhaps because the proximity of the Himalayas produced a higher level of rainfall. It is in this area that a new tendency emerges—the expansion of settlements associated with the pottery known as Painted Gray Ware. This characteristic ceramic accompanied a spread of settlements toward the east into the upper Ganges-Yamuna valleys and constitutes a distinguishing feature of the process of development that, by the second quarter of the 1st millennium BCE, gave rise to the first cities of the Ganges system. (The previous wave of urbanization appears not to have penetrated below the upper Gangetic plain.)

Another factor that coincided with, if not actually contributed to, the new process of change is the beginning and spread of iron working. The earliest dated occurrence of iron is probably that from about 1200 to 1100 BCE at Pirak in the Kachchhi region. Comparably early dates are suggested at other widely scattered sites, but it probably took many years for the use of iron in almost all types of toolmaking to become common in all regions. During this period an increasingly marked contrast may be observed between the growing number of cities across the north and the relatively less-developed settlement pattern of peninsular India, where a mixture of small-scale agriculture and pastoralism coincided with the appearance of the various types of “Megalithic” graves and monuments.

Peninsular India in the aftermath of the Indus civilization (c. 2000–1000 BCE)

It was stated above that the earliest known settlements in peninsular India appeared early in the 3rd millennium and showed either a mixed agricultural or strongly pastoral character. From about 2000 BCE there appears to have been a general expansion of these settlements. It is sometimes suggested that this expansion may have been in some way a result of the end of the Indus civilization and that large numbers of “Harappans” migrated to the south. There is little solid evidence to support this view, and it appears rather that the development was primarily indigenous.What is particularly noteworthy is the way in which regional cultural variants occurred throughout peninsular India and often seem to be ancestral to the major cultural regions known from later historical times. In Maharashtra the excavations at Inamgaon have provided the clearest picture so far of the developments and changes that took place in one of these regions. There can be seen the variety of crops and domestic animals, the changing house types, suggestions of tribal chiefdoms, limited craft specialization, and trade. Copper and bronze artifacts, though still relatively scarce, appear alongside stone blades and axes. This mixed technology continued until the time when iron became common. Farther south, in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, there is similar evidence, although the staple crop appears to have been millet, and wheat and barley are absent.Frank Raymond Allchin

The development of Indian civilization from c. 1500 BCE to c. 1200 CE

Traditional approaches to Indian historiography

The European scholars who reconstructed early Indian history in the 19th century regarded it as essentially static and Indian society as concerned only with things spiritual. Indologists, such as the German Max Müller, relied heavily on the Sanskritic tradition and saw Indian society as an idyllic village culture emphasizing qualities of passivity, meditation, and otherworldliness. In sharp contrast was the approach of the Scottish historian James Mill and the Utilitarians, who condemned Indian culture as irrational and inimical to human progress. Mill first formulated a periodization of Indian history into Hindu, Muslim, and British periods, a scheme that, while still commonly used, is now controversial. During the 19th century, direct contact with Indian institutions through administration, together with the utilization of new evidence from recently deciphered inscriptions, numismatics, and local archives, provided fresh insights. Nationalist Indian historians of the early 20th century tended to exaggerate the glory of the past but nevertheless introduced controversy into historical interpretation, which in turn resulted in more precise studies of Indian institutions. In more recent times, historians have reconstructed in greater detail the social, economic, and cultural history of the subcontinent—though politics has continued to influence the study of Indian history.

A major change in the interpretation of Indian history has been a questioning of an older notion of Oriental despotism as the determining force. Arising out of a traditional European perspective on Asia, this image of despotism grew to vast proportions in the 19th century and provided an intellectual justification for colonialism and imperialism. Its deterministic assumptions clouded the understanding of early interrelationships among Indian political forms, economic patterns, and social structures.

Trends in early Indian society

A considerable change is noticeable during this period in the role of institutions. Clan-based societies had assemblies, whose political role changed with the transformation of tribe into state and with oligarchic and monarchical governments. Centralized imperialism, which was attempted under the Mauryan empire (c. 325–185 BCE), gave way gradually to decentralized administration and to what has been called a feudalistic pattern in the post-Gupta period—i.e., from the 7th century CE. Although the village as an administrative and social unit remained constant, its relationship with the mainstream of history varied. The concept of divine kingship was known but rarely taken seriously, the claim to the status of the caste of royalty becoming more important. Because conformity to the social order had precedence over allegiance to the state, the idea of representation found expression not so much in political institutions as in caste and village assemblies. The pendulum of politics swung from large to small kingdoms, with the former attempting to establish empires—the sole successful attempt being that of the Mauryan dynasty. Thus, true centralization was rare, because local forces often determined historical events. Although imperial or near-imperial periods were marked by attempts at the evolution of uniform cultures, the periods of smaller kingdoms (often referred to as the Dark Ages by earlier historians) were more creative at the local level and witnessed significant changes in society and religion. These small kingdoms also often boasted the most elaborate and impressive monuments.

The major economic patterns were those relating to land and to commerce. The transition from tribal to peasant society was a continuing process, with the gradual clearing of wasteland and the expansion of the village economy based on plow agriculture. Recognition of the importance of land revenue coincided with the emergence of the imperial system in the 4th century BCE; and from this period onward, although the imperial structure did not last long, land revenue became central to the administration and income of the state. Frequent mentions of individual ownership, references to crown lands, numerous land grants to religious and secular grantees in the post-Gupta period, and detailed discussion in legal sources of the rights of purchase, bequest, and sale of land all clearly indicate that private ownership of land existed. Much emphasis has been laid on the state control of the irrigation system; yet a systematic study of irrigation in India reveals that it was generally privately controlled and that it serviced small areas of land. (See hydraulic civilization.) When the state built canals, they were mainly in the areas affected by both the winter and summer monsoons, in which village assemblies played a dominant part in revenue and general administration, as, for example, in the Cola (Chola) kingdom of southern India.

The urban economy was crucial to the rise of civilization in the Indus valley (c. 2600–2000 BCE). Later the 1st millennium BCE saw an urban civilization in the Ganges (Ganga) valley and still later in coastal south India. The emergence of towns was based on administrative needs, the requirements of trade, and pilgrimage centres. In the 1st millennium CE, when commerce expanded to include trade with western Asia, the eastern Mediterranean, and Central and Southeast Asia, revenue from trade contributed substantially to the economies of the participating kingdoms, as indeed Indian religion and culture played a significant part in the cultural evolution of Central and Southeast Asia. Gold coins were issued for the first time by the Kushan dynasty and in large quantity by the Guptas; both kingdoms were active in foreign trade. Gold was imported from Central Asia and the Roman Republic and Empire and later perhaps from eastern Africa because, in spite of India’s recurring association with gold, its sources were limited. Expanding trade encouraged the opening up of new routes, and this, coupled with the expanding village economy, led to a marked increase of knowledge about the subcontinent during the post-Mauryan period. With increasing trade, guilds became more powerful in the towns. Members of the guilds participated in the administration, were associated with politics, and controlled the development of trade through merchant embassies sent to places as far afield as Rome and China. Not least, guilds and merchant associations held envied and respectable positions as donors of religious institutions.

The structure of Indian society was characterized by caste. The distinguishing features of a caste society were endogamous kinship groups (jatis) arranged in a hierarchy of ritual ranking, based on notions of pollution and purity, with an intermeshing of service relationships and an adherence to geographic location. There was some coincidence between caste and access to economic resources. Although ritual hierarchy was unchanging, there appears to have been mobility within the framework. Migrations of peoples both within the subcontinent and from outside encouraged social mobility and change. The nucleus of the social structure was the family, with the pattern of kinship relations varying from region to region. In the more complex urban structure, occupational guilds occasionally took on jati functions, and there was a continual emergence of new social and professional groups.

Religion in early Indian history did not constitute a monolithic force. Even when the royalty attempted to encourage certain religions, the idea of a state religion was absent. In the main, there were three levels of religious expression. The most widespread was the worship of local cult deities vaguely associated with major deities, as seen in fertility cults, in the worship of mother goddesses, in the Shakta-Shakti cult, and in Tantrism. (See Shaktism.) Less widespread but popular, particularly in the urban areas, were the more puritanical sects of Buddhism and Jainism and the bhakti tradition of Hinduism. A third level included classical Hinduism and more abstract levels of Buddhism and Jainism, with an emphasis on the major deities in the case of the first and on the teachings of the founders in the case of the latter two. It was this level, endorsed by affluent patronage, that provided the base for the initial institutionalization of religion. But the three levels were not isolated; the shadow of the third fell over the first two, the more homely rituals and beliefs of which often crept into the third. This was the case particularly with Hinduism, the very flexibility of which was largely responsible for its survival. Forms of Buddhism, ranging from an emphasis on the constant refinement of doctrine on the one hand to an incorporation of magical fertility cults in its beliefs on the other, faded out toward the end of this period.

Sanskrit literature and the building of Hindu and Buddhist temples and sculpture both reached apogees in this period. Although literary works in the Sanskrit language continued to be written and temples were built in later periods, the achievement was never again as inspiring.

From c. 1500 to c. 500 BCE

By about 1500 BCE an important change began to occur in the northern half of the Indian subcontinent. The Indus civilization had declined by about 2000 BCE (or perhaps as late as 1750 BCE), and the stage was being set for a second and more lasting urbanization in the Ganges valley. The new areas of occupation were contiguous with and sometimes overlapping the core of the Harappan area. There was continuity of occupation in the Punjab and Gujarat, and a new thrust toward urbanization came from the migration of peoples from the Punjab into the Ganges valley.

Early Vedic period

In addition to the archaeological legacy discussed above, there remains from this period the earliest literary record of Indian culture, the Vedas. Composed in archaic, or Vedic, Sanskrit, generally dated between 1500 and 800 BCE, and transmitted orally, the Vedas comprise four major texts—the Rig-, the Sama-, the Yajur-, and the Atharvaveda. Of these, the Rigveda is believed to be the earliest. The texts consist of hymns, charms, spells, and ritual observations current among the Indo-European-speaking people known as Aryans (from Sanskrit arya, “noble”), who presumably entered India from the Iranian regions.

Theories concerning the origins of the Aryans, whose language is also called Aryan, relate to the question of what has been called the Indo-European homeland. In the 17th and 18th centuries CE, European scholars who first studied Sanskrit were struck by the similarity in its syntax and vocabulary to Greek and Latin. This resulted in the theory that there had been a common ancestry for these and other related languages, which came to be called the Indo-European group of languages. This in turn resulted in the notion that Indo-European-speaking peoples had a common homeland from which they migrated to various parts of Asia and Europe. The theory stirred intense speculation, which continues to the present day, regarding the original homeland and the period or periods of the dispersal from it. The study of Vedic India is still beset by “the Aryan problem,” which often clouds the genuine search for historical insight into this period.

That there was a migration of Indo-European speakers, possibly in waves, dating from the 2nd millennium BCE, is clear from archaeological and epigraphic evidence in western Asia. Mesopotamia witnessed the arrival about 1760 BCE of the Kassites, who introduced the horse and the chariot and bore Indo-European names. A treaty from about 1400 BCE between the Hittites, who had arrived in Anatolia about the beginning of the 2nd millennium BCE, and the Mitanni empire invoked several deities—Indara, Uruvna, Mitira, and the Nasatyas (names that occur in the Rigveda as Indra, Varuna, Mitra, and the Ashvins). An inscription at Bogazköy in Anatolia of about the same date contains Indo-European technical terms pertaining to the training of horses, which suggests cultural origins in Central Asia or the southern Russian steppes. Clay tablets dating to about 1400 BCE, written at Tell el-Amarna (in Upper Egypt) in Akkadian cuneiform, mention names of princes that are also Indo-European.

Nearer India, the Iranian plateau was subject to a similar migration. Comparison of Iranian Aryan literature with the Vedas reveals striking correspondences. Possibly a branch of the Iranian Aryans migrated to northern India and settled in the Sapta Sindhu region, extending from the Kābul River in the north to the Sarasvati and upper Ganges–Yamuna Doab in the south. The Sarasvati, the sacred river at the time, is thought to have dried up during the later Vedic period. Conceived as a goddess (see Sarasvati), it was personified in later Hinduism as the inventor of spoken and written Sanskrit and the consort of Brahma, promulgator of the Vedas. It was in the Sapta Sindhu region that the majority of the hymns of the Rigveda were composed.

The Rigveda is divided into 10 mandalas (books), of which the 10th is believed to be somewhat later than the others. Each mandala consists of a number of hymns, and most mandalas are ascribed to priestly families. The texts include invocations to the gods, ritual hymns, battle hymns, and narrative dialogues. The 9th mandala is a collection of all the hymns dedicated to soma, the unidentified hallucinogenic juice that was drunk on ritual occasions.

Few events of political importance are related in the hymns. Perhaps the most impressive is a description of the battle of the 10 chiefs or kings: when Sudas, the king of the preeminent Bharatas of southern Punjab, replaced his priest Vishvamitra with Vasishtha, Vishvamitra organized a confederacy of 10 tribes, including the Puru, Yadu, Turvashas, Anu, and Druhyu, which went to war against Sudas. The Bharatas survived and continued to play an important role in historical tradition. In the Rigveda the head of a clan is called the raja; this term commonly has been translated as “king,” but more recent scholarship has suggested “chief” as more appropriate in this early context. If such a distinction is recognized, the entire corpus of Vedic literature can be interpreted as recording the gradual evolution of the concept of kingship from earlier clan organization. Among the clans there is little distinction between Aryan and non-Aryan, but the hymns refer to a people, called the dasyus, who are said to have had an alien language and a dark complexion and to worship strange gods. Some dasyus were rich in cattle and lived in fortified places (puras) that were often attacked by the god Indra. In addition to the dasyus, there were the wealthy Panis, who were hostile and stole cattle.

The early Vedic was the period of transition from nomadic pastoralism to settled village communities intermixing pastoral and agrarian economies. Cattle were initially the dominant commodity, as indicated by the use of the words gotra (“cowpen”) to signify the endogamous kinship group and gavishti (“searching for cows”) to denote war. A patriarchal extended family structure gave rise to the practice of niyoga (levirate), which permitted a widow to marry her husband’s brother. A community of families constituted a grama. The term vish is generally interpreted to mean “clan.” Clan assemblies appear to have been frequent in the early stages. Various categories of assemblies are mentioned, such as vidatha, samiti, and sabha, although the precise distinctions between these categories are not clear. The clan also gathered for the yajna, the Vedic sacrifice conducted by the priest, whose ritual actions ensured prosperity and imbued the chief with valour. The chief was primarily a war leader with responsibility for protecting the clan, for which function he received a bali (“tribute”). Punishment was exacted according to a principle resembling the wergild of ancient Germanic law, whereby the social rank of a wronged or slain man determined the compensation due him or his survivors.

Later Vedic period (c. 800–c. 500 BCE)

The principal literary sources from this period are the Sama-, the Yajur-, and the Atharvaveda (mainly ritual texts), the Brahmanas (manuals on ritual), and the Upanishads (Upanisads) and Aranyakas (collections of philosophical and metaphysical discourses). Associated with the corpus are the sutra texts, largely explanatory aids to the other works, comprising manuals on sacrifices and ceremonies, domestic observances, and social and legal relations. Because the texts were continually revised, they cannot be dated accurately to the early period. The Dharma-sutra texts of this period became the nuclei of the socio-legal Dharma-shastras of later centuries.

Historians formerly assigned the two major Indian epics, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, to this period, but subsequent scholarship has rendered these dates less certain. Both works are mixtures of the historical and the legendary, both were rewritten and edited, both suffered from frequent interpolations even as late as the early centuries CE, and both were later converted into sacred literature with the deification of their heroes. Consequently, important as they are to the literary and religious tradition, they are not easily identified with a historical period. The central event of the Mahabharata, whose geographic setting is the upper Ganges–Yamuna Doab and adjoining areas, is a war between two groups of cousins—the Kauravas and the Pandavas. Though the traditional date for the war is about 3102 BCE, most historians would prefer a later one. The events of the Ramayana relate to the middle Ganges valley and central India, with later interpolations extending the area southward.

The geographic focus of the later Vedic corpus moves from the Sapta Sindhu region into the Ganges–Yamuna Doab and the territories on its fringe. The areas within this land of the aryas, called Aryavarta, were named for the ruling clans, and the area encompassed within Aryavarta gradually expanded eastward. By the end of the period, clan identity had changed gradually to territorial identity, and the areas of settlement came eventually to form states. The people beyond the Aryavarta were termed the mlecchas (or mlechchhas), the impure barbarians unfamiliar with the speech and customs of the aryas.

The literature is replete with the names of clans. The most powerful among them, commanding the greatest respect, was the Kuru-Pancala, which incorporated the two families of Kuru and Puru (and the earlier Bharatas) and of which the Pancala was a confederation of lesser-known tribes. They occupied the upper Ganges–Yamuna Doab and the Kurukshetra region. In the north the Kamboja, Gandhara, and Madra groups predominated. In the middle Ganges valley the neighbours and rivals of the Kuru-Pancalas were the Kashi, Koshala, and Videha, who worked in close cooperation with each other. The Magadha, Anga, and Vanga peoples in the lower Ganges valley and delta were (in that period) still outside the Aryan pale and regarded as mlecchas. Magadha (Patna and Gaya districts of Bihar) is also associated with the vratya people, who occupied an ambiguous position between the aryas and mlecchas. Other mleccha tribes frequently mentioned include the Satvants of the Chambal River valley and, in the Vindhyan and northern Deccan region, the Andhra, Vidarbha, Nishadha, Pulinda, and Shabara. The location of all these tribes is of considerable historical interest, because they gave their names to enduring geographic regions.

By the 5th century BCE, clan identity had changed to territorial identity, and the areas of settlement changed from chiefdoms to kingdoms in some cases. The state was emerging as a new feature. Assemblies such as the sabha and parishad continued as political institutions into later periods. The larger assemblies declined. Rudimentary notions of taxation were the genesis of administration, as were the ratnins (“jewels”), consisting of representatives of various professions advising the chief. A major transformation occurred in the notion of kingship, which ceased to be merely an office of a war leader; territorial identity provided it with power and status, symbolized by a series of lengthy and elaborate ceremonies—the abhishekha, generally followed by major sacrificial rituals, such as the ashvamedha. This ceremony was a famous horse sacrifice, in which a specially selected horse was permitted to wander at will, tracked by a body of soldiers; the area through which the horse wandered unchallenged was claimed by the chief or king conducting the sacrifice. Thus, theoretically at least, only those with considerable power could perform this sacrifice. Such major sacrificial rituals involved a large amount of wealth and a hierarchy of priests. The ceremonies lasted many days and involved a reciprocal economy of gift exchange between the chief and the priest, by which the latter received wealth in kind and the former established status, prosperity, and proximity to the gods.

The conspicuous display and consumption of these ceremonies have elicited comparison with the potlatch of the Kwakiutl and related North American indigenous peoples. The assumption of such sacrifices was that the clan had settled in a particular area, marking the end of nomadism. This led eventually to the claim of ownership by kings of the wastelands, although a ruler’s right to collect taxes was viewed not as a consequence of his ownership of wasteland but as his wage for protecting society. The new trends emphasized the importance of the priests and the aristocracy (Brahmans and Kshatriyas), who were the mainstay of kingship. The introduction, through royal sacrifices, of notions of divinity in kingship further strengthened the role of the priests. This was also the period in which kingship became hereditary.

The technology of iron, or krishna ayas (“dark metal”), as it was apparently called in later Vedic literature, and the migration into the Ganges valley helped in stabilizing agriculture and settlements. Some of these settlements along the rivers evolved into towns, essentially as administrative and craft centres. By the mid-1st millennium BCE the second urbanization—this time in the Ganges valley—was under way.

The development with the most far-reaching consequences for Indian culture is the structure of society that has come to be called caste. A hymn in the Rigveda contains a description of the primeval sacrifice and refers to the emergence of four groups from the body of the god Prajapati—the Brahmans (Brāhmaṇas), Kshatriyas (Kṣatriyas), Vaishyas (Vaiśyas), and Sudras (Śūdras). This is clearly a mythologized attempt to describe the origin of the four varnas, which came to be regarded as the four major classes in Indian society.

The etymology of each is of interest: Brahman is one who possesses magical or divine knowledge (brahman); Kshatriya is endowed with power or sovereignty (kṣatra); and Vaishya, derived from viś (vish, “settlement”), is a person settled on the land or a member of the clan. The derivation of the term Sudra, however, denoting a member of the group born to serve the upper three varnas, is not clear, which may suggest that it is a non-Aryan word. In addition to varna there are references to jati (birth), which gradually came to acquire a close association with caste and appears to mean the endogamous kinship group.

In the course of time the Brahmans became the preeminent priestly group, the intermediaries with the gods at the sacrificial rituals, and the recipients of large donations for priestly functions; in the process they acquired a number of privileges, such as exemption from taxes and inviolability. The Kshatriyas, who were to become the landowning families, assumed the role of military leaders and of the natural aristocracy having connections with royalty. The Vaishyas were more subservient, and, although their status was not as inferior as that of the Sudras, they appear to have been crucial to the economy. The traditional view of the Sudras is that they were non-Aryan cultivators who came under the domination of the Aryans and in many cases were enslaved and therefore had to serve the upper three groups. But not all references to the Sudras are to slaves. Sometimes wealthy Sudras are mentioned, and in later centuries some of them even became kings.

The traditional view that varna reflects the organization of Indian society has recently been questioned; it has been suggested that the rules of varna conform to a normative or presumptive model, and that the concept of jati is more central to caste functioning. This view is strengthened by the fact that the non-Brahmanical literature of later periods does not always conform to the picture of caste society depicted in the Dharma-shastras.

The beginning of the historical period, c. 500–150 BCE

For this phase of Indian history a variety of historical sources are available. The Buddhist canon, pertaining to the period of the Buddha (c. 6th–5th century BCE) and later, is invaluable as a cross-reference for the Brahmanic sources. This also is true, though to a more limited extent, of Jain sources. In the 4th century BCE there are secular writings on political economy and accounts of foreign travelers. The most important sources, however, are inscriptions of the 3rd century BCE. (See Buddhism; Jainism.)

(Left) India c. 500 BCE and (right) Ashoka's empire at its greatest extent, c. 250 BCE.Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Pre-Mauryan states

Buddhist writings and other sources from the beginning of this period mention 16 major states (mahajanapada) dominating the northern part of the subcontinent. A few of these, such as Gandhara, Kamboja, Kuru-Pancala, Matsya, Kashi, and Koshala, continued from the earlier period and are mentioned in Vedic literature. The rest were new states, either freshly created from declining older ones or new areas coming into importance, such as Avanti, Ashvaka, Shurasena, Vatsa, Cedi, Malla, Vrijji, Magadha, and Anga. The mention of so many new states in the eastern Ganges valley is attributable in part to the eastern focus of the sources and is partly the antecedent to the increasing preeminence of the eastern regions.

Location

Gandhara lay astride the Indus and included the districts of Peshawar and the lower Swat and Kābul valleys. For a while its independence was terminated by its inclusion as one of the 22 satrapies of the Achaemenian Empire of Persia (c. 519 BCE). Its major role as the channel of communication with Iran and Central Asia continued, as did its trade in woolen goods. Kamboja adjoined Gandhara in the northwest. Originally regarded as a land of Aryan speakers, Kamboja soon lost its important status, ostensibly because its people did not follow the sacred Brahmanic rites—a situation that was to occur extensively in the north as the result of the intermixing of peoples and cultures through migration and trade. Kamboja became a trading centre for horses imported from Central Asia.

The Kekayas, Madras, and Ushinaras, who had settled in the region between Gandhara and the Beas River, were described as descendants of the Anu tribe. The Matsyas occupied an area to the southwest of present-day Delhi. The Kuru-Pancala, still dominant in the Ganges–Yamuna Doab area, were extending their control southward and eastward; the Kuru capital had reportedly been moved from Hastinapura to Kaushambi when the former was devastated by a great flood, which excavations show to have occurred about the 9th century BCE. The Mallas lived in eastern Uttar Pradesh. Avanti arose in the Ujjain-Narmada valley region, with its capital at Mahishmati; during the reign of King Pradyota, there was a matrimonial alliance with the royal family at Kaushambi. Shurasena had its capital at Mathura, and the tribe claimed descent from the Yadu clan. A reference to the Sourasenoi in later Greek writings is often identified with the Shurasena and the city of Methora with Mathura. The Vatsa state emerged from Kaushambi. The Cedi state (in Bundelkhand) lay on a major route to the Deccan. South of the Vindhyas, on the Godavari River, Ashvaka continued to thrive.

The mid-Ganges valley was dominated by Kashi and Koshala. Kashi maintained close affiliations with its eastern neighbours, and its capital was later to acquire renown as the sacred city of Varanasi (Benares). Kashi and Koshala were continually at war over the control of the Ganges; in the course of the conflict, Koshala extended its frontiers far to the south, ultimately coming to comprise Uttar (northern) and Dakshina (southern) Koshala. The new states of Magadha (Patna and Gaya districts) and Anga (northwest of the delta) were also interested in controlling the river and soon made their presence felt. The conflict eventually drew in the Vrijji state (Behar and Muzaffarpur districts). For a while, Videha (modern Tirhut), with its capital at Mithila, also remained powerful. References to the states of the northern Deccan appear to repeat statements from sources of the earlier period, suggesting that there had been little further exchange between the regions.

Political systems

The political system in these states was either monarchical or a type of representative government that variously has been called republican or oligarchic. The fact that representation in these latter states’ assemblies was limited to members of the ruling clan makes the term oligarchy, or even chiefdom, preferable. Sometimes within the state itself there was a gradual change from monarchy to oligarchy, as in the case of Vaishali, the nucleus of the Vrijji state. Apart from the major states, there also were many smaller oligarchies, such as those of the Koliyas, Moriyas, Jnatrikas, Shakyas, and Licchavis. The Jnatrikas and Shakyas are especially remembered as the tribes to which Mahavira (the founder of Jainism) and Gautama Buddha, respectively, belonged. The Licchavis eventually became extremely powerful.

The oligarchies comprised either a single clan or a confederacy of clans. The elected chief or the president (ganapati or ganarajya) functioned with the assistance of a council of elders probably selected from the Kshatriya families. The most important institution was the sovereign general assembly, or parishad, to the meetings of which members were summoned by kettledrum. Precise rules governed the seating arrangement, the agenda, and the order of speaking and debate, which terminated in a decision. A distinction was maintained between the families represented and the others. The broad authority of the parishad included the election of important functionaries. An occasional lapse into hereditary office on the part of the chief may account for the tendency toward monarchy among these states. The divisiveness of factions was a constant threat to the political system.

The institutional development within these oligarchies suggests a stabilized agrarian economy. Sources mention wealthy householders (gahapatis) employing slaves and hired labourers to work on their lands. The existence of gahapatis suggests the breaking up of clan ownership of land and the emergence of individual holdings. An increase in urban settlements and trade is evident not only from references in the literary sources but also from the introduction of two characteristics of urban civilization—a script and coinage. Evidence for the script dates at least to the 3rd century BCE. The most widely used script was Brahmi, which is germane to most Indian scripts used subsequently. A variant during this period was Kharoshti, used only in northwestern India and derived from the Aramaic of western Asia. The most commonly spoken languages were Prakrit, which had its local variations in Shauraseni (from which Pali evolved), and Magadhi, in which the Buddha preached. Sanskrit, the more cultured language as compared with Prakrit, was favoured by the educated elite. Panini’s grammar, the Astadhyayi, and Yaska’s etymological work, the Nirukta, suggest considerable sophistication in the development of Sanskrit.

Economy

Silver bent bar coins and silver and copper punch-marked coins came into use in the 5th century BCE. It is not clear whether the coins were issued by a political authority or were the legal tender of moneyers. The gradual spread in the same period of a characteristic type of luxury ware, which has come to be known as the northern black polished ware, is an indicator of expanding trade. One main trade route followed the Ganges River and crossed the Indo-Gangetic watershed and the Punjab to Taxila and beyond. Another extended from the Ganges valley via Ujjain and the Narmada valley to the western coast or, alternatively, southward to the Deccan. The route to the Ganges delta became more popular, increasing maritime contact with ports on the eastern coast of India. The expansion of trade and consequently of towns resulted in an increase in the number of artisans and merchants; some eventually formed guilds (shrenis), each of which tended to inhabit a particular part of a town. The guild system encouraged specialization of labour and the hereditary principle in professions, which was also a characteristic of caste functioning. Gradually some of the guilds acquired caste status. The practice of usury encouraged the activity of financiers, some of whom formed their own guilds and found that investment in trade proved increasingly lucrative. The changed economy is evident in the growth of cities and of an urban culture in which such distinctions as pura (walled settlement), durga (fortified town), nigama (market centre), nagara (town), and mahanagara (city) became increasingly important.

Religion

The changing features of social and economic life were linked to religious and intellectual changes. Orthodox traditions maintained in certain sections of Vedic literature were questioned by teachers referred to in the Upanishads and Aranyakas and by others whose speculations and philosophy are recorded in other texts. There was a sizable heterodox tradition current in the 6th century BCE, and speculation ranged from idealism to materialism. The Ajivikas and the Carvakas, among the smaller sects, were popular for a time, as were the materialist theories of the Buddha’s contemporary Ajita Keshakambalin. Even though such sects did not sustain an independent religious tradition, the undercurrent of their teachings cropped up time and again in the later religious trends that emerged in India.

Of all these sects, only two, Jainism and Buddhism, acquired the status of major religions. The former remained within the Indian subcontinent; the latter spread to Central Asia, China, Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asia. Both religions were founded in the 6th–5th century BCE; Mahavira gave shape to earlier ideas of the Nirgranthas (an earlier name for the Jains) and formulated Jainism (the teachings of the Jina, or Conqueror, Mahavira), and the Buddha (the Enlightened One) preached a new doctrine.

There were a number of similarities among these two sects. Religious rituals were essentially congregational. Monastic orders (the sangha) were introduced with monasteries organized on democratic lines and initially accepting persons from all strata of life. Such monasteries were dependent on their neighbourhoods for material support. Some of the monasteries developed into centres of education. The functioning of monks in society was greater, however, among the Buddhist orders. Wandering monks, preaching and seeking alms, gave the religions a missionary flavour. The recruitment of nuns signified a special concern for the status of women. Both religions questioned Brahmanical orthodoxy and the authority of the Vedas. Both were opposed to the sacrifice of animals, and both preached nonviolence. Both derived support in the main from the Kshatriya ruling clans, wealthy gahapatis, and the mercantile community; because trade and commerce did not involve killing, the principle of ahimsa (“noninjury”) could be observed in these activities. The Jains participated widely as the middlemen in financial transactions and in later centuries became the great financiers of western India. While both religions disapproved in theory of the inequality of castes, neither directly attacked the assumptions of caste society; even so, they were able to secure a certain amount of support from lower caste groups, which was enhanced by the borrowing of rituals and practices from popular local cults. The patronage of women, especially those of royal families, was to become a noticeable feature.

Magadhan ascendancy

Political activity in the 6th–5th century BCE centred on the control of the Ganges valley. The states of Kashi, Koshala, and Magadha and the Vrijjis battled for this control for a century until Magadha emerged victorious. Magadha’s success was partly due to the political ambition of its king, Bimbisara (c. 543–491 BCE). He conquered Anga, which gave him access to the Ganges delta—a valuable asset in terms of the nascent maritime trade. Bimbisara’s son Ajatashatru—who achieved the throne through patricide—implemented his father’s intentions within about 30 years. Ajatashatru strengthened the defenses of the Magadhan capital, Rajagrha, and built a small fort on the Ganges at Pataligrama, which was to become the famous capital Pataliputra (modern Patna). He then attacked and annexed Kashi and Koshala. He still had to subdue the confederacy of the Vrijji state, and this turned out to be a protracted affair lasting 16 years. Ultimately the Vrijjis, including the important Licchavi clan, were overthrown, having been weakened by a minister of Ajatashatru, who was able to sow dissension in the confederacy.

The success of Magadha was not solely attributable to the ambition of Bimbisara and Ajatashatru. Magadha had an excellent geographic location controlling the lower Ganges and thus drew revenue from both the fertile plain and the river trade. Access to the delta also brought in lucrative profits from the eastern coastal trade. Neighbouring forests provided timber for building and elephants for the army. Above all, nearby rich deposits of iron ore gave Magadha a lead in technology.

Bimbisara had been one of the earliest Indian kings to emphasize efficient administration, and the beginnings of an administrative system took root. Rudimentary notions of land revenue developed. Each village had a headman who was responsible for collecting taxes and another set of officials who supervised the collection and conveyed the revenue to the royal treasury. But the full understanding of the utilization of land revenue as a major source of state income was yet to come. The clearing of land continued apace, but it is likely that the agrarian settlements were small, because literary references to journeys from one town to another mention long stretches of forest paths.

After the death of Ajatashatru (c. 459 BCE) and a series of ineffectual rulers, Shaishunaga founded a new dynasty (see Shaishunaga dynasty), which lasted for about half a century until ousted by Mahapadma Nanda. The Nandas are universally described as being of low origin, perhaps Sudras. Despite these rapid dynastic changes, Magadha retained its position of strength. The Nandas continued the earlier policy of expansion. They are proverbially connected with wealth, probably because they realized the importance of regular collections of land revenue.

Campaigns of Alexander the Great

The northwestern part of India witnessed the military campaign of Alexander the Great of Macedon, who in 327 BCE, in pursuing his campaign to the eastern extremities of the Achaemenian Empire, entered Gandhara. He campaigned successfully across the Punjab as far as the Beas River, where his troops refused to continue fighting. The vast army of the Nandas is referred to in Greek sources, and some historians have suggested that Alexander’s Macedonian and Greek soldiers may have mutinied out of fear of this army. The campaign of Alexander made no impression on the Indian mind, for there are no references to it in Indian sources. A significant outcome of his campaign was that some of his Greek companions—such as Onesicritus, Aristobulus, and his admiral, Nearchus—recorded their impressions of India. Later Greek and Roman authors such as Strabo and Arrian, as well as Pliny and Plutarch, incorporated much of this material into their writings. However, some of the accounts are fanciful and make for better fiction than history. Alexander established a number of Greek settlements, which provided an impetus for the development of trade and communication with western Asia. Most valuable to historians was a reference to Alexander’s meeting the young prince Sandrocottos, a name identified in the 18th century as Chandragupta, which provides a chronological landmark in early Indian history.

The Mauryan empire

The accession of Chandragupta Maurya (reigned c. 321–297 BCE) is significant in Indian history because it inaugurated what was to become the first pan-Indian empire. The Mauryan dynasty was to rule almost the entire subcontinent (except the area south of present-day Karnataka), as well as substantial parts of present-day Afghanistan.

Chandragupta Maurya

Chandragupta overthrew the Nanda power in Magadha and then campaigned in central and northern India. Greek sources report that he engaged in a conflict in 305 BCE in the trans-Indus region with Seleucus I Nicator, one of Alexander’s generals, who, following the death of Alexander, had founded the Seleucid dynasty in Iran. The result was a treaty by which Seleucus ceded the trans-Indus provinces to the Maurya and the latter presented him with 500 elephants. A marriage alliance is mentioned, but no details are recorded.

The treaty ushered in an era of friendly relations between the Mauryas and the Seleucids, with exchanges of envoys. One among them, the Greek historian Megasthenes, left his observations in the form of a book, the Indica. Although the original has been lost, extensive quotations from it survive in the works of the later Greek writers Strabo, Diodorus, and Arrian. A major treatise on political economy in Sanskrit is the Artha-shastra of Kautilya (or Canakya, as he is sometimes called). Kautilya, it is believed, was prime minister to Chandragupta, although this view has been contested. In describing an ideal government, Kautilya indicates contemporary assumptions of political and economic theory, and the description of the functioning of government occasionally tallies with present-day knowledge of actual conditions derived from other sources. The date of origin of the Artha-shastra remains problematic, with suggested dates ranging from the 4th century BCE to the 3rd century CE. Most authorities agree that the kernel of the book was originally written during the early Mauryan period but that much of the existing text is post-Mauryan.

According to Jain sources, Chandragupta became a Jain toward the end of his reign. He abdicated in favour of his son Bindusara, became an ascetic, and traveled with a group of Jain monks to southern India, where he died, in the orthodox Jain manner, by deliberate slow starvation.

Bindusara

The second Mauryan emperor was Bindusara, who came to the throne about 297 BCE. Greek sources refer to him as Amitrochates, the Greek for the Sanskrit amitraghata, “destroyer of foes.” This name perhaps reflects a successful campaign in the Deccan, Chandragupta having already conquered northern India. Bindusara’s campaign stopped in the vicinity of Karnataka, probably because the territories of the extreme south, such as those of the Colas, Pandyas, and Ceras, were well-disposed in their relations toward the Mauryas.

Ashoka and his successors

Bindusara was succeeded by his son Ashoka, either directly in 272 BCE or, after an interregnum of four years, in 268 BCE (some historians say c. 265 BCE). Ashoka’s reign is comparatively well documented. He issued a large number of edicts, which were inscribed in many parts of the empire and were composed in Prakrit, Greek, and Aramaic, depending on the language current in a particular region. Greek and Aramaic inscriptions are limited to Afghanistan and the trans-Indus region.

Stupa 1 (Great Stupa), eastern gateway, Sanchi, Madhya Pradesh, India.Frederick M. Asher

Sanchi, Madhya Pradesh, India: stupa no. 2Stupa no. 2, Sanchi, Madhya Pradesh, India.Frederick M. Asher

The first major event in Ashoka’s reign, which he describes in an edict, was a campaign against Kalinga in 260 BCE. The suffering that resulted caused him to reevaluate the notion of conquest by violence, and gradually he was drawn to the Buddhist religion. He built a number of stupas. About 12 years after his accession, he began issuing edicts at regular intervals. In one he referred to five Greek kings who were his neighbours and contemporaries and to whom he sent envoys—these were Antiochus II Theos of Syria, the grandson of Seleucus I; Ptolemy II Philadelphus of Egypt; Antigonus II Gonatas of Macedonia; Magas of Cyrene; and Alexander (of either Epirus or Corinth). This reference has become the bedrock of Mauryan chronology. Local tradition asserts that he had contacts with Khotan and Nepal. Close relations with Tissa, the king of Sri Lanka, were furthered by the fact that Mihinda, Ashoka’s son (or his younger brother according to some sources), was the first Buddhist missionary on the island.

Ashoka ruled for 37 years. After his death a political decline set in, and half a century later the empire was reduced to the Ganges valley alone. Tradition asserts that Ashoka’s son Kunala ruled in Gandhara. Epigraphic evidence indicates that his grandson Dasharatha ruled in Magadha. Some historians have suggested that his empire was bifurcated. In 185 BCE the last of the Mauryas, Brihadratha, was assassinated by his Brahman commander in chief, Pushyamitra, who founded the Shunga dynasty.

Financial base for the empire

The Mauryan achievement lay in the ability to weld the diverse parts of the subcontinent into a single political unit and to maintain an imperial system for almost 100 years. The financial base for an imperial system was provided by income from land revenue and, to a lesser extent, from trade. The gradual expansion of the agrarian economy and improvements in the administrative machinery for collecting revenue increased the income from land revenue. This is confirmed by both the theories of Kautilya and the account of Megasthenes; Kautilya maintained that the state should organize the clearing of wasteland and settle it with villages of Sudra cultivators. It is likely that some 150,000 persons deported from Kalinga by Ashoka after the campaign were settled in this manner. Megasthenes wrote that there were no slaves in India, yet Indian sources speak of various categories of slaves called dasas, the most commonly used designation being dasa-bhritakas (slaves and hired labourers). It is likely that there was no large-scale slavery for production, although slaves were used on the land, in the mines, and in the guilds, along with the hired labour. Domestic slavery was common, however.

The nature of land revenue has been a subject of controversy. Some scholars maintain that the state was the sole owner of the land, while others contend that there was private and individual ownership as well. References to private ownership would seem to be too frequent to be ignored. There also are references to the crown lands, the cultivation of which was important to the economy. Two types of taxes were levied—one on the amount of land cultivated and the other on the produce of the land. The state maintained irrigation in limited areas and in limited periods. By and large, irrigation systems were privately controlled by cultivators and landowners. There is no support for a thesis that control of the hydraulic machinery was crucial to the political control of the country.

Another source of income, which acquired increasing importance, was revenue from taxes levied on both internal and foreign trade. The attempt at improved political administration helped to break the economic isolation of various regions. Roads built to ensure quick communication with the local administration inevitably became arteries of exchange and trade.

Mauryan society

According to Megasthenes, Mauryan society comprised seven occupational groups: philosophers, farmers, soldiers, herdsmen, artisans, magistrates, and councillors. He defined these groups as endogamous and the professions as hereditary, which has led to their being considered as castes. The philosophers included a variety of priests, monks, and religious teachers; they formed the smallest group but were the most respected, were exempt from taxation, and were the only ones permitted to marry into the other groups. The farmers were the largest group. The soldiers were highly paid, and, if Pliny’s figures for the army are correct—9,000 elephants, 30,000 cavalry, and 600,000 infantry—their support must have required a considerable financial outlay. The mention of herdsmen as a socioeconomic group suggests that, although the agrarian economy was expanding and had become central to the state income, pastoralism continued to play an important economic role. The artisans probably represented a major section of the urban population. The listing of magistrates and councillors as distinct groups is evidence of a large and recognizable administrative personnel.

Mauryan government

The Mauryan government was organized around the king. Ashoka saw his role as essentially paternal: “All men are my children.” He was anxious to be in constant touch with public opinion, and to this end he traveled extensively throughout his empire and appointed a special category of officers to gauge public opinion. His edicts indicate frequent consultations with his ministers, the ministerial council being a largely advisory body. The offices of the sannidhatri (treasurer), who kept the account, and the samahartri (chief collector), who was responsible for revenue records, formed the hub of the revenue administration. Each administrative department, with its superintendents and subordinate officials, acted as a link between local administration and the central government. Kautilya believed that a quarter of the total income should be reserved for the salaries of the officers. That the higher officials expected to be handsomely paid is clear from the salaries suggested by Kautilya and from the considerable difference between the salary of a clerk (500 panas) and that of a minister (48,000 panas). Public works and grants absorbed another large percentage of state income.

The empire was divided into four provinces, each under a prince or a governor. Local officials were probably selected from among the local populace, because no method of impersonal recruitment to administrative office is mentioned. Once every five years, the emperor sent officers to audit the provincial administrations. Some categories of officers in the rural areas, such as the rajjukas (surveyors), combined judicial functions with assessment duties. Fines constituted the most common form of punishment, although capital punishment was imposed in extreme cases. Provinces were subdivided into districts and these again into smaller units. The village was the basic unit of administration and has remained so throughout the centuries. The headman continued to be an important official, as did the accountant and the tax collector (sthanika and gopa, respectively). For the larger units, Kautilya suggests the maintenance of a census. Megasthenes describes a committee of 30 officials, divided into six subcommittees, who looked after the administration of Pataliputra. The most important single official was the city superintendent (nagaraka), who had virtual control over all aspects of city administration. Centralization of the government should not be taken to imply a uniform level of development throughout the empire. Some areas, such as Magadha, Gandhara, and Avanti, were under closer central control than others, such as Karnataka, where possibly the Mauryan system’s main concern was to extract resources without embedding itself in the region.

Ashoka’s edicts

It was against this background of imperial administration and a changing socioeconomic framework that Ashoka issued edicts that carried his message concerning the idea and practice of dhamma, the Prakrit form of the Sanskrit dharma, a term that defies simple translation. It carries a variety of meanings depending on the context, such as universal law, social order, piety, or righteousness; Buddhists frequently used it with reference to the teachings of the Buddha. This in part coloured the earlier interpretation of Ashoka’s use of the word to mean that he was propagating Buddhism. Until his inscriptions were deciphered in 1837, Ashoka was practically unknown except in the Buddhist chronicles of Sri Lanka—the Mahavamsa and Dipavamsa—and the works of the northern Buddhist tradition—the Divyavadana and the Ashokavadana—where he is extolled as a Buddhist emperor par excellence whose sole ambition was the expansion of Buddhism. Most of these traditions were preserved outside India in Sri Lanka, Central Asia, and China. Even after the edicts were deciphered, it was believed that they corroborated the assertions of the Buddhist sources, because in some of the edicts Ashoka avowed his personal support of Buddhism. However, more-recent analyses suggest that, although he was personally a Buddhist, as his edicts addressed to the Buddhist sangha attest, the majority of the edicts in which he attempted to define dhamma do not suggest that he was merely preaching Buddhism.

Ashokan pillarInscription on Ashokan pillar, Lauriya Nandangarh, Bihar state, India.Frederick M. Asher

Ashoka addressed his edicts to the entire populace, inscribing them on rock surfaces or on specially erected and finely polished sandstone pillars, in places where people were likely to congregate. It has been suggested that the idea of issuing such decrees was borrowed from the Persian Achaemenian emperors, especially from Darius I, but the tone and content of Ashoka’s edicts are quite different. Although the pillars, with their animal capitals, have also been described as imitations of Achaemenian pillars, there is sufficient originality in style to distinguish them as fine examples of Mauryan imperial art. (The official emblem of India since 1947 is based on the four-lion capital of the pillar at Sarnath near Varanasi.) The carvings contrast strikingly with the numerous small, gray terra-cotta figures found at urban sites, which are clearly expressions of Mauryan popular art.

Lauriya-Nandangarh pillar, Bihar state, India.Frederick M. Asher

Ashoka defines the main principles of dhamma as nonviolence, tolerance of all sects and opinions, obedience to parents, respect for the Brahmans and other religious teachers and priests, liberality toward friends, humane treatment of servants, and generosity toward all. These suggest a general ethic of behaviour to which no religious or social group could object. They also could act as a focus of loyalty to weld together the diverse strands that made up the empire. Interestingly, the Greek versions of these edicts translate dhamma as eusebeia (piety), and no mention is made in the inscriptions of the teachings of the Buddha, which would be expected if Ashoka had been propagating Buddhism. His own activities under the impact of dhamma included attention to the welfare of his subjects, the building of roads and rest houses, the planting of medicinal herbs, the establishment of centres for tending the sick, a ban on animal sacrifices, and the curtailing of killing animals for food. He also instituted a body of officials known as the dhamma-mahamattas, who served the dual function of propagating the dhamma and keeping the emperor in touch with public opinion. (See rock edicts.)

Mauryan decline

Some historians maintain that the disintegration of the Mauryan empire was an aftermath of Ashoka’s policies and actions and that his pro-Buddhist policy caused a revolt among the Brahmans. The edicts do not support such a contention. It has also been said that Ashoka’s insistence on nonviolence resulted in the emasculation of the army, which was consequently unable to meet the threat of invaders from the northwest. There is, however, no indication that Ashoka deliberately ignored the military wing of his administration, despite his emphasis on nonviolence.

Other explanations for the decline of the empire appear more plausible. Among these is the idea that the economy may have weakened, putting economic pressure on the empire. It has been thought that the silver currency of the Mauryas was debased as a result of this pressure. The expense required for the army and the bureaucracy must have tied up a substantial part of the income. It is equally possible that the expansion of agriculture did not keep pace with the expansion of the empire, and, because many areas were nonagricultural, the revenue from the agrarian economy may not have been sufficient for the maintenance of the empire. It is extremely difficult to compute the population of the empire, but a figure of approximately 50 million can be suggested. For a population of mixed agriculturalists and others to support an empire of this size would have been extremely difficult without intensive exploitation of resources. Relatively recent excavations at urban sites show a distinct improvement in material prosperity in the post-Mauryan levels. This may be attributable to an increase in trade, but the income from trade was unlikely to have been sufficient to supplement fully the land revenue in financing the empire.

It has been argued that the Mauryan bureaucracy at the higher levels tended to be oppressive. This may have been true during the reigns of the first two emperors, from which the evidence is cited, but oppression is unlikely to have occurred during Ashoka’s reign, because he was responsible for a considerable decentralization at the upper levels and for continual checks and inspections. A more fundamental weakness lay in the process of recruitment, which was probably arbitrary, with the hierarchy of officials locally recruited.

The concept of the state

Allegiance presupposes a concept of statehood. A number of varying notions had evolved by this time to explain the evolution of the state. Some theorists pursued the thread of the Vedic monarchies, in which the clan chief became the king and was gradually invested with divinity. An alternative set of theories arising out of Buddhist and Jain thought ignored the idea of divinity and assumed instead that, in the original state of nature, all needs were effortlessly provided but that slowly a decline set in and man became evil, developing desires, which led to the notions of private property and of family and finally to immoral behaviour. In this condition of chaos, the people gathered together and decided to elect one among them (the mahasammata, or “great elect”) in whom they would invest authority to maintain law and order. Thus, the state came into being. Later theories retained the element of a contract between a ruler and the people. Brahmanic sources held that the gods appointed the ruler and that a contract of dues was concluded between the ruler and the people. Also prevalent was the theory of matsyanyaya, which proposes that in periods of chaos, when there is no ruler, the strong devour the weak, just as in periods of drought big fish eat little fish. Thus, the need for a ruler was viewed as absolute.

The existence of the state was primarily dependent on two factors: danda (authority) and dharma (in its sense of the social order—i.e., the preservation of the caste structure). The Artha-shastra, moreover, refers to the seven limbs (saptanga) of the state as the king, administration, territory, capital, treasury, coercive authority, and allies. However, the importance of the political notion of the state gradually began to fade, partly because of a decline of the political tradition of the republics and the proportional dominance of the monarchical system, in which loyalty was directed to the king. The emergence of the Mauryan empire strengthened the political notion of monarchy. The second factor was that the dharma, in the sense of the social order, demanded a far greater loyalty than did the rather blurred idea of the state. The king’s duty was to protect dharma, and, as long as the social order remained intact, anarchy would not prevail. Loyalty to the social order, which was a fundamental aspect of Indian civilization, largely accounts for the impressive continuity of the major social institutions over many centuries. However, it also deflected loyalty from the political notion of the state, which might otherwise have permitted more-frequent empires and a greater political consciousness. After the decline of the Mauryas, the reemergence of an empire was to take many centuries.

From 150 BCE to 300 CE

The disintegration of the Mauryan empire gave rise to a number of small kingdoms, whose regional affiliations were often to be repeated in subsequent centuries. The Punjab and Kashmir regions were drawn into the orbit of Central Asian politics. The lower Indus valley became a passage for movements from the north to the west. The Ganges valley assumed a largely passive role except when faced with campaigns from the northwest. In the northern Deccan there arose the first of many important kingdoms that were to serve as the bridge between the north and the south. Kalinga was once more independent. In the extreme south the prestige and influence of the Cera, Cola, and Pandya kingdoms continued unabated. Yet in spite of political fragmentation, this was a period of economic prosperity, resulting partly from a new source of income—trade, both within the subcontinent and with distant places in Central Asia, China, the eastern Mediterranean, and Southeast Asia.

Rise of small kingdoms in the north

In the adjoining area held by the Seleucids, Diodotus I, the Greek governor of Bactria, rose in rebellion against the Seleucid king Antiochus II Theos and declared his independence, which was recognized by Antiochus about 250 BCE. Parthia also declared its independence.

Indo-Greek rulers

A later Bactrian king, Demetrius (reigned c. 190–c. 167 BCE), took his armies into the Punjab and finally down the Indus valley and gained control of northwestern India. This introduced what has come to be called Indo-Greek rule. The chronology of the Indo-Greek rulers is based largely on numismatic evidence. Their coins were, at the start, imitations of Greek issues, but they gradually acquired a style of their own, characterized by excellent portraiture. The legend was generally inscribed in Greek, Brahmi, and Khorosti.

The best-known of the Indo-Greek kings was Menander, recorded in Indian sources as Milinda (reigned 155–130 BCE). He is featured in the Buddhist text Milinda-panha (“Questions of Milinda”), written in the form of a dialogue between the king and the Buddhist philosopher Nagasena, as a result of which the king is converted to Buddhism. Menander controlled Gandhara and Punjab, although his coins have been found farther south. According to one theory, he may have attacked the Shungas in the Yamuna region and attempted to extend his control into the Ganges valley, but, if he did so, he failed to annex the area. Meanwhile, in Bactria the descendants of the line of Eucratides, who had branched off from the original Bactrian line, now began to take an interest in Gandhara and finally annexed Kabul and the kingdom of Taxila. An important Prakrit inscription at Besnagar (Bhilsa district) of the late 2nd century BCE, inscribed at the instance of Heliodorus, a Greek envoy of Antialcidas of Taxila, records his devotion to the Vaishnava Vasudeva sect.

Central Asian rulers

The Bactrian control of Taxila was disturbed by an intrusion of the Scythians, known in Indian sources as the Shakas (who established the Shaka satrap). They had attacked the kingdom of Bactria and subsequently moved into India. The determination of the Han rulers of China to keep the Central Asian nomadic tribes (the Xiongnu, Wu-sun, and Yuezhi) out of China forced these tribes in their search for fresh pastures to migrate southward and westward; a branch of the Yuezhi, the Da Yuezhi, moved farthest west to the Aral Sea and displaced the existing Shakas, who poured into Bactria and Parthia. The Parthian king Mithradates II tried to hold them back, but after his death (88 BCE) they swept through Parthia and continued into the Indus valley; among the early Shaka kings was Maues, or Moga (1st century BCE), who ruled over Gandhara. The Shakas moved southward under pressure from the Pahlavas (Parthians), who ruled briefly in northwestern India toward the end of the 1st century BCE, the reign of Gondophernes being remembered. At Mathura the Shaka rulers of note were Rajuvala and Shodasa. Ultimately the Shakas settled in western India and Malava and came into conflict with the kingdoms of the northern Deccan and the Ganges valley—particularly during the reigns of Nahapana, Cashtana, and Rudradaman—in the first two centuries CE. Rudradaman’s fame is recorded in a lengthy Sanskrit inscription at Junagadh, dating to 150 CE.

Kujula Kadphises, the Yuezhi chief, conquered northern India in the 1st century CE. He was succeeded by his son Vima, after whom came Kanishka, the most powerful among the Kushan kings, as the dynasty came to be called. The date of Kanishka’s accession is disputed, ranging from 78 to 248. The generally accepted date of 78 is also the basis for an era presumably started by the Shakas and used in addition to the Gregorian calendar by the present-day Indian government; the era, possibly commemorating Kanishka’s accession, was widely used in Malava, Ujjain, Nepal, and Central Asia. The Kushan kingdom was essentially oriented to the north, with its capital at Purusapura (near present-day Peshawar), although it extended southward as far as Sanchi and into the Ganges valley as far as Varanasi. Mathura was the most important city in the southern part of the kingdom. Kanishka’s ambitions included control of Central Asia, which, if not directly under the Kushans, did come under their influence. Inscriptions fairly recently discovered in the Gilgit area further attest such Central Asian connections. Kanishka’s successors failed to maintain Kushan power. The southern areas were the first to break away, and, by the middle of the 3rd century, the Kushans were left virtually with only Gandhara and Kashmir. By the end of the century they were reduced to vassalage by the king of the Persian Sāsānian dynasty.

Not surprisingly, administrative and political nomenclature in northern India at this time reflected that of western and Central Asia. The Persian term for the governor of a province, khshathrapavan, as used by the Achaemenians, was Hellenized into satrap and widely used by these dynasties. Its Sanskrit form was kshatrapa. The governors of higher status came to be called maha-kshatrapa; they frequently issued inscriptions reflecting whatever era they chose to follow, and they minted their own coins, indicating a more independent status than is generally associated with governors. Imperial titles also were taken by the Indo-Greeks, such as basileus basileōn (“king of kings”), similar to the Persian shāhanshāh, of which the later Sanskrit form was maharatadhiraja. A title of Central Asian derivation was the daivaputra of the Kushans, which is believed to have come originally from the Chinese “son of heaven,” emphasizing the divinity of kingship.

Oligarchies and kingdoms

Occupying the watershed between the Indus and Ganges valleys, Punjab and Rajasthan were the nucleus of a number of oligarchies, or tribal republics whose local importance rose and fell in inverse proportion to the rise and fall of larger kingdoms. According to numismatic evidence, the most important politically were the Audambaras, Arjunayanas, Malavas, Yaudheyas, Shibis, Kunindas, Trigartas, and Abhiras. The Arjunayanas had their base in the present-day Bharatpur-Alwar region. The Malavas appear to have migrated from the Punjab to the Jaipur area, perhaps after the Indo-Greek invasions; they are associated with the Malava era, which has been identified with the Vikrama era, also known as the Krita era and dating to 58 BCE. It is likely that southern Rajasthan as far as the Narmada River and the Ujjain district was named Malwa after the Malavas. Yaudheya evidence is scattered over many parts of the Punjab and the adjoining areas of what is now Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, but during this period their stronghold appears to have been the Rohtak district, north of Delhi; the frequent use of the term gana (“group”) on Yaudheya coins indicates an adherence to the tribal tradition. References to Shaiva deities, especially Karttikeya or Skanda, the legendary son of Shiva, are striking. The Shibis also migrated from the Punjab to Rajasthan and settled at Madhyamika (near Chitor, now Chittaurgarh). (See Shaivism.)

Coins of the Kunindas locate them in the Shiwalik Range between the Yamuna and the Beas rivers. The Trigartas have been associated with the Chamba region of the upper Ravi River, but they also may have inhabited the area of Jalandhara in the plains. The Abhiras lived in scattered settlements in various parts of western and central India as far as the Deccan. Most of these tribes claimed descent from the ancient lineages of the Puranas, and some of them were later connected with the rise of Rajput dynasties.

In addition to the oligarchies, there were small monarchical states, such as Ayodhya, Kaushambi, and the scattered Naga kingdoms, the most important of which was the one at Padmavati (Gwalior). Ahicchatra (now the Bareilly district of Uttar Pradesh) was ruled by kings who bore names ending in the suffix -mitra.

The Shunga kingdom

Magadha was the nucleus of the Shunga kingdom, which succeeded the Mauryan. The kingdom extended westward to include Ujjain and Vidisha. The Shungas came into conflict with Vidarbha and with the Yavanas, who probably were Bactrian Greeks attempting to move into the Ganges valley. (The word yavana derives from the Prakrit yona, suggesting that the Ionians were the first Greeks with whom the Persians and Indians came into contact. In later centuries the name Yavana was applied to all peoples coming from western Asia and the Mediterranean region, which included the Romans, Persians, and Arabs.) The Shunga dynasty lasted for about one century and was then overthrown by the Brahman minister Vasudeva, who founded the Kanva dynasty, which lasted 45 years and following which the Magadha area was of greatly diminished importance until the 4th century CE.

Kalinga

Kalinga rose to prominence under Kharavela, dated with some debate to the 1st century BCE. Kharavela boasts, perhaps exaggeratedly for a pious Jain, of successful campaigns in the western Deccan and against the Yavanas and Magadha and of a triumphal victory over the Pandyas of southern India.

The Andhras and their successors

The Andhras are listed among the tribal peoples in the Mauryan empire. Possibly they rose to being local officials and then, on the disintegration of the empire, gradually became independent rulers of the northwestern Deccan. It cannot be ascertained for certain whether the Andhras arose in the Andhra region (i.e., the Krishna-Godavari deltas) and moved up to the northwestern Deccan or whether their settling in the delta gave it their name. There is also controversy as to whether the dynasty became independent at the end of the 3rd century BCE or at the end of the 1st century BCE. Their alternative name, Satavahana, is presumed to be the family name, whereas Andhra was probably that of the tribe. It is likely that Satavahana power was established during the reign of Shatakarni I, with the borders of the kingdom reaching across the northern Deccan; subsequent to this the Satavahana dynasty suffered an eclipse in the 1st century CE, when it was forced out of the northern Deccan by the Shakas and resettled in Andhra. In the 2nd century CE the Satavahanas reestablished their power in the northwestern Deccan, as evidenced by Shaka coins from this region overstruck with the name Gautamiputra Shatakarni. That the Andhras did not control Malava and Ujjain is clear from the claim of the Shaka king Rudradaman to these regions. The last of the important Andhra kings was Yajnashri Shatakarni, who ruled at the end of the 2nd century CE and asserted his authority over the Shakas. The 3rd century saw the decline of Satavahana power, as the kingdom broke into small pockets of control under various branches of the family.

The Satavahana feudatories then rose to power. The Abhiras were the successors in the Nashik area. The Iksvakus succeeded in the Krishna-Guntur region. The Cutu dynasty in Kuntala (southern Maharashtra) had close connections with the Satavahanas. The Bodhis ruled briefly in the northwestern Deccan. The Brihatphalayanas came to power at the end of the 3rd century in the Masulipatam area. In these regions the Satavahana pattern of administration continued; many of the rulers had matronymics (names derived from that of the mother or a maternal ancestor); many of the royal inscriptions record donations made to Buddhist monks and monasteries, often by princesses, and also land grants to Brahmans and the performance of Vedic sacrifices by the rulers.

Southern Indian kingdoms

Significant, historically attested contact between the north and the Tamil regions can be reasonably dated to the Mauryan period. Evidence on the early history of the south consists of the epigraphs of the region, the Tamil cankam (sangam) literature, and archaeological data.

Inscriptions in Brahmi (recently read as Tamil Brahmi) date to between the 2nd century BCE and the 4th century CE. Most of the inscriptions record donations made by royalty or by merchants and artisans to Buddhist and Jain monks. These are useful in corroborating evidence from the cankam literature, a collection of a large number of poems in classical Tamil that, according to tradition, were recited at three assemblies of poets held at Madurai. Included in this literature are the Eight Anthologies (Ettutokai) and Ten Idylls (Pattupattu). The grammatical work Tolkappiyam also is said to be of the same period. The literature probably belongs to the same period as the inscriptions, although some scholars suggest an earlier date. The historical authenticity of sections of the cankam literature has been confirmed by archaeological evidence.

Tamilakam, the abode of the Tamils, was defined in cankam literature as approximately equivalent to the area south of present-day Chennai (Madras). Tamilakam was divided into 13 nadus (districts), of which the region of Madurai was the most important as the core of the Tamil speakers. The three major chiefdoms of Tamilakam were those of the Pandya dynasty (Madurai), the Ceras (Cheras; Malabar Coast and the hinterland), and the Colas (Cholas; Thanjavur and the Kaveri valley), founders of the Cola dynasty. The inscriptions of the Pandyas, recording royal grants and other grants made by local citizens, date to the 2nd century BCE. The chief Nedunjeliyan (early 3rd century CE) is celebrated by the poets of the cankam as the victor in campaigns against the Ceras and the Colas. Cera inscriptions of the 2nd century CE referring to the Irrumporai clan have been found near Karur (Tiruchchirapalli district), identified with the Korura of Ptolemy. Cankam literature mentions the names of Cera chiefs who have been dated to the 1st century CE. Among them, Nedunjeral Adan is said to have attacked the Yavana ships and held the Yavana traders to ransom. His son Shenguttuvan, much eulogized in the poems, also is mentioned in the context of Gajabahu’s rule in Sri Lanka, which can be dated to either the first or last quarter of the 2nd century CE, depending on whether he was the earlier or the later Gajabahu. Karikalan (late 2nd century CE) is the best known of the early Cola chiefs and was to become almost a kind of eponymous ancestor to many families of the south claiming Cola descent. The early capital was at Uraiyur, in an area that stretched from the Vaigai River in the south to Tondaimandalam in the north. The three chiefdoms were frequently at war; in addition there were often hostilities with Sri Lanka. Mention is also made of the ruler of Tondaimandalam with its capital at Kanchipuram. There is also frequent mention of the minor chieftains, the Vel, who ruled small areas in many parts of the Tamil country. Ultimately all the chiefdoms suffered at the hands of the Kalvar, or Kalabras, who came from the border to the north of Tamilakam and were described as evil rulers, but they were overthrown in the 5th century CE with the rise of the Calukya (Chalukyas) and Pallava dynasties.

Cankam literature reflects the indigenous cultural tradition as well as elements of the intrusion of the northern Sanskritic tradition, which by now was beginning to come into contact with these areas, some of which were in the process of change from chiefdoms to kingdoms. In poems praising the chiefs, heroism in raids and gift-giving are hailed as the main virtues. The predominant economy remained pastoral-cum-agrarian, with an increasing emphasis on agriculture. The Tamil poems divide the land into five ecological zones, or tinais. Among the poems that make reference to social stratification, one uses the word kudi (“group”) to denote caste. Each village had its sabha, or council, for administering local affairs, an institution that was to remain a fixture of village life. Religious observance consisted primarily in conducting sacrifices to various deities, among whom Murugan was preeminent.

Trade with the Yavanas and with the northern parts of the subcontinent provided considerable economic momentum for the southern Indian states. Given the terrain of the peninsula and the agricultural technology of the time, large agrarian-based kingdoms like those of northern India were not feasible, although the cultivation of rice provided a base for economic change. Inevitably, trade played more than a marginal role, and overseas trade became a major economic activity. Almost as soon as the Roman trade began to decline, the Southeast Asian trade commenced; in subsequent centuries this became the focus of maritime interest.

Contacts with the West

Numerous sources from the 1st millennium BCE mention trade between western Asia and the western coast of India. Hebrew texts refer to the port of Ophir, sometimes identified with Sopara, on the west coast. Babylonian builders used Indian teak and cedar in the 7th and 6th centuries BCE. The Buddhist jataka literature mentions trade with Baveru (Babylon). After the decline of Babylon, Arab merchants from southern Arabia apparently continued the trade, probably supplying goods to Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean. The discovery of the regular seasonal monsoon winds, enabling ships to sail a straight course across the Arabian Sea, made a considerable difference to shipping and navigation on the route from western Asia to India. Unification of the Mediterranean and western Asian world at the turn of the Christian era under the Roman Empire brought Roman trade into close contact with India—overland with northern India and by sea with peninsular India. The emperor Augustus received two embassies—almost certainly trade missions—from India in 25–21 BCE.

The Periplus Maris Erythraei (“Navigation of the Erythrean [i.e., Red] Sea”), an anonymous Greek travel book written in the 1st century CE, lists a series of ports along the Indian coast, including Muziris (Cranganore), Colchi (Korkai), Poduca, and Sopatma. An excavation at Arikamedu (near present-day Puducherry [Pondicherry]) revealed a Roman trading settlement of this period, and elsewhere too the presence of Roman pottery, beads, intaglios, lamps, glass, and coins point to a continuous occupation, resulting even in imitations of some Roman items. It would seem that textiles were prepared to Roman specification and exported from such settlements. Graffiti on pottery found at a port in the Red Sea indicates the presence of Indian traders.

Large hoards of Roman coins substantiate other evidence. The coins are mainly of the emperors Augustus (reigned 27 BCE–14 CE), Tiberius (reigned 14–37), and Nero (reigned 54–68). Their frequency suggests that the Romans paid for the trade in gold coins. Many are overstruck with a bar, which may indicate that they were used as bullion in India; certainly, the Roman savant Pliny the Elder complained that the Indian luxury trade was depleting the Roman treasury. The coins are found most often in trading centres or near the sources of semiprecious stones, especially quartz and beryl. Cankam literature attests the prosperity of Yavana merchants trading in towns such as Kaveripattinam (in the Kaveri delta). The Periplus lists the major exports of India as pepper, precious stones, pearls, tortoise shells, ivory, such aromatic plants as spikenard (Nardostachys jatamansi) and malabathrum (Cinnamomum malabathrum), and silk and other textiles. For these the Romans traded glass, copper, tin, lead, realgar (a red pigment), orpiment (a gold pigment), antimony, and wine, or else they paid in gold coins.

The maritime trade routes from the Indian ports were primarily to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, from where they went overland to the eastern Mediterranean and to Egypt, but Indian merchants also ventured out to Southeast Asia seeking spices and semiprecious stones. River valleys and the Mauryan roads were the chief routes within India. Greek sources refer to a royal highway built by the Mauryas, connecting Taxila with Pataliputra and terminating at Tamralipti, the main port in the Ganges delta. On the western coast the major port of Bhrigukaccha (modern Bharuch) was connected with the Ganges valley via Rajasthan or, alternatively, Ujjain. From the Narmada valley there were routes going into the northwestern Deccan and continuing along rivers flowing eastward to various parts of the peninsula. Goods were transported mainly in caravans of oxen and donkeys—but only in the dry seasons, the rains creating impossible conditions for travel. Coastal and river shipping was clearly cheaper than overland transport. The main northern route connected Taxila with Kābul and Kandahār and from there branched off in various directions, mainly linking up with routes across Persia to the Black Sea ports and the eastern Mediterranean. The route connecting China with Bactria via Central Asia, which would shortly become famous as the Silk Road, linked the oases of Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Miran, Kucha, Karashahr, and Turfan, in all of which Indian merchants established trading stations. The Central Asian route brought Chinese goods in large quantities into the Indian and western Asian markets. It is thought that the prosperity resulting from this trade enabled the Kushans to issue the first Indian gold coins. Another consequence was the popularity of horsemanship.

Society and culture

The commercial economy played a central role during this period. Circuits of exchange developed at various levels among groups throughout the subcontinent. In some regions these patterns extended to external trade. Agrarian expansion was not arrested, and land revenue continued to be a major source of income, but profit from trade made a substantial difference to the urban economy, noticeably improving the standard of living and registering a growth in the number and size of towns.

Guilds

The social institution most closely related to commercial activity was the shreni, or guild, through which trade was channeled. The guilds were registered with the town authority, and the activities of guild members followed strict guidelines called the shreni-dharma. The wealthier guilds employed slaves and hired labourers in addition to their own artisans, though the percentage of such slaves appears to have been small. Guilds had their own seals and insignia. They often made lavish donations to Buddhist and Jain monasteries, and some of the finest Buddhist monuments of the period resulted from such patronage. In some areas, such as the Deccan, members of the royal family invested money with a particular guild, and the accruing interest became a regular donation to the Buddhist sangha. This must also have enhanced the political prestige of the guild.

Finance

Increasing reliance on money in commerce greatly augmented the role of the financier and banker. Sometimes the wealthier guilds offered financial services, but the more usual source of money was the merchant financier (shresthin). Coinage proliferated in the various kingdoms, and minting attained a high level of craftsmanship. The most widely used coins were the gold dinaras and suvarnas, based on the Roman denarius (124 grains [about 8 grams]); a range of silver coins, such as the earlier karshapana (or pana; 57.8 grains [3.75 grams]) and the shatamana; an even wider range of copper coins, such as the masa, kakani, and a variety of unspecified standards; and other coins issued in lead and potin, particularly in western India. Usury was an accepted part of the banker’s trade, with 15 percent being the typical interest rate, although this varied according to the enterprise for which the money was borrowed. Expanding trade also introduced a multiplicity of weights and measures.

Impact of trade

Foreign trade probably had its greatest economic impact in the south, but the interchange of ideas appears to have been more substantial in the north. This latter effect may have been attributable to the north’s longer association with western Asia and the colonial Hellenic culture. Greek, along with Aramaic, was widely spoken in Afghanistan and was doubtless understood in Taxila. The spurt of geographic studies in the Mediterranean produced works with extensive descriptions of the trade with India; these include Strabo’s Geography, Ptolemy’s Geography, Pliny’s Natural History, and the Periplus Maris Erythraei. The most obvious and visible impact occurred in Gandhara art, which depicted Indian themes influenced by Hellenistic and Roman styles, an attractive hybrid that influenced the development of Buddhist iconography. The more prized among objects were the ivory carvings that reached Afghanistan from central India.

Religious patronage

If art remains are an index to patronage, then Buddhism seems to have been the most-favoured religion, followed by Shaivism and the Bhagavata cult. Buddhist centres generally comprised a complex of three structures—the monastery (vihara), the hall of worship (caitya), and the sacred tumulus (stupa)—all of which were freestanding structures in the north but were initially rock-cut monuments in the Deccan. The Jains found more patrons in the Deccan. Literary sources of the period mention Hindu temples, but none of comparable antiquity have been found. Apart from the Gandhara style of sculpture, a number of indigenous centres in other parts of India, such as Mathura, Karli, Nagarjunakonda, and Amaravati, portrayed Buddhist legends in a variety of local stones. The more popular medium was terra-cotta, by then changed from gray to red, depicting not only ordinary men and women and animal figures but also large numbers of mother goddesses, indicating the continued popular worship of these deities.

BuddhaHead of Buddha in gray schist, 1st–3rd century CE, showing Hellenistic influences, from Gandhara, northwestern Pakistan; in the Guimet Museum, Paris.Sailko

The practice of Buddhism was itself undergoing change. Affluent patronage endowed the large monasteries with land and slaves. Association with royalty gave Buddhism access to power. Under the proselytizing consciousness that had gradually evolved, Buddhist monks traveled as missionaries to Central Asia and China, western Asia, and Southeast Asia. New situations inevitably led to the need for new ideas, as is most clearly seen in the contact of Buddhism with Christianity and Zoroastrianism in Central Asia. Arguments over the original teaching of the Buddha had already resulted in a series of councils called to clarify the doctrine. The two main sects were the Theravada, centred at Kaushambi, which compiled the Pali canon on Buddhist teachings, and the Sarvastivada, which arose at Mathura, spread northward, and finally established itself in Central Asia, using Sanskrit as the language for preserving the Buddhist tradition. (See Tipitaka.) A council held in Kashmir during the reign of Kanishka ratified the separation of the two main schools of Buddhism—the Mahayana (“Greater Vehicle”) and the Theravada (or Hinayana, “Lesser Vehicle”). The impressive dominance of Buddhism did not arise without hostility from the patrons of other religions.

Central nave of the Buddhist caitya (holy place) at Karli, near Pune, Maharashtra, India.Holle Bildarchiv

Jainism had by now also split into two groups: the Digambara (“Sky-Clad”—i.e., naked), the more orthodox, and the Shvetambara (“White-Clad”), the more liberal. The Jains were not as widespread as the Buddhists, their main centres being in western India, Kalinga for a brief period, and the Mysore (modern Karnataka) and Tamil country.

Brahmanism also underwent changes with the gradual fading out of some of the Vedic deities. The two major gods were Vishnu and Shiva, around whom there emerged a monotheistic trend perhaps best expressed in the Vaishnava Bhagavadgita, which most authorities would date to the 1st century BCE. The doctrine of karma and rebirth, emphasizing the influence of actions performed either in this life or in former lives on present and future lives, became central to Hindu belief and influenced both religious and social notions. Vedic sacrifices were not discontinued but gradually became symbols of such ceremonial occasions as royal consecrations. Sacrificial ritual was beginning to be replaced by the practice of bhakti, a form of personal devotion whereby the worshiper shares in the grace of the deity.

Literature

Popular epics, such as the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, were injected with didactic sections on religion and morality and elevated to the status of sacred literature. Their heroes, Krishna and Rama, were incorporated into Vaishnavism as avatars (incarnations) of Vishnu. The concept of incarnations was useful in subsuming local deities and cults.

Ladies in conversation, detail from a folio from a manuscript of the Mahabharata, 1516.P. Chandra

The epics also served as a treasury of stories, which provided themes and characters for countless poems and plays. The works of the dramatist Bhasa, notably Svapnavasavadatta and Pratijnayaugandharayana, were foundational to the Sanskrit drama. Ashvaghosa, another major dramatist who wrote in Sanskrit, based his works on Buddhist themes. The popularity of drama necessitated the writing of a work on dramaturgy, the Natyashastra (“Treatise on Dramatic Art”) of the sage-priest Bharata. The composition of Dharma-shastras (collections of treatises on sacred duties), among which the most often quoted is ascribed to Manu, became important in a period of social flux in which traditional social law and usage were important as precedent. A commentary on the earlier Sanskrit grammar of Panini was provided by the Mahabhasya of Patanjali, timely because even the non-Indian dynasties of the north and west made extensive use of Sanskrit. Of the sciences, astronomy and medicine were foremost, both reflecting the interchange of ideas with western Asia. Two basic medical treatises, composed by Caraka and Sushruta, date to this period.

Assimilation of foreigners

The presence of foreigners, most of whom settled in Indian cities and adopted Indian habits and behaviour in addition to religion, became a problem for social theorists because the newcomers had to be fitted into caste society. It was easier to accommodate a group rather than an individual into the social hierarchy, because the group could be given a jati status. Technically, conversion to Hinduism was difficult because one had to be born into a particular caste, and it was karma that determined one’s caste. The theoretical definition of caste society continued as before, and the four varnas were referred to as the units of society. The assimilation of local cults demanded the assimilation of cult priests, who had to be accommodated within the Brahmanic hierarchy. The Greeks and the Shakas, clearly of non-Indian origin and initially the ruling group, were referred to as “fallen Kshatriyas.” The Vaishya and Sudra groups did not pose such a serious problem, because their vague definition gave them social mobility. It is likely that in such periods of social change some lower-caste groups may have moved up the ladder of social hierarchy.

From 300 to 750 CE

Northern India

The Guptas

Historians once regarded the Gupta period (c. 320–540) as the classical age of India, the period during which the norms of Indian literature, art, architecture, and philosophy were established. It was also thought to have been an age of material prosperity, particularly among the urban elite, and of renascent Hinduism. Some of these assumptions have been questioned by more-extensive studies of the post-Mauryan, pre-Gupta period. Archaeological evidence from the earlier Kushan levels suggests greater material prosperity, to such a degree that some historians argue for an urban decline in the Gupta period. Much of Gupta literature and art derived from that of earlier periods, and renascent Hinduism is probably more correctly dated to the post-Gupta time. The Gupta realm, although less extensive than that of the Mauryas, did encompass the northern half and central parts of the subcontinent. The Gupta period also has been called an imperial age, but the administrative centralization so characteristic of an imperial system is less apparent than during the Mauryan period.

The Gupta empire at the end of the 4th century.Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

The Guptas, a comparatively unknown family, came from either Magadha or eastern Uttar Pradesh. The third king, Chandra Gupta I (reigned c. 320–c. 330), took the title of maharajadhiraja. He married a Licchavi princess—an event celebrated in a series of gold coins. It has been suggested that, if the Guptas ruled in Prayaga (present-day Prayagraj in eastern Uttar Pradesh), the marriage alliance may have added Magadha to their domain. The Gupta era began in 320, but it is not clear whether this date commemorated the accession of Chandra Gupta or the assumption of the status of independence.

Chandra Gupta appointed his son Samudra Gupta (reigned c. 330–c. 380) to succeed him about 330, according to a long eulogy to Samudra Gupta inscribed on a pillar at Prayagraj. The coins of an obscure prince, Kacha, suggest that there may have been contenders for the throne. Samudra Gupta’s campaigns took him in various directions and resulted in many conquests. Not all the conquered regions were annexed, but the range of operations established the military prowess of the Guptas. Samudra Gupta acquired Pataliputra (present-day Patna), which was to become the Gupta capital. Proceeding down the eastern coast, he also conquered the states of Dakshinapatha but reinstated the vanquished rulers.

Among those he rendered subservient were the rulers of Aryavarta, various forest chiefs, the northern oligarchies, and border states in the east, in addition to Nepal. More-distant domains brought within Samudra Gupta’s orbit were regarded as subordinate; these comprised the “king of kings” of the northwest, the Shakas, the Murundas, and the inhabitants of “all the islands,” including Sinhala (Sri Lanka), all of which are listed in the inscription at Prayagraj. It would seem that the campaign extended Gupta power in northern and eastern India and virtually eliminated the oligarchies and the minor kings of central India and the Ganges valley. The identity of the islands remains problematic, as they could either have been the ones close to India or those of Southeast Asia, with which communication had increased. The Ganges valley and central India were the areas under direct administrative control. The campaign in the eastern coastal areas may have been prompted by the desire to acquire the trading wealth of these regions. The grim image of Samudra Gupta as a military conqueror is ameliorated, however, by references to his love of poetry and by coins on which he is depicted playing the lyre.

Samudra Gupta was succeeded about 380 by his son Chandra Gupta II (reigned c. 380–c. 415), though there is some evidence that there may have been an intermediate ruler. Chandra Gupta II’s major campaign was against the Shaka rulers of Ujjain, the success of which was celebrated in a series of silver coins. Gupta interest lay not merely in the political control of the west but in the wealth the area derived from trade with western and southeastern Asia. Gupta territory adjoining the northern Deccan was secured through a marriage alliance with the Vakataka dynasty, the successors of the Satavahanas in the area. Although Chandra Gupta II took the title of Vikramaditya (“Sun of Valour”), his reign is associated more with cultural and intellectual achievements than with military campaigns. His Chinese contemporary Faxian, a Buddhist monk, traveled in India and left an account of his impressions.

Administratively, the Gupta kingdom was divided into provinces called deshas or bhuktis, and these in turn into smaller units, the pradeshas or vishayas. The provinces were governed by kumaramatyas, high imperial officers or members of the royal family. A decentralization of authority is evident from the composition of the municipal board (adhishthana-adhikarana), which consisted of the guild president (nagara-shreshthin), the chief merchant (sarthavaha), and representatives of the artisans and of the scribes. During that period the term samanta, which originally meant neighbour, was beginning to be applied to intermediaries who had been given grants of land or to conquered feudatory rulers. There was also a noticeable tendency for some of the higher administrative offices to become hereditary. The lack of firm control over conquered areas led to their resuming independence. The repeated military action that this necessitated may have strained the kingdom’s resources.

The first hint of a fresh invasion from the northwest comes in the reign of Chandra Gupta’s son and successor, Kumara Gupta (reigned c. 415–455). The threat was that of a group known in Indian sources as the Hunas, or Huns, though it is not clear whether this group had any relations to the Huns of European history. They were in any event a branch of a Central Asian group known as the Hephthalites. Skanda Gupta (c. 455–467), who succeeded Kumara Gupta, and his successors all had to face the full-fledged invasion of the Hunas. Skanda Gupta managed to rally Gupta strength for a while, but after his death the situation deteriorated. Dissensions within the royal family added to the problem. Gupta genealogies of this period show considerable variance in their succession lists. By the mid-6th century, when the dynasty apparently came to an end, the kingdom had dwindled to a small size. Northern India and parts of central India were in the hands of the Hunas.

The first Huna king in India was Toramana (early 6th century), whose inscriptions have been found as far south as Eran (Madhya Pradesh). His son Mihirakula, a patron of Shaivism, is recorded in Buddhist tradition as uncouth and extremely cruel. The Gupta rulers, together with Yashodharman of Malava, seem to have confronted Mihirakula and forced him back to the north. Ultimately his kingdom was limited to Kashmir and Punjab with its capital at Shakala (possibly present-day Sialkot). Huna power declined after his reign.

The coming of the Hunas brought northern India once more into close contact with Central Asia, and a number of Central Asian tribes migrated into India. It has been suggested that the Gurjaras, who gradually spread to various parts of northern India, may be identified with the Khazars, a Turkic people of Central Asia. The Huna invasion challenged the stability of the Gupta kingdom, even though the ultimate decline may have been caused by internal factors. A severe blow was the resultant disruption of the Central Asian trade and the decline in the income that northern India had derived from it. Some of the north Indian tribes migrated to other regions, and this movement of peoples effected changes in the social structure of the post-Gupta period. The rise of Rajput families and “Kshatriya” dynasties (see below The Rajputs) is associated by some scholars with tribal chiefs in these new areas.

Successor states

Of the kingdoms that arose as inheritors of the Gupta territory, the most important were those of Valabhi (Saurashtra and Kathiawar); Gujarata (originally the area near Jodhpur), believed to be the nucleus of the later Pratihara kingdom; Nandipuri (near Bharuch); Maukhari (Magadha); the kingdom of the later Guptas (in the area between Malava and Magadha); and those of Bengal, Nepal, and Kamarupa (in the Assam Valley). Orissa (Kongoda) was under the Mana and Shailodbhava dynasties before being conquered by Shashanka, king of Gauda (lower Bengal). In the early 7th century Shashanka annexed a substantial part of the Ganges valley, where he came into conflict with the Maukharis and the rising Puspabhuti (Pushyabhuti) dynasty of Thanesar (north of Delhi).

The Puspabhuti dynasty aspired to imperial status during the reign of Harsha (Harsavardhana). Sthanvishvara (Thanesar) appears to have been a small principality, probably under the suzerainty of the Guptas. Harsha came to the throne in 606 and ruled for 41 years. The first of the major historical biographies in Sanskrit, the Harshacarita (“Deeds of Harsha”), was written by Bana, a celebrated author attached to his court, and contains information on Harsha’s early life. A fuller account of the period is given by the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Xuanzang, who traveled through India and stayed for some time at a monastery at Nalanda. Harsha acquired Kannauj (in Farrukhabad district), which became the eponymous capital of his large kingdom. He waged a major but unsuccessful campaign against Pulakeshin II, a king of the Calukya dynasty of the northern Deccan, and was confined to the northern half of the subcontinent. Nor was his success spectacular in western India against Valabhl, Nandipurl, and Sind (lower Indus valley). In his eastern campaign, however, Harsh met with little resistance (Shashanka having died in 636) and acquired Magadha, Vanga, and Kongoda (Orissa). His alliance with Bhaskaravarman of Kamarupa (Assam) proved helpful. Although Harsha failed to build an empire, his kingdom was of no mean size, and he earned the reputation of being the preeminent ruler of the north. He is remembered as the author of three Sanskrit plays—Ratnavall, Priyadarshika, and Nagananda—the theme of the last indicating his interest in Buddhist thought. The Tang emperor of China, Taizong, sent a series of embassies to Harsha, establishing closer ties between the two realms. After the death of Harsha, the kingdom of Kannauj entered a period of decline until the early 8th century, when it revived with the rise of Yashovarman, who is eulogized in the Prakrit poem Gauda-vadha (“The Slaying of [the King of] Gauda”) by Vakpati. Yashovarman came into conflict with Lalitaditya, the king of Kashmir of the Karkota dynasty, and appears to have been defeated.

In the 8th century the rising power in western India was that of the Gurjara-Pratiharas. The Rajput dynasty of the Guhilla had its centre in Mewar (with Chitor as its base). The Capa family was associated with the city of Anahilapataka (present-day Patan) and are involved in early Rajput history. In the Haryana region the Tomara Rajputs (Tomara dynasty), originally feudatories of the Gurjara-Pratiharas, founded the city of Dhillika (modern Delhi) in 736. The political pattern of this time reveals a rebirth of regionalism and of new political and economic structures.

In the early 8th century a new power base was established briefly with the arrival of the Arabs in Sind. Inscriptions of the western Indian dynasties speak of controlling the tide of the mleccha, which has been interpreted in this case to mean the Arabs; some Indian sources use the term yavana. The conquest of Sind marked the easternmost extent of Arab territorial control. A 13th-century Persian translation of a chronicle from Sind, the Chach-nāmeh, gives an account of these events. The initial naval expedition met with failure, so the Arabs conducted an overland campaign. The Arab hold on Sind was loose at first, and the local chiefs remained virtually independent, but by 724 the invaders had established direct rule, with a governor representing the Muslim caliph. Arab attempts to advance into Punjab and Kashmir, however, were checked. The Indians did not fully comprehend the magnitude of Arab political and economic ambitions. Along the west coast, the Arabs were seen as familiar traders from western Asia. The possible competition with Indian trade was not realized.

The Deccan

In the Deccan the Vakataka dynasty was closely tied to the Guptas. With a nucleus in Vidarbha, the founder of the dynasty, Vindhyashakti, extended his power northward as far as Vidisha (near Ujjain). At the end of the 4th century, a collateral line of the Vakatakas was established by Sarvasena in Vatsagulma (Basim, in Akola district), and the northern line helped the southern to conquer Kuntala (southern Maharashtra). The domination of the northern Deccan by the main Vakataka line during this period is clearly established by the matrimonial alliances not only with the Guptas but also with other peninsular dynasties such as the Visnukundins and the Kadambas. The Vakatakas were weakened by attacks from Malava and Koshala in the 5th century. Ultimately, the Calukyas of Vatapi (present-day Badami) ended their rule.

Of the myriad ruling families of the Deccan between the 4th and 7th centuries—including the Nalas, the Kalacuris, the Gangas, and the Kadambas—the most significant were the Calukyas (Chalukyas), who are associated with Vatapi in the 6th century. The Calukyas controlled large parts of the Deccan for two centuries. There were many branches of the family, the most important of which were the Eastern Calukyas, ruling at Pishtapura (modern Pithapuram in the Godavari River delta) in the early 7th century; the Calukyas of Vemulavada (near Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh); and the renascent later Calukyas of Kalyani (between the Bhima and Godavari rivers), who rose to power in the 10th century. Calukya power reached its zenith during the reign of Pulakeshin II (610–642), a contemporary of Harsha (see above Successor states). The early years of Pulakeshin’s reign were taken up with a civil war, after which he had to reconquer lost territories and reestablish his control over recalcitrant feudatories. Pulakeshin then campaigned successfully in the south against the Kadambas, the Alupas, and the Gangas. Leading his armies north, he defeated the Latas, Malavas, and Gurjaras. Pulakeshin’s final triumph in the north was the victory over Harsha of Kannauj. Pulakeshin then turned his attention to the eastern Deccan and conquered southern Koshala, Kalinga, Pishtapuram, and the Vishnukundin kingdom. He started the collateral branch of the Eastern Calukyas based at Pishtapuram with his younger brother Vishnuvardhana as the first king. Pulakeshin then launched another major campaign against the powerful southern Indian kingdom of the Pallavas, in which he defeated their king Mahendravarman I—thus inaugurating a conflict between the two kingdoms that was to continue for many centuries. Pulakeshin II sent an embassy to the court of the Sāsānian Persian king Khosrow II. Good relations between the Persians and the Indians of the Deccan were of great advantage to the Zoroastrians of Persia, who, fleeing from the Islamic persecution in subsequent centuries, sought asylum in India and settled along the west coast of the Deccan. Their descendants today constitute the Parsi community.

Control over both coasts enhanced the Calukya king’s already firm hold on the Deccan. The major river valleys of the plateau—the Narmada, Tapi (Tapti), Godavari with its tributaries, and Krishna—were in Calukya hands, as were the valuable routes in the valleys. This amounted to control of the west coast trade with western Asia and the Kalinga and Andhra trade on the east coast with Southeast Asia. The centuries-long conflict between the northern and the southern Deccan, of which the Calukya-Pallava conflict was but a facet, also had geographic, political, and economic causes. Any southern Indian power seeking to expand would inevitably try to move up the east coast, which was not only the most fertile area of the peninsula but was also wealthy from the income of trade with Southeast Asia. Therefore, control of the northern Deccan required control of the east coast as well. With the major maritime activity gradually concentrating on Southeast Asian trade, in which even the west coast had a large share, the control of both coasts was of considerable economic advantage. It was along the east coast, therefore, that the conflict between the two regions often erupted. The next 100 years of Calukya power witnessed the continuation of this conflict, weakening both contenders. Ultimately, in the mid-8th century, a feudatory of the Calukyas, Dantidurga of the Rashtrakuta dynasty, rose to importance and established himself in place of the declining Calukya dynasty. The Eastern Calukyas, who had managed to avoid involvement in the conflict, survived longer and came into conflict with the Rashtrakutas. Another branch of the Calukyas established itself at Lata in the mid-7th century and played a prominent role in obstructing the Arab advance.

Southern India

The southern part of the peninsula split into many kingdoms, each fighting for supremacy. Cera power relied mainly on a flourishing trade with western Asia. The Colas retired into insignificance in the Uraiyur (Tiruchchirappalli) area. The Pandyas were involved in fighting the rising power of the Pallavas, and occasionally they formed alliances with the Deccan kingdoms.

The origin of the Pallava dynasty is obscure. It is not even clear whether the early Pallavas of the 3rd century were the ancestors of the later Pallavas of the 6th century, who are sometimes distinguished by the title “imperial.” It would seem, though, that their place of origin was Tondaimandalam, with its centre at Kanchipuram (ancient Kanci). Prakrit copperplate charters issued by the early kings from Kanchipuram often mention places just to the north in Andhra Pradesh, suggesting that the dynasty may have migrated to the Kanchipuram area. The Sanskrit and Tamil epigraphic records of the later kings of the dynasty indicate that the later Pallavas became dominant in the 6th century after a successful attack against the Kalabhras, which extended their territory as far south as the Kaveri River. The Pallavas reached their zenith during the reign of Mahendravarman I (c. 600–630), a contemporary of Harsha and Pulakeshin II. Among the sources of the period, Xuanzang’s account serves as a link, as he traveled through the domains of all three kings. The struggle for Vengi between the Pallavas and the Calukyas became the immediate pretext for a long, drawn-out war, which began with the defeat of the Pallavas. Apart from his campaigns, Mahendravarman was a writer and artist of some distinction. The play associated with him, Mattavilasaprahasana, treats in a farcical manner the idiosyncrasies of Buddhist and Shaiva ascetics.

Mahendravarman’s successor, Narasimhavarman I (reigned c. 630–668), also called Mahamall or Mamalla, avenged the Pallava defeat by capturing Vatapi. He sent two naval expeditions from Mahabalipuram to Sri Lanka to assist the king Manavamma in regaining his throne. Pallava naval interests laid the foundation for extensive reliance on the navy by the succeeding dynasty, the Colas. Toward the end of the 8th century, the Gangas and the Pandyas joined coalitions against the Pallavas. As the Calukyas declined under pressure from the Rashtrakutas, the Pandyas gradually took on the Pallavas and, by the mid-9th century, advanced as far as Kumbakonam. This defeat was avenged, but, by the end of the 9th century, Pallava power had ceased to be significant.

Society and culture

Some of the Pallava kings took an interest in the Alvars and Nayanars, the religious teachers who preached a new form of Vaishnavism and Shaivism based on the bhakti (devotional) cults. Among the Shaivas were Appar (who is said to have converted Mahendravarman from Jainism) and Manikkavacakar. Among the Vaishnavas were Nammalvar and a woman teacher, Andal. The movement aimed at preaching a popular Hinduism, in which Tamil was preferred to Sanskrit, and emphasized the role of the peripatetic teacher. Women were encouraged to participate in the congregations. The Tamil devotional cult and similar movements elsewhere were in a sense competitive with Buddhism and Jainism, both of which suffered a gradual decline in most areas. Jainism found a foothold in Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Gujarat. Buddhism flourished in eastern India, with major monastic centres at Nalanda, Vikramashila, and Paharpur that attracted vast numbers of students from India and abroad. Tibetan and eastern Indian cults, particularly the Tantric cults, influenced the development of Vajrayana (“Thunderbolt Vehicle”) Buddhism. The widespread Shakti cult associated with Hindu practice was based on the notion that the male can be activated only by union with the female. Thus, the gods were given consorts—Lakshmi (or Shri) for Vishnu; Parvati, Kali, and Durga for Shiva—and ritual was directed toward the worship of the mother goddess. Much of the ritual was derived from the earlier fertility cults and local rites and beliefs that were assimilated into Hinduism.

During the same period, orthodox Brahmanism received encouragement, especially from the royal families. Learned Brahmans were given endowments of land. The performance of Vedic sacrifices for purposes of royal legitimacy gave way to the keeping of genealogies, which the Brahmans now controlled. The new Brahmanism acquired a locality and an institution in the form of the temple. The earliest remains of a Hindu temple, discovered at Sanchi, date to the Gupta period. These extremely simple structures consisted of a shrine room, called a garbhagrha (“womb house,” or sanctum sanctorum), which contained an image of the deity and opened onto a porch. Over the centuries, additional structures were added until the temple complexes covered many acres. In the peninsula the early rock-cut temples imitated Buddhist models. Although the Calukyas did introduce freestanding temples, most of their patronage extended to rock-cut monuments. The Pallavas also began with rock-cut temples, as at Mahabalipur, but, when they took to freestanding temples, they produced the most-impressive examples of their time.

As temples and monasteries became larger and more complex, the decorative arts of mural painting and sculpture flourished. Early examples of mural painting occur at Bagh and Sittanvasal (now in Tamil Nadu), and the tradition reached its apogee in the murals at the Ajanta Caves (Maharashtra) during the Vakataka and Calukya periods. The fashion for murals in Buddhist monasteries spread from India to Afghanistan and Central Asia and ultimately to China. Equally impressive was the Buddhist sculpture at Sarnath, in Uttar Pradesh. It is possible that the proliferation of Buddhist images led to the depiction of Hindu deities in iconic form.

Sandstone sculpture of the Buddha, 5th century CE, from Sarnath, Uttar Pradesh, India; in the Indian Museum, Kolkata.P. Chandra

Fresco of a court scene from Cave I, Ajanta, Maharashtra, India, 600–700 CE.V. Panjabi/Shostal Associates

Temples were richly endowed with wealth and land, and the larger institutions could accommodate colleges of higher learning (ghatikas and mathas), primarily for priests. These colleges became responsible for much of the formal education, and inevitably the use of Sanskrit became widespread. There was an appreciable development of Hindu philosophy, which now recognized six major systems (darshans): Nyaya, Vaishesika, Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa, and Vedanta. Indicative of the growing domination of Brahmanic intellectual life, the ancient Puranas were now written substantially in their present form under Brahmanic influence. (See Indian philosophy.)

The flowering of classical Sanskrit literature is indicated by the plays and poems of Kalidasa (Abhijnanashakuntala, Malavikagnimitra, Vikramorvashiya, Raghuvamsha, Meghaduta), although Kalidasa’s precise date is uncertain. In the south the propagation of Sanskrit resulted in the Kiratarjuniya, an epic written by Bharavi (7th century); in Dandin’s Dashakumaracarita, a collection of popular stories (6th century); and in Bhavabhuti’s play Malatimadhava. Tamil literature flourished as well, as evidenced by two didactic works, the Tirukkural (by Tiruvalluvar) and Naladiyar, and by the more lyrical Silappadikaram and Manimekhalai, two Tamil epics. Representing a less common genre of literature in the Gupta period was the Kama-sutra of Vatsyayana, a manual on the art of love. This was a collation and revision of earlier texts and displays a remarkable sophistication and urbanity. It was a period of literary excellence, though in the other arts such levels of excellence came later. Not all the achievements can be associated with the Gupta dynasty.

The monasteries and temples were centres of formal learning, and the guilds were centres of technical knowledge. The mixture of the theoretical and practical, however, sometimes occurred, as in the case of medicine, particularly veterinary science. Advances in metallurgy are attested in such objects as the Sultanganj Buddha and a famous iron pillar now at Mehrauli (Delhi). Gold and silver coins of the Gupta period exhibit a refinement that was not to be surpassed for many centuries. Mathematics was particularly advanced, probably more so than anywhere in the world at the time. Indian numerals were later borrowed by the Arabs and introduced to Europe as Arabic numerals. The use of the cipher and the decimal system is confirmed by inscriptions. With advances in mathematics there was comparable progress in astronomy. Aryabhata, writing in 499, calculated π (pi) to 3.1416 and the solar year to 365.3586… days and stated that the Earth was spherical and rotated on its axis. That European astronomy was also known is suggested by the 6th-century astronomer Varahamihira, who mentions the Romaka Siddhanta (“School of Rome”) among the five major schools of astronomy.

Legal texts and commentaries were abundant—the better-known being those of Yajnavalkya, Narada, Brihaspati, Katyayana. Earlier texts relating to social problems and property rights received particular attention. The post-Gupta period saw considerable and lasting social change, which resulted not only from outside influences but also from the interaction of the elite Sanskritic culture with more-parochial non-Sanskritic cultures. The expanding village economy opened up new areas geographically, and the increasing importance of guilds in the towns indicated fresh perspectives on social life. These activities also incorporated new groups and cultures into the existing norms of Indian society.

From 750 to c. 1200

Northern India

The tripartite struggle

The 8th century was a time of struggle for control over the central Ganges valley—focusing on Kannauj—among the Gurjara-Pratihara, the Rashtrakuta, and the Pala dynasties. The Pratiharas rose to power in the Avanti-Jalaor region and used western India as a base. The Calukyas fell about 753 to one of their own feudatories, the Rashtrakutas under Dantidurga, who established a dynasty. The Rashtrakuta interest in Kannauj probably centred on the trade routes from the Ganges valley. This was the first occasion on which a power based in the Deccan made a serious bid for a pivotal position in northern India. From the east the Palas also participated in the competition. They are associated with Pundravardhana (near Bogra, Bangl.), and their first ruler, Gopala (reigned c. 750–770), included Vanga in his kingdom and gradually extended his control to the whole of Bengal.

Vatsaraja, a Pratihara ruler who came to the throne about 778, controlled eastern Rajasthan and Malava. His ambition to take Kannauj brought him into conflict with the Pala king, Dharmapala (reigned c. 770–810), who had by this time advanced up the Ganges valley. The Rashtrakuta king Dhruva (reigned c. 780–793) attacked each in turn and claimed to have defeated them. This initiated a lengthy tripartite struggle. Dharmapala soon retook Kannauj and put his nominee on the throne. The Rashtrakutas were preoccupied with problems in the south. Vatsaraja’s successor, Nagabhata II (reigned c. 793–833), reorganized Pratihara power, attacked Kannauj, and for a short while reversed the situation. However, soon afterward he was defeated by the Rashtrakuta king Govinda III (reigned 793–814), who in turn had to face a confederacy of southern powers that kept him involved in Deccan politics, leaving northern India to the Pratiharas and Palas. Bhoja I (reigned c. 836–885) revived the power of the Pratiharas by bringing Kalanjara, and possibly Kannauj as well, under Pratihara control. Bhoja’s plans to extend the kingdom, however, were thwarted by the Palas and the Rashtrakutas. More serious conflict with the latter ensued during the reign of Krishna II (reigned c. 878–914).

An Arab visitor to western India, the merchant Sulaymān, referred to the kingdom of Juzr (which is generally identified as Gurjara) and its strong and able ruler, who may have been Bhoja. Of the successors of Bhoja, the only one of significance was Mahipala (reigned c. 908–942), whose relationship with the earlier king remains controversial. Rajashekhara, a renowned poet at his court, implies that Mahipala restored the kingdom to its original power, but this may be an exaggeration. By the end of the 10th century the Pratihara feudatories—Cauhans (Cahamanas), Candellas (Chandelas), Guhilas, Kalacuris, Paramaras, and Caulukyas (also called Solankis)—were asserting their independence, although the last of the Pratiharas survived until 1027. Meanwhile Devapala (reigned c. 810–850) was reasserting Pala authority in the east and, he claimed, in the northern Deccan. At the end of the 9th century, however, the Pala kingdom declined, with feudatories in Kamarupa (modern Assam) and Utkala (Orissa) taking independent titles. Pala power revived during the reign of Mahipala (reigned c. 988–1038), although its stronghold now was Bihar rather than Bengal. Further attempts to recover the old Pala territories were made by Ramapala, but Pala power gradually declined. There was a brief revival of power in Bengal under the Sena dynasty (c. 1070–1289).

In the Rashtrakuta kingdom, Amoghavarsa (reigned c. 814–878) faced a revolt of officers and feudatories but managed to survive and reassert Rashtrakuta power despite intermittent rebellions. Campaigns in the south against Vengi and the Gangas kept Amoghavarsa preoccupied and prevented him from participating in northern politics. The Rashtrakuta capital was moved to Manyakheta (Andhra Pradesh), doubtlessly to facilitate southern involvements, which clearly took on more-important dimensions at this time. Sporadic campaigns against the Pratiharas, the Eastern Calukyas, and the Colas, the new power of the south, continued (see below The Colas). Indra III (reigned 914–927) captured Kannauj, but, with mounting political pressures from the south, his control over the north was inevitably short-lived. The reign of Krishna III (reigned c. 939–968) saw a successful campaign against the Colas, a matrimonial alliance with the Gangas, and the subjugation of Vengi. Rashtrakuta power declined suddenly, however, after the reign of Indra, and this was fully exploited by the feudatory Taila.

Taila II (reigned 973–997), who traced his ancestry to the earlier Calukyas of Vatapi, ruled a small part of Bijapur. Upon the weakening of Rashtrakuta power, he defeated the king, declared his independence, and founded what has come to be called the Later Calukya dynasty. The kingdom included much of Karnataka, Konkan, and the territory as far north as the Godavari River. By the end of the 10th century, the Later Calukyas clashed with the ambitious Colas. The Calukyas’ capital was subsequently moved north to Kalyani (near Bidar, in Karnataka). Campaigns against the Colas took a more serious turn during the reign of Someshvara I (reigned 1043–68), with alternating defeat and victory. The Later Calukyas, however, by and large retained control over the western Deccan despite the hostility of the Colas and of their own feudatories. In the middle of the 12th century, however, a feudatory, Bijjala (reigned 1156–67) of the Kalacuri dynasty, usurped the throne at Kalyani. The last of the Calukya rulers, Someshvara IV (reigned 1181–c. 1189), regained the throne for a short period, after which he was overthrown by a feudatory of the Yadava dynasty.

On the periphery of the large kingdoms were the smaller states such as Nepal, Kamarupa, Kashmir, and Utkala (Orissa) and lesser dynasties such as the Shilaharas in Maharashtra. Nepal had freed itself from Tibetan suzerainty in the 8th century but remained a major trade route to Tibet. Kamarupa, with its capital at Pragjyotisapura (near present-day Gawahati), was one of the centres of the Tantric cult. In 1253 a major part of Kamarupa was conquered by the Ahom, a Shan people. Politics in Kashmir were dominated by turbulent feudatories seeking power. By the 11th century Kashmir was torn between rival court factions, and the oppression by Harsha accentuated the suffering of the people. Smaller states along the Himalayan foothills managed to survive without becoming too embroiled in the politics of the plains.

The Rajputs

In Rajasthan and central India there arose a number of small kingdoms ruled by dynasties that came to be called the Rajputs (from Sanskrit raja-putra, “son of a king”). The name was assumed by royal families that claimed Kshatriya status and linked their lineage either with the Suryavamshi (solar) or the Candravamshi (lunar), the royal lineages of the itihasa-purana tradition, or else with the Agnikula (fire lineage), based on a lesser myth in which the eponymous ancestor arises out of the sacrificial fire. The four major Rajput dynasties—Pratihara, Paramara, Cauhan, and Caulukya—claimed Agnikula lineage. The references in Rajput genealogies to supernatural ancestry suggest either an obscure origin—perhaps from semi-Hinduized local tribes who gradually acquired political and economic status—or else a non-Indian (probably Central Asian) origin.

The Caulukyas of Gujarat had three branches: one ruling Mattamayura (the Malava-Cedi region), one established on the former kingdom of the Capas at Anahilapataka (present-day Patan), and the third at Bhrigukaccha (present-day Bharuch) and Lata in the coastal area. By the 11th century they were using Gujarat as a base and attempting to annex neighbouring portions of Rajasthan and Avanti. Kumarapala (reigned c. 1143–72) was responsible for consolidating the kingdom. He is also believed to have become a Jain and to have encouraged Jainism in western India. Hemacandra, an outstanding Jain scholar noted for his commentaries on political treatises, was a well-known figure at the Caulukya court. Many of the Rajput kingdoms had Jain statesmen, ministers, and even generals, as well as Jain traders and merchants. By the 14th century, however, the Caulukya kingdom had declined.

Adjoining the kingdom of the Caulukyas was that of the Paramaras in Malava, with minor branches in the territories just to the north (Mount Abu, Banswara, Cungarpur, and Bhinmal). The Paramaras emerged as feudatories of the Rashtrakutas and rose to eminence during the reign of Bhoja. An attack by the Caulukyas weakened the Paramaras in 1143. Although the dynasty was later re-established, it remained weak. In the 13th century the Paramaras were threatened by both rising Yadava power in the Deccan and the Turkish kingdom at Delhi (see below The coming of the Turks); the latter conquered the Paramaras in 1305.

The Kalacuris of Tripuri (near Jabalpur) also began as feudatories of the Rashtrakutas, becoming a power in central India in the 11th century during the reigns of Gangeyadeva and his son Lakshmikarna, when attempts were made to conquer territories as far afield as Utkala (Orissa), Bihar, and the Ganges–Yamuna Doab. There they came into conflict with the Turkish governor of the Punjab, who briefly had extended his territory as far as Varanasi. To the west there were conflicts with Bhoja Paramara, and the Kalacuris declined at the end of the 12th century.

The Candellas, whose kingdom comprised mainly Bundelkhand, were feudatories of the Pratiharas. Among the important rulers was Dhanga (reigned c. 950–1008), who issued a large number of inscriptions and was generous in donations to Jain and Hindu temples. Dhanga’s grandson Vidyadhara (reigned 1017–29), often described as the most powerful of the Candella kings, extended the kingdom as far as the Chambal and Narmada rivers. There he came into direct conflict with the Turkic conqueror Maḥmūd of Ghazna when the latter swept down from Afghanistan in a series of raids. But the ensuing battles were indecisive. The Candellas also had to face the attacks of the Cauhans, who were in turn being harassed by the Turks. The Turkish kingdom at Delhi encroached into Bundelkhand, but the Candellas survived until the 16th century as minor chieftains.

The Gahadavalas rose to importance in Varanasi and extended their kingdom up the Gangetic plain, including Kannauj. The king Jayacandra (12th century) is mentioned in the poem Prithviraja-raso by Candbardai, in which his daughter, the princess Sanyogita, elopes with the Cauhan king Prithviraja. Jayacandra died in battle against the Turkish leader, Muʿizz al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Sām (Muḥammad of Ghūr), and his kingdom was annexed.

Inscriptional records associate the Cauhans with Lake Shakambhari and its environs (Sambhar Salt Lake, Rajasthan). Cauhan politics were largely campaigns against the Caulukyas and the Turks. In the 11th century the Cauhans founded the city of Ajayameru (Ajmer) in the southern part of their kingdom, and in the 12th century they captured Dhillika (Delhi) from the Tomaras and annexed some Tomara territory along the Yamuna River. Prithviraja III has come down both in folk and historical literature as the Cauhan king who resisted the Turkish attacks in the first battle at Taraori (Tarain) in 1191. Prithviraja, however, was defeated at a second battle in the same place in 1192; the defeat ushered in Turkish rule in northern India.

The coming of the Turks

The establishment of Turkish power in India is initially tied up with politics in the Punjab. The Punjab was ruled by Jayapala of the Hindu Shahi family (Shahiya), which had in the 9th century wrested the Kābul valley and Gandhara from a Turkish Shah. Political and economic relations were extremely close between the Punjab and Afghanistan. Afghanistan in turn was closely involved with Central Asian politics. Sebüktigin, a Turk, was appointed governor of Ghazna in 977. He attacked the Hindu Shahis and advanced as far as Peshawar. His son Maḥmūd succeeded to the Ghazna principality in 998. Maḥmūd went to war with the Shahiya dynasty, and, almost every year until his death in 1030, he led raids against the rich temple towns in northern and western India, using the wealth obtained from the raids to finance successful campaigns in Central Asia and build an empire there. He acquired a reputation as an iconoclast as well as a patron of culture and was responsible for sending to India the scholar al-Bīrūnī, whose study Taʾrīkh al-Hind (“The History of India”) is a source of valuable information. Maḥmūd left his governors in the Punjab with a rather loose control over the region.

In the 12th century the Ghūrid Turks were driven out of Khorāsān and later out of Ghazna by the Khwārezm-Shah dynasty. Inevitably the Ghūrids sought their fortune in northern India, where the conflict between the Ghaznavids and the local rulers provided an excellent opportunity. Muḥammad of Ghūr advanced into the Punjab and captured Lahore in 1185. Victory in the second battle of Taraori consolidated Muḥammad’s success, and he left his mamlūk (slave) general, Quṭb-al-Dīn Aybak, in charge of his Indian possessions. Muḥammad was assassinated in 1206 on his way back to Afghanistan. Quṭb al-Dīn remained in India and declared himself sultan of Delhi, the first of the Mamlūk dynasty.

The Deccan and the south

In the northern Deccan the decline of the Later Calukyas brought about the rise of their feudatories, among them the Yadava dynasty (also claiming descent from the Yadu tribe) based at Devagiri (Daulatabad), whose kingdom (Seunadesha) included the broad swaths of what is now Maharashtra state. The kingdom expanded during the reign of Simhana (reigned c. 1210–47), who campaigned against the Hoysala in northern Karnataka, against the lesser chiefs of the western coast, and against the Kakatiya kingdom in the eastern Deccan. Turning northward, Simhana attacked the Paramaras and the Caulukyas. The Yadavas, however, facing the Turks to the north and the powerful Hoysalas to the south, declined in the early 14th century.

In the eastern Deccan the Kakatiya dynasty was based in parts of what is now Andhra Pradesh state and survived until the Turkish attack in the 14th century. The Eastern Calukyas ruled in the Godavari River delta, and in the 13th century their fortunes were tied to those of the Colas. The Eastern Gangas, ruling in Kalinga, came into conflict with the Turks advancing down the Ganges River valley to the delta during the 13th century.

The Colas

The Colas (Cholas) were by far the most important dynasty in the subcontinent at this time, although their activities mainly affected the peninsula and Southeast Asia. The nucleus of Cola power during the reign of Vijayalaya in the late 9th century was Thanjavur, from which the Colas spread northward, annexing in the 10th century what remained of Pallava territory. To the south they came up against the Pandyas. Cola history can be reconstructed in considerable detail because of the vast number of lengthy inscriptions issued not only by the royal family but also by temple authorities, village councils, and trade guilds. Parantaka I (reigned 907–953) laid the foundation of the kingdom. He took the northern boundary up to Nellore (Andhra Pradesh), where his advance was stopped by a defeat at the hands of the Rashtrakuta king Krishna III. Parantaka was more successful in the south, where he defeated both the Pandyas and the Gangas. He also launched an abortive attack on Sri Lanka. For 30 years after his death, there was a series of feeble reigns that did not strengthen the Cola position. There then followed two outstanding rulers who rapidly reinstated Cola power and ensured the kingdom its supremacy. These were Rajaraja I and Rajendra.

Rajaraja (reigned 985–1014) began establishing power with attacks against the Pandyas and Illamandalam of Sri Lanka. Northern Sri Lanka became a province of the Cola kingdom. A campaign against the Gangas and Calukyas extended the Cola boundary north to the Tungabhadra River. On the eastern coast the Colas battled with the Calukyas for the possession of Vengi. A marriage alliance gave the Colas an authoritative position, but Vengi remained a bone of contention. A naval campaign led to the conquest of the Maldive Islands, the Malabar Coast, and northern Sri Lanka, all of which were essential to the Cola control over trade with Southeast Asia and with Arabia and eastern Africa. These were the transit areas, ports of call for the Arab traders and ships to Southeast Asia and China, which were the source of the valuable spices sold at a high profit to Europe.

Rajaraja I’s son Rajendra participated in his father’s government from 1012, succeeded him two years later, and ruled until 1044. To the north he annexed the Raichur Doab (the interfluve between the Krishna and Tungabhadra rivers in Karnataka) and moved into Manyakheta in the heart of Calukya territory. A revolt against Mahinda V of Sri Lanka gave Rajendra the excuse to conquer southern Sri Lanka as well. In 1021–22 the now-famous northern campaign was launched. The Cola army campaigned along the east coast as far as Bengal and then north to the Ganges River—almost the exact reverse of Samudra Gupta’s campaign to Kanchipuram in the 4th century CE. The most spectacular campaign, however, was a naval campaign against the Srivijaya empire in Southeast Asia in 1025. The reason for the assault on Srivijaya and neighbouring areas appears to have been the interference with Indian shipping and mercantile interests seeking direct trading connections with southern China. The Cola victory reinstated these connections, and throughout the 11th century Cola trading missions visited China.

The Hoysalas and Pandyas

The succession after Rajendra is confused until the emergence of Kulottunga I (reigned 1070–1122), but his reign was the last of any significance. The 12th and 13th centuries saw a gradual decline in Cola power, accelerated by the rise of the Hoysalas to the west and the Pandyas to the south.

The Hoysalas began as hill chieftains northwest of Dorasamudra (modern Halebid), feudatory to the Calukyas. Vishnuvardhana consolidated the kingdom in the 12th century. The Hoysalas were involved in conflict with the Yadava kingdom, which was seeking to expand southward, particularly during the reign of Ballala II (reigned 1173–1220). Hostilities also developed with the Colas to the east. The armies of the Turks eroded the Hoysala kingdom until, in the 14th century, it gave way to the newly emerging Vijayanagara empire. In the 13th century the Pandyas became the dominant power in the south, but their supremacy was brief because they were attacked in the 14th century by Turkish armies. Information on the dynasty is supplemented by the colourful account of Venetian traveler Marco Polo, who visited the region in 1288 and 1293.

Society and culture

Apart from the political events of the time, a common development in the subcontinent was the recognizable decentralization of administration and revenue collection. From the Cola kingdom there are long inscriptions on temple walls referring to the organization and functioning of village councils. Villages that had been donated to Brahmans had councils called sabhas; in the non-Brahman villages the council was called the ur. Eligibility qualifications generally relating to age and ownership of property were indicated, along with procedural rules. The council was divided into various committees in charge of the different aspects of village life and administration. Among the responsibilities of the council was the collection of revenue and the supervision of irrigation. References to village bodies and local councils also occur in inscriptions from other regions. A more recent and much-contested view held by some historians holds that the Cola state was a segmentary state with control decreasing from the centre outward and a ritual hierarchy that determined the relations between the centre and the units of the territory. The nature of the state during this period has been the subject of widespread discussion among historians.

In the Deccan the rise and fall of dynasties was largely the result of the feudatory pattern of political relationships. The same held true of northern India and is seen both in the rise of various Rajput dynasties and in their inability to withstand the Turkish invasions. There is considerable controversy among historians as to whether it would be accurate to describe the feudatory pattern as feudalism per se. Some argue that, although it was not identical to the classic example of feudalism in western Europe, there are sufficient similarities to allow the use of the term. Others contend that the dissimilarities are substantial, such as the apparent absence of an economic contract involving king, vassal, and serf. In any event, the patterns of land relations, politics, and culture changed considerably, and the major characteristic of the change consists of forms of decentralization.

The commonly used term for a feudatory was samanta, which designated either a conquered ruler or a secular official connected with the administration who had been given a grant of land in lieu of a salary and who had asserted ownership over the land and gradually appropriated rights of ruling the area. There were various categories of samantas. As long as a ruler was in a feudatory status, he called himself samanta and acknowledged his overlord in official documents and charters. Independent status was indicated by the elimination of the title of samanta and the inclusion instead of royal titles such as maharaja and maharatadhiraja. The feudatory had certain obligations to the ruler. Although virtually in sole control administratively and fiscally over the land granted to him, he nevertheless had to pay a small percentage of the revenue to the ruler and maintain a specified body of troops for him. He was permitted the use of certain symbols of authority on formal occasions and was required, if called upon, to give his daughter in marriage to his suzerain. These major administrative and economic changes, although primarily concerning fiscal arrangements and revenue organization, also had their impact on politics and culture. The grantees or intermediaries in a hierarchy of grants were not merely secular officials but were often Brahman beneficiaries who had been given grants of land in return for religious services rendered to the state. The grants were frequently so lucrative that the Brahmans could marry into the families of local chiefs, which explains the presence of Brahman ancestors in the genealogies of the period.

The economy

Cultivation was still carried out by the peasants, generally Shudras, who remained tied to the land. Since the revenue was now to be paid not to the king but to the samanta, the peasants naturally began to give more attention to his requirements. Although the samantas copied the life-style of the royal court, often to the point of setting up miniature courts in imitation of the royal model, the system also encouraged parochial loyalties and local cultural interests. One manifestation of this local involvement was a sudden spurt of historical literature such as Bilhana’s Vikramankadevacarita, the life of the Calukya king Vikramaditya VI, and Kalhana’s Rajatarangini, a history of Kashmir.

The earlier decline in trade was gradually reversed in this period, with trade centres emerging in various parts of the subcontinent. Some urban centres developed from points of exchange for agrarian produce, whereas others were involved in long-distance trade. In some cases, traders from elsewhere settled in India, such as the Arabs on the Malabar Coast; in other cases Indian traders went to distant lands. Powerful trading guilds could enjoy political and military support, as was the case during the Cola monarchy. Even the rich Hindu temples of southern India invested their money in trade. Pala contacts were mainly with Srivijaya, and trade was combined with Buddhist interests. The monasteries at Nalanda and Vikramashila maintained close relations. By now eastern India was the only region with a sizable Buddhist presence. The traditional trade routes were still used, and some kingdoms drew their revenue from such routes as those along the Aravalli Range, Malava, and the Chambal and Narmada valleys. Significantly, the major technological innovation, the introduction of the sāqiyah (Persian wheel), or araghatta, as an aid to irrigation in northern India, pertains to agrarian life and not to urban technology.

Social mobility

Historians once believed that the post-Gupta period brought greater rigidity in the caste structure and that this rigidity was partially responsible for the inability of Indians to face the challenge of the Turks. This view is now being modified. The distinctions, particularly between the Brahmans and the other castes, were in theory sharper, but in practice it now appears that social restrictions were not so rigid. Brahmans often lived off the land and founded dynasties. Most of the groups claiming Kshatriya status had only recently acquired it. The conscious reference to being Kshatriya, a characteristic among Rajputs, is a noticeable feature in post-Gupta politics. The fact that many of these dynasties were of obscure origin suggests some social mobility: a person of any caste, having once acquired political power, could also acquire a genealogy connecting him with the traditional lineages and conferring Kshatriya status. A number of new castes, such as the Kayasthas (scribes) and Khatris (traders), are mentioned in the sources of this period. According to the Brahmanic sources, they originated from intercaste marriages, but this is clearly an attempt at rationalizing their rank in the hierarchy. Many of these new castes played a major role in society. The hierarchy of castes did not have a uniform distribution throughout the country. But the preeminent position of the Brahman was endorsed not merely by the fact that many had lands and investments but also by the fact that they controlled education. Formal learning was virtually restricted to the institutions attached to the temples. Technical knowledge was available in the various artisan guilds. Hierarchy existed, however, even among the Brahmans; some Brahman castes, who had perhaps been tribal priests before being assimilated into the Sanskritic tradition, remained ordinary village priests catering to the day-to-day religious functions.

Religion

The local nucleus of the new culture led to a large range of religious expression, from the powerful temple religion of Brahmanism to a widespread popular bhakti religion and even more widespread fertility cults. The distinctions between the three were not clearly demarcated in practice; rites and concepts from each flowed into the other. The formal worship of Vishnu and Shiva had the support of the elite. Temples dedicated to Vaishnava and Shaiva deities were the most numerous. But also included were some of the chief deities connected with the fertility cult, and the mother goddesses played an important role. The Puranas had been rewritten to incorporate popular religion; now the upa-puranas were written to record rites and worship of more-localized deities. Among the more-popular incarnations of Vishnu was Krishna, who, as the cowherd deity, accommodated pastoral and erotic themes in worship. The love of Krishna and Radha was expressed in sensitive and passionate poetry.

The introduction of the erotic theme in Hinduism was closely connected with the fertility cult and Tantrism. The latter, named for its scriptures, the Tantras, influenced both Hindu and Buddhist ritual. Tantrism, as practiced by the elite, represented the conversion of a widespread folk religion into a sophisticated one. The emphasis on the mother goddess, related to that expressed in the Shakti (Śakti) cult, strengthened the status of the female deities. The erotic aspect also was related to the importance of ritual coition in some Tantric rites. The depiction of erotic scenes on temple walls therefore had a magico-religious context.

Vajrayana Buddhism, current in eastern India, Nepal, and Tibet, shows evidence of the impact of Tantrism. The goddess Tara emerges as the saviour and is in many ways the Buddhist counterpart of Shakti. Buddhism was on the way out—the Buddha had been incorporated as an avatar of Vishnu—and had lost much of its popular appeal, which had been maintained by the simple habits of the monks. The traditional source of Buddhist patronage had dwindled with declining trade. Jainism, however, managed to maintain some hold in Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Karnataka. The protest aspect of both Buddhism and Jainism, especially the opposition to Brahmanic orthodoxy, had now been taken over by the Tantrists and the bhakti cults. The Tantrists expressed their protest through some rather extreme rites, as did some of the heretical sects such as the Kalamukhas and Kapalikas. The bhakti cults expressed the more-puritanical protest of the urban groups, gradually spreading to the rural areas. Preeminent among the bhakti groups during this period were the Lingayats, or Virashaivas, who were to become a powerful force in Karnataka, and the Pandharpur cult in Maharashtra, which attracted such preachers as Namadeva and Jnaneshvara.

Literature and the arts

It was also in the matha (monastery) and the ghatika (assembly hall), attached to the temples, that the influential philosophical debates were conducted in Sanskrit. Foremost among the philosophers were Shankara (8th–9th century), Ramanuja (d. 1137), and Madhva (13th century). The discussions centred on religious problems, such as whether knowledge or devotion was the more effective means of salvation, and problems of metaphysics, including that of the nature of reality.

Court literature, irrespective of the region, continued to be composed in Sanskrit, with the many courts competing for the patronage of the poets and the dramatists. There was a revival of interest in earlier literature, generating copious commentaries on prosody, grammar, and technical literature. The number of lexicons increased, perhaps necessitated by the growing use of Sanskrit by non-Sanskrit speakers. Literary style tended to be pedantic and imitative, although there were notable exceptions, such as Jayadeva’s lyrical poem on the love of Radha and Krishna, the Gitagovinda. The bhakti teachers preached in the local languages, giving a tremendous stimulus to literature in these languages. Adaptations of the Ramayana, Mahabharata, and Bhagavadgita were used regularly by the bhakti teachers. There was thus a gradual breaking away from Sanskrit and the Prakrit languages via the Apabhrahmsha language and the eventual emergence and evolution of such languages as Kannada, Telugu, Marathi, Gujarati, Bengali, and Oriya and of the Bihari languages.

The period was rich in sculpture, in both stone and metal, each region registering a variant style. Western India and Rajasthan emphasized ornateness, with the Jain temples at Mount Abu attaining a perfection of rococo. Nalanda was the centre of striking but less-ornate images in black stone and of Buddhist bronze icons. Central Indian craftsmen used the softer sandstone. In the peninsula the profusely sculptured rock-cut temples such as the Kailasa at the Ellora Caves, under Calukya and Rashtrakuta patronage, displayed a style of their own. The dominant style in the south was that of Cola sculpture, particularly in bronze. The severe beauty and elegance of these bronze images, mainly of Shaiva and Vaishnava deities and saints, remains unsurpassed. A new genre of painting that rose to popularity in Nepal, eastern India, and Gujarat was the illustration of Buddhist and Jain manuscripts with miniature paintings.

Temple architecture was divided into three main styles—nagara, dravida, and vasara—which were distinguished by the ground plan of the temple and by the shape of the shikhara (tower) that rose over the garbhagrha (cubical structure) and that became the commanding feature of temple architecture. The north Indian temples conformed to the nagara style, as is seen at Osian (Rajasthan state); Khajuraho (Madhya Pradesh state); and Konarka, Bhubaneshwar, and Puri (Orissa state). The Orissa temples, however, remain nearest to the original archetype. South Indian temple architecture, or dravida, style—with its commanding gopuras (gateways)—can be seen in the Rajarajeshvara and the Gangaikondacolapuram temples. The Deccani style, vasara, tended to be an intermixture of the northern and the southern, with early examples at Vatapi, Aihole, and Pattadakal and, later, at Halebid, Belur, and Somnathpur in the vicinity of Mysore. The wealth of the temples made them the focus of attack from plunderers.

Surya temple, Osian, Rajasthan state, India.Frederick M. Asher

Citragupta temple, at Khajuraho, Madhya Pradesh state, India, 11th century.P. Chandra

The question that is frequently posed as to why the Turks so easily conquered northern India and the Deccan has in part to do with what might be called the medieval ethos. A contemporary observed that the Indians had become self-centred and unaware of the world around them. This was substantially true. There was little interest in the politics of neighbouring countries or in their technological achievements. The medieval ethos expressed itself not only in the “feudatory” attitude toward politics and the parochial concerns that became dominant and prevented any effective opposition to the Turks but also in the trappings of chivalry and romanticism that became central to elite activity.

It has been generally held that the medieval period of Indian history began with the arrival of the Turks (dated to either 1000 or 1206 CE), because the Turks brought with them a new religion, Islam, which changed Indian society at all levels. Yet the fundamental changes that took place about the 8th century, when the medieval ethos was introduced, would seem far more significant as criteria.Romila Thapar

The early Muslim period

North India under Muslim hegemony, c. 1200–1526

The first Muslim raids in the subcontinent were made by Arabs on the western coast and in Sind during the 7th and 8th centuries, and there had been Muslim trading communities in India at least since that time. The significant and permanent military movement of Muslims into northern India, however, dates from the late 12th century and was carried out by a Turkish dynasty that arose indirectly from the ruins of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate. The road to conquest was prepared by Sultan Maḥmūd of Ghazna (now Ghaznī, Afg.), who conducted more than 20 raids into north India between 1001 and 1027 and established in the Punjab the easternmost province of his large but short-lived empire. Maḥmūd’s raids, though militarily successful, primarily had as their object taking plunder rather than conquering territory.

Early Muslim India (c. 1200–c. 1500).Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

The Delhi sultanate

The decline of the Ghaznavids after 1100 was accentuated by the sack of Ghazna by the rival Shansabānīs of Ghūr in 1150–51. The Ghūrids, who inhabited the region between Ghazna and Herāt, rose rapidly in power during the last half of the 12th century, partly because of the changing balance of power that resulted from the westward movement of the non-Muslim Qara Khiṭāy (Karakitai) Turks into the area dominated by the Seljuq Turks, who had been the principal power in Iran and parts of Afghanistan during the previous 50 years. The Seljuq defeat in 1141 led to a struggle for power among the Qara Khiṭāy, the Khwārezm-Shahs, and the Ghūrids for control of parts of Central Asia and Iran. By 1152 Ghazna had been captured again by the Ghūrid ruler, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn. After his death the Ghūrid territory was partitioned principally between his two nephews, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad and Muʿizz al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Sām, commonly called Muḥammad of Ghūr. Ghiyāth al-Dīn ruled over Ghūr from Fīrūz-Kūh and looked toward Khorāsān, while Muḥammad of Ghūr was established in Ghazna and began to try his luck in India for expansion. The Ghūrid invasions of north India were thus extensions of a Central Asian struggle.

Almost all of north India was, however, already in contact with Ghūr through extensive trade, particularly in horses. The Ghūrids were well known as horse breeders. Ghūr also had a reputation for supplying Indian and Turkish slaves to the markets of Central Asia. Muslim merchants and saints had settled much beyond Sind and the Punjab in a number of towns in what are now Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The Ghūrids also were familiar with the fabulous wealth of western and central India. They therefore followed a route into India through the Gumal Pass, with an eye set eventually on Gujarat. It was only after suffering a severe defeat at the hands of the Caulukya army of Gujarat that they turned to a more northerly route through the Khyber Pass.

The tomb of Ghiyāth al-Dīn, Delhi.Frederick M. Asher

The Turkish conquest

By 1186 the Ghūrids had destroyed the remnants of Ghaznavid power in the northwest and were in a favourable military position to move against the northern Indian Rajput powers. The conquest of the Rajputs was not easy, however. The Cauhans (Cahamanasa) under Prithviraja defeated Muḥammad of Ghūr in 1191 at Taraori, northwest of Delhi, but his forces returned the following year to defeat and kill the Rajput king on the same battlefield. The victory opened the road to Delhi, which was conquered in 1193 but left in the hands of a tributary Hindu king. Muḥammad of Ghūr completed his conquests with the occupation of the military outposts of Hansi, Kuhram, Sursuti, and Sirhind and then returned to Ghazna with a large hoard of treasure, leaving his slave and lieutenant, Quṭb al-Dīn Aybak, in charge of consolidation and further expansion.

Quṭb al-Dīn displaced the Cauhan chief and made his headquarters at Delhi in 1193, when he began a campaign of expansion. By 1202 he was in control of Varanasi, Badaun, Kannauj, and Kalinjar.

In the meantime, an obscure adventurer, Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Muḥammad Bakhtiyār Khaljī of the Ghūrid army, conquered Nadia, the capital of the Sena kings of Bengal (1202). Within two years Bakhtiyār embarked on a campaign to conquer Tibet in order to plunder the treasure of its Buddhist monasteries, and in 1206 he attacked Kamarupa (Assam) to gain control of Bengal’s traditional trade route leading to Southeast Asian gold and silver mines. The attempt, however, proved disastrous. Bakhtiyār managed to return to Bengal with a few hundred men, and there he died.

The availability of a large number of military adventurers from Central Asia who would follow commanders with reputations for success was one of the important elements in the rapid Ghūrid conquest of the major cities and forces of the north Indian plain. Other factors were important as well; better horses contributed to the success of mobile tactics, and the Ghūrids also made better use of metal for weapons, armour, and stirrups than did most of their adversaries. Perhaps most important was the tradition of centralized organization and planning, which was conducive to large-scale military campaigns and to the effective organization of postcampaign occupation forces. While the Rajputs probably saw the Ghūrids as an equal force competing for paramount power in north India, the Ghūrids had in mind the model of the successor states to the ʿAbbāsid caliphate, the old Iranian Sāsānid empire, and particularly the vast centralized empire of Maḥmūd of Ghazna.

Soon, however, the Ghūrid possessions were insecure everywhere. In 1205 Sultan Muḥammad of Ghūr suffered a severe defeat at Andkhvoy (Andkhui) at the hands of the Khwārezm-Shah dynasty. News of the defeat precipitated a rebellion by some of the sultan’s followers in the Punjab, and, although the rebellion was put down, Muḥammad of Ghūr was assassinated at Lahore in 1206. The Ghūrids at the time held the major towns of the Punjab, of Sind, and of much of the Gangetic Plain, but almost all the land outside the cities still was subject to some form of control by Hindu chiefs. Even in the Ganges–Yamuna Doab, the Gahadavalas held out against the Turks. Most significantly, the chiefs of Rajasthan had not been permanently subdued.

The early Turkish sultans

When Quṭb al-Dīn Aybak assumed authority over the Ghūrid possessions in India, he moved from the neighbourhood of Delhi to Lahore. There he set up guard against another of Muḥammad of Ghūr’s slaves, Tāj al-Dīn Yildiz of Ghazna, who also claimed his former master’s Indian possessions. In 1208 Quṭb al-Dīn defeated his rival and captured Ghazna but soon was driven out again. He died in 1210 in a polo accident, having made no effort to extend his Indian conquests, but he had managed to establish the foundation of an Indian Muslim state.

Quṭb Mīnār (1199)—a minaret built for Quṭb al-Dīn Aibak—and the Alai Darwāza domed gateway (1311) at Qūwat-ul-Islām mosque complex, Delhi.Frederick M. Asher

Quṭb al-Dīn was the first ruler in what has become known, perhaps unreasonably, as the Slave dynasty (only he actually attained a freed status after becoming ruler). Slavery was, however, an integral part of the political system. As practiced in eastern Muslim polities of this period, the institution of slavery provided a nucleus of well-trained and loyal military followers (the mamlūks) for important political figures; indeed, one of the principal objects of this form of slavery was to train specialists in warfare and government, usually Turks, whose first loyalty would be to their masters. Slave status was honourable and was a principal avenue to wealth and high position for talented individuals whose origins were outside the ruling group. It has been observed that a slave was a better investment than a son, whose claim was not based upon proved efficiency. Yet, slaves with high qualifications could get out of control, and often slaves or former slaves controlled their masters as much as they were controlled by them. The beneficial results for the sultanate of this type of political interaction were that some men of talent had room to rise within the system and thus were less tempted to tear it down and that the responsibilities of government tended to rest in the hands of capable men, whether or not they were the actual rulers.

The sultans thus not only kept a close watch over the slave market but also commissioned slave merchants as state agents. Sultan Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish (reigned 1211–36), son-in-law and successor to Aybak, who was himself a mamlūk, sent a merchant to Samarkand, Bukhara, and Tirmiz to purchase young slaves on his behalf.

Consolidation of Turkish rule

During his reign, Iltutmish was faced with three problems: defense of his western frontier, control over the Muslim nobles within India, and subjugation of the many Hindu chiefs who still exercised a large measure of independent rule. His relative success in all three areas gives him claim to the title of founder of the independent Delhi sultanate. His reign opened with a factional dispute in which he and his Delhi-based supporters defeated and killed the rival claimant to the throne, Quṭb al-Dīn’s son, and put down a revolt by a portion of the Delhi guards. In the west Iltutmish was passive at first and even accepted investiture from his old rival, Yildiz, but, when Yildiz was driven from Ghazna into the Punjab by the Khwārezm-Shah ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad in 1215, Iltutmish was able to defeat and capture him at Taraori. Iltutmish might have faced a threat himself from the Khwārezm-Shah had it not been for the latter’s conflict with the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan. Again Iltutmish waited while refugees, including the heir to the Khwārezm-Shahī throne, poured into the Punjab and while Nāṣir al-Dīn Qabācha, another of Muḥammad of Ghūr’s former slaves, maintained a perilous hold on Lahore and Multan. Iltutmish’s political talents were pushed to the maximum as he tried desperately to avoid a direct confrontation with the armies of Genghis Khan. He refused aid to the Khwārezm-Shah heir against the Mongols and yet would not attempt to capture him. Fortunately, the Mongols were content to send raiding parties no further than the Salt Range (in the northern Punjab region), which Iltutmish wisely ignored, and eventually the Khwārezm-Shah prince fled from India after causing enormous destruction within Qabācha’s domains. Thus, Iltutmish’s cause was advanced, and in 1228 he was able to drive Qabācha from the Punjabi cities of Multan and Uch and, by establishing his frontier east of the Beas River, to avoid a direct confrontation with the Mongols. He was not able to gain effective control of the western Punjab, however, largely because the area was subject to raids by hill tribes.

In the east in 1225, Iltutmish launched a successful campaign against Ghiyāth al-Dīn ʿIwāz Khaljī, one of Bhaktiyār Khaljī’s lieutenants, who had assumed sovereign authority in Lakhnauti (northern Bengal) and was encroaching on the province of Bihar. ʿIwāz Khaljī was defeated and slain in 1226, and in 1229 Iltutmish invaded Bengal and slew Balka, the last of the Khaljī chiefs to claim independent power. Iltutmish’s campaigns in Rajasthan and central and western India were ultimately less successful, although he temporarily captured Ranthambhor (1226), Mandor (Mandawar; 1227), and Gwalior (1231) and plundered Bhilsa and Ujjain in Malwa (1234–35). His generals suffered defeats, however, at the hands of the Cauhans of Bundi, the Caulukyas of Gujarat, and the Candellas (Chandelas) of Narwar.

By 1236, the year Iltutmish died, the Delhi sultanate was established as clearly the largest and most powerful of a number of competing states in north India. Owing to Iltutmish’s able leadership, Delhi was no longer subordinate to Ghazna, nor was it to remain simply a frontier outpost; it was to become, rather, a proud centre of Muslim power and culture in India. Iltutmish made clear, however, to what extent Islam and Islamic law (Sharīʿah) could determine the contour of politics and culture in the overwhelmingly non-Muslim Indian environment. Early in his reign, a party of theologians approached him with the plea that the infidel Hindus be forced, in accordance with Islamic law, to accept Islam or face death. On behalf of the sultan, his wazīr (vizier) told the divines that this was impractical, since the Muslims were as few as grains of salt in a dish of food. Despite the Islamic proscription against women rulers, Iltutmish nominated his daughter Raziyyah (Raziyyat al-Dīn) to be his successor. By refusing shelter to the Muslim Jalāl al-Dīn Mingburnu (the last Khwārezm-Shah) against the pagan Genghis Khan, he politely asserted that the Turkish power in Delhi, even though a sequel to a Central Asian social and political struggle, was no longer to involve itself in the power politics of countries of the Islamic East. Iltutmish legitimated his ambition by obtaining a letter of investiture from the ʿAbbāsid caliph in Baghdad, whose name appeared in Hindi on the bullion currency so that the people on the streets might perceive the nature of the new regime.

Iltutmish seems to have enjoyed support among his nobles and advisers for his assertion that the legal structure of the state in India should not be based strictly on Islamic law. Gradually, a judicious balance between the dictates of Sharīʿah and the needs of the time emerged as a distinctive feature of the Turkish rule. The Muslim constituency, however, could not adjust to the idea of being ruled by a woman, and Raziyyah (reigned 1236–40) fairly quickly succumbed to powerful nobles (the Shamsī), who once had been Iltutmish’s slaves.

Still, the new state had enough internal momentum to survive severe factional disputes during the 10 years following Iltutmish’s death, when four of Iltutmish’s children or grandchildren were in turn raised to the throne and deposed. This momentum was maintained largely through the efforts of Iltutmish’s personal slaves, who came to be known as the Forty (Chihilgān), a political faction whose membership was characterized by talent and by loyalty to the family of Iltutmish.

The political situation had changed by 1246, when Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban, a junior member of the Forty, had gained enough power to attain a controlling position within the administration of the newest sultan, Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd (reigned 1246–66). Balban, acting first as nāʾib (“deputy”) to the sultan and later as sultan (reigned 1266–87), was the most important political figure of his time. The period was characterized by almost continuous struggles to maintain Delhi’s position against the revived power of the Hindu chiefs (principally Rajputs) and by vigilance against the strife-ridden but still dangerous Mongols in the west. Even in the central regions of the state, sultanate rule was sometimes challenged by discontented Muslim nobles.

During the first 10 years of Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd’s reign, Balban’s campaigns against the Hindu chiefs were only partially successful. By 1266, when he assumed the sultanate, his military strategy was to work outward from the capital. First, he cleared the forests of Mewatis (Mina); then he restored order in the Doab and at Oudh (present-day Ayodhya) and suppressed a revolt in the region of the cities of Badaun and Amroha with particular viciousness. Having established the security of his home territory, Balban then chose to consolidate his rule over the provincial governors rather than to embark upon expeditions against Hindu territories. Thus, he reacted vigorously and effectively against an attempt to establish an independent state in Bengal in the 1280s.

Balban sought to raise the prestige of the institution of the sultanate through the use of ceremony, the strict administration of justice, and the formulation of a despotic view of the relationship between ruler and subject. Probably the most significant aspect of his reign was this elevation of the position of the sultan, which made possible the reorganization and strengthening of the army and the imposition of a tighter administrative apparatus. Iltutmish had enforced the centre’s control over the nobles in the districts (iqṭāʿs and wilāyahs) by subjecting them to periodic transfers. Balban’s government began to investigate what was actually collected and spent within the iqṭāʿ. He appointed a new category of officials, the khwājas, to estimate both the income of the iqṭāʿ holders and the expenses they incurred in maintaining their troops. Any surplus (fawāḍil) was to be remitted to the sultan’s treasury. Balban’s policy of consolidation, the success of which owed much to the death or incapacity of most of the Forty and to the lack of rival claimants to the throne, strengthened sultanate rule so that his successors could undertake a number of successful expansionist campaigns after 1290.

The Khaljīs

Balban’s immediate successors, however, were unable to manage either the administration or the factional conflicts between the old Turkish nobility and the new forces, led by the Khaljīs; after a struggle between the two factions, Jalāl al-Dīn Fīrūz Khaljī assumed the sultanate in 1290. During his short reign (1290–96), Jalāl al-Dīn suppressed a revolt by some of Balban’s officers, led an unsuccessful expedition against Ranthambhor, and defeated a substantial Mongol force on the banks of the Sind River in central India. In 1296 he was assassinated by his ambitious nephew and successor, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī (reigned 1296–1316).

The Khaljī dynasty was not recognized by the older nobility as coming from pure Turkish stock (although they were Turks), and their rise to power was aided by impatient outsiders, some of them Indian-born Muslims, who might expect to enhance their positions if the hold of the followers of Balban and the Forty were broken. To some extent then, the Khaljī usurpation was a move toward the recognition of a shifting balance of power, attributable both to the developments outside the territory of the Delhi sultanate, in Central Asia and Iran, and to the changes that followed the establishment of Turkish rule in northern India.

In large measure, the dislocation in the regions beyond the northwest assured the establishment of an independent Delhi sultanate and its subsequent consolidation. The eastern steppe tribes’ movements to the west not only ended the threat to Delhi from the rival Turks in Ghazna and Ghūr but also forced a number of the Central Asian Muslims to migrate to northern India, a land that came to be known as Hindustan. Almost all the high nobles, including the famous Forty in the 13th century, were of Central Asian origin; many of them were slaves purchased from the Central Asian bazaars. The same phenomenon also led to the destabilization of the core of the Turkish mamlūks. With the Mongol plunder of Central Asia and eastern Iran, many more members of the political and religious elite of these regions were thrown into north India, where they were admitted into various levels of the military and administrative cadre by the early Delhi sultans.

Centralization and expansion

During the reign of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī, the sultanate briefly assumed the status of an empire. In order to achieve his goals of centralization and expansion, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn needed money, a loyal and reasonably subservient nobility, and an efficient army under his personal control. He had earlier, in 1292, partly solved the problem of money when he conducted a lucrative raid into Bhilsa in central India. Using that success to build his position and a fresh army, he led a brilliant and unauthorized raid on the fabulously wealthy Devagiri (present-day Daulatabad), the capital of the Yadavas, in the Deccan early in 1296. The wealth of Devagiri not only financed his usurpation but provided a good foundation for his state-building plans. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn already had the support of many of the disaffected Turkish nobles, and now he was able to purchase the support of more with both money and promotion.

Taxation and distribution of revenue resources

Centralization and heavy agrarian taxation were the principal features of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s rule. The sultan and his nobles depended in the 13th century largely on tribute extorted from the subjugated local potentates and on plunder from the unpacified areas. The sultanate thus had no stable economic base; the nobles were often in debt for large sums of money to the moneylenders of Delhi. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī altered the situation radically, implementing the principles of the iqṭāʿ (revenue district) and the kharāj (land tax) in their classic sense. The iqṭāʿ, formerly loosely used to mean a transferable revenue assignment to a noble, now combined the two functions of collection and distribution of the sultan’s claim to the bulk of the surplus agrarian product in the form of kharāj.

ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn imposed a land tax set at half the produce (in weight or value) on each individual peasant’s holding, regardless of size. It was to be supplemented by a house and cattle tax. The revenue resources so created, divided into iqṭāʿs, or different territorial units, were distributed among the nobles. But the nobles had no absolute control of their iqṭāʿs. They had to submit accounts of their income and expenditure and send the balances to the sultan’s treasury. The sultan had prepared an estimate of the produce of each locality by measuring the land. A set of officers in each iqṭāʿ, separate from the assignee, ensured the sultan’s control over it. The khāliṣah, the territory whose revenues accrued directly to the sultan’s own treasury, was expanded significantly, enabling the sultan to pay a much larger number of his soldiers and cavalry troops in cash. Through these measures the sultan struck hard at all the others—his officials and the local rural potentates—who shared economic and political power with him.

The magnitude and mechanism of agrarian taxation enabled the sultan to achieve two important objectives: (1) to ensure supplies at low prices to grain carriers and (2) to fill the state granaries with a buffer stock, which, linked with his famous price regulations, came as a solution to the critical financial problem of maintaining a large standing army. Following their occupation of Afghanistan, the Chagatai Mongols began to penetrate well beyond the Punjab, necessitating a comprehensive defense program for the sultanate, including the capital, Delhi, which underwent a two-month siege in 1303. Besides fortifying the capital and supplying the frontier towns and forts with able commanders, marshaling a large army was the task of the hour. Further, the vast expenditure was to be financed by means of the existing resources of the state. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn planned to compensate for the low cash payments to his soldiers by a policy of market control. The policy enhanced the purchasing power of the soldiers and enabled them to live in tolerable comfort.

Expansion and conquests

The result of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s reforms and his energetic rule was that the sultanate expanded rapidly and was subject to a more unified and efficient direction than during any other period. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn began his expansionist activities with the subjugation of Gujarat in 1299. Next he moved against Rajasthan and then captured Ranthambhor (1301), Chitor (1303), and Mandu (1305), later adding Siwan (1308) and Jalor (1312). The campaigns in Rajasthan opened the road for further raids into south India.

These raids were intended to result not in occupation of the land but rather in the formal recognition by Hindu kings of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s supremacy and in the collection of huge amounts of tribute and booty, which were used to finance his centralizing activities in the north. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s lieutenant Malik Kāfūr again subdued the Yadava kingdom of Devagiri in 1307 and two years later added the Kakatiya kingdom of Telingana. In 1310–11 Malik Kāfūr plundered the Pandya kingdom in the far south, and in 1313 Devagiri was again defeated and finally annexed to the sultanate.

ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn also managed to fend off a series of Mongol attacks—at least five during the decade 1297–1306. After 1306 the invasions subsided, probably as much because of an intensification of internal Mongal rivalries as of the lack of their success in India.

Ambition, a talent for ruling, and the gold of southern India carried ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn a long way, but it is also significant that he was one of the first rulers to deliberately expand political participation within the sultanate government. Not only did he partly open the gates to power for the non-Turkish Muslim nobility—some of whom were even converted Hindus—but he also at least made gestures toward the inclusion of Hindus within the political world he viewed as legitimate. Both ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn and his son married into the families of important Hindu rulers, and several such rulers were received at court and treated with respect.

The urban economy

The expansion and centralization of the Khaljī sultanate paralleled economic and technological developments of the late 13th and early 14th centuries. Delhi in the 13th century became one of the largest cities in the whole of the Islamic world, and Multan, Lahore, Anhilwara, Kar, Cambay (Khambhat), and Lakhnauti emerged as major urban centres. The repeated Mongol invasions certainly affected the fortunes of some northwestern cities, but on the whole the period was marked by a flourishing urban economy and corresponding expansion in craft production and commerce. Advancements in the textile industry included the introduction of the wooden cotton gin and the spinning wheel and, reportedly, of the treadle loom and sericulture (the raising of silkworms). In construction technology, cementing lime and vaulted roofing radically changed the face of the city. The production of paper gave rise to increased record keeping in government offices and to widespread use of bills of exchange (hundis).

An expanding trade in textiles and horses provided constant nourishment to the economies of these towns. Bengal and Gujarat were the production centres for both coarse cloths and fine fabrics. Since cavalry came to be the mainstay of the political and military system of the Delhi sultans, horses were imported in large numbers beginning in the early years of the 13th century. Earlier in the 12th century the Hindu kings also kept large standing armies that included cavalry. The Turks, however, had far superior horsemen. Iron stirrups and heavy armour, for both horses and horsemen, came into common use during the period, with significant impact on warfare and military organization. The Battles of Taraori, between Prithviraja III Cauhan and Muḥammad of Ghūr, were mainly engagements of cavalrymen armed with bows and spears; superior Ghūrid tactics were decisive.

The Multanis and Khorāsānīs, in the main, controlled the long-distance overland trade. Trade between the coastal ports and northern India was in the hands of Marwaris and Gujaratis, many of whom were Jains. A measure of commercial expansion was the emergence and increasing role of the dallals, or brokers, who acted as middlemen in transactions for which expert knowledge was required, such as the sale of horses, slaves, and cattle. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī extended a large loan to the Multanis for bringing goods from afar into Delhi. By the mid-13th century a stable equation between gold and silver was attained, resulting in a coinage impressive in both quality and volume. Northern Indian merchants now benefited from the unification of the Central Asian steppes, which from 1250 until about 1350 (following an initially quite destructive Mongol impact) opened up a new and secure trade route from India to China and the Black Sea. Further, there arose a chain of sea emporia all along the Indian Ocean coast. It was, however, plunder and tribute from Gujarat, the Deccan, eastern and central India, and Rajasthan—combined with regular taxation in the Indo-Gangetic Plain—that sustained the economy and the centralizing regime of Delhi.

The Tughluqs

Within five years of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s death (1316), the Khaljīs lost their power. The succession dispute resulted in the murder of Malik Kāfūr by the palace guards and in the blinding of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s six-year-old son by Quṭb al-Dīn Mubārak Shah, the sultan’s third son, who assumed the sultanate (reigned 1316–20). Quṭb al-Dīn suppressed revolts in Gujarat and Devagiri and conducted another raid on Telingana. He was murdered by his favourite general, a Hindu convert named Khusraw Khan, who had built substantial support among a group of Hindus outside the traditional nobility. Opposition to Khusraw’s rule arose immediately, led by Ghāzī Malik, the warden of the western marches at Deopalpur, and Khusraw was defeated and slain after four months.

Ghāzī Malik, who ascended the throne as Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq (reigned 1320–25), had distinguished himself prior to his accession by his successful defense of the frontier against the Mongols. His reign was brief but eventful. He captured Telingana, conducted raids in Jajnagar, and reconquered Bengal, which had been independent under Muslim kings since the death of Balban. While returning from the Bengal campaign, the sultan was killed when a wooden shelter collapsed on him at Afghanpur, near Delhi. Although some historians have argued that Muḥammad ibn Tughluq plotted his father’s death, the case never has been proved.

Delhi: tomb of Ghiyāth al-Dīn TughluqTomb of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq, Delhi.David Haberlah (CC-BY-3.0) (A Britannica Publishing Partner)

The reign (1325–51) of Muḥammad ibn Tughluq marked both the high point of the sultanate and the beginning of its decline. The period from 1296 to 1335 can be seen as one of nearly continuous centralization and expansion. There were few places in the subcontinent where the sultan’s authority could be seriously challenged. Muḥammad ibn Tughluq, however, was unable to maintain the momentum of consolidation. By 1351 southern India had been lost and much of the north was in rebellion.

Reversal and rebellion

Muḥammad ibn Tughluq faced serious problems resulting from expansion into southern India. Eschewing the Khaljī policy of maintaining Hindu tributary states in the south, Muḥammad ibn Tughluq, while still a prince, had begun to bring southern Hindu powers under the direct control of the sultanate, a policy he continued as sultan. Direct Muslim rule in the south, however, did not necessarily signify control from Delhi. In an effort both to settle other Muslim nobles in the south and to maintain his control over them, the sultan made Daulatabad (Devagiri) his second capital in 1327.

Muḥammad ibn Tughluq moved to Daulatabad to ensure an effective control over the wealthy and fertile Deccan and Gujarat and possibly also to gain access to the western and southern ports. Gujarat, the Coromandel Coast, and Bengal were the core areas of India’s overseas trade. Huge supplies of textiles and other goods, including glass and metal objects manufactured in these regions, were exported to the Middle East, Africa, and East and Southeast Asia in exchange for horses, precious metals, extracted goods, and raw materials. Muḥammad ibn Tughluq also planned to face the Mongols by positioning and equipping himself at a safe distance from the northwest.

However, no sooner was the sultan established at Daulatabad than trouble broke out in the north, on the western border, and in Bengal. Muḥammad ibn Tughluq had to move back to Delhi to crush the rebellions by his nobles. He also was less successful against an invasion by the Mongols, who had come almost to the gates of Delhi. On the other hand, by 1335 the Muslim governor of Maʿbar, the southernmost province of the sultanate, declared his independence and founded the sultanate of Madura while Muḥammad ibn Tughluq was busy quelling a rebellion in Lahore. Soon rebellions by Hindu chiefs had resulted in the formation of several new states, the most important of which was Vijayanagar. During the next few years, while the sultan shuttled to and fro in an attempt to put down rebellions in practically every province, he lost control of the rest of his south Indian possessions after successful rebellions in Gulbarga (1339), Warangal (1345–46), and Daulatabad, which led to the founding of the Bahmani sultanate (1347). Muḥammad ibn Tughluq spent the last five years of his life trying to suppress yet another rebellion in Gujarat and thus could not make an attempt to regain Daulatabad.

Muḥammad ibn Tughluq’s successor, his cousin Fīrūz Shah (reigned 1351–88), campaigned in Bengal (1353–54 and 1359), Orissa (1360), Nagarkot (1361), Sind (1362 and 1366–67), Etawah (1377), and Katehr (1380). Fīrūz was unable to recover Bengal for the sultanate, and Sind was no more than a tribute-paying vassal during his reign. Fīrūz also showed no interest in reconquering the southern provinces. He refused to accept an invitation (c. 1365) from a Bahmani prince to intervene in the politics of the Deccan.

Fīrūz has been noted in particular for his conciliatory attitude toward the two main influential Muslim groups of the period—the religious leaders and the nobility. While ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī had kept religion and religious leaders apart from his political plans and Muḥammad ibn Tughluq had incurred the enmity of at least some Sufis because of his refusal to give them what they regarded as proper support, Fīrūz rewarded Sufis and other religious leaders generously and listened to their counsel. He also created charities to aid poor Muslims, built colleges and mosques, and abolished taxes not recognized by Muslim law.

Balban, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn, and Muḥammad ibn Tughluq all had made attempts to check the power of the nobility and the religious leaders; the latter two also had realized the necessity of allowing a certain amount of mobility both into and within the army and civil administration for groups that had come to represent significant and articulated interests. Such a policy also enhanced the power of the sultans over all the nobility, because it removed old nobles and provided grateful new ones. Judging by the revolts during his reign, however, Muḥammad ibn Tughluq’s policy toward his nobility was too autocratic to succeed. Fīrūz adopted policies that gave his nobles much more autonomy. The result was that the sultan lost both an important means of leverage and a means of adjusting to new political circumstances. Fīrūz also made little or no attempt to pay officers in cash (rather than in assignments of land revenue), granted hereditary appointments, and extended the system of revenue farming. All these measures, which reversed policies adopted by one or more of the strong rulers of the previous several decades, tended to decrease Fīrūz’s control over his nobility and over the revenue system.

Society and the state under the Tughluqs

The Tughluq rule roughly coincided with an important and interesting development in the Hindu countryside, which, to a degree, was a reaction to ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī’s harsh measures. If, on the one hand, his new policy of taxation cut into the power of the erstwhile ruling chiefs who had escaped regular payment by offering tribute only under military pressure, it meant, on the other hand, a heavy loss of revenue for the small landlords and village headmen. The latter were also often subjected to severe corporal torture. The power of the Delhi regime, however, suffered an obvious setback after that. The former rural elite began to reappear, consolidated into the great Rajput caste spread over much of northern India. Incorporating such groups as the Cauhans and the Gahadawalas as subcastes and clans, the Rajputs claimed power and perquisites, at least at the local level. The first appearance of the generic term zamindar, which denoted first superior rights over land and its produce and later came to represent the local power-mongers themselves, dates to this period. The new caste cohesion also created a sense of unity between the village elite and the peasantry, which in turn added to their strength; at certain levels, the two classes became virtually undifferentiated.

The Tughluqs thus had to handle the rural classes with care and diplomatic skill. Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq modified ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī’s system by exempting the village headmen from paying taxes on their cultivation and cattle, but he confirmed the Khaljī sultan’s injunctions that the headmen were not to levy anything in addition to the existing land tax on the peasantry.

As Muḥammad ibn Tughluq adopted a stern policy, he provoked rebellion by the rural chiefs and the peasants, but, interestingly, he was also the first Indian ruler in recorded history to advance loans (taccavi) to the villagers for rehabilitation following a disastrous famine. He also proposed a grand scheme for improving cropping patterns and extending cultivation. Fīrūz Tughluq created the biggest network of canals known in premodern India, wrote off the loans granted earlier to the peasants by Muḥammad ibn Tughluq, and, more significantly, enforced a policy of fixed tax, as opposed to the former proportional one, thus guaranteeing in normal times a larger share of surplus to the intermediaries.

The desire of the Tughluq sultans for warmer relations with society as a whole was further illustrated by a generally appreciative approach to local social and religious practices. A few Hindus and Jains had held state positions under the Khaljīs; under the Tughluqs the non-Muslim Indians rose to high and extremely responsible offices, including the governorships of provinces. Muḥammad ibn Tughluq was the first Muslim ruler to make planned efforts to induct Hindus into administration. He also conducted several discourses with Indian scholars and saints. Fīrūz showed keen interest in Indian culture, commissioning Persian translations (Persian being the court language) of some important Sanskrit texts and placing an Ashokan pillar in a prominent position on the roof of his palace.

While all these developments indicated the sultans’ broadly tolerant and catholic policies, they demonstrated at the same time the strength of the locality. What was then emerging was a kind of tacit sharing of power between the local Hindu magnates and the essentially town-based Muslim aristocracy as a crucial source of political stability. Significantly, by the time of the Tughluqs, a theory of Islamic power, different from the universal Islamic theory of state, had also begun to emerge. The Turkish state was, in a formal sense, Islamic. The sultans could not allow open violation of Sharīʿah. They appointed Muslim divines (ʿulamāʾ) to profitable offices and granted revenue-free lands to many of them. But the policy of the state was based increasingly upon the opinion of the sultans and their advisers and not on any religious texts as interpreted by the ʿulamāʾ. In view of practical needs and worldly considerations (jahāndārī), the sultans supplemented Sharīʿah by framing their own state laws (thawābit). These regulations in cases of conflict overrode the universal Muslim law.

Accommodation and tolerance afforded a most secure course in such a situation; however, the threat from the locality, as well as from the Muslim nobles in control of the provinces, sometimes compelled the sultans to assert their Islamic connections rather forcefully. By doing so, the sultans also intended to strike a balance between the demands of orthodoxy and the needs of the state. Ghiyth al-Dīn Tughluq’s success against Khusraw Khan was presented as the regeneration of Islam in India. Muḥammad ibn Tughluq had removed the name of the ʿAbbāsid caliph from his coins, but, when he faced rebellion from every side, he searched for a caliph who could give him some moral authority to deal at least with his refractory Muslim officers. Fīrūz inherited a more difficult situation. Like his predecessor, he obtained a letter of investiture from the caliph. Further, he took several measures to align the state with Sunnite orthodoxy. In addition to giving important concessions to the ʿulamāʾ, he banned unorthodox practices, persecuted heretical sects, and refused to exempt the Brahmans from the payment of jizyah, or poll tax on non-Muslims, on the ground that this was not provided for in the Sharīʿah. Muḥammad ibn Tughluq’s largesse toward the Muslim foreigners was legendary. Fīrūz generously funded pious works within his territory and in other parts of the Islamic world.

The Tughluqs did not fare well in the face of an imminent crisis of the central treasury. With the loss of Bengal and the southern provinces, Delhi was disconnected from the important supply lines of its gold and silver. This in turn affected its capacity to import horses and soldiers. Cavalry, the backbone of the sultanate army, was thus severely crippled. Good warhorses were extremely expensive; in the mid-14th century an ordinary Central Asian steed cost 100 silver tangas, an exceptional one 500 silver tangas, while a fine Arabian or Persian racehorse cost as much as 1,000 to 4,000 silver tangas. The sultans’ liberal support of the various holy centres and eminent individuals of the Islamic East also contributed to the shortage of precious metals. In response, Muḥammad ibn Tughluq attempted to reduce the weight of his coins and experimented with token money. His proposed expeditions to Khorāsān and the Himalayas were possibly aimed at locating new sources of horses and precious metals. Fīrūz Tughluq addressed the crisis by withdrawing the practice of cash payment to the soldiers and by building an army from among the huge corps of slaves (mamlūks) plundered from throughout the sultanate. The slaves were, however, no match for the mounted archers from the countries northwest of the subcontinent.

Thus, Fīrūz’s weak policy toward his nobility, his light hand on the reins of administration, the resultant inefficiency and corruption among his ranks, and, indeed, his predecessor Muḥammad ibn Tughluq’s failure could be explained only in part in terms of these leaders’ personal proclivities. Both were overwhelmed by social and economic circumstances.

Decline of the sultanate

By 1388, when Fīrūz Tughluq died, the decline of the sultanate was imminent; subsequent succession disputes and palace intrigues only accelerated its pace. The sons and grandsons of Fīrūz, supported by various groups of nobles, began a struggle for the throne that rapidly diminished the authority of Delhi and provided opportunities for Muslim nobles and Hindu chiefs to enhance their autonomy. By 1390 the governor of Gujarat had declared his independence, and between 1391 and 1394 the important Rajput chiefs of Etawah rebelled and were defeated four times. By 1394 there were two sultans, both residing in or near Delhi. The result was bitter civil war for three years; meanwhile, the disastrous invasion of Timur (the Tamerlane of Western literature) drew nearer.

Timur invaded India in 1398, when he was in possession of a vast empire in the Middle East and Central Asia, and dealt the final blow to the effective power and prestige of the Delhi sultanate. In a well-executed campaign of four months—during which many of the disunited Muslim and Hindu forces of northern India either were bypassed or submitted peacefully while Rajputs and Muslims fighting together were slaughtered at Bhatnagar—Timur reached Delhi and, in mid-December, defeated the army of Sultan Maḥmūd Tughluq and sacked the city. It is said that Timur ordered the execution of at least 50,000 captives before the battle for Delhi and that the sack of the city was so devastating that practically everything of value was removed—including those inhabitants who were not killed.

Timur’s invasion further drained the wealth of the Delhi sultanate. Billon tanga then replaced the relatively pure silver coins as the standard currency of trade in almost the entire northern part of India. Bengal, which imported silver from Myanmar (Burma) and China, was, however, an obvious exception. The silver and gold coins struck in the period of the last Tughluqs and their successors in Delhi in the 15th and early 16th centuries were mainly commemorative issues.

The rise of regional states

During the 15th and early 16th centuries, no paramount power enjoyed effective control over most of north India and Bengal. Delhi became merely one of the regional principalities of north India, competing with the emerging Rajput and Muslim states. Gujarat, Malwa, and Jaunpur soon became powerful independent states; old and new Rajput states rapidly emerged; and Lahore, Dipalpur, Multan, and parts of Sind were held by Khizr Khan Sayyid for Timur (and later for himself). Khizr Khan also took over Delhi and a small area surrounding it after the last of the Tughluqs died in 1413, and he founded the dynasty known as the Sayyid. The Sayyids ruled the territory of Delhi until 1451, trying to obtain tribute and recognition of suzerainty from the nearby Rajput rulers and fighting almost continuously against neighbouring states to preserve their kingdom intact. The last Sayyid ruler, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿĀlam Shah (reigned 1445–51), peacefully surrendered Delhi to his nominal vassal, the Afghan Bahlūl Lodī (reigned 1451–89), and retired to the Badaun district, which he retained until his death in 1478. Before he moved to Delhi, Bahlūl Lodī had already carved out a kingdom in the Punjab that was larger than that of the Sayyid sultans. (See Lodī dynasty.)

Meanwhile, the neighbouring kingdom of Jaunpur developed into a power equal to Delhi during the reign (1402–40) of Ibrāhīm Sharqī. Ibrāhīm’s successor, Maḥmūd, conducted expansionist campaigns against Bengal and Orissa and, in 1452, initiated a conflict with the Lodī sultans of Delhi that lasted at least until the defeat and partial annexation of Jaunpur by Bahlūl Lodī in 1479.

The lack of unified rule has led some historians to describe the period as one of political anarchy and confusion, in which the inhabitants suffered because there was no strong guiding hand. Such a conclusion is far from certain, however, even for the central areas of the Gangetic Plain, where many battles were fought. In areas where effective regional rule was either restored or developed—as in Rajasthan, Orissa, Bengal, Gujarat, Malwa, Jaunpur, and various smaller states in the north, as well as in the large and small states of the Deccan—the quality of life may well have been comparable or superior to that of earlier centuries for cultivators, townspeople, landholders, and nobles. Although contemporary sources are scarce, the information available does not indicate a significant decline in total cultivation or trade (despite some alteration of trade routes). To the contrary, Gujarat and Bengal, in addition to their fertile tracts and rich handicrafts, carried on a brisk overseas trade. The Gujarati traders had a big role in the trade of the Middle East and Africa; Chittagong in Bengal was a flourishing port for trade with China and for the reexport of Chinese goods to other parts of the world.

Struggle for supremacy in northern India

These regional states had enough vigour and strength to balance and check the growth of each other’s power. With the Lodī conquest of Jaunpur, however, Delhi appeared to reestablish its hegemony over northern India. Bahlūl (reigned 1451–89) and his two successors, Sikandar (reigned 1489–1517) and Ibrāhīm (reigned 1517–26), continued intermittently to expand their control over the surrounding territory. Bahlūl pacified the Ganges–Yamuna Doab and subdued Etawah, Chandwar, and Rewari. Sikandar completed the pacification of Jaunpur (1493), campaigned into Bihar, and founded the city of Agra in 1504 as a base from which to launch his attempt to control Malwa and Rajasthan.

By the time of Sikandar’s death, the Afghans could claim a somewhat uneven control over the Punjab and most of the Gangetic Plain down to Bihar. Still, the question of Lodī hegemony in north India was far from settled. Rana Sanga of Mewar did not simply check the Lodī encroachments into central India but also repulsed a Lodī attempt to invade Mewar and threatened to move toward Bayana and Agra. Eastern Malwa, including Chanderi (at that time in possession of a Rajput leader, Medini Rai), passed under his overlordship. Rana Sanga defeated the Khalji sultan of Malwa and took him prisoner in Chitor. The rana was thus emerging as another formidable Rajput contender for supremacy in north India. Meanwhile, Bābur, a descendant of Timur, was knocking at the gates of India.

Ibrāhīm Lodī was more autocratic than his predecessor, and he was ultimately less able to control his skittish nobility, which had swelled significantly following the immigration into India of a considerable number of Afghans. They tended to see the Lodī sultans as merely first among equals. Ibrāhīm soon faced an Afghan rebellion in the east under the leadership of his brother Jalāl Khan, and, while Ibrāhīm put down this and other Afghan revolts in the region, the groundwork for the final disaster was laid in the west. Dawlat Khan Lodī, governor of the Punjab, and ʿĀlam Khan Lodī, Ibrāhīm’s uncle, appealed to Bābur, the Mughal ruler of Kābul, to aid them in their attempt to overthrow the sultan. The adventurous Bābur was at that time probably thinking only of annexing the Punjab, but, as his previous history had demonstrated, he was quick to take advantage of political opportunities. In 1524 he led an expedition to Lahore and defeated Ibrāhīm’s army. Bābur then passed over his Afghan allies and appointed his own officials in the Punjab. After his allies had indignantly left him, he went on to defeat and kill Ibrāhīm at the first of three important battles at Panipat, near Delhi, in 1526 (see below The Mughal Empire). The Afghan sultanate underwent a short revival under the Sūrs in 1540–55, only to be replaced by the Mughals again under Humāyūn and then Akbar the Great.Philip B. CalkinsMuzaffar Alam

The Muslim states of southern India, c. 1350–1680

Sultanate rule in most of southern India existed for only a few years and was firmly established only in the northern Deccan, with Daulatabad as its centre. The forced withdrawal of the sultanate forces from the Deccan between 1330 and 1347 was partly the result of resistance offered by Hindu chiefs and some Muslim nobles. Members of those two groups established several rebel principalities and the two strongest states of the south—the Muslim-ruled Bahmani kingdom and the Hindu-ruled Vijayanagar empire.

Maʿbar, the first among the rebel states to emerge in south India, was founded at Madurai by the erstwhile Tughluq general Jalāl al-Dīn Aḥsan Shah in 1335. Lasting only 43 years, with seven rulers in quick succession, Maʿbar covered the mainly Tamil region between Nellore and Quilon and contributed to the commercial importance of south India by encouraging Muslim traders from the Middle East and even attempting to sponsor an expedition to the Maldives. The Maʿbar wars with the Hoysala dynasty of Karnataka took place in the lower Kaveri region and were fought for control over a series of fortified trading stations between the coast and the interior. The Vijayanagar invasion under Prince Kumara Kampana dealt a severe blow to Maʿbar’s commercial importance in 1347; Vijayanagar completed the conquest in 1377–78 under Harihara II.

The Bahmani sultanate

A revolt by a group of Muslim nobles against Muḥammad ibn Tughluq that began in Daulatabad in 1345 culminated in the foundation of the Bahmani sultanate by Ḥasan Gaṅgū, who ascended the throne of Daulatabad as ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Bahman Shah in 1347 and soon moved his capital to the more centrally located Gulbarga on the Deccan plateau. Much of the political and military history of the Bahmanī sultanate can be described as a generally effective attempt to gain control of the Deccan and a less successful effort to expand outward from it. The initial period of consolidation was followed by a much longer period of intermittent warfare against Malwa and Gujarat in the north, Orissa and the Reddi kingdoms of Andhra in the east, and Vijayanagar in the south.

Tomb of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Bahmanī, Bidar, Karnataka, India.Frederick M. Asher

The rise of Bahmanī, Vijayanagar, and other subregional kingdoms signified a new trend in the political and military history of southern India, with the emergence of fortified warrior strongholds under Muslim and Hindu chiefs and of advanced military technology, including artillery and heavy cavalry. Control over such strongholds was thus essential to Bahmanī’s military supremacy.

Bahmanī consolidation of the Deccan

Bahman Shah spent most of his reign consolidating a kingdom in the Deccan and strengthening his hold over those Muslim nobles who chose to remain there rather than to join Muḥammad ibn Tughluq in northern India. He adopted the four territorial divisions (ṭarafs) established by Muḥammad ibn Tughluq for his own administration and established departments and appointed functionaries similar to those of the Delhi sultanate. Working outward from his capital, he was able to establish his authority over the western half of the Deccan plateau and to impose an annual tribute upon the Hindu state of Warangal, which had also emerged from the breakup of the Deccan portion of the Tughluq empire. Often, however, the tribute was not paid, and a number of wars were fought over the question of whether the Bahmanīs could maintain a superior position in relation to their eastern neighbours, including also the Reddi kingdoms of Rajahmundry and Kondavidu, in the following years.

Jāmiʿ Masjid (“Congregational Mosque”), Gulbarga Fort, Karnataka, India.John Henry Rice/Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Muḥammad Shah I (reigned 1358–75), son and successor of Bahman Shah, began the struggle with Vijayanagar that was to outlast the Bahmanī sultanate and continue, as a many-sided conflict, into the 17th century. There were at least 10 wars during the period 1350–1500, most of which were concerned with control over the Tungabhadra-Krishna Doab. The doab had been an area of contention long before the foundation of either the Bahmanī kingdom or Vijayanagar. Claims and counterclaims of victory show that neither side gained effective and lasting control over the doab, and the struggle extended eventually into the Konkan and Andhra regions. In his wars against Vijayanagar and Telingana (Warangal), Muḥammad Shah made use of newly organized artillery to defeat an army much larger than his own. His two wars with Vijayanagar gained him little, but his attack on Telingana in 1363 brought him a large indemnity, including the turquoise throne and the town of Golconda with its dependencies; in 1365 his rapid response to a rebellion by the governor of Daulatabad and some Maratha and other chieftains of Berar and Baglana led to a quick victory. The sultan devoted the last decade of his reign to consolidating his hold over the territories in his possession. Institutional and geographic consolidation under Muḥammad Shah laid a solid foundation for the kingdom. His legacy was soon disturbed, however, when his son and successor, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Mujāhid (reigned 1375–78), was assassinated by his cousin Dāʾūd while returning from a campaign in Vijayanagar. Dāʾūd was in turn murdered by ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s partisans, who then set Dāʾūd’s brother Muḥammad II (reigned 1378–97) on the throne and blinded Dāʾūd’s son. These political difficulties enabled Vijayanagar to take away Goa and other territory along the western coast, but the rest of Muḥammad II’s reign was peaceful, and the sultan spent much of his time building his court as a centre of culture and learning.

Several political and cultural tendencies that emerged at this time had significant effects on the development of the Bahmanī state and its successors. Although the state had been organized by a group of dissident nobles from the Delhi sultanate, differences in both the culture and the political affiliation of the nobilities developed, largely because of differences in recruiting patterns. Soon after the foundation of the Bahmanī state, large numbers of Arabs, Turks, and particularly Persians began to immigrate to the Deccan, many of them at the invitation of Sultan Muḥammad I, and there they had a strong influence on the development of Muslim culture during subsequent generations. The new settlers (āfāqīs) also had a political effect, as they soon began competing successfully for important positions within the political hierarchy. The original rebels from the Delhi sultanate and their descendants, who came to be called dakhnīs (i.e., Deccanis—from the Deccan), thought of themselves as the old nobility and thus resented the success of the newcomers. The situation was comparable to that of the Delhi sultanate, in which a party of entrenched nobles had tried to protect their privileged position against newcomers who were developing claims to power. Thus, the distribution of high offices among Persian newcomers by Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn (Muḥammad II’s oldest son, who ruled for about two months) in 1397 was seen as a threat by the old nobles and Turks and was probably a major reason for his assassination. Later the addition of Hindu converts and Hindus to the nobility complicated the situation further, as it had in the north, but the division between Deccanis and āfāqīs (hereinafter called newcomers) was most significant and contributed to the disintegration of the Bahmanī state.

Muḥammad II’s peaceful reign was followed by a year of succession disputes caused both by party conflicts and by dynastic rivalries. When Muḥammad’s cousins Aḥmad and Fīrūz finally gained control, Fīrūz succeeded as Fīrūz Shah Bahmanī. His reign (1397–1422) was a period of notable cultural activity in the Bahmanī sultanate, as well as one of continued development of the trend toward wider political participation. Noted for his intelligence and learning, Fīrūz established on the Bhima River his new capital, Firuzabad, as the greatest centre of Muslim culture in India at a time when the Delhi sultanate was rapidly dissolving. Perhaps in an effort to balance the continuing influx of Persians, as well as to strengthen his own position as a ruler who was above all the nobles and who recognized the realities of political power, Fīrūz gave a number of high offices to Hindus (Brahmans) and married several Hindu women, including the daughter of the king of Vijayanagar. Thus, the parallel with the earlier development of the Delhi sultanate nobility continued. The fact that Hindus were becoming politically more significant at a time when the military rivalry with Vijayanagar was renewed suggests a political rather than a religious motivation for that rivalry.

Kalaburagi, Karnataka, India: tombTomb of Fīrūz Shah Bahmanī, Kalaburagi, Karnataka, India.John Henry Rice/Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Fīrūz stopped an invasion in the north by the Gond raja of Kherla in Madhya Pradesh and conducted two moderately successful campaigns against Vijayanagar. The first brought him a tribute payment and temporary military control over the Raichur Doab, while the second ended with his marriage to the Vijayanagar king’s daughter and the establishment of an apparently amicable relationship between the two rulers. The peace lasted for only 10 years, however, and a third war (1417–20) ended in a disastrous defeat for Fīrūz by the united forces of Vijayanagar and Fīrūz’s former allies, the Velama faction of the Reddi ruling group in Andhra. The Vemas of Kondavidu, once hostile, now joined the sultan. Fīrūz’s position was so weakened by the defeat that he was forced to abdicate in favour of his brother Aḥmad, who had the support of most of the army.

One of the first acts of the new sultan, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad I (reigned 1422–36), was to move the capital from Gulbarga to Bidar, which was surrounded by more fertile ground and had become more centrally located now that some territory had been gained to the southeast, in Telingana. Perhaps, also, the move signified Aḥmad’s expansionist ambitions, for in 1425 he defeated and killed the Velama ruler of Warangal and finally annexed most of Telingana, bringing his eastern border to the edge of Orissa. During the next decade, however, rebellions forced Aḥmad to allow local chieftains to rule as tributaries throughout much of the area.

External and internal rivalries

Although the Bahmanī state had been threatened from the north earlier, it was during Aḥmad’s reign that conflicts first broke out with the northern neighbours Malwa and Gujarat. The breakdown of centralized authority within the Delhi sultanate and the consequent rise of provincial kingdoms meant that new rivalries could develop on a regional basis, and the Bahmanī sultans found themselves contending with two of the successor states of the Delhi sultanate in an arena where their expansionist ambitions had some chance of success. A border dispute with Malwa led to a Bahmanī victory and a short-lived recognition of the chieftainship of Kherla as a Bahmanī protectorate. Aḥmad I then forged an alliance with another northern neighbour, Khandesh, which acted as a buffer between Bahmanī and the kingdoms of Malwa and Gujarat. On the pretext of giving aid to a Hindu chieftain who had revolted against Gujarat, he sent unsuccessful expeditions into Gujarat in 1429 and 1430. The latter defeat was especially significant, as it partly stemmed from rivalries between the Deccani officers and the newcomers from the Middle East, a friction that appears to have become gradually more intense from this point until the decline of the Bahmanī sultanate.

Toward the close of his reign, Aḥmad I named his eldest son as his successor and gave him full charge of the administration; he parceled out the provinces (ṭarafs) among his other sons, exacting from them promises that they would be loyal to the new sultan, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Aḥmad II (reigned 1436–58). Even though Aḥmad II had to face a rebellion by one of his brothers, a precedent was set for a rule of primogeniture, which seemed to alleviate the problem of succession disputes for the rest of the century. Unfortunately for later Bahmanī rulers, rivalries among the nobility were to prove just as detrimental to the fortunes of the dynasty as family disputes were in many other dynasties of the period.

Aḥmad II proved to be a weaker ruler than his father had been, and during his reign the conflicts among the nobles intensified. Two short wars with Vijayanagar in 1436 and 1443–44 were confined to Tungabhadra-Krishna Doab and signified little except the arrival of a new power, the Hindu Gajapati king of Orissa, who allied himself with the Bahmanī ruler in the second campaign. Perhaps more significant in its ultimate effect was the Bahmanī victory over Khandesh in 1438. The force in that campaign was composed exclusively of newcomers, who had convinced the sultan that Deccani treachery had been responsible for the defeat in Gujarat in 1430. The newcomers thereby gained considerable influence with the sultan but at the same time intensified the resentment of the Deccanis, who retaliated in 1446 by massacring a large number of them, with the malleable sultan’s tacit permission. Later, when the sultan was convinced that the newcomers had been unjustly killed, he punished many of the responsible Deccanis and promoted the surviving newcomers. During the last years of his reign, Aḥmad had to face a rebellion in Telingana led by his son-in-law and supported by the sultan of Malwa. It was at this time that Maḥmūd Gāwān, a newly arrived noble from Persia, displayed his military and diplomatic skills by persuading the rebels to desist and the sultan to pardon them.

Under the successors of Aḥmad II, Bahmanī faced continuous disturbances, such as further rebellion in Telingana and three serious onslaughts by Maḥmūd Khaljī of Malwa; the Gajapati king of Orissa joined the fray by making inroads into the heart of the Bahmanī kingdom. Humāyūn (reigned 1458–61) and Niẓām al-Dīn Aḥmad III (reigned 1461–63) sought the help of Muḥammad Begarā of Gujarat against Malwa and warded off the invasions.

Vizierate of Maḥmūd Gāwān

The most notable personality of the period was Maḥmūd Gāwān, who was a leading administrator during the reigns of Humāyūn and his son Aḥmad III and was vizier (chief minister) under Muḥammad III (reigned 1463–82). During Maḥmūd Gāwān’s ascendancy, the Bahmanī state achieved both its greatest size and greatest degree of centralization, and yet, partly because of the attempts at centralization and partly because of the continuing rivalry between the Deccanis and the newcomers, the period ended with Maḥmūd Gāwān’s assassination and the rapid dissolution of the effective power of the Bahmanī state.

After Maḥmūd Gāwān’s installation as vizier in 1463, a series of Bahmanī campaigns resulted in the subjugation in the west of most of the Konkan, including several forts (e.g., Khelna, Belgaum, and Kolhapur) and the important port of Goa, which was then under Vijayanagar control. This not only guaranteed the safety of Muslim merchants and pilgrims from piratical attacks but also gave Bahmanī virtual command over the west coast trade, at least until the arrival of the Portuguese. In the north the frontier with Malwa was maintained more or less as it was, although Bahmanī agreed to return Kherla’s status as a fief of Malwa. An alliance with Vijayanagar proved effective in defeating Orissa in 1470. Later, campaigns in the east brought some advantages against the rival claimants to the Orissa throne, who sought Bahmanī’s help against one another. In 1481 Muḥammad III, with Maḥmūd Gāwān, succeeded in taking Kondapalli from Saluva Narasimha, the Vijayanagar general, and the sultan quickly marched south as far as Kanchipuram in a show of prowess.

As vizier, Maḥmūd Gāwān attempted to enhance the central authority—ostensibly of the crown but possibly his own as well—through a series of administrative reforms and political maneuvers. Up to the 1470s the kingdom had been divided into four provinces, centring around the cities of Daulatabad, Mahur, Bidar, and Gulbarga, respectively. The governors of the four provinces had control over almost all aspects of civil and military administration within their territorial jurisdictions. Administration was thus decentralized from the beginning, but the relative power of the provincial governors as compared with the centre potentially became even greater as the state expanded and each of the four provinces grew larger. To decrease the power of the governors, Maḥmūd Gāwān divided each of the overgrown provinces into two, under separate governors, reduced the military control of the governors by bringing all forts but one in each province directly under the control of the sultan, and tightened central control over the employment and payment of troops within the provinces. In addition, he introduced a system of measurement and valuation of agricultural land and created a large block of crown land within each province. Perhaps the most significant of all of Maḥmūd Gāwān’s measures was his policy of balancing important appointments between Deccanis and newcomers in order to reduce disputes among the nobility and to keep himself, as vizier, above party conflicts.

Unfortunately for Maḥmūd Gāwān and for the Bahmanī dynasty, party strife had developed to such an extent that a group of Deccani nobles—motivated by hostility toward the chief minister as a newcomer, as well as by dislike of his efforts toward centralization—falsified evidence to make Maḥmūd Gāwān appear a traitor and convinced Muḥammad III to execute him in 1481. The execution was widely disapproved of by the newcomers and even by some of the Deccani nobles, many of whom sided with Yūsuf ʿĀdil Khan, previously Maḥmūd Gāwān’s chief supporter. Most of the newcomers returned to their provinces and refused to come to the capital, and the sultan was left with only the support of the conspirators. When he died in 1482 (of grief over his error in judgment, the chronicles report), the leader of the conspirators, Malik Nāʾib, was able to make himself regent for Muḥammad’s minor son, Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd (reigned 1482–1518).

Bahmanī decline

Maḥmūd’s reign hastened the disintegration of the Bahmanī kingdom. An abortive attempt to assassinate Yūsuf ʿĀdil Khan resulted in the Khan’s agreement to retire to Bijapur and leave Malik Nāʾib and the conspirators in charge at Bidar. Now the lack of institutionalized central power brought group conflicts to the fore. Malik Nāʾib, never popular even with a number of the Deccanis, was put to death in 1486 by the Abyssinian governor of Bihar, and the sultan subsequently began to rely on the newcomers for support. An attempt on Maḥmūd’s life in 1487 by a group of Deccanis strengthened the sultan’s reliance on the newcomers and led to the slaughter of a great many Deccanis. But by this time it began to become apparent that the power of the sultan was less than that of several of his nobles, and, although he continued to be a valuable pawn for the provincial governors to try to control, his power to rule was nearly gone. The provincial governors and their followers could not be controlled, nor did they believe that maintaining the centralized Bahmanī state would any longer be in their best interests. Consequently, the governors were usually unwilling to aid the sultan when he attempted to put down rebellions by other governors or by powerful nobles.

One of the first revolts was that of the kotwal (superintendent of police) of Bidar, Qāsim Barīd, a Turkish noble who defeated the army sent against him by the sultan and then forced Maḥmūd to make him chief minister of the state. Qāsim Barīd’s attempt to reimpose central authority was opposed by most of the chief nobles, however, who defeated him once and then refused to recognize his authority. Next, Malik Aḥmad Niẓām al-Mulk (see Niẓām Shāhī dynasty), the son of Malik Nāʾib, began to carve out a territory for himself by conquering Maratha forts along the western coast. He defeated the two armies sent against him by the sultan, whom he forced to recognize his conquests, and in 1490 he assumed a practical independence and established his capital at Ahmadnagar. Yūsuf ʿĀdil Khān of Bijapur and Faṭh Allāh ʿImād al-Mulk of Berar had demonstrated their sympathy for Malik Aḥmad’s activities and soon emulated him. Although the three governors still did not assume the insignia of royalty, it was clear by the end of 1490 that Sultan Maḥmūd and the chief minister, Qāsim Barīd, could not command any of them.

Successors to the Bahmanī

During the 1490s the rivalries intensified among the former provincial governors, other high nobles, and Qāsim Barīd, who was the effective head of the government at the Bahmanī capital. Each began to form temporary alliances and to fight battles with other nobles in order to enhance his own position. Gradually the five successor states to the Bahmanī sultanate took shape, as lesser nobles were defeated and their territories were incorporated by the provincial governors or retained by Bidar. Bijapur (1490), Ahmadnagar (1490), and later Golconda (1512) emerged as the most successful of these states. Although a Bahmanī sultan still remained as a puppet ruler until at least 1538, effective control of the Bidar government passed into the hands of Qasīm Barīd’s son Amīr Barīd upon his father’s death in 1505, thus establishing what proved to be a dynastic claim for the Barīd Shāhī dynasty of Bidar.

Ironically, the conflict between Deccanis and newcomers, which had done so much to destroy the unity of the sultanate, was of little importance after 1492. The major rivalry of the next decade was between two newcomers, Qāsim Barīd and Yūsuf ʿĀdil Khan. (Qāsim Barīd, however, was supported by the Deccanis of Bidar in his struggle with another Deccani, Malik Aḥmad of Ahmadnagar; see also ʿĀdil Shāhī dynasty.) The shift resulted from the fact that there were no longer parties of nobles but rather semi-independent states whose rulers were attempting to establish and expand their authority. Political expediency dictated the shifting alliances among these regional chiefs, who were no longer representatives of factional politics but were potential rulers of independent states. The primary goals of territorial integrity and military supremacy offered sufficient rationale for one or the other of these chiefs to seek even the alliance of their traditional enemy Vijayanagar, particularly in the conflicts between Bijapur and Ahmadnagar.

One issue that occasionally united the Bahmanī successor states was the desire to profit at the expense of Vijayanagar. Sultan Maḥmūd II proposed in 1501 that a policy of an annual jihad, or holy war, against the Hindu kingdom be adopted by the Muslim nobles. A number of relatively successful raids were undertaken during the next few years, but in 1509 the new ruler of Vijayanagar, Krishna Deva Raya, repulsed the Muslims, who suffered substantial losses. Later the political ambitions of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar prompted a series of successful interventions by Vijayanagar under Rama Raya, a regent who finally usurped the Vijayanagar throne and played a significant role in Deccan politics. The excesses of Rama Raya, carried out on the pretext of assisting Bijapur against Ahmadnagar in their wars, led to a temporary but fruitful coalition among the five successor states and the crushing defeat of Vijayanagar’s powerful forces at the Battle of Talikota in 1565, which, though it did not destroy the Hindu kingdom, ultimately helped the expansionist ambitions of Bijapur and Golconda (see below The Vijayanagar empire, 1336–1646).

During the 16th century the strongest and best-organized of the Bahmanī successor states was Ahmadnagar (Niẓām Shāhī), followed by Bijapur (ʿĀdil Shāhī) and then Golconda (see Quṭb Shāhī dynasty). All three were much larger and more important than Berar and Bidar, and all three either began with or soon came to accept the Shīʿite form of Islam (the religion of the Persian newcomers) as the official faith of their rulers. During the 16th century the three major states formed shifting patterns of alliances, which sometimes (both before and after 1565) also included Vijayanagar, while the two smaller Muslim states ranged themselves on one side or the other in order to protect their independence. The goal of military campaigns normally was to humble the adversary without doing irreparable harm, for all three major Muslim states feared the supremacy of any one state, and a tripartite division of territory seemed more likely to ensure the continued independence of all.

Bijapur and Ahmadnagar were drawn into a series of conflicts over the forts in the Maratha region and the Konkan coast. A treaty between the two in 1571, however, reveals their interest in restoring a balance in the political situation by recognizing the right of Ahmadnagar to annex Berar and Bidar in return for recognition of Bijapur’s right to occupy extensive territories in the south, particularly portions of Vijayanagar. Ahmadnagar did not annex Bidar, owing to intervention by Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah of Golconda, but it did acquire Berar in 1574. Bijapur was unable to take full advantage of the opportunities for expansion to the south during the 1570s because of factional disputes among the nobles, as well as Golconda’s interests in the Vijayanagar-controlled areas. Thus, Ahmadnagar managed to retain a slightly superior position.

The tide began to turn in the 1580s, however, with the establishment of a stable regency at Bijapur, fortified by a series of marriage alliances with other royal lines in the Deccan and by the political deterioration of Ahmadnagar under the rule of the slightly mad Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah. Murtaḍā’s murder in 1588, by a son who was more insane than he, set off a chain of events that resulted in simultaneous invasions by Bijapur from the south and by Murtaḍā’s brother Burhān, who had the support of the Mughal emperor Akbar, from the north. Burhān defeated the army of Ahmadnagar, recalled the foreign nobles (as the newcomers of Bahmanī times were by then designated) who had been expelled from the kingdom, and assumed the throne in 1591. Campaigns against Bijapur and against the Portuguese at Chaul (just south of present-day Mumbai [Bombay]), as well as a bitter rivalry between the Deccani and foreign nobles, further weakened Ahmadnagar at a time when Akbar’s growing interest indicated grave danger. The deaths of both Burhān and his son in 1595 were followed by increased factionalism and eventually by civil war as rival claimants to the throne were put forward. When one party appealed for aid to the governor of Gujarat, Akbar had an excuse to launch the campaign he had already been planning. The two wars that followed resulted in the Mughal acquisition of Berar, the capture of the ruler of Ahmadnagar, and the defeat and annexation of Khandesh. A group of nobles, however, led by the Abyssinian Malik ʿAmbār, raised a member of the royal family to the throne at Daulatabad and continued to fight the Mughals.

Golconda, whose area by the mid-17th century approximated that of the Telugu linguistic and cultural region, was built up as a strong state by the Quṭb Shāhīs from 1512. It developed a distinct regional culture with the founding of Hyderabad in 1590–91 by Muḥammad Qulī Quṭb Shah and evolved a political system to suit the indigenous sociopolitical structure. Golconda enjoyed a high level of economic prosperity owing to the productive agricultural plains of Andhra and the busy trade of such ports as Masulipatam, as well as to the diamond mines near Vijayawada.

Quṭb Shāhī tombsQuṭb Shāhī tombs, Golconda, Telangana, India.Frederick M. Asher

The Quṭb Shāhīs steadily expanded the area under their control during the 16th century at the expense of the politically fragmented Telugu kings and Nayakas and held their own against the Vijayanagar rulers and the Gajapatis of Orissa. Vijayanagar interests in Andhra and its intervention in Golconda politics through encouragement to the rebel Nayakas under Krishna Deva Raya and his successors ceased after the Talikota debacle in 1565. Consolidation was achieved by Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah (reigned 1550–80) and enhanced under Muḥammad Qulī early in the 17th century. A conciliatory policy toward the Nayakas, as well as the regime’s desire to preserve the Telugu warrior ethos, brought Telugu warrior groups into Golconda’s service. Special attention to large-scale irrigation and agriculture, promotion of interregional trade, and administrative centralization were the basic factors in Golconda’s stability.

In the struggle for control of the Deccan after the decline of the Bahmanī sultanate, the two southernmost states, Bijapur and Golconda, ultimately found themselves in the most advantageous position, because they were farthest away from the growing power of the Mughal Empire in north India. The Mughal’s southward movement, which began under Akbar (reigned 1556–1605) with a successful onslaught against Ahmadnagar, was to end with the annexation of Bijapur (1686) and Golconda (1687) during the reign of Aurangzeb (reigned 1658–1707). During the intervening period, the Mughal presence became increasingly important to the remaining Deccan kings, who struggled to maintain or expand their position within the Deccan while trying to fend off the advancing Mughal arms.

The Vijayanagar empire, 1336–1646

Founded in 1336 in the wake of the rebellions against Tughluq rule in the Deccan, the Hindu Vijayanagar empire lasted for more than two centuries as the dominant power in south India. Its history and fortunes were shaped by the increasing militarization of peninsular politics after the Muslim invasions and the commercialization that made south India a major participant in the trade network linking Europe and East Asia. Urbanization and monetization of the economy were the two other significant developments of the period that brought all the peninsular kingdoms into highly competitive political and military activities in the race for supremacy.

Development of the state

The kingdom of Vijayanagar was founded by Harihara and Bukka, two of five brothers (surnamed Sangama) who had served in the administrations of both Kakatiya and Kampili before those kingdoms were conquered by the armies of the Delhi sultanate in the 1320s. When Kampili fell in 1327, the two brothers are believed to have been captured and taken to Delhi, where they converted to Islam. They were returned to the Deccan as governors of Kampili for the sultanate with the hope that they would be able to deal with the many local revolts and invasions by neighbouring Hindu kings. They followed a conciliatory policy toward the landholders of the area, many of whom had not accepted Muslim rule, and began a process of consolidation and expansion. Their first campaign was against the neighbouring Hoysala king, Ballala III of Dorasamudra, but it stagnated; after the brothers reconverted to Hinduism under the influence of the sage Madhavacarya (Vidyaranya) and proclaimed their independence from the Delhi sultanate, however, they were able to defeat Ballala and thereby secure their home base. Harihara I (reigned 1336–56) then established his new capital, Vijayanagar, in an easily defensible position south of the Tungabhadra River, where it came to symbolize the emerging medieval political culture of south India. The kingdom’s expansion in the first century of its existence made it the first south Indian state to exercise enduring control over different linguistic and cultural regions, albeit with subregional and local chiefly powers exercising authority as its agents and subordinates.

Tiruvengalanatha Temple complex, Vijayanagar, Karnataka, India.Frederick M. Asher

Conquests

In 1336 Harihara, with the help of his brothers, held uneasy suzerainty over lands extending from Nellore, on the southeast coast, to Badami, south of Bijapur on the western side of the Deccan. All around him new Hindu kingdoms were rising, the most important of which were the Hoysala kingdom of Ballala and the Andhra confederacy, led by Kapaya Nayaka. However, Ballala’s kingdom was disadvantageously situated between the Maʿbar sultanate and Vijayanagar, and within two years after Ballala was killed by the sultan in 1343–44, his kingdom had been conquered by Bukka, Harihara’s brother, and annexed to Vijayanagar. This was the most important victory of Harihara’s reign; the new state now could claim sovereignty from sea to sea, and in 1346 the five brothers attended a great celebration at which Bukka was made joint ruler and heir.

Harihara’s brothers made other, less significant conquests of small Hindu kingdoms during the next decade. However, the foundation of the Bahmanī sultanate in 1347 created a new and greater danger, and Harihara was forced to lessen his own expansionist activities to meet the threat posed by this powerful and aggressive new state on his northern borders.

During Harihara’s reign the administrative foundation of the Vijayanagar state was laid. Borrowing from the Kakatiya kings he had served, he created administrative units called stholas, nadus, and simas and appointed officials to collect revenue and to carry on local administration, preferring Brahmans to men of other castes. The income of the state apparently was increased by the reorganization, although centralization probably did not proceed to the stage where salaried officials collected directly for the government in most areas. Rather, most land remained under the direct control of subordinate chiefs or of a hierarchy of local landholders, who paid some revenue and provided some troops for the king. Harihara also encouraged increased cultivation in some areas by allowing lower revenue payments for lands recently reclaimed from the forests.

Consolidation

Harihara was succeeded by Bukka (I; reigned 1356–77), who during his first decade as king engaged in a number of costly wars against the Bahmanī sultans over control of strategic forts in the Tungabhadra-Krishna Doab, as well as over the trading emporia of the east and west coasts. The Bahmanīs generally prevailed in these encounters and even forced Vijayanagar to pay a tribute in 1359. The major accomplishments of Bukka’s reign were the conquest of the short-lived sultanate of Maʿbar (Madurai; 1370) and the maintenance of his kingdom against the threat of decentralization. During Harihara’s reign the government of the outlying provinces of the growing state had been entrusted to his brothers—usually to the brother who had conquered that particular territory. By 1357 some of Bukka’s nephews had succeeded their fathers as governors of these provinces, and there was a possibility that the state would become less and less centralized as the various branches of the family became more firmly ensconced in their particular domains. Bukka, therefore, removed his nephews and replaced them with his sons and favourite generals so that centralized authority (and his own line of succession) could be maintained. However, the succession of Bukka’s son Harihara II (reigned 1377–1404) precipitated a repetition of the same action. A rebellion in the Tamil country at the beginning of his reign probably was aided by the disaffected sons and officers of Bukka’s deceased eldest son, Kumara Kampana, who were not ready to acknowledge Harihara’s authority. Harihara was able to put down the rebellion and subsequently to replace his cousins with his own sons as governors of the provinces. Thus, the circle of power was narrowed once again. The question of succession to the throne had not been settled, however. On many occasions, the conflict resumed between the king and his lineal descendant, who tried to centralize the state, and the collateral relatives (cousins and brothers), who tried to establish ruling rights over some portion of the kingdom.

The temporary confusion that followed the assassination of the Bahmanī sultan ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Mujāhid in 1378 gave Harihara the opportunity to recapture Goa and some other western ports and impose his authority southward along the Malabar Coast. During the next decade, pressure increased for expansion against the Reddi kingdom of Kondavidu in the northeast. Prince Devaraya captured Panagal fort and made it a base of operations in the region. The slight gains made in 1390–91 against an alliance of the Velama chieftain of Rajakonda and the Bahmanīs were more than offset when the Bahmanī sultan besieged Vijayanagar in 1398–99, slaughtered a large number of people, and exacted a promise to pay tribute. The tribute was withheld two years later, however, when Vijayanagar made alliances with the sultans of Malwa and Gujarat. Nevertheless, Harihara’s reign was relatively successful, because he expanded the state, maintained internal order, and managed to fend off the Bahmanī sultans. The control of ports on both coasts provided opportunities for the acquisition of increased wealth through trade.

Wars and rivalries

Harihara II’s death in 1404 was followed by a violent succession dispute among his three surviving sons. Only after two of them had been crowned and dethroned was the third, Devaraya I (reigned 1406–22), able to emerge victorious. Continuing instability, however, coupled with the involvement of Vijayanagar and the Bahmanī sultanate as backers of different claimants to the throne of Kondavidu, led to further confrontation between the two powers (each joined by various of the rivalrous Telugu chiefs). Sultan Fīrūz Shah Bahmanī supported a Reddi attack on Udayagiri. In a related move, the sultan himself mounted another siege of Vijayanagar city, imposing tributary conditions that included his marriage to Devaraya’s daughter. Despite Bahmanī successes, Vijayanagar managed to hold Panagal, Nalgonda, and other forts and to regain Udayagiri. The defeat of Fīrūz Shah in 1419 and the death of his Vema ally led to the eventual partition of Kondavidu between Vijayanagar and the Velamas of Rajakonda, who had switched sides with the Vemas during the protracted struggle. This extensive involvement in Andhra and Telingana—inspired by the ambition to expand farther up the eastern seaboard (an area that the Bahmanīs to the west also sought to control)—brought Vijayanagar into conflict for the first time with the kingdom of Orissa to the north. Although a war was temporarily averted, there began a rivalry that was to last more than a century.

Perhaps Devaraya’s most significant achievement was his reorganization of the army. Realizing the value of cavalry and well-trained archers, he imported many horses from Persia and Arabia and hired Turkish bowmen, as well as troopers who were skilled in mounted warfare. Thus, although it appears that he was seldom able to best the Bahmanīs in the field, he had begun to narrow the strategic and technological gap between north and south and to build an army that would be better suited to warfare on open plains.

The short reigns of Devaraya’s two sons, Ramcandra and Vijaya, were disastrous. In a war against the Bahmanīs, many temples were destroyed, and Vijaya was forced to pay a huge indemnity. A combined invasion by the king of Orissa and the Velamas of Andhra resulted in the loss of the territories newly gained in the partition of the Reddi kingdom of Kondavidu. Vijaya’s son and successor, Devaraya II (reigned 1432–46), reconquered the lost Reddi territories and incorporated them into his kingdom, thus establishing the Krishna River as the northeastern boundary. Wars with the Bahmanīs in 1435–36 and 1443–44 over control of Raichur and Mudgal forts in the Tungabhadra-Krishna Doab ended inconclusively. Those campaigns, however, led to further improvements in Vijayanagar’s military forces when Devaraya II proclaimed that Muslims would be welcome in his service and assigned Muslim archers already in Vijayanagar service to instruct his Hindu troops. Devaraya also levied tribute from Sri Lanka and campaigned successfully in the Kerala country of the far south, where his victories over local chieftains suggest a process of consolidation. His reign saw both the greatest territorial extension and the greatest centralization of the first period of the history of Vijayanagar.

Decentralization and loss of territory

During the first 40 years after Devaraya’s death in 1446, the centralized power of the state declined, and a considerable amount of territory along both coasts was lost to the Bahmanī sultans and to the suddenly powerful Gajapati ruler of Orissa. In the 1450s and ’60s Kapilendra (Kapileshvara), the great king of Orissa, together with his son Hamvira, conquered the Reddi kingdom of Rajahmundry and the Vijayanagar province of Kondavidu, captured Warangal and Bidar from the Bahmanīs, eventually occupied Udayagiri, and sent a victorious army down the east coast as far south as the Kaveri (Cauvery) River, where he was repulsed by the able Vijayanagar general and governor of Chandragiri, Saluva Narasimha.

The Orissan raid had a considerable effect upon Vijayanagar. It not only weakened the empire in the east but also indicated that provincial governors might have to fend for themselves if they expected to retain their territories. The fact that Devaraya’s son Mallikarjuna (reigned 1446–65) was succeeded by a cousin rather than by his own son was another indication of lessened central control and of the failure of the king and his immediate family to secure their own future, as had been done by many of his ancestors when they removed their cousins from positions of power. The new ruler, Virupaksha (reigned 1465–85), had been a provincial governor. His usurpation was not accepted by many of the provincial governors on the east and west coasts or by the direct descendants of Mallikarjuna, who retired to the banks of the Kaveri and ruled much of the southern part of the kingdom in a semi-independent fashion.

Beginning in 1470, the Bahmanīs, under the vizier Maḥmūd Gāwān, began a campaign that succeeded in taking much of the west coast and the northern Karnataka from Vijayanagar. The loss of Goa and other ports was especially disconcerting, because it cut off not only an important source of trade and state income but the principal source of supply of Middle Eastern horses for the military as well. The death in 1470 of Kapilendra of Orissa temporarily relieved military pressure in the east; but it was Saluva Narasimha (since transferred to Penukonda), rather than Virupaksha, who took advantage of the resultant civil war in Orissa to regain lost territory. He reconquered the Tamil region and became master of the east coast up to the Godavari River. Bahmanī aid to Hamvira, in return for the surrender of all the captured forts in Telingana, drew Narasimha into a war with the sultanate. A two-pronged attack by Muḥammad Shah and Maḥmūd Gāwān on Narasimha’s territories—Penukonda and the coastal region—and the plunder of Kanchipuram in 1481 were only temporarily successful, for Ishvara Nayaka, a Vijayanagar general, recovered the loot from the returning Bahmanī forces at Kandukur, and Narasimha recaptured Penukonda after turning back the Bahmanī forces.

Later dynasties

Beginning as a small chieftain about 1456, Narasimha had put together a large dominion by 1485 as a result of conquests in the south, as well as campaigns against Orissa; and, although nominally subordinate to Virupaksha, he was performing more extensive military and administrative functions than was his superior. It is not surprising that when Virupaksha was murdered by one of his sons—who was in turn murdered by his brother—Saluva Narasimha (reigned 1485–90) stepped in to remove the new ruler and to begin his own dynasty. Usurpation was easier than consolidation, however, and Narasimha spent his reign in relatively successful campaigns to reduce his vassals throughout the kingdom to submission and in unsuccessful attempts to stop the encroachment of the king of Orissa. Narasimha also opened new ports on the west coast so that he could revive the horse trade, which had fallen into Bahmanī hands, and he generally revitalized the army. By 1490 the process of centralization had begun again, and both internal and external political circumstances soon would combine to create better opportunities than ever before.

Reconsolidation

At his death in 1491, following the siege of Udayagiri (and his own imprisonment there) by Orissa, Narasimha left his kingdom in the hands of his chief minister, Narasa Nayaka, whom he had appointed regent for his two young sons the previous year. The minister in effect ruled Vijayanagar from 1490 until his own death in 1503. Court intrigues led to the murder of the elder prince by one of Narasa’s rivals and to the capture and virtual imprisonment of the younger prince (officially enthroned as Immadi Narasimha) by Narasa in 1492. The usurpation resulted in opposition from provincial governors and chiefs that lasted for the rest of Narasa’s life. Early in his regency, however, he had the opportunity to take advantage of the beginning of the disintegration of the Bahmanī sultanate. He invaded the disputed Tungabhadra-Krishna Doab in 1492–93 at the invitation of the Bahmanī minister, Qāsim Barīd, who was trying to subdue the newly independent Yūsuf ʿĀdil Khan of Bijapur. Narasa took the strategic forts of Raichur and Mudgal; and, although they were lost again in 1502, the growing disunity of the emerging Muslim polities would provide many similar opportunities in the future.

Narasa also campaigned in the south to restore effective control, which had not existed in many areas since the raid from Orissa in 1463–64. He compelled most of the chiefs and provincial governors to recognize his suzerainty in both Tamil country and Karnataka and nearly restored the old boundaries of the kingdom (some eastern districts were still held by Orissa). By 1503 Narasa had practically completed the process of reconsolidation with which Saluva Narasimha had charged him, although trade restrictions and other impositions by the Portuguese had significantly compromised Vijayanagar’s prestige. He also had made virtually certain that his own line rather than that of his old master would continue to rule. It was during the reigns of his sons that Vijayanagar rose to new heights of political power and cultural eminence.

Narasa’s eldest son and successor, best known as Vira Narasimha (reigned 1503–09), ended the sham of regency. After ordering the by-then grown Immadi Narasimha’s murder in 1505, he ascended the throne and inaugurated the Tuluva dynasty, the third dynasty of Vijayanagar. The usurpation again provoked opposition, which the new king spent most of his reign attempting to quell. He was successful except in subduing the rebellious chiefs of Ummattur and Seringapatam in the south and in recovering Goa from the Portuguese, with whom, however, he was able to establish relations to obtain a supply of better horses. By this time the Bahmanī wars, in which the successor states had joined, had become a series of annual jihads, or holy wars, maintaining the Bahmanī’s virtual control over the doab forts.

Growth of power

Vira Narasimha was succeeded by his brother Krishna Deva Raya (reigned 1509–29), generally regarded as the greatest of the Vijayanagar kings. During his reign the kingdom became more powerful than ever before, and internal consolidation reached a new peak. Krishna Deva spent the first 10 years of his reign solidly establishing his authority over his subordinate chieftains and governors while fending off invasions from the northeast.

In an effort to achieve centralization and effective political control, Krishna Deva Raya appointed Brahmans and capable nonkinsmen as commanders, garrisoned the forts with Portuguese and Muslim mercenary gunners, and recruited foot soldiers from local forest tribes; he also created the rank of lesser chiefs known as poligars (palaiyakkarars) in the Vijayanagar service.

After decisively defeating an invading coalition of Bahmanī forces (who by this time were virtually separated into five states) and capturing Raichur fort, Krishna Deva took advantage of a quarrel between Bijapur and the Bahmanī ruler to subdue both Gulbarga and Bidar and to restore the imprisoned Bahmanī sultan to his throne in 1512. During the same period he conducted a successful campaign to subdue Ummattur in the south, and a new province was established from it. From 1513 to 1520, Krishna Deva campaigned against the Gajapati ruler of Orissa, conquering all that king’s territory up to the Godavari and raiding as far as the Orissan capital at Kataka. Orissa then sued for peace, and its king gave his daughter in marriage to Krishna Deva, who consequently returned to Orissa all the conquered territory north of the Krishna River.

While Krishna Deva was fighting in the east, Ismāʿīl ʿĀdil Shah of Bijapur had retaken Raichur fort. In 1520 Krishna Deva decisively defeated Ismāʿīl with some aid from Portuguese gunners and recaptured Raichur. In 1523 he carried the attack further, invading Bijapur and capturing several forts. Krishna Deva razed Gulbarga and once again claimed to have restored the Bahmanī sultanate by setting one of the three sons of Maḥmūd Shah II on the throne. One result of these successful campaigns and of Krishna Deva’s subsequent haughty behaviour was to point out vividly to the Muslim rulers the dangers posed by Vijayanagar, so that in years to come they thought increasingly of taking concerted action against that kingdom. Krishna Deva’s highly successful reign thus led to increased danger to his realm.

During most of his reign Krishna Deva maintained a mutually advantageous relationship with the increasingly powerful Portuguese, whereby he retained access to trade goods, especially to horses from the Middle East, while the Portuguese were allowed to trade in his dominions. The accounts from this period by the Portuguese travelers Domingos Pais and Duarte Barbosa depict a thriving city and kingdom under a highly venerated and capable ruler. Krishna Deva Raya’s scholarship and patronage of Telugu and Sanskrit literature have become symbols of Telugu pride and cultural traditions.

About 1524–25 Krishna Deva abdicated and had his young son crowned king. His son died shortly thereafter, however, reportedly poisoned by the jealous former chief minister. Krishna Deva imprisoned the minister and his family and dealt successfully with a serious rebellion three years later—when one of the minister’s sons escaped—as well as with Ismāʿīl ʿĀdil Shah’s attempt to take advantage of Krishna Deva’s troubles to recoup his position. Krishna Deva’s death in 1529 ended the period of the kingdom’s greatest military and administrative success.

Renewed decentralization

Krishna Deva had passed over his infant son and his young nephew and picked his half brother Achyuta Deva Raya (reigned 1529–42) to succeed him. Following a brief succession dispute, Achyuta Deva Raya was able to reach the capital from Chandragiri, where Krishna Deva had kept him and other princes confined, and to ascend the throne. Although he probably was not as dissolute a ruler as the Portuguese traveler and writer Fernão Nuniz described him to be, the severe challenges he faced made a successful reign difficult. Krishna Deva’s death had precipitated renewed attacks by Bijapur, Golconda, and Orissa and a revolt by the king’s minister, Saluva Viranarasimha, and the southern chieftains of Ummattur and Tiruvadi. Achyuta dealt successfully with all his enemies until the late 1530s, when he was imprisoned by Rama Raya, the chief minister, with whom he had agreed to share power. Opposition by some of the nobles to Achyuta’s imprisonment, combined with a revolt in the south, led to his release and the beginnings of civil war; but the new ruler of Bijapur, Ibrāhīm ʿĀdil Shah, after early attempts to create divisiveness in Vijayanagar, arbitrated a settlement between Achyuta and Rama Raya. Under the settlement, Achyuta virtually handed over his sovereignty to the regent, retaining nominal kingship.

Achyuta’s reign ended with about the same external boundaries of the kingdom as in 1529, but the struggle with Rama Raya plus the activities of other nobles and chieftains weakened the hold of the centre over some of the provinces. The process of decentralization had set in again, but now the strongman who would pull the kingdom together was already on the scene. Rama Raya brought himself to the undisputed pinnacle of power in 1542–43, when he defeated his rival in the succession struggle following Achyuta’s death and crowned his own candidate, Achyuta’s nephew Sadashiva (reigned 1542–76). After seven or eight years, Rama Raya also assumed royal titles, but from the first Sadashiva was kept under guard, and Rama Raya, together with his brothers Tirumala and Venkatadri, ruled the kingdom.

Rama Raya was able to control, although not to subdue entirely, rebellious nobles in the east and the extreme south. He also concluded a treaty with the Portuguese (1546), whose settlements had been expanding and who had caused no small amount of damage to indigenous settlements over the past few years. The treaty was broken in 1558, however, and Rama Raya then exacted tribute in compensation for damage to temples caused by the Portuguese.

Relations with the Muslim states

Most crucial during the period of Rama Raya’s rule, however, were Vijayanagar’s relations with the Muslim successor states to the Bahmanī sultanate. At least since Krishna Deva Raya’s time, Vijayanagar had usually competed on a more than equal basis and in the same system of state rivalries with the five Muslim states. Thus, an invasion from Bijapur was repulsed in 1543; in 1548 Rama Raya aided Burhān Niẓām Shah of Ahmadnagar in taking a fort from Bidar, but in 1557 Rama Raya allied himself with Bijapur against the Niẓām Shah and Golconda. The result of the last war was a collective treaty, by which any of the four parties, attacked unjustly by another, could call upon the other allies to stop the aggressor. When Ḥusayn Niẓām Shah broke the treaty by invading Bijapur in 1560, Vijayanagar and Golconda responded with an attack that resulted not only in Ahmadnagar’s loss of the fort of Kalyani to Bijapur but also in an invasion of Bidar and the defeat of its ruler by Rama Raya. Soon, however, the ruler of Golconda, Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah, allied himself with Ahmadnagar against Bijapur, and Rama Raya allied Vijayanagar with Bijapur to severely defeat the aggressors.

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The Mughal Empire, 1526–1761

The significance of Mughal rule

The Mughal Empire at its zenith commanded resources unprecedented in Indian history and covered almost the entire subcontinent. From 1556 to 1707, during the heyday of its fabulous wealth and glory, the Mughal Empire was a fairly efficient and centralized organization, with a vast complex of personnel, money, and information dedicated to the service of the emperor and his nobility.

Development of the Mughal Empire.Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Much of the empire’s expansion during that period was attributable to India’s growing commercial and cultural contact with the outside world. The 16th and 17th centuries brought the establishment and expansion of European and non-European trading organizations in the subcontinent, principally for the procurement of Indian goods in demand abroad. Indian regions drew close to each other by means of an enhanced overland and coastal trading network, significantly augmenting the internal surplus of precious metals. With expanded connections to the wider world came also new ideologies and technologies to challenge and enrich the imperial edifice.

The empire itself, however, was a purely Indian historical experience. Mughal culture blended Perso-Islamic and regional Indian elements into a distinctive but variegated whole. Although by the early 18th century the regions had begun to reassert their independent positions, Mughal manners and ideals outlasted imperial central authority. The imperial centre, in fact, came to be controlled by the regions. The trajectory of the Mughal Empire over roughly its first two centuries (1526–1748) thus provides a fascinating illustration of premodern state building in the Indian subcontinent.

The individual abilities and achievements of the early Mughals—Bābur, Humāyūn, and later Akbar—largely charted this course. Bābur and Humāyūn struggled against heavy odds to create the Mughal domain, whereas Akbar, besides consolidating and expanding its frontiers, provided the theoretical framework for a truly Indian state. Picking up the thread of experimentation from the intervening Sūr dynasty (1540–56), Akbar attacked narrow-mindedness and bigotry, absorbed Hindus in the high ranks of the nobility, and encouraged the tradition of ruling through the local Hindu landed elites. This tradition continued until the very end of the Mughal Empire, despite the fact that some of Akbar’s successors, notably Aurangzeb (1658–1707), had to concede to contrary forces.

The establishment of the Mughal Empire

Bābur

The foundation of the empire was laid in 1526 by Ẓahīr al-Dīn Muḥammad Bābur, a Chagatai Turk (so called because his ancestral homeland, the country north of the Amu Darya [Oxus River] in Central Asia, was the heritage of Chagatai, the second son of Genghis Khan). Bābur was a fifth-generation descendant of Timur on the side of his father and a 14th-generation descendant of Genghis Khan. His idea of conquering India was inspired, to begin with, by the story of the exploits of Timur, who had invaded the subcontinent in 1398.

Bābur inherited his father’s principality in Fergana at a young age, in 1494. Soon he was literally a fugitive, in the midst of both an internecine fight among the Timurids and a struggle between them and the rising Uzbeks over the erstwhile Timurid empire in the region. In 1504 he conquered Kabul and Ghaznī. In 1511 he recaptured Samarkand, only to realize that, with the formidable Ṣafavid dynasty in Iran and the Uzbeks in Central Asia, he should rather turn to the southeast toward India to have an empire of his own. As a Timurid, Bābur had an eye on the Punjab, part of which had been Timur’s possession. He made several excursions in the tribal habitats there. Between 1519 and 1524—when he invaded Bhera, Sialkot, and Lahore—he showed his definite intention to conquer Hindustan, where the political scene favoured his adventure.

Conquest of Hindustan

Having secured the Punjab, Bābur advanced toward Delhi, garnering support from many Delhi nobles. He routed two advance parties of Ibrāhīm Lodī’s troops and met the sultan’s main army at Panipat. The Afghans fought bravely, but they had never faced new artillery, and their frontal attack was no answer to Bābur’s superior arrangement of the battle line. Bābur’s knowledge of western and Central Asian war tactics and his brilliant leadership proved decisive in his victory. By April 1526 he was in control of Delhi and Agra and held the keys to conquer Hindustan.

Bābur, however, had yet to encounter any of the several Afghans who held important towns in what is now eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar and who were backed by the sultan of Bengal in the east and the Rajputs on the southern borders. The Rajputs under Rana Sanga of Mewar threatened to revive their power in northern India. Bābur assigned the unconquered territories to his nobles and led an expedition himself against the rana in person. He crushed the rana’s forces at Khanua, near Fatehpur Sikri (March 1527), once again by means of the skillful positioning of troops. Bābur then continued his campaigns to subjugate the Rajputs of Chanderi. When Afghan risings turned him to the east, he had to fight, among others, the joint forces of the Afghans and the sultan of Bengal in 1529 at Ghagra, near Varanasi. Bābur won the battles, but the expedition there too, like the one on the southern borders, was left unfinished. Developments in Central Asia and Bābur’s failing health forced him to withdraw. He died near Lahore in December 1530.

Bābur’s achievements

Bābur’s brief tenure in Hindustan, spent in wars and in his preoccupation with northwest and Central Asia, did not give him enough time to consolidate fully his conquests in India. Still, discernible in his efforts are the beginnings of the Mughal imperial organization and political culture. He introduced some Central Asian administrative institutions and, significantly, tried to woo the prominent local chiefs. He also established new mints in Lahore and Jaunpur and tried to ensure a safe and secure route from Agra to Kabul. He advised his son and successor, Humāyūn, to adopt a tolerant religious policy.Muzaffar Alam

Humāyūn

Humāyūn’s rule began badly with his invasion of the Hindu principality of Kalinjar in Bundelkhand, which he failed to subdue. Next he became entangled in a quarrel with Sher (or Shīr) Khan (later Sher Shah of Sūr, founder of the Sūr dynasty), the new leader of the Afghans in the east, by unsuccessfully besieging the fortress of Chunar (1532). Thereafter he conquered Malwa and Gujarat, but he could not hold them. Leaving the fortress of Chunar unconquered on the way, Humāyūn proceeded to Bengal to assist Sultan Maḥmūd of that province against Sher Khan. He lost touch with Delhi and Agra, and, because his brother Hindal began to openly behave like an independent ruler at Agra, he was obliged to leave Gaur, the capital of Bengal. Negotiations with Sher Khan fell through, and the latter forced Humāyūn to fight a battle at Chausa, 10 miles southwest of Buxar (Baksar; June 26, 1539), in which Humāyūn was defeated. He did not feel strong enough to defend Agra, and he retreated to Bilgram near Kannauj, where he fought his last battle with Sher Khan, who had now assumed the title of shah. Humāyūn was again defeated and was compelled to retreat to Lahore; he then fled from Lahore to the Sindh (or Sind) region, from Sindh to Rajputana, and from Rajputana back to Sindh. Not feeling secure even in Sindh, he fled (July 1543) to Iran to seek military assistance from its ruler, the Ṣafavid Shah Ṭahmāsp I. The shah agreed to assist him with an army on the condition that Humāyūn become a Shīʿite Muslim and return Kandahār, an important frontier town and commercial centre, to Iran in the event of his successful acquisition of that fortress.

Humāyūn's tomb, Delhi.© Rudolf Tepfenhart/Fotolia

Humāyūn had no answer to the political and military skill of Sher Shah and had to fight simultaneously on the southern borders to check the sultan of Gujarat, a refuge of the rebel Mughals. Humāyūn’s failure, however, was attributable to inherent flaws in the early Mughal political organization. The armed clans of his nobility owed their first allegiance to their respective chiefs. These chiefs, together with almost all the male members of the royal family, had a claim to sovereignty. There was thus always a lurking fear of the emergence of another centre of power, at least under one or the other of his brothers. Humāyūn also fought against the heavy odds of his opponents’ rapport with the locality.

Sher Shah and his successors

During Humāyūn’s exile Sher Shah established a vast and powerful empire and strengthened it with a wise system of administration. He carried out a new and equitable revenue settlement, greatly improved the administration of the districts and the parganas (groups of villages), reformed the currency, encouraged trade and commerce, improved communication, and administered impartial justice.

Tomb of Sher Shah of Sūr, Sasaram, Bihar, India.Frederick M. Asher

Sher Shah died during the siege of Kalinjar (May 1545) and was succeeded by his son Islam Shah (ruled 1545–53). Islam Shah, preeminently a soldier, was less successful as a ruler than his father. Palace intrigues and insurrections marred his reign. On his death his young son, Fīrūz, came to the Sūr throne but was murdered by his own maternal uncle, and subsequently the empire fractured into several parts.

Restoration of Humāyūn

After his return to Kabul from Iran, Humāyūn watched the situation in India. He had been preparing since the death of Islam Shah to recover his throne. Following the capture of Kandahār and Kabul from his brothers, he had reasserted his unique royal position and assembled his own nobles. In December 1554 he crossed the Indus River and marched to Lahore, which he captured without opposition the following February. Humāyūn occupied Sirhind and captured Delhi and Agra in July 1555. He thus regained the throne of Delhi after an interval of 12 years, but he did not live long enough to recover the whole of the lost empire; he died as the result of an accident in Shermandal in Delhi (January 1556). His death was concealed for about a fortnight to enable the peaceful accession of his son Akbar, who was away at the time in the Punjab.

The reign of Akbar the Great

Extension and consolidation of the empire

Akbar (ruled 1556–1605) was proclaimed emperor amid gloomy circumstances. Delhi and Agra were threatened by Hemu—the Hindu general of the Sūr ruler, ʿĀdil Shah—and Mughal governors were being driven from all parts of northern India. Akbar’s hold over a fraction of the Punjab—the only territory in his possession—was disputed by Sikandar Sūr and was precarious. There was also disloyalty among Akbar’s own followers. The task before Akbar was to reconquer the empire and consolidate it by ensuring control over its frontiers and, moreover, by providing it with a firm administrative machinery. He received unstinting support from the regent, Bayram Khan, until 1560. The Mughal victory at Panipat (November 1556) and the subsequent recovery of Mankot, Gwalior, and Jaunpur demolished the Afghan threat in upper India.

Agra fort, built by Akbar the Great, in Uttar Pradesh state, India.Frederick M. Asher

The early years

Until 1560 the administration of Akbar’s truncated empire was in the hands of Bayram Khan. Bayram’s regency was momentous in the history of India. At its end the Mughal dominion embraced the whole of the Punjab, the territory of Delhi, what are now the states of Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal in the north (as far as Jaunpur in the east), and large tracts of what is now Rajasthan in the west.

Akbar, however, soon became restless under Bayram Khan’s tutelage. Influenced by his former wet nurse, Maham Anaga, and his mother, Ḥamīdah Bānū Begam, he was persuaded to dismiss him (March 1560). Four ministers of mediocre ability then followed in quick succession. Although not yet his own master, Akbar took a few momentous steps during that period. He conquered Malwa (1561) and marched rapidly to Sarangpur to punish Adham Khan, the captain in charge of the expedition, for improper conduct. Second, he appointed Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Atgah Khan as prime minister (November 1561). Third, at about the same time, he took possession of Chunar, which had always defied Humāyūn.

The most momentous events of 1562 were Akbar’s marriage to a Rajput princess, daughter of Raja Bharmal of Amber, and the conquest of Merta in Rajasthan. The marriage led to a firm alliance between the Mughals and the Rajputs.

By the end of June 1562, Akbar had freed himself completely from the influence of the harem party, headed by Maham Anaga, her son Adham Khan, and some other ambitious courtiers. The harem leaders murdered the prime minister, Atgah Khan, who was then succeeded by Munʿim Khan.

From about the middle of 1562, Akbar took upon himself the great task of shaping his policies, leaving them to be implemented by his agents. He embarked on a policy of conquest, establishing control over Jodhpur, Bhatha (present-day Rewa), and the Gakkhar country between the Indus and Beas rivers in the Punjab. Next he made inroads into Gondwana. During this period he ended discrimination against the Hindus by abolishing pilgrimage taxes in 1563 and the hated jizyah (poll tax on non-Muslims) in 1564.

Struggle for firm personal control

Akbar thus commanded the entire area of Humāyūn’s Indian possessions. By the mid-1560s he had also developed a new pattern of king-noble relationship that suited the current need of a centralized state to be defended by a nobility of diverse ethnic and religious groups. He insisted on assessing the arrears of the territories under the command of the old Tūrānī (Central Asian) clans and, in order to strike a balance in the ruling class, promoted the Persians (Irānī), the Indian Muslims, and the Rajputs in the imperial service. Akbar placed eminent clan leaders in charge of frontier areas and staffed the civil and finance departments with relatively new non-Tūrānī recruits. The revolts in 1564–74 by the members of the old guard—the Uzbeks, the Mirzās, the Qāqshāls, and the Atgah Khails—showed the intensity of their indignation over the change. Utilizing the Muslim orthodoxy’s resentment over Akbar’s liberal views, they organized their last resistance in 1580. The rebels proclaimed Akbar’s half-brother, Mirzā Ḥakīm, the ruler of Kabul, and he moved into the Punjab as their king. Akbar crushed the opposition ruthlessly.

Subjugation of Rajasthan

Rajasthan occupied a prominent place in Akbar’s scheme of conquest; without establishing his suzerainty over that region, he would have no title to the sovereignty of northern India. Rajasthan also bordered on Gujarat, a centre of commerce with the countries of western Asia and Europe. In 1567 Akbar invaded Chitor, the capital of Mewar; in February 1568 the fort fell into his hands. Chitor was constituted a district, and Āṣaf Khan was appointed its governor. But the western half of Mewar remained in the possession of Rana Udai Singh. Later, his son Rana Pratap Singh, following his defeat by the Mughals at Haldighat (1576), continued to raid until his death in 1597, when his son Amar Singh assumed the mantle. The fall of Chitor and then of Ranthambor (1569) brought almost all of Rajasthan under Akbar’s suzerainty.

Conquest of Gujarat and Bengal

Akbar’s next objective was the conquest of Gujarat and Bengal, which had connected Hindustan with the trading world of Asia, Africa, and Europe. Gujarat had lately been a haven of the refractory Mughal nobles, and in Bengal and Bihar the Afghans under Dāʾūd Karrānī still posed a serious threat. Akbar conquered Gujarat at his second attempt in 1573 and celebrated by building a victory gate, the lofty Buland Darwāza (“High Gate”), at his new capital, Fatehpur Sikri. The conquest of Gujarat pushed the Mughal Empire’s frontiers to the sea. Akbar’s encounters with the Portuguese aroused his curiosity about their religion and culture. He did not show much interest in what was taking place overseas, but he appreciated the political and commercial significance of bringing the other gateway to his empire’s international trade—namely, Bengal—under his firm control. He was in Patna in 1574, and by July 1576 Bengal was a part of the empire, even if some local chiefs continued to agitate for some years more. Later, Man Singh, governor of Bihar, also annexed Orissa and thus consolidated the Mughal gains in the east.

Buland Darwāza (“High Gate”), built during the reign of Akbar the Great, in Fatehpur Sikri, Uttar Pradesh state, India.Frederick M. Asher

The frontiers

On the northwest frontier Kabul, Kandahār, and Ghaznī were not simply strategically significant; these towns linked India through overland trade with central and western Asia and were crucial for securing horses for the Mughal cavalry. Akbar strengthened his grip over these outposts in the 1580s and ’90s.

Following Ḥakīm’s death and a threatened Uzbek invasion, Akbar brought Kabul under his direct control. To demonstrate his strength, the Mughal army paraded through Kashmir, Baluchistan, Sindh, and the various tribal districts of the region. In 1595, before his return, Akbar wrested Kandahār from the Ṣafavids, thus fixing the northwestern frontiers. In the east, Man Singh stabilized the Mughal gains by annexing Orissa, Koch Bihar, and a large part of Bengal. Conquest of Kathiawar and later of Asirgarh and the northern territory of the Niẓām Shāhī kingdom of Ahmadnagar ensured a firm command over Gujarat and central India. At Akbar’s death in October 1605, the Mughal Empire extended to the entire area north of the Godavari River, with the exceptions of Gondwana in central India and Assam in the northeast.

The state and society under Akbar

More than for its military victories, the empire under Akbar is noted for a sound administrative framework and a coherent policy that gave the Mughal regime a firm footing and sustained it for about 150 years.

Central, provincial, and local government

Akbar’s central government consisted of four departments, each presided over by a minister: the prime minister (wakīl), the finance minister (dīwān, or vizier [wazīr]), the paymaster general (mīr bakhshī), and the chief justice and religious official combined (ṣadr al-ṣudūr). They were appointed, promoted, and dismissed by the emperor, and their duties were well defined.

The empire was divided into 15 provinces (subahs)—Allahabad, Agra, Ayodhya (Avadh), Ajmer, Ahmedabad (Ahmadabad), Bihar, Bengal, Delhi, Kabul, Lahore, Multan, Malka, Qhandesh, Berar, and Ahmadnagar. Kashmir and Kandahār were districts of the province of Kabul. Sindh, then known as Thatta, was a district in the province of Multan. Orissa formed a part of Bengal. The provinces were not of uniform area or income. There were in each province a governor, a dīwān, a bakhshī (military commander), a ṣadr (religious administrator), and a qāḍī (judge) and agents who supplied information to the central government. Separation of powers among the various officials (in particular, between the governor and the dīwān) was a significant operating principle in imperial administration.

The provinces were divided into districts (sarkārs). Each district had a fowjdār (a military officer whose duties roughly corresponded to those of a collector); a qāḍī; a kotwāl, who looked after sanitation, the police, and the administration; a bitikchī (head clerk); and a khazānedār (treasurer).

Every town of consequence had a kotwāl. The village communities conducted their affairs through pancayats (councils) and were more or less autonomous units.

The composition of the Mughal nobility

Within the first three decades of Akbar’s reign, the imperial elite had grown enormously. As the Central Asian nobles had generally been nurtured on the Turko-Mongol tradition of sharing power with the royalty—an arrangement incompatible with Akbar’s ambition of structuring the Mughal centralism around himself—the emperor’s principal goal was to reduce their strength and influence. The emperor encouraged new elements to join his service, and Iranians came to form an important block of the Mughal nobility. Akbar also looked for new men of Indian background. Indian Afghans, being the principal opponents of the Mughals, were obviously to be kept at a distance, but the Sayyids of Baraha, the Bukhārī Sayyids, and the Kambūs among the Indian Muslims were specially favoured for high military and civil positions.

The Dīwān-e Khass at Fatehpur Sikri, Uttar Pradesh state, India, built c. 1585.P. Chandra

More significant was the recruitment of Hindu Rajput leaders into the Mughal nobility. This was a major step, even if not completely new in Indo-Islamic history, leading to a standard pattern of relationship between the Mughal autocracy and the local despotism. Each Rajput chief, along with his sons and close relatives, received high rank, pay, perquisites, and an assurance that they could retain their age-old customs, rituals, and beliefs as Hindu warriors. In return, the Rajputs not only publicly expressed their allegiance but also offered active military service to the Mughals and, if called upon to do so, willingly gave daughters in marriage to the emperor or his sons. The Rajput chiefs retained control over their ancestral holdings (watan jāgīrs) and additionally, in return for their services, often received land assignments outside their homelands (tankhwa jāgīrs) in the empire. The Mughal emperor, however, asserted his right as a “paramount.” He treated the Rajput chiefs as zamindars (landholders), not as rulers. Like all local zamindars, they paid tribute, submitted to the Mughals, and received a patent of office. Akbar thus obtained a wide base for Mughal power among thousands of Rajput warriors who controlled large and small parcels of the countryside throughout much of his empire.

The Mughal nobility came to comprise mainly the Central Asians (Tūrānīs), Iranians (Irānīs), Afghans, Indian Muslims of diverse subgroups, and Rajputs. Both historical circumstances and a planned imperial policy contributed to the integration of this complex and heterogeneous ruling class into a single imperial service. The emperor saw to it that no single ethnic or religious group was large enough to challenge his supreme authority.

Organization of the nobility and the army

In order to organize his civil and military personnel, Akbar devised a system of ranks, or manṣabs, based on the “decimal” system of army organization used by the early Delhi sultans and the Mongols. The manṣabdārs (rank holders) were numerically graded from commanders of 10 to commanders of 5,000. Although they fell under the jurisdiction of the mīr bakhshī, each owed direct subordination to the emperor.

The manṣabdārs were generally paid in nonhereditary and transferable jāgīrs (assignments of land from which they could collect revenues). Over their jāgīrs, as distinct from those areas reserved for the emperor (khāliṣah) and his personal army (aḥadīs), the assignees (jāgīrdārs) normally had no magisterial or military authority. Akbar’s insistence on a regular check of the manṣabdārs’ soldiers and their horses signified his desire for a reasonable correlation between his income and obligations. Most jāgīrdārs except the lowest-ranking ones collected the taxes through their personal agents, who were assisted by the local moneylenders and currency dealers in remitting collections by means of private bills of exchange rather than cash shipments.

Revenue system

A remarkable feature of the Mughal system under Akbar was his revenue administration, developed largely under the supervision of his famed Hindu minister Todar Mal. Akbar’s efforts to develop a revenue schedule both convenient to the peasants and sufficiently profitable to the state took some two decades to implement. In 1580 he obtained the previous 10 years’ local revenue statistics, detailing productivity and price fluctuations, and averaged the produce of different crops and their prices. He also evolved a permanent schedule circle by grouping together the districts having homogeneous agricultural conditions. For measuring land area, he abandoned the use of hemp rope in favour of a more definitive method using lengths of bamboo joined with iron rings. The revenue, fixed according to the continuity of cultivation and quality of soil, ranged from one-third to one-half of production value and was payable in copper coin (dāms). The peasants thus had to enter the market and sell their produce in order to meet the assessment. This system, called ẓabṭ, was applied in northern India and in Malwa and parts of Gujarat. The earlier practices (e.g., crop sharing), however, also were in vogue in the empire. The new system encouraged rapid economic expansion. Moneylenders and grain dealers became increasingly active in the countryside.

Fiscal administration

All economic matters fell under the jurisdiction of the vizier, assisted principally by three ministers to look separately after the crown lands, the salary drafts and jāgīrs, and the records of fiscal transactions. At almost all levels, the revenue and financial administration was run by a cadre of technically proficient officials and clerks drawn mainly from Hindu service castes—Kayasthas and Khatris.

More significantly, in local and land revenue administration, Akbar secured support from the dominant rural groups. With the exception of the villages held directly by the peasants, where the community paid the revenue, his officials dealt with the leaders of the communities and the superior landrights holders (zamindars). The zamindar, as one of the most important intermediaries, collected the revenue from the peasants and paid it to the treasury, keeping a portion to himself against his services and zamindari claim over the land.

Coinage

Akbar reformed Mughal currency to make it one of the best known of its time. The new regime possessed a fully functioning trimetallic (silver, copper, and gold) currency, with an open minting system in which anyone willing to pay the minting charges could bring metal or old or foreign coin to the mint and have it struck. All monetary exchanges, however, were expressed in copper coins in Akbar’s time. In the 17th century, following the silver influx from the New World, silver rupee with new fractional denominations replaced the copper coin as a common medium of circulation. Akbar’s aim was to establish a uniform coinage throughout his empire; some coins of the old regime and regional kingdoms also continued.

Evolution of a nonsectarian state

Mughal society was predominantly non-Muslim. Akbar therefore had not simply to maintain his status as a Muslim ruler but also to be liberal enough to elicit active support from non-Muslims. For that purpose, he had to deal first with the Muslim theologians and lawyers (ʿulamāʾ) who, in the face of Brahmanic resilience, were rightly concerned with the community’s identity and resisted any effort that could encourage a broader notion of political participation. Akbar began his drive by abolishing both the jizyah and the practice of forcibly converting prisoners of war to Islam and by encouraging Hindus as his principal confidants and policy makers. To legitimize his nonsectarian policies, he issued in 1579 a public edict (maḥẓar) declaring his right to be the supreme arbiter in Muslim religious matters—above the body of Muslim religious scholars and jurists. He had by then also undertaken a number of stern measures to reform the administration of religious grants, which were now available to learned and pious men of all religions, not just Islam.

The maḥẓar was proclaimed in the wake of lengthy discussions that Akbar had held with Muslim divines in his famous religious assembly ʿIbādat-Khāneh, at Fatehpur Sikri. He soon became dissatisfied with what he considered the shallowness of Muslim learned men and threw open the meetings to non-Muslim religious experts, including Hindu pandits, Jain and Christian missionaries, and Parsi priests. A comparative study of religions convinced Akbar that there was truth in all of them but that no one of them possessed absolute truth. He therefore disestablished Islam as the religion of the state and adopted a theory of rulership as a divine illumination incorporating the acceptance of all, irrespective of creed or sect. He repealed discriminatory laws against non-Muslims and amended the personal laws of both Muslims and Hindus so as to provide as many common laws as possible. While Muslim judicial courts were allowed as before, the decision of the Hindu village pancayats also was recognized. The emperor created a new order commonly called the Dīn-e Ilāhī (“Divine Faith”), which was modeled on the Muslim mystical Sufi brotherhood. The new order had its own initiation ceremony and rules of conduct to ensure complete devotion to the emperor; otherwise, members were permitted to retain their diverse religious beliefs and practices. It was devised with the object of forging the diverse groups in the service of the state into one cohesive political community.

Akbar in historical perspective

By 1600 the Mughals in India had achieved a fairly austere and efficient state system, for which Akbar’s genius deserves much credit. However, the Mughal system must be studied in the context of broad historical developments of the 16th and 17th centuries. Long before Akbar’s schemes, Sher Shah of Sūr’s short-lived reforms had included demand for cash payment from the peasants, surveys of agricultural lands and of crops grown, and a reliable, standardized, and high-quality coinage. The Sūr ruler insisted on a uniform rate for the entire empire, which was certainly a major flaw in contrast to Akbar’s consideration for regional variations. It is striking, however, that the chief ẓabṭ territories under Akbar were largely made up of the provinces already controlled by Sher Shah.

Another major development of Sher Shah’s brief period—namely, the building of a network of roads to improve the connections already started by Bābur between Hindustan and the great trading routes extending into central and western Asia via Kabul and Kandahār—foreshadowed in a measure the later imperial edifice and economy. By laying a road between Sonargaon (in Bengal) and Attock (near present-day Rawalpindi, Pak.), the Sūr ruler had made a first attempt at bringing the economy of Bengal into closer contact with that of northern India. The expansion under Akbar followed in logical sequence what had already occurred. The network based on Sher Shah’s routes had extended considerably by 1600. Agra came to be linked not only to Burhanpur but also to Cambay, Surat, and Ahmedabad. Lahore and Multan were now the gateway to Kabul as well as to the ports of the mouth of the Indus. The link with Sonargaon became a far more secure control over the ports of Bengal. Many other changes initiated in the late 16th century were to be consolidated only later, in conjunction with further political unification.

The empire in the 17th century

The Mughal Empire in the 17th century continued its conquest and territorial expansion, with a dramatic increase in the numbers, resources, and responsibilities of the Mughal nobles and manṣabdārs. There were also attempts at tightening imperial control over the local society and economy. The critical relationship between the imperial authority and the zamindars was regularized and generally institutionalized through thousands of sanads (patents) issued by the emperor and his agents. These centralizing measures imposed increasing demands upon both the Mughal officials and the local magnates and therefore generated tensions expressed in various forms of resistance. The century witnessed the rule of the three greatest Mughal emperors: Jahāngīr (ruled 1605–27), Shah Jahān (1628–58), and Aurangzeb (1658–1707). The reigns of Jahāngīr and Shah Jahān are noted for political stability, brisk economic activity, excellence in painting, and magnificent architecture. The empire under Aurangzeb attained its greatest geographic reach; however, the period also saw the unmistakable symptoms of Mughal decline.

Political unification and the establishment of law and order over extensive areas, together with extensive foreign trade and the ostentatious lifestyles of the Mughal elites, encouraged the emergence of large centres of commerce and crafts. Lahore, Delhi, Agra, and Ahmedabad, linked by roads and waterways to other important towns and the key seaports, were among the leading cities of the world at the time. The Mughal system of taxation had expanded both the degree of monetization and commodity production, which in turn promoted a network of grain markets (mandīs), bazaars, and small fortified towns (qaṣbahs), supplied by a highly differentiated peasantry in the countryside.

Increasing use of money was illustrated, in the first place, by the growing use of bills of exchange (hundīs) to transfer revenue to the centre from the provinces and the consequent meshing of the fiscal system with the financial network of the money changers (ṣarrāfs; commonly rendered shroff in English) and, second, by the increasing interest of and even direct participation by the Mughal nobles and the emperor in trade. Thatta, Lahore, Hugli, and Surat were great centres for such activity in the 1640s and ’50s. The emperor owned the shipping fleets, and the governors advanced funds to merchants from state treasuries and the mints.

The shift in the attitude toward trade in the course of the 17th century owed a good deal to the growing Iranian influence in the Mughal court. The Iranians had a long tradition of combining political power and trade. Shah ʿAbbās I had espoused greater state control of commerce. Because the contemporary Muslim empires—including the Mughals, the Ṣafavids, and the Ottomans—were conscious of one another as competitors, mutual borrowings and emulations were more frequent than the chroniclers would indicate.

Jahāngīr

Within a few months of his accession, Jahāngīr had to deal with a rebellion led by his eldest son, Khusraw, who was reportedly supported by, among others, the Sikh Guru Arjun. Khusraw was defeated at Lahore and was brought in chains before the emperor. The subsequent execution of the Sikh Guru permanently estranged the Sikhs from the Mughals.

JahāngīrThe feast of Nōrūz at Jahāngīr's court, with Jahāngīr in the upper centre; painting in the Mughal miniature style, early 17th century.P. Chandra

Khusraw’s rebellion led to a few more risings, which were suppressed without much difficulty. Shah ʿAbbās I of Iran, taking advantage of the unrest, besieged the fort of Kandahār (1606) but abandoned the attack when Jahāngīr promptly sent an army against him.

Loss of Kandahār

In 1622 Shah ʿAbbās again attacked Kandahār, and Prince Khurram (later Shah Jahān) was directed to relieve that fortress. However, the prince was planning a rebellion against his father and failed to take effective action. The fortress fell after a 45-day siege. Shah ʿAbbās justified its capture on the plea that it belonged to Iran. Jahāngīr accused the shah of treachery and sent forces to recover the fortress. This effort failed, owing to Shah Jahān’s rebellion and the illness and death of Jahāngīr himself. The loss of Kandahār was a grievous blow to the prestige of the empire. Jahāngīr, however, commanded full control over Kabul, having reinforced it now by inducting the Afghans under Khan Jahān Lodī into the Mughal nobility. Khan Jahān had close connections with the tribesmen in the northwestern frontiers.

Submission of Mewar

Jahāngīr’s most significant political achievement was the cessation of the Mughal-Mewar conflict, following three consecutive campaigns and his own arrival in Ajmer in 1613. Prince Khurram was given the supreme command of the army (1613), and Jahāngīr marched to be near the scene of action. The Rana Amar Singh then initiated negotiations (1615). He recognized Jahāngīr as his suzerain, and all his territory in Mughal possession was restored, including Chitor—although it could not be fortified. Amar Singh was not obliged to attend the imperial court, but his son was to represent him; nor was he required to enter into a matrimonial alliance with the Mughal royal family. Further, the Rajput rulers of Kangra, Kishtwar (in Kashmir), Navanagar, and Kutch (Kachchh; in western India) accepted the Mughal supremacy. Bir Singh Bundela was given a high rank, and a Bundela princess entered the Mughal harem. Also significant was the subjugation of the last Afghan domains in eastern Bengal (1612) and Orissa (1617).

Developments in the Deccan

Toward the last years of Akbar’s reign, the Niẓām Shāhīs of Ahmadnagar in the Deccan had engaged the attention of the emperor considerably. The main objective of his intervention in Ahmadnagar was to gain Berar, which had been recently acquired by Ahmadnagar from Khandesh, and Balaghat, which had been a bone of contention between Ahmadnagar and Gujarat. By 1596 Berar was conquered and Ahmadnagar had accepted Mughal suzerainty. However, the issue of a clearly defined frontier could not be resolved, and Mughal attacks continued. Under Jahāngīr the rise of Malik ʿAmbār, a Habshi (Abyssinian) general of unusual ability, at the Ahmadnagar court and his alliance with the ʿĀdil Shāhīs of Bijapur cemented a united front of the Deccan sultanates and initially forced the Mughals to retreat.

At this time the Marathas also had emerged as a force in the Deccan. Jahāngīr appreciated their importance and encouraged many Marathas to defect to his side (1615). Later, two successive Mughal victories against the combined Deccani armies (1618 and 1620) restrained the Habshi general. However, the Deccan expedition remained unfinished as a result of the rise to power of the emperor’s favourite queen, Nūr Jahān, and her relatives and associates. The queen’s alleged efforts to secure the prince of her choice as successor to the ailing emperor resulted in the rebellion of Prince Khurram in 1622 and later of Mahābat Khan, the queen’s principal ally, who had been deputed to subdue the prince.

Rebellion of Khurram (Shah Jahān)

After failing to take Fatehpur Sikri in April 1623, Khurram retreated to the Deccan, then to Bengal, and from Bengal back again to the Deccan, pursued all the while by an imperial force under Mahābat Khan. His plan to seize Bihar, Ayodhya, Allahabad, and even Agra failed. At last Khurram submitted to his father unconditionally (1626). He was forgiven and appointed governor of Balaghat, but the three-year-old rebellion had caused a considerable loss of men and money.

Mahābat Khan’s coup

Immediately upon the conclusion of peace with Khurram, the imperious queen decided to punish Mahābat Khan for his refusal to take orders from anyone but Jahāngīr. She ordered Mahābat Khan to Bengal and framed charges of disloyalty and disobedience against him. Instead of complying, he proceeded to the Punjab, where the emperor was encamped. Jahāngīr refused to see him. Mahābat Khan placed both the emperor and the queen under surveillance, but he was finally overcome. The ordeal greatly impaired the emperor’s health, and he died in November 1627.

Mahābat Khan Mosque, Peshawar, Pak.Frederic Ohringer—Nancy Palmer Agency/Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Shah Jahān

On his accession, Khurram assumed the title Shah Jahān (ruled 1628–58). Shahryār, his younger and only surviving brother, had contested the throne but was soon blinded and imprisoned. Under Shah Jahān’s instructions, his father-in-law, Āṣaf Khan, slew all other royal princes, the potential rivals for the throne. Āṣaf Khan was appointed prime minister, and Nūr Jahān was given an adequate pension.

Detail from The Emperor Shah Jahan, oil painting by Bichitr, 1631.

Courtesy of the Victoria and Albert Museum, London; photographs, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

The Deccan problem

Shah Jahān’s reign was marred by a few rebellions, the first of which was that of Khan Jahān Lodī, governor of the Deccan. Khan Jahān was recalled to court after failing to recover Balaghat from Ahmadnagar. However, he rose in rebellion and fled back to the Deccan. Shah Jahān followed, and in December 1629 he defeated Khan Jahān and drove him to the north, ultimately overtaking and killing him in a skirmish at Shihonda (January 1631).

The next rebellion was led by Jujhar Singh, a Hindu chief of Orchha, in Bundelkhand, who commanded the crucial passage to the Deccan. Jujhar was compelled to submit after his kinsman Bharat Singh defected and joined the Mughals. His refusal to comply with subsequent conditions led, after a protracted conflict, to his defeat and murder (1634). Unrest in the region persisted.

The chronic volatility of the Deccan prompted Shah Jahān to seek a comprehensive solution. His first step was to offer a military alliance to Bijapur, with the objective of partitioning troublesome Ahmadnagar. The result was both the total annihilation of the province and the accord of 1636, by which Bijapur was granted one-third of its southern territories. The accord reconciled the Deccan states to a pervasive Mughal presence in the Deccan. Bijapur agreed not to interfere with Golconda, which became a tacit ally of the Mughals. The treaty limited further Mughal advance in the Deccan and gave Bijapur and Golconda respite to conquer the warring Hindu principalities in the south. Within a span of a dozen years, Bijapuri and Golcondan armies overran and annexed a vast and prosperous tract beyond the Krishna River up to Thanjavur and including Karnataka. The Mughals, on the other hand, maneuvered to regain Kandahār (1638) and consolidated and extended their eastern position on the Assamese border (1639) and also in Bengal, where Shah Jahān had become involved in a dispute over Portuguese piracy and abduction of Mughal slaves. In 1648 he moved his capital from Agra to Delhi in an effort to consolidate his control over the northwestern provinces of the empire.

The Mughal attitude of benevolent neutrality toward the Deccan states began to change gradually after 1648, culminating in the invasion of Golconda and Bijapur in 1656 and 1657. A factor in this change was the inability of the Mughals to manage the financial affairs of the Deccan. Subsequently, Bijapur was compelled to surrender the Ahmadnagar areas it had received in 1636, and Golconda was to cede to the Mughals the rich and fertile tract on the Coromandel Coast as part of the jāgīr of Mīr Jumla, the famous Golconda vizier who had now joined the Mughal service. To a great extent Shah Jahān’s new policy in the Deccan also was propelled by commercial considerations. The entire area had acquired an added value because of the growing importance of the Coromandel Coast as the centre for the export of textiles and indigo.

Central Asian policy

Following in the footsteps of his predecessors, Shah Jahān hoped to conquer Samarkand, the original homeland of his ancestors. The brother of Emām Qulī, ruler of Samarkand, invaded Kabul and in 1639 captured Bamiyan, which gave offense to Shah Jahān. The emperor was on the lookout for an opportunity to move his army to the northwest borders. In 1646 he responded to the Uzbek ruler’s appeal for aid in settling an internal dispute by sending a huge army. The campaign cost the Mughals heavily. They suffered serious initial setbacks in Balkh, and, before they could recover fully, an alliance between the Uzbeks and the shah of Iran complicated the situation. Kandahār was again taken by Iran, even though the Mughals reinforced their hold over the other frontier towns.

War of succession

The events at the end of Shah Jahān’s reign did not augur well for the future of the empire. The emperor fell ill in September 1657, and rumours of his death spread. He executed a will bequeathing the empire to his eldest son, Dārā. His other sons, Shujāʿ, Aurangzeb, and Murād, who were grown men and governors of provinces, decided to contest the throne. From the war of succession in 1657–59 Aurangzeb emerged the sole victor. He then imprisoned his father in the Agra fort and declared himself emperor. (See Bahadurpur, Battle of; Samugarh, Battle of; Deorai, Battle of.)

Shah Jahān died a prisoner on Feb. 1, 1666, at the age of 74. He was, on the whole, a tolerant and enlightened ruler, patronizing scholars and poets of Sanskrit and Hindi as well as Persian. He systematized the administration, but he raised the government’s share of the gross produce of the soil. Fond of pomp and magnificence, he commissioned the casting of the famous Peacock Throne and erected many elegant buildings, including the dazzling Taj Mahal outside Agra, a tomb for his queen, Mumtāz Maḥal; his remains also are interred there.

The Taj Mahal, in Agra, Uttar Pradesh state, India.Tom Nebbia-Aspect Picture Library

Aurangzeb

The empire under Aurangzeb (ruled 1658–1707) experienced further growth but also manifested signs of weakness. For more than a decade, Aurangzeb appeared to be in full control. The Mughals suffered a bit in Assam and Koch Bihar, but they gainfully invaded Arakanese lands in coastal Myanmar (Burma), captured Chittagong, and added territories in Bikaner, Bundelkhand, Palamau, Assam, and elsewhere. There was the usual display of wealth and grandeur at court.

Local and peasant uprisings

Soon, however, regional disturbances again rocked the empire. The Jat peasantry of Mathura rebelled in 1669; the tribal Pathans plundered the northwestern border districts and caravan routes, declaring war on Aurangzeb in 1667 and again in 1672; a rising occurred among the Satnami sect in Narnaul in 1672; and the Sikhs in the Punjab revolted under their Guru Tegh Bahadur, who was brutally put to death in 1675. The most prolonged uprising, however, was the Rajput rebellion, sparked by Aurangzeb’s annexation of the Jodhpur state and his seizure of its ruler’s posthumous son Ajit Singh with the alleged intention of converting him to Islam. This rebellion spread to Mewar, and Aurangzeb himself had to proceed to Ajmer to fight the Rajputs, who had been joined by the emperor’s third son, Akbar (January 1681). By a stratagem, Aurangzeb managed to isolate Akbar, who fled to the Deccan and thence to Persia. The war with Mewar came to an end (June 1681) because Aurangzeb had to pursue Akbar to the Deccan, where the prince had joined the Maratha king Sambhaji. Jodhpur remained in a state of rebellion for 27 years more, and Ajit Singh occupied his ancestral dominion immediately after Aurangzeb’s death.

Aurangzeb spent the last 25 years of his reign in the Deccan. Upon his arrival in the region in 1681, he attempted to cut off the Hindu Marathas from Muslim Bijapur and Golconda, which were, as a result of earlier Mughal offensives, similarly predisposed against Aurangzeb. Failing in this effort, the emperor invaded and annexed Bijapur (1686) and Golconda (1687) with the objective of conquering the Marathas outright, which he achieved, in his own estimation, by capturing and executing Sambhaji. Maratha resistance proved so stubborn, however, that even after nearly two decades of struggle Aurangzeb failed to completely subdue them (see below). The aged emperor died on March 3, 1707.

Assessment of Aurangzeb

Aurangzeb possessed natural gifts of a high order. He had assiduously cultivated learning, self-knowledge, self-esteem, and self-control. He was extremely industrious, methodical, and disciplined in habits and thoughts, and his private life was virtuous. However, his religious bigotry made him ill-suited to rule the mixed population of his empire.

Aurangzeb deliberately reversed the policy of his predecessors toward non-Muslim subjects by trying to enforce the principles and practices of the Islamic state. He reimposed the jizyah on non-Muslims and saddled them with religious, social, and legal disabilities. To begin with, he forbade their building new temples and repairing old ones. Next, he issued orders to demolish all the schools and temples of the Hindus and to put down their teaching and religious practices. He doubled the customs duties on the Hindus and abolished them altogether in the case of Muslims. He granted stipends and gifts to converts from Hinduism and offered them posts in public service, liberation from prison in the case of convicted criminals, and succession of disputed estates. He also persecuted some Shīʿites and Sufis, who veered from his strict interpretation of Muslim orthodoxy.

Badshāhī (“Imperial”) Mosque, built by the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, 1670, in Lahore, Pak.© Sompote SaeLee—iStock/Getty Images

All these efforts failed miserably at shoring up the sprawling Mughal political structure. Many of Aurangzeb’s orders were not implemented, largely because his nobles did not support them. His bigotry strengthened the hand of those sectors that opposed him for political or other reasons. Of further detriment was his prolonged absence from the heartland of the empire. While he captured the forts of the Marathas, facing his own nobles’ connivance at their escape, many of his jāgīrdārs in the north were unable to collect their dues from the villages. In the regions that experienced economic growth in the 17th century, the local power-mongers and their followers in the community felt increasingly confident to stand on their own. The abundant commissioning of manṣabdārs with which the leadership addressed this situation far outstripped the empire’s growth in area or revenues. The Mughal centre thus began to collapse under its own weight. In 1707, when Aurangzeb died, serious threats from the peripheries had begun to accentuate the problems at the core of the empire.A.L. SrivastavaMuzaffar Alam

Mughal decline in the 18th century

The new emperor, Bahādur Shah I (or Shah ʿĀlam; ruled 1707–12), followed a policy of compromise, pardoning all nobles who had supported his dead rivals and granting them appropriate postings. He never abolished jizyah, but the effort to collect the tax became ineffectual. There was no destruction of temples in Bahādur Shah’s reign. In the beginning he tried to gain greater control over the Rajput states of the rajas of Amber (later Jaipur) and Jodhpur, but, when his attempt met with firm resistance, he realized the necessity of a settlement. Because Rajput demands for high manṣabs and important governorships were never conceded, however, the settlement did not restore them to fully committed warriors for the Mughal cause. The emperor’s policy toward the Marathas was also that of halfhearted conciliation. They continued to fight among themselves as well as against the Mughals in the Deccan. Bahādur Shah was, however, successful in conciliating Chatrasal, the Bundela chief, and Curaman, the Hindu Jat chief; the latter also joined him in the campaign against the Sikhs. (See Battle of Jajau.)

The Sikh uprisings

Bahādur Shah attempted to make peace with the Sikh Guru, Gobind Singh. But when, after the death of the Guru, the Sikhs once again raised the banner of revolt in the Punjab under the leadership of Banda Singh Bahādur, the emperor decided to take strong measures and himself led a campaign against the rebels. Practically the entire territory between the Sutlej and the Jamuna rivers, reaching the immediate vicinity of Delhi, was soon under Sikh control. Newly prosperous Jat zamindars and peasants, anxious for recognition, responded to Banda’s egalitarian appeal. They, along with numerous other low-caste poor cultivators, traveled to Banda’s camp, converted to Sikhism, and took the name Singh as members of the faith. Banda also had support among the Khatris, the caste of the Sikh Gurus. The Sikh movement was an open challenge to Mughal royalty. Banda adopted the title of Sacha Badshah (“True King”), started a new calendar, and issued coins bearing the names of Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikh religion, and Guru Gobind. The Himalayan Rajput chiefs, secretly in sympathy with any resistance against the Mughals, also supplied Banda with information, material, and refuge when needed. However, the plains Rajputs, the Muslim elite, and the wealthy townsfolk, including some Khatri traders, opposed Banda. The imperial forces under Bahādur Shah captured some important Sikh strongholds but could not crush the movement; they only swept the Sikhs from the plains back into the Himalayan foothills. In 1715, during Farrukh-Siyar’s reign, however, Banda, together with hundreds of his followers, was captured by the governor of the Punjab. They were all executed in Delhi. Thus ended the threat of the emergence of an autonomous non-Mughal state in the Punjab in the early 18th century.

When Bahādur Shah died (February 1712), the position of state finances had deteriorated further as a result of his reckless grants of jāgīrs and promotions. During his reign the remnants of the royal treasure were exhausted. Failure to assign productive jāgīrs strained the loyalties of the members of the nobility and of the manṣabdārs and reduced the efficiency of the state machinery.

Cracks in the core

A new element entered Mughal politics in the ensuing wars of succession. While previously such contests had occurred among royal princes—the nobles merely aiding one rival or another—ambitious nobles now became direct aspirants to the throne. The leading contender to succeed Bahādur Shah was his second son, ʿAẓīm al-Shān, who had accumulated a vast treasure as governor of Bengal and Bihar and had been his father’s chief adviser. His principal opponent was Ẓulfiqār Khan (Dhū al-Fiqār Khan), a powerful Iranian noble, who was the chief bakhshī of the empire and the viceroy of the Deccan. Ẓulfiqār negotiated an unusual agreement allying the three other princes against ʿAẓīm al-Shān and setting forth a partitioned, jointly ruled empire with Ẓulfiqār as imperial vizier. He later shifted his support to Jahāndār Shah, the most pliable of the three brothers, but his proposal, in a measure, demonstrated the increasing potency of regional aspirations.

Jahāndār Shah (ruled 1712–13) was a weak and degenerate prince, and Ẓulfiqār Khan assumed the executive direction of the empire with power unprecedented for a vizier. Ẓulfiqār believed that it was necessary to establish friendly relations with the Rajputs and the Marathas and to conciliate the Hindu chieftains in general in order to save the empire. He reversed the policies of Aurangzeb. The hated jizyah was abolished. Only toward the Sikhs did he continue the old policy of suppression. His goal was to reconcile all those who were willing to share power within the Mughal institutional framework.

Ẓulfiqār Khan made several attempts at reforming the economic system, but, in the brief course of his ascendancy, he could do little to redress imperial fiscal decay. When Farrukh-Siyar, son of the slain prince ʿAẓīm al-Shān, challenged Jahāndār Shah and Ẓulfiqār Khan with a large army and funds from Bihar and Bengal, the rulers found their coffers depleted. In desperation they looted their own palaces, even ripping gold and silver from the walls and ceilings, in order to finance an adequate army.

Struggle for a new power centre

Farrukh-Siyar (ruled 1713–19) owed his victory and accession to the Sayyid brothers, ʿAbd Allāh Khan and Ḥusayn ʿAlī Khan Bāraha. The Sayyids thus earned the offices of vizier and chief bakhshī and acquired control over the affairs of state. They promoted the policies initiated earlier by Ẓulfiqār Khan. In addition to the jizyah, other similar taxes were abolished. The brothers finally suppressed the Sikh revolt and tried to conciliate the Rajputs, the Marathas, and the Jats. However, this policy was hampered by divisiveness between the vizier and the emperor, as the groups tended to ally themselves with one or the other. The Jats had once again started plundering the royal highway between Agra and Delhi; however, while Farrukh-Siyar deputed Raja Jai Singh to lead a punitive campaign against them, the vizier negotiated a settlement over the raja’s head. As a result, throughout northern India zamindars either revolted violently or simply refused to pay assessed revenues. On the other hand, Farrukh-Siyar compounded difficulties in the Deccan by sending letters to some Maratha chiefs urging them to oppose the forces of the Deccan governor, who happened to be the deputy and an associate of Sayyid Ḥusayn ʿAlī Khan. Finally, in 1719, the Sayyid brothers brought Ajit Singh of Jodhpur and a Maratha force to Delhi to depose the emperor.

The murder of Farrukh-Siyar created a wave of revulsion against the Sayyids among the various factions of nobility, who also were jealous of their growing power. Many of these, in particular the old nobles of Aurangzeb’s time, resented the vizier’s encouragement of revenue farming (selling the right to collect taxes), which in their view was mere shopkeeping and violated the age-old Mughal notion of statecraft. In Farrukh-Siyar’s place the brothers raised to the throne three young princes in quick succession within eight months in 1719. Two of these, Rafīʿ al-Darajāt and Rafīʿ al-Dawlah (Shah Jahān II), died of consumption. The third, who assumed the title Muḥammad Shah, exhibited sufficient vigour to set about freeing himself from the brothers’ control.

A powerful group under the leadership of Chīn Qilich Khan, who held the title Niẓām al-Mulk, and his father’s cousin Muḥammad Amīn Khan, the two eminent “Tūrānīs,” emerged finally to dislodge the Sayyid brothers (1720). However, this did not signal the restoration of imperial authority.

The emperor, the nobility, and the provinces

By the time Muḥammad Shah (ruled 1719–48) came to power, the nature of the relationship between the emperor and the nobility had almost completely changed. Individual interests of the nobles had come to guide the course of politics and state activities. In 1720 Muḥammad Amīn Khan replaced Sayyid ʿAbd Allāh Khan as vizier; after Amīn Khan’s death (January 1720), the office was occupied by the Niẓām al-Mulk for a brief period until Amīn Khan’s son Qamar al-Dīn Khan assumed the title in July 1724 by a claim of hereditary right. The nobles themselves virtually dictated these appointments. However, because no faction of the nobility, nor for that matter the nobility as a whole, was capable of ruling on its own, the symbols of imperial power—most pointedly the person of the dynastic emperor—had to be preserved with a rather exaggerated emphasis. The nobles in control of the central offices maintained an all-empire outlook, even if they were more concerned with the stability of the regions where they had their jāgīrs. Farmāns (mandates granting certain rights or special privileges) to governors, fowjdārs, and other local officials were sent, in conformity with tradition, in the name of the emperor.

Individual failings of Aurangzeb’s successors also precipitated the decline of royal authority. Jahāndār Shah lacked dignity and decency; Farrukh-Siyar was fickle-minded; Muḥammad Shah was frivolous and overly fond of ease and luxury. The rise to power of the latter’s favourite consort, Kokī Jio, and her relations and associates showed that a position at the Mughal court no longer depended on administrative ability, office, or military achievements. Opinions of the emperor’s favourites weighed in the appointments, promotions, and dismissals even in the provinces.

The steadily increasing vulnerability of the centre in the face of agrarian unrest, combined with the aforementioned irregularities, set in motion a new type of provincial government. Nobles with ability and strength sought to build a regional base for themselves. The vizier himself, Chīn Qilich Khan, showed the path. Having failed to reform the administration, he relinquished his office in 1723 and in October 1724 marched south to found the state of Hyderabad in the Deccan. In the east, Murshid Qulī Khan had long held Bengal and Orissa, which his family retained after his death in 1726. In the heartland of the empire, the governors of Ayodhya and the Punjab became practically independent. The court needed money from the governors in order to maintain both its functional structure and the necessary pomp and majesty. As the court was not in a position to militarily enforce its regulations in the empire, different provinces—in proportion to their internal conditions and geographic distance from Delhi, as well as the ambition and capability of their governors—reformulated their links with the court. The Mughal court’s chief concern at this stage was to ensure the flow of the necessary revenue from the provinces and the maintenance of at least the semblance of imperial unity. Seizing upon the disintegration of the empire, the Marathas now began their northward expansion and overran Malwa, Gujarat, and Bundelkhand. Then, in 1738–39, Nādir Shah, who had established himself as the ruler of Iran, invaded India.

Nādir Shah’s invasion

The obvious weakness of the Mughal Empire invited Nādir Shah’s descent upon the plains of northern India for plunder and spoil. For years the defenses of the northwest had been neglected. Nādir captured Ghaznī and Kabul, crossed the Indus at Attock (December 1738), and occupied Lahore virtually unopposed. Hurried preparations were then made to defend Delhi, but the faction-ridden nobles could not agree on a strategy. Nādir defeated the Mughals at the Battle of Karnal (February 1739), took Emperor Muḥammad Shah prisoner, and marched to Delhi. As a reprisal against the killing of some of his soldiers, Nādir ordered the massacre of some 30,000 Delhi citizens. The invader left Delhi in May laden with booty. His plunder included the famous Koh-i-noor diamond and the jewel-studded Peacock Throne of Shah Jahān. He compelled Muḥammad Shah to cede to him the province of Kabul.

The Iranian invasion paralyzed Muḥammad Shah and his court. Maratha raids on Malwa, Gujarat, Bundelkhand, and the territory north of these provinces continued as before. The emperor was compelled to appoint the Maratha chief minister (peshwa), Balaji Baji Rao, as governor of Malwa. The province of Katehar (Rohilkhand) was seized by an adventurer, ʿAlī Muḥammad Khan Ruhela, who could not be suppressed by the feeble government of Delhi. The loss of Kabul opened the empire to the threat of invasions from the northwest; a vital line of defense had disappeared. The Punjab was again invaded, this time by Aḥmad Shah Durrānī (Abdālī), an Afghan lieutenant of Nādir Shah’s forces, who became king of Kabul after Nādir’s death (June 1747); Aḥmad Shah sacked Lahore, and, even though a Delhi army compelled him to retreat, his repeated invasions eventually devastated the empire.

The Afghan-Maratha struggle for northern India

Muḥammad Shah died in April 1748, and within the next 11 years four princes ascended the Mughal throne. Muḥammad Shah’s son, Aḥmad Shah (ruled 1748–54), was deposed by his vizier, ʿImād al-Mulk. ʿĀlamgīr II (ruled 1754–59), the next emperor, was assassinated, also by the vizier, who now proclaimed Prince Muḥī al-Millat, a grandson of Kām Bakhsh, as emperor under the title of Shah Jahān III (November 1759); he was soon replaced by ʿĀlamgīr II’s son Shah ʿĀlam II. In one way or another, the Marathas played a role in all these accessions. Maratha power had by then reached its zenith in northern India. Maratha efforts to dominate the Mughal court were, however, stubbornly contested by the Afghans, newly risen in power under the leadership of Najīb al-Dawlah. The Afghans also had the advantage of support from Aḥmad Shah Durrānī. The period thus saw a fierce struggle between the Marathas and the Afghans for control over Delhi and northern India. The Afghans enjoyed the blessings of the Sunni Muslim theologians, who saw in the rise of the Marathas the eclipse of the power of Islam. The Marathas, however, were never able to mobilize the Hindu chiefs of northern India to side with them collectively. The Jats and the Rajputs, who had emerged as effective rulers of a sizable part of northern India, preferred to stay neutral. To the people of northern India, including the Hindus, the Marathas were alien plunderers from the south, comparable to the Pathans (Pashtuns) from the northwest.

Meanwhile, Aḥmad Shah Durrānī had invaded and plundered repeatedly the northern plains down to Delhi and Mathura. The peshwa then dispatched a strong army under his cousin Sadashiva Rao to drive away the invader and establish the Maratha supremacy in northern India on a firm footing. The final battle, in which the forces of Aḥmad Shah Durrānī routed the Marathas, was fought near Panipat on Jan. 14, 1761. This defeat shattered the Maratha dream of controlling the Mughal court and thereby dominating the whole of the empire. Durrānī did not, however, found a new kingdom in India. The Afghans could not even retain the Punjab, where a regional confederation was emerging again under the Sikhs. With Shah ʿĀlam II away in Bihar, the throne in Delhi remained vacant from 1759 to 1771. During most of this period, Najīb al-Dawlah was in charge of the dwindling empire, which was now effectively a regional kingdom of Delhi.

Political and economic decentralization during the Mughal decline

With the decline of Mughal central authority, the period between 1707 and 1761 witnessed a resurgence of regional identity that promoted both political and economic decentralization. At the same time, intraregional as well as interregional trade in local raw materials, artifacts, and grains created strong ties of economic interdependence, irrespective of political and military relations. Bengal, Bihar, and Avadh (Ayodhya) in northern India were among the regions where these developments were most pronounced. These provinces saw a rise in revenue figures and also the emergence and increasing affluence of a number of towns served by long-distance trade routes.

In due course, the enrichment of the regions emboldened local land- and power-holders to take up arms against external authority. However, parochial goals prevented these rebels from consolidating their interests into an effective challenge to the empire. They relied on support from kinsfolk, peasants, and smaller zamindars of their own castes. Each local group strove to maximize its share of the prosperity at the expense of the others. In conditions of conflict and the absence of coordination among the local elements, the Mughal nobles assumed the role of mediating between Delhi and the localities; as the imperial group weakened further, the nobles found themselves virtually independent, if collectively so, controlling the centre from without.

The necessity of emphasizing imperial symbols was inherent in the kind of power politics that emerged. As each of the contenders in the regions, in proportion to his strength, looked for and seized opportunities to establish his dominance over the others in the neighbourhood, each also apprehended and resisted any such attempt by the others. They all needed for their spoliations a kind of legitimacy, which was so conveniently available in the long-accepted authority of the Mughal emperor. They had no fear in collectively accepting the symbolic hegemony of the Mughal centre, which had come to coexist with their ambitions.Muzaffar Alam

Regional states, c. 1700–1850

The states that arose in India during the phase of Mughal decline and the following century (roughly 1700 to 1850) varied greatly in terms of resources, longevity, and essential character. Some of them—such as Avadh (Ayodhya) in the north and Hyderabad in the south—were located in areas that had harboured regional states in the immediate pre-Mughal period and thus could hark back to an older local or regional tradition of state formation. Others were states that had a more original character and derived from very specific processes that had taken place in the course of the late 16th and 17th centuries. In particular, many of the post-Mughal states were based on ethnic or sectarian groupings—the Marathas, the Jats, and the Sikhs, for instance—which had no real precedent in medieval Indian history.

The Marathas

Early history

There is no doubt that the single most important power to emerge in the long twilight of the Mughal dynasty was the Maratha confederacy. Initially deriving from the western Deccan, the Marathas were a peasant warrior group that rose to prominence during the rule in that region of the sultans of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar. The most important Maratha warrior clan, the Bhonsles, had held extensive jāgīrs (land-tax entitlements) under the ʿĀdil Shāhī rulers, and these were consolidated in the course of the 1630s and ’40s, as Bijapur expanded to the south and southwest. Shahji Bhonsle, the first prominent member of the clan, drew substantial revenues from the Karnataka region, in territories that had once been controlled by the rulers of Mysore and other chiefs who derived from the collapsing Vijayanagar kingdom. One of his children, Shivaji Bhonsle, emerged as the most powerful figure in the clan to the west, while Vyamkoji, half-brother of Shivaji, was able to gain control over the Kaveri (Cauvery) River delta and the kingdom of Thanjavur in the 1670s.

The Maratha kingdom at the death of Shivaji (1680).Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Shivaji’s early successes were built on a complex relationship of mixed negotiation and conflict with the ʿĀdil Shāhīs on the one hand and the Mughals on the other. His raids brought him considerable returns and were directed not merely at agrarian resources but also at trade. In 1664 he mounted a celebrated raid on the Gujarat port city of Surat, at that time the most important of the ports under Mughal control. The next year he signed a treaty with the Mughals, but this soon broke down after a disastrous visit by the Maratha leader to Aurangzeb’s court in Agra. Between 1670 and the end of his life (1680), Shivaji devoted his time to a wide-ranging set of expeditions, extending from Thanjavur in the southeast to Khandesh and Berar in the north. This was a portent of things to come, for the mobility of the Marathas was to become legendary in the 18th century.

Rise of the peshwas

The good fortune of Shivaji did not fall to his son and successor, Sambhaji, who was captured and executed by the Mughals in the late 1680s. His younger brother, Rajaram, who succeeded him, faced with a Mughal army that was now on the ascendant, moved his base into the Tamil country, where Shivaji too had earlier kept an interest. He remained in the great fortress of Jinji (earlier the seat of a Nayaka dynasty subordinate to Vijayanagar) for eight years in the 1690s, under siege by a Mughal force, and for a time it may have appeared that Maratha power was on the decline. But a recovery was effected in the early 18th century, in somewhat changed circumstances. A particularly important phase in this respect is the reign of Shahu, who succeeded Rajaram in 1708 with some acrimony from his widow, Tara Bai.

Lasting some four decades, to 1749, Shahu’s reign was marked by the ascendancy of a lineage of Citpavan Brahman ministers, who virtually came to control central authority in the Maratha state, with the Bhonsles reduced to figureheads. Holding the title of peshwa (chief minister), the first truly prominent figure of this line is Balaji Vishvanath, who had aided Shahu in his rise to power. Vishvanath and his successor, Baji Rao I (peshwa between 1720 and 1740), managed to bureaucratize the Maratha state to a far greater extent than had been the case under the early Bhonsles. On the one hand, they systematized the practice of tribute gathering from Mughal territories, under the heads of sardeshmukhi and cauth (the two terms corresponding to the proportion of revenue collected). But, equally, they seem to have consolidated methods of assessment and collection of land revenue and other taxes, which were derived from the Mughals. Much of the revenue terminology used in the documents of the peshwa and his subordinates derives from Persian (the language of Mughal administration), which suggests a far greater continuity between Mughal and Maratha revenue practice than might have been imagined.

By the close of Shahu’s reign, a complex role had been established for the Marathas. On the one hand, in the territories that they controlled closely, particularly in the Deccan, these years saw the development of sophisticated networks of trade, banking, and finance; the rise of substantial banking houses based at Pune, with branches extending into Gujarat, the Ganges River valley, and the south; and an expansion of the agricultural frontier. At the same time, maritime affairs were not totally neglected either, and Balaji Vishvanth took some care to cultivate the Angria clan, which controlled a fleet of vessels based in Kolaba and other centres of the west coast. These ships posed a threat not only to the new English settlement of Bombay (Mumbai) but to the Portuguese at Goa, Bassein, and Daman.

On the other hand, there also emerged a far larger domain of activity away from the original heartland of the Marathas, which was either subjected to raiding or given over to subordinate chiefs. Of these chiefs, the most important were the Gaekwads (Gaikwars), the Sindhias, and the Holkars. Also, there were branches of the Bhonsle family itself that relocated to Kolhapur and Nagpur, while the main line remained in the Deccan heartland, at Satara. The Kolhapur line derived from Rajaram and his wife, Tara Bai, who had refused in 1708 to accept Shahu’s rule and who negotiated with some Mughal court factions in a bid to undermine Shahu. The Kolhapur Bhonsles remained in control of a limited territory into the early 19th century, when the raja allied himself with the British against the peshwas in the Maratha Wars.

Unlike the Kolhapur Bhonsles and the descendants of Vyamkoji at Thanjavur, both of whom claimed a status equal to that of the Satara raja, the line at Nagpur was clearly subordinate to the Satara rulers. A crucial figure from this line is Raghuji Bhonsle (ruled 1727–55), who was responsible for the Maratha incursions on Bengal and Bihar in the 1740s and early ’50s. The relations of his successors, Janoji, Sabaji, and Mudoji, with the peshwas and the Satara line were variable, and it is in this sense that these domains can be regarded as only loosely confederated, rather than tightly bound together.

Subordinate Maratha rulers

Other subordinate rulers who emerged under the overarching umbrella provided by the Satara ruler and his peshwa were equally somewhat opportunistic in their use of politics. The Gaekwads, who came to prominence in the 1720s with the incursions of Damaji and Pilaji Gaekwad into Gujarat, were initially subordinate not only to the Bhonsles but also to the powerful Dabhade family. Their role in this period was largely confined to the collection of the cauth levy, and they consolidated their position by taking advantage of differences between the peshwa and the Dabhades. The fact that various interests at the Mughal court were at loggerheads with each other also worked to the Gaekwads’ advantage. However, it was only after the death of Shahu, when the power of the peshwas was further enhanced, that the position of the Gaekwads truly improved. By the early 1750s, the rights of the family to an extensive portion of the revenues of Gujarat were recognized by the peshwa, and an amicable division was arranged. The expulsion of the Mughal governor of the Gujarat subah (province) from his capital of Ahmedabad in 1752 set the seal on the process. The Gaekwads preferred, however, to establish their capital in Baroda, causing a realignment in the network of trade and consumption in the area.

The rule of Damaji (died 1768) at Baroda was followed by a period of some turmoil. The Gaekwads still remained partly dependent on Pune and the peshwa, especially to intervene in moments of succession crisis. The eventual successor of Damaji, Fateh Singh (ruled 1771–89), did not remain allied to the peshwa for long, though. Rather, in the late 1770s and early ’80s, he chose to negotiate a settlement with the English East India Company, which eventually led to increased British interference in his affairs. By 1800 the British rather than the peshwa were the final arbiters in determining succession among the Gaekwad, who became subordinate rulers under them in the 19th century.

In the mid-18th century a great part of the holdings of the Gaekwads was described in the peshwa’s correspondence and papers as saranjam (nonhereditary grants to maintain troops), and the ruler himself was termed saranjamdar, or at times jāgīrdār. The same was broadly true of the Holkars and Sindhias and also of another relatively minor dynasty of chiefs, the Pawars of Dhar. In the case of the Holkars, the rise in status and wealth was particularly rapid and marked. From petty local power brokers, they emerged by the 1730s into a position in which Malhar Rao Holkar could be granted a large share of the cauth collection in Malwa, eastern Gujarat, and Khandesh. Within a few years, Malhar Rao consolidated his own principality at Indore, from which his successors controlled important trade routes as well as the crucial trading centre of Burhanpur. After him, control of the dynastic fortunes fell largely to his son’s widow, Ahalya Bai, who ruled from 1765 to 1794 and brought Holkar power to its apogee. Nevertheless, their success could not equal that of the last great chieftain family, the Sindhias, who carved a prominent place for themselves in north Indian politics in the decades following the third battle of Panipat (1761). Again, like the Holkars, the Sindhias were based largely in central India, first at Ujjain, and later (from the last quarter of the 18th century) in Gwalior. It was during the long reign of Mahadaji Sindhia, which began after Panipat and continued to 1794, that the family’s fortunes were truly consolidated.

Mahadaji, employing in the 1780s a large number of European mercenaries in his forces, proved an effective and innovative military commander who went beyond the usual Maratha dependence on light cavalry. His power, however, had already grown in the 1770s, when he managed to make substantial inroads into a north India that had been weakened by Afghan attacks. He intervened with some effect in the Mughal court during the reign of Shah ʿĀlam II, who made him the “deputy regent” of his affairs in the mid-1780s. His shadow fell not only across the provinces of Delhi and Agra but also on Rajasthan and Gujarat, making him the most formidable Maratha leader of the era. He caused trepidation among the personnel of the East India Company and also at Pune, where his relations with the acting peshwa, Nana Fadnavis, were fraught with tension. Eventually, the momentum generated by Mahadaji could not be maintained by his successor, Daulat Rao Sindhia (ruled 1794–1827), who was defeated by the British and forced under the Treaty of Surji-Arjungaon (1803) to surrender his territories both to the north and to the west.

THE CASTE SYSTEM AND THE UNTOUCHABLES OF INDIA:

AMBEDKAR’S INITIATIVES

The Caste System and the Untouchables

Brahmānical – Hinduism is a very ancient religion in India. It has profoundly influenced the structure of Indian society for centuries. Based on Hindu beliefs, Indian society was structured into a system of castes. Basically, there are four castes called Brahmās, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas and Shudras, and one additional caste called the Untouchables.

When discussing the caste system of India, it is first necessary to explore the theoretical foundation of it. The theory of Chaturvarna is first elaborated in the Purusha Sukta, the tenth and last Hymn of the Rig Veda. This explanation is also found in the Atharva Veda and the Yajur Veda. According to the Purusha Sukta, when the God Prajapati created the world, he divided Purusha, a comic man who is immortal and diffused everywhere over things and universe, into many parts. From each part, a category of people was produced. As Ambedkar has stated,

“The Brahmanas were his mouth; the Rajanya were his arms; the being called the Vaisyas were his thighs; and the Shudras sprang from his feet.” Depending on the conditions of one’s birth, he or she was assigned into one of the noble or ignoble stratum. Brahmas were recognized as the highest, the Kshatriyas the next highest, the Vaisyas lower than the Kshatriyas, and the Shudras the lowest in the hierarchy. This idea of castes had been supported and propagated by sutra writers, such as the Apastamba Dharma Sutra, the Vasishtha Dharma Sutra, and finally laid down in the Manusmriti (or Law of Manu), the main architect of Hindu society. The Manusmriti confirmed the divine injunction of what had been set out in the Purusha Sukta and enunciated the duties of each caste specifically, as follows:

Now, for the sake of preserving all this creations, the most glorious (being) ordained separate duties for those who sprang from (his) mouth, arm, thigh and feet.

For the Brahmins he ordered teaching, study, sacrifices and sacrificing (as priests) for others, also giving and receiving gifts.

Defence of the people giving (alms), scarify, also study, and absence of attachment to objects of sense, in sort for Kshatriyas.

Tending of cattle, giving (alms, sacrifice, study, trade, usury, and also agriculture for the Vaisyas.

One duty the Lord assigned to the Shudras-serve to those (beforementioned) classes without grudging.

The four castes are distinguished by their origin and by particular sacraments. Out of the four castes, the first three castes are called twice-born (Dvija); the first born is from their mother and the second is from the investiture with the sacred girdle. The last caste, the Shudras, does not receive the sacraments, so they are once-born (non-Dvija). The caste system is based on birth and it is unalterable. The caste system especially stresses the superiority of Brahmin class and inferiority of Shudras. The Brahmins assumed themselves the position of the bhudeo (God of the earth). It is because they believed that the world was under God, God under mantra (incantation), and the mantra under the Brahmin. Therefore, the Brahmin was considered as God on earth.

Shudras occupy the lowest of the four castes positions in the Hindu caste system. However, the Hindu civilization has further produced a fifth (and lowest) grouping of people called the Untouchables. In some parts of India, people of this stratum are considered as unclean Shudras; however, they are popularly regarded as the outcastes or those excluded from the caste system whose touch is enough to cause pollution to anyone or thing. Both Shudras and Untouchables share the same destiny as non-Dvija. The Vasishtha Dharma Sutra stated that,

The distinction is based on the right to have Upanayana. The Upanayana is treated as a second birth. Those who have the right to wear the sacred thread are called Dvijas. Those who have not right to wear it are called non-Dvijas. The Brahmas, Kshatriyas, and Vaisyas have the right to wear the sacred thread. Logically, they are Dvijas. The Shudras and the Ati-Shudras have no right to wear the sacred thread. Logically, they are both non-Dvijas.

Shudras belong to the lowest caste and have to do most of the hard work in Hindu society. However, compared to Untouchables, their status is higher because they are still recognized as human beings. The Untouchables are considered unclean and in many instances receive sub-human status.

For centuries, Indian society has operated according to the division of castes, which broadly defined the responsibilities of each person in society. Based on birth conditions, a person was “born into” a caste and had to remain in that Caste for life. “Caste assigns to each individual his own profession or calling; and the handing down of this system from father to son, from generation to generation, makes it impossible for any person or his descendants to change the condition of life which the law assigns to him for any other.”

Ambedkar published his work entitled The Untouchable in 1948, in which he suggested that the Untouchables fill the same position is modern Hindu society that Broken men occupied in ancient history. Largely conjectural and based on scanty historical evidence, Ambedkar’s theory of Broken men served as an foundational text for his followers. In this book, Ambedkar argued that in primitive society, most people were nomads with cattle as their property. The life of the early nomads in India was unstable and unpredictable. Nomads later took up farming as a means to ensure a bigger and more reliable source of food. They found good land to cultivate and became farmers in settled communities. However, some nomads attacked settled communities. Some of these communities were defeated and destroyed. The people of these destroyed communities became known as the Broken men. Both the Broken men and the people in the settled communities confronted different problems. The Settled community needed to be protected from the raids of the nomadic tribes while the Broken men needed shelter and food. A bargain occurred between them. The Broken men agreed to watch and protect the Settled tribes and the Settled tribes agreed to give them food and shelter. According to primitive customs, only peopl of the same tribe or the same blood could live together. The Broken men were treated as outsiders and were required to live outside the village of the settled tribe. Hence, from the very beginning, the Broken men had lived outside the village. Later these people would be called the Untouchables.

Brahmanism had existed long before the rise of Buddhism, but the former gradually declined with the spread of the latter. Brahmins gradually lost patronage from the royal family and subsequently among masses. This lost made them worried and resentful. Therefore, they made all possible efforts to regain their lost benefits and prestige. According to Ambedkar, the Brahmins were conscious that one of the reasons that people had begun to follow Buddhism was their rejection of animal sacrifices, particularly that of the cow. The Gupta Kings, who were champions of Hinduism in the 5th century A. D, issued a decree that, cow-killing was made a Mahapataka (a mortal sin or a capital offence) and was looked upon as an offence as serious as murdering a Brahmin.

In history, neither Buddhism nor Brahmanism forbade meat-eating including beef-eating. Buddhist Bhikkhus are allowed to eat meat and the Brahmins ate beef after performing animal sacrifices. Even Manusmriti “did not prohibit meat eating... did not prohibit cow-killing.” However, in order to win back the sentiment of people, the Brahmins figured that it was not enough to just give up the sacrifice of cows. Some of them went one step further and gave up meat eating completely.

However, the law only forbade the killing of cows; it did not forbid eating meat from a dead cow. Because of this, the Broken men felt no need to give up beefeating as they had done earlier as the only mean of their livelihood. Although the Law of Kings did not forbid beef-eating, Hindus made cow a sacred animal and beef-eating became a sin. Naturally, by eating beef, Broken men had committed a sacrilege, and therefore, were forbidden to enter the village permanently. as Ambedkar observes:

To my mind, it was a strategy, which made the Brahmins, gives up beef eating and start worshipping the cow. The clue to the worship of the cow is to be found in the struggle between Buddhism and Brahmanism and the means adopted by Brahmanism to establish its supremacy over Buddhism.

The timing of the appearance of the Untouchables in India cannot be easily determined. According to Ambedkar, Untouchables did not exist in the Vedic period or the period of the Dharma Sutras. Moreover, up until the Chinese pilgrim Fa-Hsien arrival in India in 400 AD, the Untouchables were not visible, but when Yuan Chwang came to India in 629 AD, he witnessed the emergence of untouchability. Based on these observations,

Ambedkar fixed 400 AD as the approximate date for the birth of untouchability in India.

The term Untouchable is essentially derived from the notions of defilement, pollution and contamination. Thus, an Untouchable was one whose touch causes others to be polluted. In human history, there have existed various forms of defilement, and its connotations have changed with geography and history. This notwithstanding, people in general believed that the defilement could be caused by three reasons:

1. The occurrences of certain events like birth, menstruation, death and so on.

2. Contact with certain things like carcass, and so on.

3. Contact with certain persons like strangers, unclean people and so on.

Untouchables are unclean by definition and one becomes an Untouchable by “accident of birth.” The term of “accident” implies something which is unexpected and beyond one’s control. When Ambedkar declared that he would leave Hinduism, he said that he was born an Untouchable which was beyond his control and could not be corrected by staying a Hindu. Truly, one of the characteristics of untouchability is is inherited from parents and passed down to children and from generation to generation. The Buddha advocated that one becomes noble or ignoble not because of his birth but by his actions. Being an Untouchable was worse than being slave. Comparing the differences between untouchability and slavery, Ambedkar said:

Slavery was never obligatory. But untouchability is obligatory. A person is permitted to hold another as his slave. There is no compulsion on him if he does not want to. But an Untouchable has no option. One he is born an Untouchable, he is subject to all the disabilities of an Untouchable. The law of slavery permitted emancipation. Once is a slave always was not the fate of the slave. In untouchability, there is no escape. Once is an Untouchable always is an Untouchable.

Untouchability was hereditary. From the parents it paved to the children: “They were born impure; they were impure while they lived, they died in the death of the impure, and they gave birth to children who were born with a stigma of Untouchability affixed to them. It is a case of permanent, hereditary stain which nothing can cleanse.”

The term Untouchable conveys the meaning of contempt and discrimination. One of the names of the Untouchables is Antyaja, which means one who is born last. It means that the Untouchables are born at last, after the Brahmanas, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas and Shudras, came into being. However, Ambedkar did not agree with this explanation. According to him, the term “last” cannot be explained like that, because the Untouchables lived outside the schemata of creation that is outside the Varna System. He concluded that:

To my view, the word Antyaja means not end of creation but end of the village. It is a name given to those people who lived on the outskirts of the village. The word Antyaja has, therefore, a survival value. It tells us that there was a time when some people lived inside the village and some lived outside the village and that those who lived outside the village, i.e. on the Antya of the village, were called Antyaja.

From about the middle of the 19th century, the Untouchables came to be referred as one of the Depressed Classes by the Indian government. In 1935, the Government of India introduced the term “Scheduled Castes” which incorporated the Untouchables in the scheduled (list) of castes which provided for reserved seats throughout the British Administered provinces.

Gandhi gave another name to the Untouchables Harijans or ‘Children of God.’ However, as Sagharakshita has argued that this name found little favour by the Untouchables themselves, because the Caste Hindus, in practice, continued to treat them as the Untouchables. Further, according to Alan Sponberg, the Untouchables did not favour the sweet name Harijan because Mahatma Gandhi advocated the caste system. In addition, they did not like the word Harijan because it is also used to refer to the fatherless children of temple prostitutes.

Through his struggle, Ambedkar also wanted to give the Untouchables a nomenclature of the Avarna or “Protestant Hindus.” However, he often used the term of Depressed Classes (DCs) and Untouchables as synonymous terms. We can see these terms had been used by him in his written statements and oral evidence before the Simon Commission of 1928, the Round Table Conferences of 1930-1932 and their subcommittees etc. More often than not, he preferred to address them as the Untouchables to remind them of their plight as dehumanised people.

They were also called Pariahs or outcastes who had been pushed out of the Hindu Varna System. However, once the Indian Constitution came into force, the term Pariah was not used any longer because an article of the Constitution forbad discrimination untouchability in any form. As a result, some of them began to call themselves as ex-Untouchables.

Untouchables began to address themselves as Dalits. The concept Dalit is rooted in Marathi language, and refers to ‘suppressed and exploited people.’ Ambedkar also used this term to connote the Untouchables. However, Dalit gained greater currency with the establishment of the Dalit Panther Political Party founded by Namdev Dhasal in April 1972 in Mumbai.38 In 1984, with the emergence of the Bahujana Samaj Party (BSP), the more inclusive term Bahujana came to refer the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, and the other Backward Castes to the Untouchables.

The Untouchables were also called by many other names such as Dasa, Dasyu, Chandala, Panchama and Adisudra. Despite the various labels given the Untouchables, they were still oppressed, deprived, downtrodden, and disabled.

After many Untouchables converted to Buddhism, they were called new Buddhists or neo-Buddhists. The term of neo-Buddhist was used by Ambedkar occasionally when speaking of the need for creating the Navayana, a new and reformed dispensation of Buddhism. However, his followers preferred to address themselves as the new Buddhists or Buddhist simply because they felt that neoBuddhist “has pejorative overtones suggesting questionable orthodoxy or legitimacy.” One of the Indian Buddhists told that: “It makes me feel very sad to hear such words as ‘out-caste’ and ‘ex-untouchable’ and ‘Dalit’ and ‘depressed classes’ and ‘scheduled castes’ and so forth. All those words draw too much attention to hardship. I like words that make me think of friendship and joy. That’s why I say to people ‘Please, if you have to call me something, just call be a Buddhist.’

 ” About the population of Untouchables, we have some numbers as follows.

In 1908, they numbered around 50 million. It occupied about 24% of the Hindu population and 16% of the total Indian population.

According to the Orders-in-Council issued under the Government of India Act of 1935, there were 429 communities of Untouchables with around 50-60 millions of people.

The Census Report in 1951 showed that there were 531 lakhs Untouchables out of 3567 lakhs in the total population, in which there were 462 lakhs out of 2949 in rural areas and 51 lakhs out of 518 in urban areas.

In the 1971 census, India recognized 80 million Untouchables that represented 14.6% of the total population.

This number of the Untouchables was equivalent to population of some countries in the world. We are reminded of Ambedkar’s speech at the R. T. C in 1930 that:

“While I want to emphasize the fact that one fifth of the total population of British India-a population as large as the population of Britain- has been reduced to a position worse than that of serfs or slaves.”

In the 1981 census, the Untouchables of India including the Buddhist converts

were 105 million.

Alan Sponberg also observed that there were about 100 million ex-untouchable Buddhists found in TBMSG, a Buddhist organization founded in 1979 by Sagharakshita. Recent document showed that there were more than 115 million people designated as Untouchables who occupied about fifteen per cent of Indian population. This population was almost equal with the combined population of the United Kingdom and France. Most of these people were living in villages.

India has a heritage of social injustice with indigenous nationalities and subnationalities reduced to slavery, serfdom, bonded labour and degrees of privation based on inferior birth.

According to Nehru in his Discovery of India, Indian social structure had degraded a mass of human beings and given them no opportunities to get out of that condition – educationally, culturally and economically.

Ambedkar succinctly captures the conditions laid down for the Untouchables in the Manusmriti:

The dwellings of the Chandalas and the Shvapakas shall be outside the village, they must be made Apapatras and their wealth (shall be) dogs and donkeys.

Their dress (shall be) the garments of the dead (they shall eat) their food from broken dishes, black iron (shall be) their ornaments and they must always wander from place to place.

A man who fulfils a religious duty, shall not seek intercourse with them; their transactions (shall be) among themselves and their marriages with their equals.

Their food shall be given to them by others (than an Aryan giver) in a broken dish: at night they shall not walk about in village and in towns.

By day, they may go about for the purpose of their work, distinguished by marks at king's command, and they shall carry out the corpses (of persons) who have no relatives, as a settled rule.

By the King's order they shall always execute the criminals, in accordance with the law, and they shall take for themselves the clothes, the beds, and the ornaments of (such) criminals.

Because Ambedkar was himself an Untouchable, he was subjected to all the disabilities which Untouchables had to endure. However, he was better off than other Untouchables because he had received a good education and occupied a high position in society, while other Untouchables were unlettered and occupied the lowest position on the social ladder.

The Hindu lawgivers went so far as to state that the life of Shudras was not valuable and that anyone may kill them without having to pay compensation.

The Shudras and Untouchables were not allowed to build houses with a tiled roof or acquire property. If they did so, the Brahmins had the right to take that property at their pleasure.

It was an offence if Untouchables wore a clean dress, shoes, a watch or gold ornaments.

They were required to salute Hindus and it would be an offence if they sat down in the presence of caste Hindus.

If a Shudra sat on the same seat as his superior, he would be banished with a mark on his buttocks.

They were also forbidden to speak cultured languages while their names (or their children's names) must indicate contempt.

They could not wear sacred thread because wearing it was an evidence of noble birth. Marriage with women of higher castes was not allowed.

If a Shudra man touched a woman of the higher castes, he would be liable to dire punishment. However, the touchable man could keep an untouchable woman as a concubine.

The Untouchables could not lead a marriage procession through the main street of the village; and when an untouchable died, the dead body could not be cremated in the Hindu cremation ground.

In the village, the situation of Untouchables was more tragic. They were not permitted to bathe in public bathing-tanks or to draw water from public wells as they could pollute the water in tanks.

In 1927, Ambedkar encouraged the depressed classes to take water from the Chowdar Tank. When prevented by caste Hindus, there was a scuffle between the two. Every Hindu village is divided into two sections, one for Touchables and another for Untouchables. The Touchable lived inside that village while the Untouchables had to live outside the village in separate quarters, away from the habitation of the Hindus and towards the South, which was considered the most inauspicious directions. The quarters of Untouchables were actually ghettos enclosed by barbed wire. There was no contiguity or proximity between them and the rest of the village. There was nothing in common between them; they did not constitute a community. The location of ghetto was often highly insalubrious. Sagharakshita found out in the early 1960s, in a village near Poona that the ghetto was situated not only outside the mud wall of the village but on the very spot where the drainage pipes of the village discharged their effluent; the wretched inmates of the ghetto subjected to streams of filth. The Untouchables were not permitted to use certain paths or to pass through the village at certain hours, especially at those times when the sun was low in the sky and when their shadow could be thrown a long way. In some parts of India, they were not allowed to enter the village at all during the daytime.

In Annihilation of Caste, Ambedkar wrote that, during the Peshwa regime, if a caste Hindu walked on the road, the Untouchable was not allowed to tread to the same path, lest his shadow should defile the high caste Hindu. The Untouchables had to tie a black thread on his wrist or neck as a mark lest the Hindus touch him by mistake. In Poona, the capital of Peshwas, Untouchables were required to move about with a broom tied to their waist. They were required to sweep their foot marks lest the Hindus be defiled by stepping on them. The Untouchables had to tie a clay pot to their necks when they walked so that they would spit in that pot, for if he spat on the ground, the Hindus would be defiled as they stepped on it.

When were Untouchables allowed to enter the village? It is when their labour was needed. The Touchables needed them to perform menial acts in the village such as carrying messages for Hindus in events of death or marriage to his relatives in other villages no matter how far it may be. They also had to work breaking fuel or going on errands during these events. When the village had festivities such as Holi or Dasara, the Untouchables had to perform all menial acts from preliminary to main observances. They are also allowed to enter village to perform all kind of heavy and dirty works like removal of faeces and the disposal of dead animals. They had to do these duties without remuneration.

Manu had stated that, “Even if capable, a Shudra shall not hoard wealth, for he will use it to torment the Brahmin.” Because of this, poverty was their common situation. Within the village, the Touchables appropriated all the political structures and wielded economic power as well. The Untouchables possessed no resources like land or money. Even if they had money to purchase land, they could not do so. Not only were they not allowed to own land they were punished if they attempted to do so. In some parts of India, Untouchables were forbidden buying land by Law. Under such condition, how did the Untouchables live? How did they earn their living? In order to earn their living, they had no choice but to work for the Touchables. The Touchable relied on this situation, took advantage of Untouchables, and exploited their labour as much as possible. The employees could not demand reasonable wages but had to accept what their masters chose to give. The wages were either cash or corn. If it was cash, it was as a little as possible. If it was corn, it was privy corn or corn contained in dung of animals. When the agricultural season was over, Untouchables could earn their living by cutting grass and collecting firewood from jungles. In order to take grass or firewood, Untouchables had to bribe the forest guard, and then they had to walk for very long distance to bring their products from village to market to sell. The majority of buyers were Hindus who often conspired with each other to beat down the price. The sellers had to accept whatever was offered to them for their items.

The Untouchables also earned their living by sweeping streets, scavenging, cleaning gutters, cleaning latrines, skinning carcasses, tanning hides and begging. These jobs were considered dirty and vile and the “noble Hindus” would never do .them. These jobs were saved for the Untouchables. Also to survive, Untouchables went to beg food from the Hindus. They must depend on the stale remnants of food left over by the Hindu households and upon the meat of cattle that die in the village. In order to survive they needed to go from door to door around every evening begging for food. This was the principal means of livelihood of the millions of untouchables.

Bansode expressed their plight as a moving poem:

... You know, in my childhood we didn’t even have milk for

Tea much less yoghurt or buttermilk

My mother cooked on sawdust she brought from the

Lumberyard wiping away the smoke from her eyes

Everyone in a while we might get garlic chutney on

Coarse bread

Otherwise we just ate bread crumbled in water

Dear Friend-Shrikand was not even a word in our Vocabulary

My nose had never smelled the fragrance of ghee

My tongue had never tasted halva, basundi

Dear Friend-You have not discarded your tradition

Its root go deep in your mind

And that’s true, true, true

Friend-There’s yoghurt on the last course of rice

Today the arrangement of food on your plate was not

Properly ordered

Are you going to tell me what mistakes I made?

Are you going to tell me my mistakes?

The Untouchables must not acquire knowledge, “it is a sin and a crime to give them education66... Thus, if a Shudra hears the Veda, hot molten lead is poured in his ears. If he pronounced the Veda, his tongue is cut. If he learns the Veda, his body is cut into pieces.” The principal subjects taught in those schools of the past were Vedas and the subjects related to the Vedas, such as Sanskrit, grammar and prosody which was the language of the gods. Only the people who were twice-born were eligible for such study. The Untouchables were considered too vile to approach the sacred Vedic knowledge. Therefore, they were not allowed to go to school. They were not permitted even to hear divinely inspired words of the Vedas. The idea of an Untouchable speaking, reading, and writing Sanskrit was therefore an abomination. It is noted here that, Sanskrit was the language of knowledge in ancient and medieval India, as Latin was in medieval and Renaissance Europe. Therefore, by preventing Untouchables from learning Sanskrit means they lost the key to enter the world of knowledge.

Even before Ambedkar was born, the colonial government allowed the Untouchables to be admitted to government schools in the Bombay Presidency. However, they had to face strong opposition from the Brahmin teachers, who treated their Untouchable pupils in the most humiliating fashion. The Untouchable pupils could not take water from the school water pot; they could not sit with the Caste Hindu children; and their teachers refused to mark their exercise books for fear of pollution. Ambedkar and his brother had to sit outside the schoolhouse when they studied at the Government Middle School in Satara, and no teacher wanted to teach them. Some Hindu teachers even refused to cane their Untouchable pupils for it could mean coming into contact with them momentarily.

Although the Touchable and the Untouchables belonged to the same social community and worship the same Gods, there was a big gap between them. The Untouchables were prohibited from studying the scriptures of Vedas, and from engaging in the practice of asceticism. If they did so, the punishment that awaited them was very severe. For example, the Gautama Dharma Sutra mentioned that, if a Shudra listened to the recitation of Veda intentionally, his ears would be filled with molten tin, if he utters the words of Veda, his tongue would be cut out, and if he tries to remember them, his body would be split in twain. In addition, they also were not permitted to enter the Hindu temples of the upper castes. If they wanted to worship, they had to keep far away from the temple. In some cases, they could not walk the street on which the temple was situated. Commonly, Untouchable communities had small, insignificant temples in which they worshipped either the popular Hindu gods and goddesses or quasi-tribal divinities peculiar to themselves. Of course, the Brahmins did not officiate or enter these temples. Furthermore, the Untouchables were not permitted to participate in the religious life of the Hindu community in any way. In this respect, they were in much the same position as the Shudras. However, the Shudras were allowed to participate in the religious life of the Hindu community to a limited extent. For example, they could invite Brahmins to perform certain ceremonies for them and they could make offerings to the Brahmins. The Untouchables were denied even these privileges. They had to find solace in the devotional mysticism of teachers of the Bhakti school. Most of the disciples of Bhakti school were themselves were of low-caste origin or people who often criticized the caste system as well as the pretensions of the Brahmins. Ambedkar’s family also found consolation in this way. The families of both his parents belonged to the Kabir sect. One of his father’s uncles was a sadhu or wandering holy man.

In general, the rules of the caste system varied in different parts in India. Each caste enjoyed certain privileges but the Untouchables almost had no rights while they had to perform the extensive and severe duties. Despite the difference in language, occupation, history or political orientation, notwithstanding, the Untouchables always were at the bottom of the caste system and subjected to disabilities and injustices in all spheres of life.72 Sagharakshita described the situation of the Untouchables as follows:

There are at present 100, 000, 000 Untouchables in India, the vast majority of those who are underprivileged in every sense of the term. Each year between four and five hundred of them are murdered by their caste Hindu compatriots while thousands more are beaten, raped, and tortured and their homes looted and burned. An incalculable number of them are not only subject to social, economic and religious discrimination but daily suffer personal harassment and humiliation.

Sagharakshita’s comment is not at variance with the observation of Gandhi: “Socially, they are lepers. Economically, they are worse than slaves. Religiously, they are denied entrance to the places we miscall ‘houses of God.’ They are denied the use, on them same terms as the Caste Hindus, of public roads, public schools, public hospitals, public wells, public taps. Public parks and the like...” Thus, as Karunyakara remarks: “Hinduism is the only religion in the world that has Dharma, that subscribes discrimination against its own Hindus.”

Indeed, the stratification of Indian society was such that. It made Indian society look like a “compartmental society” in which each caste maintained distinct and diverse styles of life. According to Ambedkar, this phenomenon produced two negative consequences, namely, the inevitability of social struggle and the destruction of the public spirit.

Firstly, because of the fourfold division, the “four Varnas never formed a society base on loving brotherhood or on economic organization base on cooperative effort but they were animated by nothing but a spirit of animosity towards one another,” to the extent that it concealed the latent risk of a social struggle among various castes, including among the Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas each other. Most of of Hindu leaders, social reformers agreed that, the caste system had deprived Indians of a strong feeling of brotherhood and shared existence.

Secondly, the division of castes not only creates struggle among castes but also kills the public spirit. In Annihilation of Caste, Ambedkar pointed out this phenomenon as follows:

The effect of caste on the ethics of the Hindus is simply deplorable. Caste has killed public spirit. Caste has destroyed the sense of public charity. Caste has made public opinion impossible. A Hindu’s public is his caste. His responsibility is only to his caste. His loyalty is restricted only to his caste. Virtue has become caste-ridden and morality has become castebound. There is no sympathy to the deserving. There is no appreciation of the meritorious. There is no charity to the needy. Suffering as such calls for no response. There is charity but it begins with the caste and ends with the caste. There is sympathy but not for men of other caste… The capacity to appreciate merits in a man apart from his caste does not exist in a Hindu. There is appreciation of virtue but only when a man is a fellow caste-man.

Why the high caste Hindus ignored or were indifferent to the pitiable plight of the Untouchables is not easily understood? Ambedkar observed that, “The Untouchables does not belong to the society of the Hindus and the Hindus does not feel that he and the Untouchables belong to one society. This is the reason why the conduct of the Hindu is marked by a moralistic unconcernedness… The Hindus did not feel responsible for the condition of the Untouchables but the Untouchables were responsible for their own deplorable conditions.

This indifference was clearly revealed in the partisan attitude of caste Hindus when they made contributions to those organization founded for the uplift of the Untouchables. For example, the Harijan Sevak Sangh remained a poor organization as compared to many others. While the Hindus were willing to contribute one crore and thirty lakhs of Rupees to make up the Tilak Swaraj Fund for the political purposes and one crore and 15 lakhs to make up the Kasturba Memorial Fund for General Welfare, the Fund for “so unimportant and so unprofitable a work as the amelioration of the Untouchables” was only two lakhs per year (for 60 millions Untouchables all over the country) and never went beyond 10 lakhs. Ironically, the fund was not exclusively a welfare arrangement but essentially a political stratagem to induce the Untouchables to abandon their requirement of a separate electorate to vote with the Hindus. Yet, the contributions from caste Hindus was disconcerting.

The rigid stratification of people in society hindered the democratic process in India. In My Personal Philosophy, Ambedkar considered that Indians were governed by two different ideologies, the political ideal and the religious ideal. Unfortunately, the two were contradictory to each other:

Today the Indian person is under the sway of different idealistic stands. One is the idealism indicated in the preamble of the Constitution and the other is the social idealism incorporated in religion. One who has understanding may know that those two are contradictory idealism. Political idealism recognized values of life in respected of liberty, equality and fraternity. However, the prevailing social idealism of Sanātanī (orthodox) attitude has rejected those principles in practice.

The root of Democracy lay not in the form of Government or in its institution such as the Parliament. A true Democracy must be a mode of associated living or social relationship. Therefore, in a talk given to the Voice of America in 1956, he concluded:

If you give education to the lower strata of Indian society, which is interested in blowing up the caste system, the caste system will be blown up… Giving education to those who want to blow up caste system will improve the prospect of Democracy in India and put Democracy in safer hands.

On the occasion of his birthday in 1953, he told an audience of 5,000 that the country would not progress unless a classless and casteless society is created. In general, Ambedkar viewed that “Caste in the hands of the orthodox has been a powerful weapon for persecuting the reforms and for killing all reform… You cannot build up a nation; you cannot build up a morality. Anything you will build on the foundations of caste will crack and will never be a whole.”

The Biography of Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar

The homeland of Ambedkar was Maharashtra. His grandfather, Maloji (or Malnak) Sakpal was a resident of Ambavade, a small village in the Ratnagiri district of Maharashtra. Maloji was a follower of the Ramanand cult. He served in the British Army until retirement. He had four children and Ambedkar’s father was the youngest one. Of Malojirao’s children, only two persons survived. They were Ambedkar’s father and Auntie Mira Ramji Sakpal. The later was a handicapped woman and lived with Ambedkar’s family.

Ambedkar’s father was Ramji Maloji Sakpal (1848-1913). He was recruited by the British army in 1866. Under the command of Subedar Major Laxman Murbadkar, he was promoted, and in course of time, occupied the rank of Subedar in the army. At that time, a beneficial rule of the East Indian Company made education compulsory for all servicemen and their families. The provision of compulsory education in the army exposed several of Mahars families to schooling while they were denied admission to school outside the army. Accordingly, independent schools were run for each platoon. A normal school at Poona groomed able teachers to teach the soldiers, and Ramji Subedar obtained a Diploma in teaching from there. He had acted as a Head Master there for 14 years.

Ambedkar’s mother was Bhimabai who hailed from a comparatively well-to-do family in Murbad village, Thane District, Bombay State. Her family also had a tradition of military service. Her father was Subedar Major Murbadkar, and also a religious man. Bhimabai was brought up in a religious circumstance. She was not only a devoted wife but also took good care of her crippled sister-in-law Mirabai.

As mentioning in chapter one, Indian social order has been divided into four castes and the Untouchables. With the passage of time, the Untouchables were sub-divided into hundreds of sub-castes. They had different names and settled in various parts of the country, and Ambedkar was born in one of such castes called the Mahar.92 Maharashtra means ‘vast’ or ‘virtually great’, and Mahar was an old and brave caste of Maharashtra. The Mahar are the descendents of the Nagas who used to rule this State. Due to losing a war, they were treated as the Untouchables. In Maharashtra, the Mahars did not live inside villages, but on the fringes of village, called Maharavada which was used contemptuously for the dirty settlement of the dirty people.94 During its history, the Mahars were famous for their daring, courage, determination, faithfulness, loyalty and honesty. They were also great fighters and good soldiers. In the battles, they were always in the front lines and suffered all sorts of hardships. Colonel of the Mahar Regiment, General K. V. Krishna Rao wrote in The History of Mahar Regiment that he had “had the good fortune of personally commanding the Mahars in war... and in counter-insurgency operations. The lasting impression that has been left on me is that a Mahar soldier is indomitable in spirit. And the Mahar officers always proved to be worthy leaders of these excellent men.”

Both from the paternal and maternal sides Ambedkar had a military tradition, so that, Ambedkar inherited a martial quality. Ambedkar also inherited his family’s belief of the preaching of Kabir who was well-known as a social reformer and rebel. These backgrounds greatly influenced his personality and philosophy and played an important role in the formation of his character.

Early Life and Education

Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar was the fourteenth child of Ramji and Bhimabai. The couple had fourteen children totally, but only three sons and two daughters survived, Ambedkar was the youngest member of family. He was born in the morning of April 14, 1891 in MHOW (Military Headquarters of War) cantonment in the State of Madhya Pradesh where his father was working at that time. There was a mythological story narrated about his birth. It was said that when his mother was pregnant, a relative of Ramji Sakpal who was considered as a saint, predicted that the child to be born would leave a permanent mark on history. It was also said that Ramji Subedar was an astrologer of a sort. He predicted his little son would be a great man, so, he loved him a lot. Sometime, Ambedkar jested that he was the fourteenth ‘gem’ of his parents.

Ramji Sakpal had received a degree of formal education in Marathi and English. He encouraged his children to learn at school. After retiring from the army in1894, Ramji moved with his family to Dapoli near Ambavade in Ratnagiri district, Maharashtra. Ambedkar then was sent to primary school at Dapoli in 1896 when he was five years old, along with his elder brother Anandrao. The whole family had to struggle to live on a small army pension of Rs. 50 per month of Ramji. So, he could not afford to stay long at Dapoli. He moved his family to Satara where he was employed as a shopkeeper in the C. P. W. D at Goregaon, Satara District. Soon after, a tragedy occurred; Ambadkar’s mother had been ill and died. At that time, he was just six years old. His aunt Mira replaced her sister in taking care of the children and they lived in difficult circumstances. Only three sons Balaram, Anandrao and Bhimrao, and two daughters Manjula and Tulasa of Ramji and Bhimabai would go on to survive them. Of his brothers and sisters, only Ambedkar succeeded in passing his examinations and graduating to a higher school.

Though the whole family was living in a very hard situation, Ramji was a respected father who had read stories from epics like Mahabharata and Ramayana to his children, and sang devotional songs of Kabir to them. In this way, home life was still happy for Ambedkar and his brothers, sisters. He never forgot the influence of his father.

Ambedkar’s father was in the colonial military services, so, he was ignorant about untouchability. It was at Satara, for the first time, he realised about his condition. It was said that, once he went to a barber to have his hair cut. The barber who used to cut the hair of buffalo, rebuked him with contempt: “You are an untouchable. How can I cut your hair? Go, get lost.” Ambedkar returned home wiping his tears.

Another story told is that, once two brothers Ambedkar and Anandrao went to see their father at Goregaon. They arrived at the Masur Railway Station, engaged a cart and continued their journey. They went some distance; then the cart driver came to know that they belonged to the Mahar cast. He at once stopped the cart and raised one end of it; the two brothers Ambedkar tumbled down and fell on the ground. The cart driver shouted at them and scolded them as he pleased. It was only after they promised that they would pay him double the amount of the agreed fare, and with the condition that they had to drive the cart and the cart man followed on foot because he did not wish to sit with the Untouchables together. It was afternoon. Two brothers were thirsty. They begged for water but no one would give them a drop. They were not allowed even to go to the near tanks and wells. When Ambedkar felt unbearable thirst, he drank water from a certain well. Someone noticed it so that they gathered and beat him mercilessly.

Anyway, when the family settled in Satara, Ambedkar and his elder brother enrolled in the Government Middle School. Recalling how he had been in school that time, once Ambedkar said that, "If you can excuse me for citing my own experience, I may tell you how I got my education. Owning to poverty, I used to attend schools with nothing more than a loin cloth on my body." Besides that, Ambedkar and his brother had to face their accident of birth as the Untouchables. In those days, untouchability was observed even in schools. All the Depressed Classes’ boys had to sit together, on the ground outside the schoolhouse, and no teacher cared to teach them. Ambedkar was very fond of playing, especially cricket that his father had taught him. However, he was not allowed to participate in games at school. While other students played cricket, he sat aside watching dismally. Ambedkar could not take water from the school water pot either. When he felt thirsty, a touchable student poured water for him to drink out of his palms.

Although Ambedkar was subjected to humiliating treatment, he also had some fortune to meet some very kind Brahmin teachers and received unexpected kindness from them.106 It was said that, once Ambedkar made a bet with his schoolmate that he could walk several miles to school under the heavy downpour. When he reached the school, he was completely soaked and shivering. Master Pendse saw him in that condition, asked his son to take Ambedkar to his house, gave him dry clothes and warm food to eat. Another teacher named Mahadev Ambedkar was also very fond of Ambedkar. He treated him like his own child. He shared the part of his lunch with him every day. Furthermore, he changed Ambedkar’s surname from Ambavadekar to his own surname Ambedkar and wrote it in school record. He began to call himself Ambedkar as a way to show respect to his teacher. Incredibly, the surname Ambedkar then became an inerasable seal in Indian history and in the world.

Talking about these favours that Ambedkar received, Vijay Kumar Pujari suggests that:

Fifty years ago, the caste Hindus in Maharashtra were very rigid on observing untouchability. As for the Brahmins, they were at the top. They were the progenitors and symbol of untouchability. In such circumstances, the Brahmin teacher Ambedkar’s and Pendse’s extraordinary love for untouchable Bhim (young Ambedkar)is not only a sign of their kindheartedness, but it also impels us to accept that it was owning to a peculiar charm in Bhim’s personality and nature that those Brahmin teachers were drawn to him. That peculiar attraction held the key to Bhim’s bright future.

Though Ambedkar was very fond of reading extracurricular books (which inspired his hobby to collect books), he was not interest in his studies at all until he confronted a bitter experience in his life later. Being an intelligent and bright boy, he only had to study a little to maintain his position at school. He was more interested in playing. He indulged in all kinds of hobbies and fancies as well as worked tending cattle, rearing goats and gardening. After returning home from school, he immediately dumped his satchel in some corner of the house or ran out to play with the neighbourhood boys. Satara Railway station was also his favourite point where he performed hamal work. Ambedkar admitted that he was not an excellent student from the beginning, even his aunt wanted to punish him, but she did not because she too loved him.

When Ambedkar was about ten years old, his father decided to remarry Jijabai, a window. Ambedkar was naturally very upset, because he still missed his mother so much. He did not like to have a strange woman taking the place of his mother as a stepmother. He decided that he should run away for an independent life. He had often heard his sisters gossiping that several boys from Satara had jobs in Bombay mills. Why not go Bombay, thought the little boy. He needed money for the railway fare. For three days, he tried to steal his aunt’s purse, and at last, he got it. However, he found just only haft an anna in it! He felt ashamed of and disgusted with his deed. He put the coin back and made a vow to himself to struggle and stand on his own legs whatever the difficulties. After that he gave up his truant habits. Instead, he decided to study hard to go through the examination as fast as possible, thereby he might earn his own livelihood and be independent of his father.

Soon, Ambedkar completed his primary education. Ramji Subedar lost his job as a storekeeper. With the employment and his children’s education in mind, Ramji decided to move from Satara to Bombay with his family. They lived in a Chawl (a single room tenement) at lower Parel under almost sub-human condition. Ambedkar and his brother were admitted to Maratha High School in Bombay in 1905. He focused on his studies because he recognised that was the only way to improve their situation. This effort was generously supported by his father who even borrowed money for purchasing books for him. After some time, he joined the Elphinston High School, which was considered as the best school in Bombay at that time. However, he continued to face the bane of untouchability at that school from both teachers and classmates. One occasion when a maths teacher asked him to solve a sum on the blackboard, the caste Hindu students shouted in unison to stop him. Because their tiffin boxes were placed on it and they were afraid that an untouchable as Ambedkar defied their boxes when he touched them. Until they had removed their tiffin boxes, Ambedkar could not approach the board. A certain Brahmin teacher often mentioned Ambedkar’s caste to humiliate him. Sometime, Ambedkar ignored the comments, sometime he reacted strongly. For example, once, that teacher asked Ambedkar what he would do with his education, because even he got it, he could do nothing as a Mahar. Ambedkar felt insulted, replied that: “Sir, it is none of your business to ask what I will do with my education. If you ever again humiliate me for my caste, I tell you, you will have to face the consequences.”

When Ambedkar was in Elphinston High School, he desired to learn Sanskrit but he was not allowed due to because he belonged to the Mahar cast! Mahar people had not been allowed to study Sanskrit and the teacher also declared that he would not teach Sanskrit to the untouchable boys. For this reason, he was forced to study Persian. Ambedkar later reminded, “Though I had the eager desire to learn Sanskrit, I was force to leave it on account of the narrow attitude of our teachers.” The narrow-minded attitude of the Brahmin teacher deprived him of the study of Sanskrit language. Later, he learnt Sanskrit on his own and became a scholar of high calibre in Sanskrit. This showed that his will was unconquerable. Anyway, he had never forgotten the insults and pains. He felt that untouchability was a black mark on Hinduism. Since then he nurtured a decision in his mind to remove it.

Matriculation and Marriage

Though Ambedkar had lived and studied in trying situation, he had overcome all the hardship with a will of steel. He finally passed his Matriculation Examination in 1907 from Elphinston High School with highest credentials. A special meeting was convened under the presidentship of S. K. Bole, a well know Maharashtrian social reformer, to congratulate Ambedkar. The meeting also was attended by other social reformers and Marathi Scholars, including K. A. Keluskar, an assistant teacher at the Wilson high School, Bombay. He had become fond of Ambedkar and both had often spent hours in the garden studying. He had allowed Ambedkar to borrow his books. Now, on the occasion of Ambedkar’s Matriculation Examination, he presented Ambedkar with a book authored by him titled Life of Gautama Buddha. This was the first time Ambedkar read about Buddhism.

Subsequently, according to the prevailing custom, he married Rami the same year. However, early marriage could not extinguish his desire for knowledge. On January 3, 1908, he enrolled in the Elphinston College in Bombay. But after passing the Intermediate examination with distinction, his father Ramji found himself unable to pay the school fees for his son. Those who were interested in Ambedkar’s progress recommended that he should meet with Maharaja Gaekwad of Baroda. In addition, his former teacher, K. A. Keluskar, came to know of Ambedkar’s difficulties and personally met up with Sir Sayajirao Gaekwad to apprise the latter about Ambedkar. At the request of Keluskar, the Maharaja granted Ambedkar a monthly scholarship of rupees twenty-five 25, a tidy sum of money in those days.

In college, Ambedkar continued to be subjected to discrimination. At the hostel he would not be served any tea or water. Most professors and students maintained a distance from him. However, some professors loved and sympathised with him. For example, professor Mueller of English gave Ambedkar clothes and Professor K. V. Irani of the Department of Persian allowed him to use his room to study. Ambedkar finally got a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Bombay in January 1913 with Persian and English as his main subjects. Upon graduation, Ambedkar prompted by a sense of gratitude, decided to serve in Baroda. Ignoring his father’s advice to seek employment in Bombay, Ambedkar left for Baroda where he worked as a Lieutenant in the Baroda State's Army. Unfortunately, two weeks later, his father passed away.

Studies in the USA and the UK

In 1913, Maharaja of Baroda proposed a scheme to send a few outstanding scholars abroad for further education. Ambedkar applied for that. The Maharaja had already been convinced of Ambedkar’s intellect and courage, accepted him immediately. Ambedkar arrived in New York on the third week of July 1913 with tremendous excitement and fervour. Free from the everyday prejudices of caste, Ambedkar found here a proper atmosphere to contemplate about the problems of India. Professor Seligman, a well-known economist, was his teacher.Ambedkar devoted eighteen hours a day to his studies. Libraries and bookshops became his favourite haunts. Thus, he was able to complete his thesis Ancient Indian Commerce in 1915. In addition to this, he also presented a paper Caste in India, their Mechanism, Genesis and Development in a seminar of anthropology. The following year, June 1916, his PhD thesis The National Dividend of India, A Historic and Analytical Study was also accepted by Columbia University. In 1917, Colombia University conferred upon him a Degree of PhD. This thesis was later enlarged and published under the title The Evolution of Imperial Provincial Finance in India. Ambedkar dedicated this work to the Highness Sayajirao Gaekwad, Maharaja of Baroda to express his gratitude to his benefactor.

After the completion of his studies at Columbia University, Ambedkar went to England in 1916 to join the famous London School of Economics and Political Sciences to pursue the degree of Master of Science. At the same time, in October 1916, he entered the Gray's Inn for completing the Barrister-at-Law. However, he had to leave London before completing his courses as the scholarship granted by the State of Baroda had expired.

Return to India – Nightmare in Baroda

Ambedkar returned to India on August 21, 1917 and then travelled to Baroda, intended to serve the princely state according to the agreement. Caste prejudices began to haunt him immediately. In fact, no one bothered to receive him at the railway station, though the Maharaja of Baroda had ordered his men to do so. Ambedkar was appointed Military Secretary to the government of Baroda. The Maharaja promised him that he would soon appoint him as a Finance Minister. However, Ambedkar was again a victim of discrimination at the secretariat. The employees complained that an untouchable had been inflicted on them and they found it humiliating. The Maharaja referred the matter to the Dewan, but the latter could not fix it.

The tragedy was not limited to interpersonal relations. When he first arrived inBaroda, he went from hotel to hotel to look for a room, but none of them would take him in because he belonged to the untouchable caste. He finally decided to keep his caste secret, so that they would let him live in a Parsi guesthouse that was in very poor conditions. He stayed there for a while until the landlord came to know his caste. Accusing him of polluting the guesthouse, the landlord forced him to get out. Recalling the incident, Ambedkar wrote: “I tried all day to find a place of residence, but I could not get it anywhere. I met several friends. They refused me on this or that pretext. And, I was unable to determine what I should do. Then I sat down on the spot. I was distressed, and tears rolled down my eyes.” However, every act of dishonour inflicted upon him caused intense pain and anguish, but each time he turned it into resolve to move further ahead. What he experienced in Baroda set his mind afire with wrath against caste prejudices and instilled in him a lifetime commitment to improve the conditions of the untouchables. He thought that if a highly educated man like him was being so inhumanly treated, what would be the fate of illiterate members of his community. He left Baroda for Bombay in November 1917.

Bombay – Beginnings of Social Activism

Ambedkar kept thinking about his unfinished academic career in London. He needed to earn enough money to complete his studies. Through the office of a Parsi gentleman, he became tutor to two Parsi boys and which fetched him hundred rupees per month. Subsequently, he also founded the Stocks and Shares Advisers, a company that would offer consultancy services to big businessmen and business concerns in matter of finance. His business run well initially. But very soon businessmen came to know that Ambedkar was an untouchable and decided to go elsewhere. So, Ambedkar had to close down his company. Once again Ambedkar found himself staring at hardship. He wrote Caste in India and Small Holding in India and Their Remedies to raise some money. Finally, he was able to get a teaching job in Sydenham College. At Sydenham, he again faced social discrimination; high caste professors would not allow him to drink water from the pot reserved for the professorial staff. However, Ambedkar was a committed teacher. Within a short time, he was able to endear himself to his students. Sometimes students from other colleges began to attend his lectures.

By this time, the Congress had passed a solution for the removal of the untouchability (1917). The Depressed Classes Mission Society which had established from 1909 by Karmavir Shinde (under chairmanship of Sir Narayanrao Chandavarkar, a High Court Judge and the Vice Chancellor of Bombay University), continued to advocate the uplift of the Untouchables. The imitational politics of the Society led to the revocation of the ban on the recruitment of the Untouchables to the army was in 1917. Later in 1919, Ambedkar along with Karmavir Shinde were authorised by the Bombay Government to represent the Untouchables’ view before the MontagueChelmsford Reform Scheme. However, there was a fundamental disagreement between them. While Ambedkar demanded a proportional representation for the Untouchables and asserted that the Government should fix qualifications for franchise according to the nature of penury and illiteracy, Karmavir Shinde proposed that the Government should nether appoint Untouchable representatives nor Untouchable voters elect them, but they be selected by the elected members of the Council. Shinde’s political strategy confounded Ambedkar who felt that would tantamount to insulting the Untouchables.

Ambedkar came in close contact with an enlightened Prince - the Maharaja of Kolhapur Chhatrapati Shahu - through the aegis of Dattoba Pawar in 1919. With the assured patronage of Maharaja, he began to publish a fortnightly paper called the “Mook Nayak,” (the Leader of the Dumb). Although Ambedkar was technically not the editor, the Paper and the Paper became his mouthpiece. The aim of Mook Nayak, as its title revealed, was to proclaim the humiliations of Untouchables, and to fight for equal rights. Thereafter, in the first issue of the Paper, Ambedkar wrote that the Hindu Society was like a tower of inequality that neither had a ladder to climb nor a door to exit. One died in the storey one was born in.135 In another article, he asserted that if India wanted to be recognized as a great country, it should guarantee equal status in religious, social, economic and political matters to all and offer them the favourable conditions to improve their condition at the same time. On March 21, 1920, Ambedkar presided over the Untouchable Conference at Mangaon, Kolhapur. At the Conference, Shahu Maharaj told the delegates that they had found their saviour in Ambedkar because he was confident that Ambedkar would break them from their shackles.

Meanwhile, the Southbourough Committee recommended only seven seats for Untouchables out of a total of 791 seats on an all India basis. Immediately, Ambedkar make efforts to hold the First All India Conference of the Untouchables. The Conference was held in May 1920 at Nagpur under the chairmanship of Chhatrapati Shahu Maharaj. Speaking at the Conference, Ambedkar condemned V. R. Shinde and his Depressed Classes Mission Society for their act of treachery against the Untouchables. He observed that, such institutions would have no right to defend the interest of the Depressed Classes if they were not run by the Untouchables themselves. “We must strongly oppose and boycott any man and institution, whether of the Untouchable community of the Hindu society, impeding the progress of the Untouchables. Now you should strive to be independent,” said Ambedkar. The conference at Nagpur launched Ambedkar the prospective leader of the Untouchables in India.

Completion of Education

Ambedkar accepted the post of a teacher at Sydenham College because he needed money to take care of his family and to save money for his unfinished academic plans in London. With the money he had saved, and with the loan of Rs. 5000 from Naval Bhathena his old friend, and some help from the Maharaja of Kolhapur, Ambedkar, finally, had sufficient money for his abroad studies. In July 5, 1920, he sailed for London to the London School of Economics (LSE). He also enrolled to the Gray's Inn to study Law for Degree of Barrister.

In London, Ambedkar led an austere existence in as a paying guest in a boarding house. His breakfast and dinner were very simple with a little food he got in the boarding house. He had to walk however long the distance, because he could not afford to pay for train fare or hired other means of conveyance. His old friend, Bhathena sometimes helped him financially. This help really meant with Ambedkar in such case. On September 4, 1921, he wrote to Shahu Maharaj for requesting of 200 pound with a promise that he would repay with interest on his return. He also wrote to his wife that if she found herself in hardship, she could sell all her ornaments. He promised with her that when he returned to India, he would compensate her.

Ambedkar’s efforts were awarded when he finished his thesis, titled Provincial Decentralization of Imperial Finance in British India. He was awarded a Degree of Master of Science in June 1921. At almost the same time, he went to Germany to study at the Bonn University. While he was studying in Germany, he was called back to London because there was some dispute within the Examiners’ Committee on his PhD thesis The Problem of Rupee: Its Origin and Its Solution for it had forthrightly criticized the British fiscal system in India. In his thesis, Ambedkar established that the British Government caused the people of India terrific loss by connecting the Indian rupee with British pound. Professor Edwin Canon required him to rewrite it. However, he could not afford to stay in London anymore because he was broke. His professor allowed him to complete his thesis in India. Some days later, he re-submitted his thesis from Bombay. This time the University of London accepted it and awarded him the degree of Doctor of Science in 1923. M/s. King and Sons, London later published the modified version of his controversial thesis in December 1923. Ambedkar dedicated the publication to his parents who he loved and owed a lot.

Ambedkar was now a Barrister-at-Law, Doctorate in Economics from the LSE, an American Doctorate in philosophy and had studied at Bonn University. With this degree, Ambedkar was perhaps the first Indian to have a Doctorate from the world-famous institutions in England, America, and Germany. His academic qualifications exceeded most of his contemporaries.

Coming Home – Leader of India’s Untouchables

Ambedkar returned India in April 1923. He decided to practise a job as barrister. However, no litigants wanted to hire him because they did not wish to do business with an untouchable. Ambedkar realized that the caste system in India was a disaster in which the low castes were its victims. Therefore, he decided to dedicate the rest of his life to remove untouchability in India. At almost the same time, others in India began to speak up about the injustices of the caste system. Some Hindus understood that untouchability was unjust. They wanted to do something to either improve the condition of the Untouchables or wiped out the state of untouchability. In August 4, 1923, the Bombay Legislative Council passed a resolution, moved by the late Shri S. K. Bole allowing the Untouchables to enjoy all public services like wells, schools. Sahu Maharaj of Kolhapur arranged for the free education of the Untouchables and secured jobs for many of them. In 1924, Veer Savarkar, a great fighter for freedom, was released from the Andaman prison; began to fight against untouchability. Gandhi also took practical steps to wipe out untouchability, etc.

In order to promote the cause of the untouchables, Ambedkar organised and presided over a series of meetings. On March 9, 1924, he convened a meeting at Damodar Hall, Bombay. He and his people discussed the need of establishment a central Organization for the Untouchables, where they had a foundation to improve their situation such as removing the innumerable handicaps that they were suffering, and placing their grievances before the Government. Following the meeting, the Bahishkrit Hitakarini Sabha (Association for the Welfare of the Depressed Classes) was formed with Sir Chimanlal Setalvad as president and Ambedkar as the chairman of managing committee. R. P. Paranjpye, K. F. Nariman and B. G. Kher were the notable figures in the managing committee. The headquarters of the Association were located at Damodar Hall, Bombay. The aim of this Association was to improve every aspects of the life of Untouchables like economics, politics, culture, and education. The Association started industrial and agricultural schools, opened libraries and studying circles. In order to improve the lives of Untouchables effectively, Ambedkar considered that the education had to reach everyone and opportunities should provide at grassroots level.

So far, the Untouchable movement was run by the Touchable Hindus who according to Ambedkar, were not sincere in their campaigns. It was more a show than an actual effort. Therefore, the first conference of Prantiya Asprishya Parishad was convened in April 1925 at Malavana village in the district of Ratnagiri, Bombay. Through the Conference, Ambedkar wanted the movement to be run by the Untouchables themselves. He wanted to inspire a sense of selfreliance in the Untouchables. In order to urge them to task for their plight, Ambedkar encouraged them with strong scolding words. They did not feel annoyed by his strong scolding but instead were moved with veneration for him. This was because they realized that behind those scolding-like words was the vast love of the speaker. Their hearts were stirred with a sense of self-pride and they were attracted to him as their saviour. Ambedkar said the following:

What a plight is yours! Your pathetic faces and words rend my heart. Why should you add to the world’s misery by your pitiable life? Why you were not dead even in your mother’s womb? The world will be obliged even if you die now. If you wish to live, you must live with zeal. It is your birthright to get the food, clothes and residence that others get, and you must come forward and work diligently in order to attain that right.

At the same time, Ambedkar was offered a post of professor in the Elphinston College, but he refused it. He said with Keluskar that the job might hinder his social work. He just assumed a part-time lectureship at the Batli Boi Accountancy Training Institute that he thought would not hinder his mission to uplift and liberate the Untouchables.

The years 1925 and 1926 saw important events which elated the spirit of the Untouchables. That is the Satyagraha149 launched by the late E. V. Ramaswamy Naicker, a non-Brahmin leader who later founded the Dravida Kazhagam Party. The Satyagraha asserted the right of the Untouchables to use the public road, which had closed to them, and the ruler of Travancore State approved their request. Another event occurred in Madras State. An Untouchable named Murgesan entered the Hindu temple. He was accused of defiling the Hindu noble place of worship. However, the court restored Murgesan’s freedom. These exciting events really blew fresh hope into the life of Untouchables.

At the same time, Ambedkar, slowly but firmly, built his career reputation as a Barrister at Law. In 1926, some Brahmins of Poona accused three non-Brahmin leaders of defaming the Brahmin community when they issued a pamphlet in which they said that the Brahmins had ruined India. An eminent lawyer of Poona, the late L. B. Bhopatker led the prosecution and the defence was lead by Ambedkar. In court, Ambedkar proved his ability in the role of defender and won the case. This victory was good not only for his career as a lawyer but also brought about hope among the Untouchables. The idea the Brahmins had been right in any time and any place was re-evaluated. Ambedkar was now a fairly well known lawyer and social worker. He worked as a professor of economics and a post of principal in Sydenham College, Bombay.

Although Ambedkar was well-known now, he still lived very simply. He did not have a private house but keeping staying in a Bombay Improvement Trust tenement while his office lied in a building owned by Social Service League, Bombay. In July 1926, his son Rajratna died. He lost three sons and one daughter, in their infancy. Overcoming the private grief, Ambedkar welcomed everybody who came to him. They came to confide to him their discontented tales and asked him for help or to take up their cases in the courts of law. He was ready to help them as much as he could with a very little charge or even nothing. His fame was become well known by Untouchables with increasing number.

In January 1927, he attended the meeting at Koregaon War Memorial near Poona held by the Depressed Classes. Speaking at the meeting, Ambedkar reminded the heroic tradition of the Untouchable soldiers in their history. Up to the year 1892, the Mahar were very popular in army. After 1892, the entry of Mahar into the army stopped. During the First World War 1 1914-1918, the Mahar army was restarted to recruit and one battalion of Mahar was formed. After that time, it was again disbanded. Ambedkar exhorted the Untouchables to agitate to require the British Government to revoke their discriminatory policy that banning the Untouchables from joining the armed force.

Ambedkar’s Satyagraha – the Struggle for Public Resources

In 1927, the Bombay Government nominated Ambedkar as a Member of Bombay Legislative Council.155 Now Ambedkar had more chances to contribute to the uplift of the Untouchables. One of the first problem he brought before the government was the practical application of the Bole resolution. The Bombay Legislature had already passed the Bole resolution in 1923 (reaffirmed in 1926) allowing everyone including the Untouchables to use public benefits like tanks, wells, schools, hospitals, courts, offices, and inns. However, it could not be deployed in practice. In fact, caste Hindus were very adamant in preventing the Untouchables touch the water in public tanks. Because of fearing of retribution, the Untouchables could not muster the courage to touch water. Those who were concerned with the issue organised a meeting on March 19-20, 1927 at Mahad in Kolaba District. The organisers invited Ambedkar to attend the conference. There were about 5000 delegates including workers and leaders of Depressed Classes of every district of Maharashtra and Gujarat attended the conference. The conference also included some members of upper castes. At the conference, Ambedkar called upon the Untouchables to stand up and assert their rights as human beings. He also emphasised the importance of education as the best way to improve their lot. Besides that, he advised his people not eat rotten flesh or food thrown away by the Hindus as a way of regaining their self-respect. He said as follows: "It is time we rooted out of our minds the ideas of high and low. We can attain self-elevation only if we learn self-help and regain our self-respect.

On the second day of the Conference, Ambedkar led a procession from the conference to the Chowdar Tank. In order to ensure the Untouchables followed example, he kneeled and drank water from it. Consequently, thousands of others followed his example. When some caste Hindus came to know that the Untouchables were drinking water, they announced that the tank had been polluted, and rumoured that the Untouchables now intended to enter the local temper. The Untouchables of the Conference were attacked with bamboo sticks, and they had to take shelter in Muslim houses nearby. About 20 Untouchables were seriously injured in the attack. The brutality of the event generated a wave of seething anger among the Untouchables in Maharashtra in particular and in the entire country in general. However, Ambedkar insisted that violence would not help and sought their pledge that they would agitate peacefully. He narrated the Adv. SuVarna and V. Bharule, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, http://socialjusticeforall.weebly.com/contact-us.html (accessed on September 23, 2013).incident to the police authorities and the administration arrested the perpetrator. The District Magistrate sentenced five of them to four months rigorous imprisonment.

When Ambedkar returned to Bombay finally on March 23, 1927, his family was very distressed. His brother apprised him of the danger of his actions. Public opinion was divided about the Chowdar Tank event. Among Hindu leaders, while some evoked fierce hatred, others congratulated the Untouchables on their courageous act. Likewise, among the articles published in the newspapers, while some condemned the struggle as an overzealous act, others praised it. A leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, Veer Savarkar openly declared that, it was a bounden duty of Hindu society to restore all rights to the Untouchables. This became an important topic all over India lasting several months. Public meetings urged the Government to look into the matter and to bring the Bole Resolution into effect. The act of drinking water from public tank of the Untouchables was indeed a significant event. For hundreds of years, the Untouchables had been forbidden to drink public water. Thus, as Pujari observes: “In the course of the Untouchable Movement, the Mahad Satyagraha was a turning point marking the mental revolution of the Untouchables.”

Publishing a Journal for Untouchables

Ambedkar started a fortnightly Marathi Journal “Bahishkrit Bharat” (The Excluded of India) in Bombay from April 3, 1927, a forum to keep the Depressed Classes informed about social issues to express and propagate his views, and respond to his critics publicly. Through Bahishkrit Bharat, Ambedkar became the voice of the untouchables demanding rightful changes. He asked the upper castes that “if eating meat and beef made some Hindus Untouchables, why was this not applied to the Christians and Muslims; and why some of communities who never touched meat were classified into Untouchables?” With his short, crisp, and fearless style, Ambedkar appealed to the Government to make the Bole Resolution effective and punish those who opposed its implementation. He also called for the British Government to act democratically and treat all Indians equally. He exhorted them to open all temples and watercourses for the use of the Untouchable communities, as they were citizens of India. Furthermore, public property belonged to all Indians including the Untouchables. Ambedkar stated that the struggle for equality was an action of every conscientious person. He argued had Lok Manya Tilak160 been born in an untouchable family; he would not have raised the slogan "Swaraj is my birth right", but would have demanded "Annihilation of untouchability is my birth right". Through his papers, Ambedkar hoped to sensitize caste Hindus so that they could become enlightened and sympathize with the problems of the Untouchables. He also clarified that his struggle was not against the entire Hindu community or that he considered all Hindus as the enemies of the Untouchables. On the contrary, he was fighting against the spirit of Brahmanism.

Bonfire of a Copy of the Manusmriti

When the Untouchables had drunk water in the Chowdar Tank, the orthodox Hindus considered that the tank was polluted; therefore, they made a rite to purify it. The remedy was a mixture of milk, curd, clarified butter, cow-dung and cowurine by a Brahmin priest chanting mantra. This hurt the hearts of Depressed Classes seriously. Ambedkar himself also felt very indignant! Meantime, August 4, 1927, Mahad Municipality, in a retrograde step, revoked its earlier resolution of 1924 in which it had declared the Chowdar tank open to Depressed Classes. Before the happening events, a public committee was convened in Damodar Hall, Bombay on September 11, 1927 in order to struggle for re-establishing the right of Depressed Classes to the Mahad tank. The conference decided that the Satyagraha would be launched three months later. Accordingly, at four-thirty in the evening of December 25, over 15, 000 thousand volunteers gathered at Mahad. Addressing at the conference, Ambedkar declared the purpose of the conference that:

This conference is held to unfurl the banner of Equality, and thus may be linked to the National Assembly in France convened in 1789. Our Conference aims at the same achievement in social, religious, civic and economic matters. We are avowedly out the smash the steel frame of the caste system ..This conference has been called to inaugurate an era of equality in this land… Hindu society should be reorganised on two main principles-equality and absence of casteism.

By a forceful voice, Ambedkar laid stress on the value and the human rights of the Untouchables. He said that Untouchables did not die when they could not drink water from the Chowdar tank, but: “We want to go the tank because we are also human beings like others and want to live like human beings. We want to decide once and for all whether the Untouchable community falls under Hinduism or not.”

The Conference also ruthlessly condemned the Manusmriti as a source and symbol of inequality, cruelty and injustice, which perpetuated their social, economic, religious, and political slavery. It was responsible for the downfall of the Depressed Classes through its discriminatory ideas of low and high. After his address, the Conference passed a number of revolutions aimed at the social, religious, and political upliftment of the down-trodden people. One of those was a resolution which condemned the Manusmriti. The revolution read that the Manusmriti, comparing this Hindu Law with other laws in other civilized countries that recognized the rights of men. The Manusmriti was not entitled to any respect and did not deserve to be called a sacred book. Furthermore, it insulted the persons of low castes and deprived them from the rights of human being as well as crushing their personality. Because of these things, the Conference resolved to burn a copy thereof. Accordingly, at nine o'clock that night, the attendants of the Conference threw the copy of Manusmriti into the bonfire in front of pandal to burn it.

The burning of the Manusmriti was an action of great daring. It was considered an attack on the very foundations of Hinduism. At the end of the Conference on the following day, Ambedkar said that, he was very joyful to see his followers launching the attack in vindication of their rights and honour. He emphasised with his people that "nothing valuable in this world is achieved except by great efforts." He was true, the case of Satyagraha ran several years with pains and troubles, finally achieved success. The Bombay High Court decided in favour of the Untouchable on 17 March 1937.

The Mahad struggle along with the bonfire of Manusmriti had a profound influence upon the Untouchables all over the country. They realised that they were not alone, but they had their brothers who were ready to respond to their call in times of danger. Therefore, it was possible for them to organise the resistance as well as to challenge the injustices. To the Hindus, it was a severe blow inflicted on the orthodox section of Hindus, and caused a rude shock to them. After the event, Dr. Ambedkar was considered as a Martin Luther169 of India. Commenting upon this event, once, Ambedkar said that:

The bonfire of Manusmriti was quite intentional. It was a very cautious and drastic step, but was taken with a view to force the attention of caste Hindus. At intervals, such drastic remedies are necessary. If you do not knock at the door, none opens it. It is not that all the parts of the Manusmriti are condemnable, that it does not contain good principles and that Manu himself was not a sociologist and was a mere fool. We made a bonfire of it because we view it as a symbol of injustice under which we have been crushed across centuries. Because of its teachings, we have been ground down under despicable poverty, and so we made the dash, staked all, took our lives in our hands and performed the deed.

According to K. N. Kadam, the Untouchables’ Satyagraha of drawing water from the public tank and burning the copy of Manusmriti expressed two significant meanings. Firstly, it proved the will of people to exercise their common civic rights. Secondly, it demonstrated their ideological revolt against to the injustice, inequality and inhumanity. This was also a reminder for those who thought that they can conquer and control others forever. Nothing in the world can last forever if it is built on the foundation of inequality.

Members of Bombay Provincial Committee

On February 3, 1928, the Indian Statutory Commission or Simon Commission (after Sir John Simon became its chairperson) arrived in India. The Commission was all-British without any Indian member. This naturally was resented by most Indian organisations and they declared to boycott the Commission. Because of this, the Commission changed its direction. It approached to those who did not boycott it like some Muslims, the Justice Party in Madras, a small group of Liberals and the Depressed Classes. The Congress Party convened the All Parties Conference in February and later in May. As a result, a Committee was founded under the leadership of Motilal Nehru to draw up a constitution for independent India. It was noticed that, the Constitution drafted by Motilal Nehru and his colleagues mainly made a bridge between the Hindus and the Muslims of India. It did not make any special provision for the representation of the Depressed Classes in the legislatures.

In June 1928, Ambedkar was appointed a professor at the Government Law College in Bombay. In August of the same year, he established the Dalit Jati Shikshan Samiti. The Dalit Jati Shikshan Samiti Trustee Board consisted of Ambedkar, Dr. Solankar, Meyaer Nissim, and Shankar Shayenna. Ambedkar‘s plan was welcomed by the Government, so it granted a sum of Rs. 9000 for hostels of the Untouchable students. Besides, Ambedkar also approached the Hindus, Parsis, Muslims and Christians for aid on that humanitarian ground.

In order to co-operate with the Simon Commission, the Central Government appointed a Committee for all British India and every Legislative Council elected its Provincial Committee to work with the Commission. On this occasion, on August 3, 1928, Ambedkar was selected as one of members of Bombay provincial committee. Because he co-operated with the Simon Commission, he was dubbed a British stooge, a Judas, a ghoul and a traitor. Also because of this, his students at Government Law College boycotted his class; one of them even denounced him. Ambedkar was undeterred with their objections, because he understood what he was doing. What he was doing was not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of those who were depressed in society. As a member of the Bombay provincial commission, he appeared before the commission to give evidence of the terrible conditions in which the Depressed Classes subjected to live, such as they were boycotted by the entire village when they tried to get admission in schools, or they had to sit in the varandha at schools. The services of DepressedClasses were very low in villages while the police inclined to favour the patils instead of helping keep the. Before the Commission, he explained that the authorities at villages and districts failed to implement the resolution and decision of the legislative councils. Therefore, the Depressed Classes must demand a share in political power. As a member of Select Committee, Ambedkar supported a combined electorate made up of all adults but opposed the separate electorate for the Muslims. He considered that the separate electorate and communal protection were against the principle of democracy; instead, the seats should be preserved proportionally amongst communities.

The Simon Commission, after a long fight, finally published its 17-volume report in May 1930. It proposed the abolition of dyarchy and the establishment of representative government in provinces. It also recommended separate electorates. The Untouchables may be included in 150 seats of the Hindus (out of 250 seats in the Central Legislature), i.e. 60 percent with a condition that the candidates of Depressed Classes had to be certified or testified their fitness by the Governor of concerned provinces. The content of the Simon Commission did not only ignore the Report drafted by Motilal Nehru but was also blatantly anti India the whole.

When the report of the Simon Commission was published, Ambedkar was busy leading the Kalaram temple entry movement at Nasik around March of 1930. Subsequently, he presided over the Depressed Classes Congress at Nagpur on August 8, 1930. He made a speech criticizing the British colonial misgovernment that created famines so that thousands of people died. He also criticised the Simon Commission about the business of certifying candidates from the Depressed Classes and called it a stupid provision. According to him, political power itself could not pave the way for liberation but it needed to achieve in the context of political and social reforms. He said with his people that, political power could not be a panacea for the ills of the Depressed Classes, but social elevation was an ultimate remedy for liberation from the various kinds of humiliations and injustices of the world. The Untouchables needed education and improvements in their lives: "The movement of social reform will result in the emancipation of our people and the establishment of such a state of society in this country of ours in which, one man have one value in all domains of life, political, social and economic."

Ambedkar was exhausted preparing for all the activities he participated in promoting the rights of the untouchables. He suddenly fell unconscious one day when he was speaking. Even in this state, people around him heard he constantly mumbled about the independent and united India with a free and egalitarian society.

Satyagraha of Temple Entry

The year 1930 was a milestone in the history of Indian. That was the year which there were two Satyagrahas occurred. While Gandhi fought for the political freedom of the Indians, Ambedkar struggled for the social emancipation of the Untouchables. Two movements practised a non-violent method and shared a common goal.

On March 12, 1930, Gandhi launched Satyagraha or massive civil disobedience movement to protest against the Salt Law (salt was a monopoly of the government and no one was allowed to make salt) without the permission of the British government. The Civil Disobedience Movement carried forward the unfinished work of the Non-Cooperation Movement. Practically the whole country became involved in it. The movement was controlled and suppressed by British troops all over the country. Some of the Congress leaders were imprisoned and a lot of Satyagrahees were killed. Anyway, the Satyagraha raised a growing tide of support for India’s freedom struggle across the world.

At almost at the same time, on Sunday, March 2, 1930, Ambedkar started the Temple entry movement at Nasik after three months of painstaking and meticulous preparations. Firstly, they had informed the trustees of the Kalaram temple that they would start the Satyagraha if the trustees of temple continued to prevent the Untouchables from entering Kalaram to worship Shri Rama their God. There were about 15000 participants including volunteers, representatives and some Brahmins like Deorao Naik, Rajbhoj, Pradhan, Shivtarkar and Shri B. G. Kher (the last one was the first Premier of the Bombay Province in 1937) assembled in a specially erected padal at Nasik. The Untouchables made a peaceful procession headed toward the Temple. However, the District Magistrate, police and official entourage barred them at all gates of the temple. Even, a contingent of the Bombay police and armed police were posted there to stop the processions. At 11 pm that night, the leaders of Untouchables discussed again and they decided to launch a non-violent struggle before the gates of the temple. They altered each other to sing bhajans at the four gates of the temple while the gates were still closed and barricaded. The Satyagraha kept going on for about a month. April 9 was the day of the chariot procession of the image of Rama. There was a compromise between the caste Hindus and the Untouchables. Accordingly, the strong men of both sides would be elected to draw the chariot. However, when the Untouchables tried to pursue the chariot, they received showers of stones that made many were injured. Ambedkar was also injured in that riotous crowd. Although Dadasaheb Gaekwad, a Dalit leader of Nasik came to advised Ambedkar to leave the crowd at one, he replied that he was not a person who believed in saving his life when his own people were at risk.

During the movement, the Dalit agaitators remained generally non-violenct. On the contrary, some Hindus in Nasik retaliated harshly. They went to the extent of expelling children of the Untouchables from schools, closing the roads for them and not allowing them to buy articles from the local markets.

Gandhi was requested to support the movement, but he denied justifying it. He argued that Satyagraha was to be used against foreigners and not against the countrymen. Some other enlightened Brahmins like Dr. Kurtakoti and Dr. Moonje made effort to heal the breach, but they failed to attain their purpose. The Temple Entry Satyagraha continued for over five years in vain. Kalaram temple continued to be closed to the Untouchables until October 1935 as Ambedkar proclaimed to denounce Hinduism.

Round Table Conferences and the Poona Pact

From the year of 1930, most of political forces of Britain supported the idea of an independent India. At the same time, they had to face the wide opposition of Indian towards the Simon Commission Report. In order to discuss these issues as well as listening to the ideas of Indian politicians, the British Government convened the Round Table Conferences in London. The conference included three secessions in years 1930, 1931 and 1932 to frame the constitution and to decide the future of India. These Conferences were not only important for Indian nation the whole but also for the Untouchables. The conferences had representatives of most the main Indian political parties, the British Government and the British Political parties. Ambedkar and Rao Bahadur Srinivasa were invited by the Viceroy to attend the Conferences as representatives of the Indian Depressed Classes.

On the eve of Ambedkar’s departure for England, he had a meeting with Untouchables in Bombay. He said that he would demand the right for his people and uphold the demand for Swaraj. He also promised with his people that he would meet leaders and representatives of nations to discuss the problem of suppressed people in India.

If the Satyagraha of the Chowdar Tank did not aim at drinking water indeed, the Satyagraha for temple entry also did not aim at religious purpose but “to vindicate the elementary civic rights of the Depressed Classes which has Hindus they were fully entitled to and to show that their presence did not defile the temples/deities nor contaminated tank water (D. K. Baisantry, Ambedkar – the Total Revolutionary, New Delhi:

Gandhi and the Indian National Congress boycotted the first session of Round Table conference while Ambedkar attended all three. At each conference, he forcefully projected his views in the interest of the Untouchables.

At the first Round Table Conference, Ambedkar delivered a touching and appealing speech of which he pointed out before the conference the fact that a large number of people of British India were reduced to the position of serfs. He criticized the British Government for failing to bring any change in the condition of Depressed Classes. He said:

The number of Untouchables, whom I represent here, is one-fifth of the total population of India – or equal to the population of England or France. But those brethren of mine are worse than slaves. Even as the slaves’ masters would touch them, it is sin to touch us. Before the British, we were in the loathsome condition due to our untouchability. Has the British Government done anything to remove it? Has the British Government secured us the right to draw water from the well now? Before the British, we could not enter the temple. Can we enter now? Before the British, we were denied entry into the police force. Does the British Government admit us into the force? Before the British, we were not allowed to serve in the military. Is that career now open to us? None of these questions can be given an affirmative answ er. Although 150 years of British rule have rolled away, our condition remains as it is. What do we gain from the government?

Ambedkar’s speech impressed all the delegates at the Conference. The author Vijay Kumar Pujari observed that the speech of Ambedkar “contained anguish, enthusiasm, a clear exposition of the prevailing condition, a dauntless criticism of the British Government, a proposition of the rights of the Untouchables, and support for freedom of his country.” In the speech, Ambedkar also required the bureaucratic form of Government in India should be replaced by the government of the people, by the people and for the people.

In order to draw the outlines of the fundamental principles of the future system of government, the RTC appointed nine sub-committees, and Ambedkar was a member of them. Right after that, the representative of the Untouchables began to prepare a memorandum and submitted it to the Minority Sub-Committee. In the memorandum, Ambedkar demanded the separate electorate and reserved seats for the Untouchables. Fighting for the benefits of Untouchables, Ambedkar said that the Untouchables must be given the rights of equal citizenship in common with other citizenship of the State. The penalties and discrimination in laws based on caste had to be abolished. Besides that, Ambedkar also required employment of Depressed Classes in the public services and the recruitment of the police force, naval force and the army. In order to safeguard these rights, according to Ambedkar, it demanded adequate representation in the legislatures and the right to elect their own men as their representatives by separate electorates for Untouchables. He said that: "We feel nobody can remove our grievances as well as we can, and we cannot remove them unless we get political power in our own hands. I am afraid the Depressed Classes have waited too long for time to work its miracle

." Besides the official speech at the Conference, Ambedkar also attempted other means to spread his message. He contributed to foreign newspapers, gave interviews to reporters, held discussions with diplomats of different countries etc. Through these occasions, Ambedkar exposed the discrimination and injustice that the Untouchables were subjected to within the Hindu society. By this way, he drew the world’s attention to the practice of the untouchability in India.

The first session of the Round Table Conference ended on January 19, 1931. When Ambedkar arrived in Bombay, he received a splendid reception by Ambedkar Seva Dal and the Untouchables in general. He reported his activities at the RTC to the conference of the Untouchable leaders. As a result of his efforts, the Government of Bombay announced that the Police Department would be thrown open for recruitment to the Depressed Classes. And Ambedkar was appointed a Member of the Bombay Council. The Depressed Classes definitely improved their political image in India and the reputation of Ambedkar increased. The Indian Daily Mail wrote that Ambedkar was a patriot and rightly interested in securing his Government. The Mail added that, “in the future discussion which will centre on the franchise, on the Senate and the Federal Assembly, this brilliant representative of the depressed classed is certain to play a most important part.” The significant development in the political situation of the country created a visible change in the attitude of the Congressmen and the role of the Depressed Classes was an issue that had to be addressed.

On January 26, 1931, the Congress leaders were released from jail. On March 5, 1931, the Gandhi-Irvin pact was signed. Accordingly, the Civil Disobedience Movement was postponed and Gandhi consented to attend the second Round Table Conference. Before the second session of the Round Table Conference, Gandhi invited Ambedkar to his place in Manibhuvan. Gandhi’s purpose was to convince Ambedkar not to oppose to the Congress, especially on the issue of political separation of the Untouchables from Hindu fold. Gandhi complained that the Congress had spent 24 lakhs rupees to uplift the Untouchables and why would Ambedkar keep struggling against him and the Congress? Ambedkar replied that the said amount that the Congress allotted to the upliftment of the Untouchables was sheer sham and humbug. In fact, there had been no change of heart in the Congressmen. The Congress gave more importance to organization than principles. If the Congress was sincere, the Nasik District Congress Committee president would not have opposed the temple-entry of the Untouchables. Therefore, Ambedkar said that he would never trust in the Congress and the Hindus. He further told Gandhi that he had no homeland. When Gandhi said that Ambedkar in fact had his homeland, he bitterly repeated that he was without it. He explained that a religion and a country that treated him (and his people) worse than dogs and cats, a religion and a country that would not allow them to drink water at the public places, could not possibly be considered his homeland. Therefore, instead of receiving the upliftment from others, he and his people should rather self-uplift. In meeting of Depressed Classes after that, Ambedkar told his people that Mr. Gandhi and the Congress would not do anything for them, so they had to fight as best they could for their rights. "Power and prestige will come to you through struggle,"195 he encouraged his followers.

The second session of Round Table Conference witnessed several verbal encounters between Ambedkar on the one side and Gandhi on the other side. Mahatma Gandhi in his speech on September 15, 1931 claimed that the Indian National Congress was the sole representative of all Indian interests, religions and castes. Therefore, he disagreed to provide special representation to the Untouchables. He said that Indian National Congress would protect the Untouchables when the Untouchables stayed in the Hindu religion. Adding to the Gandhi’s idea, Madan Mohan Malaviya expressed his opinion that if the country had spent enough money to wipe out illiteracy in the country, the term “Depressed Classes” would cease to exist. However, the argument of Malaviya was not practical and therefore was not adopted. With his quick wit and experience, Ambedkar pointed out that, even possessing the highest academic qualification from well-known centres of learning in USA, Britain and Germany, he was still an untouchable. Therefore, Ambedkar maintained continued to demand special representation for Untouchables that was equally provided to other minorities, such as Muslims, Christians, Anglo-Indian and Sikhs.

The British Government supported the idea of separate electorates and on 14th of August, the British Premier had announced the Communal Award, which granted separate electorates for Depressed Classes, and it would be incorporated into the constitution for Government of British India. This was the victory for Ambedkar. However, Gandhi felt that separate electorates would separate the Harijans from the Hindus and this division of Hindus pained him grievously. He informed the British Premier J. Ramsay MacDonald that he started a fast unto death to fight against the Communal Award.

Gandhi’s announcement of a fast created an atmosphere of resentment and anxiety. The leaders engaged in hectic efforts to save Gandhi’s life. However, only Babasaheb could save Gandhi’s life, by withdrawing the demand for separate electorates. Ambedkar felt annoyed with Mahatma Gandhi’s announcement of a fast. He complained that, while Muslims, Christians and Sikhs had obtained the right of separate electorates, Gandhi did not fast to oppose them, why then should Gandhi fast to oppose the Harijans getting separate electorates. Ambedkar said that, Gandhi’s fast until death against the Dalits was regrettable. Anybody had a right to save Gandhi’s life as he wished, but he himself would not do anything against the interests of the Dalits in order to save Mahatma Gandhi’s life. He considered that fighting for the Untouchables was his duty and he would not deviate from that direction. Even he was hung on a lamppost he would not betray the equitable interests of his people.

Later, Ambedkar visited Gandhi at Yeravda jail. Gandhi persuaded him that Hinduism would change and leave its bad practices behind. He entreated Ambedkar to give Hinduism the last chance to expiate its past sins. "You are Untouchables by birth and I am by adoption. We must be one and indivisible. I am prepared to give my life to avert the break-up of the Hindu community," said Gandhi. Gandhi added that he was preparing a referendum on the issue and it may be held in a period not exceeding five years. “Five years or my life,” Gandhi entreated Ambedkar and the latter was deeply moved by these words. The moral pressure compelled him to soften his stand. Moreover, Ambedkar feared that if Mahatma Gandhi died due to the fast, there would be a severe reprisal against the Depressed Classes by the upper caste Hindus. Finally, he accepted Gandhi's suggestion. There was a compromise between two leaders. Instead of separate electorates, a generous number of reserved seats were given to the Untouchables.

The Poona Pact, also known as the Gandhi-Ambedkar Pact, was signed at 5 pm on Saturday, September 24, 1932; and endorsed by the British Government two days later. Right after that, Mahatma Gandhi gave up his fast. Yet, the Poona pact created resentment with both sides of Hindus and Untouchables. The Dalit politicians naturally were not happy while many high caste Hindus resented with the generous reserved seats for the Untouchables. In fact, this concession of Ambedkar was considered against the cause of the Untouchables, and surrendered the rights of the Dalits. Because of this action, Ambedkar received severe criticisms by his people. Some of them even went to extent of calling him the betrayer of the cause of the Untouchables. He himself said that this was the biggest blunder of his life.204 And because of this his blunder, the Dalits remain oppressed.

If the Gandhi’s fast drew attention of the entire country, Ambedkar’s decision of withdrawing the right of separate electorate for the Untouchables also attracted the attention of the masses equally. It can be said that, Gandhi’s fast was successful, and the action of withdrawing the right of separate electorate for the Untouchables was a noble concessions of Ambedkar to save the life of Gandhi. The resonance of all of these events made an impact on the question of the abolishing untouchability. Therefore, following the signing of the Poona Pact, the Congress leaders held a meeting on September 25, 1932. The meeting resolved that, in the future no one in the Hindu caste would be considered as untouchable by birth, and those who have been considered untouchable would have the right to used wells, schools, roads and other public institutions like other Hindus. The meeting also read that, all Hindu leaders had a duty to remove legally and peacefully the social restrictions on the so-called Untouchable Hindus regarding their temple entry etc owning to old customs. The resolution on prevention of untouchability was passed at the meeting, the “Asprishyata Nivarak Sangh” or All India Anti Untouchability League was formed under the inspiration of Mahatma Gandhi to remove untouchability in society. Gandhi himself took a 21 days fast to support and encourage the activities for abolishing untouchability. He also travelled over India during ten months to popularise the Untouchability Prevention Movement and to raise fund for liberating the Untouchables.

As a result of above activities, there was a visibly change in society. In some places, the doors of temples were opened to the Untouchables and their restrictions in public places were relaxed too. However, its result was very limited. The nationwide tour of Gandhi to popularise the Untouchability Prevention Movement was mostly done in urban areas but not in the villages. Even in the cities, where it was possible, it achieved success in limited areas only. The funds raised by Gandhi for liberating the Untouchables attained eight lakhs rupees. Comparing with crores of rupees, which had been raised in the name of dead men, eight lakhs rupees for six crores of the Untouchables was not a commendable amount. In addition, the activity of the “Asprishyata Nivarak Sangh” only focused on elevating the educational, economical and social advancement of the Untouchables, whereas the abolishment of untouchability encompassed the provision of civil rights and equal facilities to them, such as the inter-caste dinning and wedding. Therefore, it can be said that, the activities of the Sangh distracted from its initial aim. Realizing the half-hearted method of the Sangh, Ambedkar on his way to London to attend the third Round Table Conference, wrote to A. V. Thakkar, the secretary of the Sangh, a letter. In the letter, he mentioned that, the objective of the Sangh was not to help a few Untouchables only, but to enhance the living standards of the entire Untouchable community as well as bringing about a social revolution in Hindu society. “The Untouchables must get equal civil rights and equal facilities. The Sangh must take direct action for that.” Such aspiration of Ambedkar was reasonable and legitimate. They helped the Untouchables to attain the dignity like others in society, not only beg charity from the upper caste Hindus. However, Ambedkar’s proposal was not addressed. Instead of focusing on the annihilating of castes as requested by Ambedkar, Gandhi seemed more interested in giving the Untouchables a respectable name. He declared that the Untouchables should be known Harijans (Children of God). So, the Asprishyata Nivarak Sangh was renamed Harijan Sevak Sangh or the Servants of Untouchables Society. Ambedkar realised that he could do nothing with the Sangh, which was under the control of the high caste Hindus. He then left.

On November 7, 1932, Ambedkar left India for London for the third Round Table Conference. While Ambedkar was taking part the third Round Table Conference in England, the issue of Temple Entry Movement once again occurred at Guruvayur temple in the State of Calicut. The ruler of Calicut adamantly refused to throw the gate of the temple open to the Untouchables. On this case, Shri Ranga Iyer, an orthodox South Indian Brahmin, compelled to introduce The Untouchability Abolition Bill in the Central Assembly. Other similar Bills also were represented by some other members of the Central Assembly. The orthodox Hindus were vehemently opposed to the Bills, and even the government was not favourably inclined to it. However, Gandhi supported the Bills and wanted Ambedkar to do so.

When Ambedkar returned to Bombay on January 23, 1933, Gandhi immediately took a telegram to request Ambedkar to meet him. Ambedkar met on February 4 in Yaravada jail. Gandhi requested Ambedkar to support the said Bills. Ambedkar, who was used to holding Satyagrahas for the temple-entry, appeared to be indifferent to the matter this time. “Owning to a lax of approach of the Harijan Sevak Sagha towards removing untouchability and Gandhi’s confusion and vainly utopian views about the innate Varna, Ambedkar could not bring himself to co-operate with him.” Ambedkar began to feel that Gandhi could not be regarded as a true well-wisher of the Untouchables. He therefore refused to join Gandhi’s temple-entry movement. Moreover, temple entry now was not the Untouchables’ ultimate goal any longer. As the caste system was not being eradicated, the Untouchables would continue to be looked down, even if they could enter the temples. Therefore, Ambedkar politely but firmly told Gandhi that, due to the Bills did not condemn the untouchability as a sin, therefore, he would not do anything about them even if the Viceroy approved them. Before the firm attitude of Ambedkar, Gandhi explained that the Hindu caste system, in fact, was not the bad one. The touchable Hindus would expiate their sins and purify Hinduism. And if the throwing open of temple for the Untouchables takes place, the Untouchables would rise in society. Ambedkar did not agree with Gandhi, because temple-entry was not the ultimate goal of the Untouchables. No matter the temple opened to them or not, the Untouchables would regard themselves as indus only when the ideology of caste was abandoned and wiped out from the Hindu scriptures. Gandhi and other Hindu reformers could not accept this demand. What the Untouchables needed was not to ask for little charity of the high caste Hindus, but the dignity of human beings. Ambedkar stressed:

I think I must ask the Hindus to show me some sacred authority, which would rule out this feeling of lowliness. If it cannot be, I should say goodbye to Hinduism... I am not going to be satisfied with measures, which would merely bring some relief... I do not want to be crushed by your charity.

White Paper

The result of three sessions of Round Table Conference was collected and summarized into a document named the White Paper. The White Paper comprised certain proposals for bringing about reforms in the Indian Constitution. It was issued in March 1933 and debated in Parliament soon afterwards. Soon after the White Paper had been issued, the British India announced the names of delegates who would be invited to the Joint Committee, and Ambedkar was one of them. Before leaving for London, Ambedkar held hectic consultations with other delegates and his followers. He also had an interview with Mahatma Gandhi in Yeravada jail. He departed on April 24, 1933 and reached London on May 6, 1933.

Though his schedule in London was very hectic and his time was very busy, he did not forget to try to help his old benefactor, Shri Keluskar who was at that time an old man living in poverty. He sent a petition to the Maharaja of Baroda appealing that he grant Shri Keluskar a monthly pension, so that this noble person could pass his last days in reasonable comfort.

At the formal conference in London, the Indian delegates of the Joint Committee decided to appoint a committee to expose before the British Government the defects in the White Paper. At this conference, Ambedkar once again placed the issue of the separate electorates for the Untouchables before the fellow Indian delegates. Dr. Moonje, a well known Hindu Mahasabha leader agreed with Ambedkar‘s viewpoint, but the very Hindu leaders who had enthusiastically welcomed the Poona Pact, did not agree. The Joint Committee finished its talks on November 1933 supporting the White Paper and appointing a Sub-committee to draft the future Constitution of India. On January 8, 1934, Ambedkar returned to Bombay. Here, he had an interview in which he said that the proposals made in the White Paper were accepted. However, in the interest of the Untouchables, they had to agitate for more rights than the ones that had been guaranteed in the White Paper.

The tension of works during these years made Ambedkar exhausted. He was almost on the verge of a nervous breakdown. He needed take rest and to have medicine treated, so he travelled to Bordi and then Mahbalestwar. When he came back to Bombay, he was very happy that the Bill sponsored the Draft Constitution was to be placed before the British Parliament very soon, in which the Untouchables, for the first time, were vested with the right to vote. His mission, therefore, was considered to be partially successful. In June 1934, he worked as a part time professor in the Government Law College in Bombay. At the same time, he embarked upon building a house where he could live and preserve the vast collection of his books. The house was completed in 1936-37 and named Rājagiha. This library of Ambedkar was considered one of the biggest and the richest private library in the country with more than fifty thousand volumes. Madan Mohan Malviya had once offered Ambedkar two lakh of rupees for his library, but he declined the offer. After his departure in 1956, the library would be used by the People’s Education Society for the purpose of education.

The Death of Ambedkar’s Wife and Pandharpur for Everybody

By this time, the health of his wife worsened. Although he tried his best to get her treated there was little hope. She died on May 27, 1935. More than 10, 000 people attended her funeral. As a religious woman, she wished to make a pilgrimage to Pandharpur, a holy place in Maharashtra where hundreds of thousand Hindu believers make pilgrimage to in devotion every year. However, Ambedkar did not allow her because he feared that they would not be permitted to enter the temple. He consoled her that he would someday create another Pandharpur, where everybody could pray equally, for her. Unfortunately, she died before fulfilling her wish.

The announcement of Conversion

After the Poona Pact, Gandhi and Hindu leaders had a meeting in Bombay, announcing an active movement to remove untouchability. They created the Harijan Sevak Sangh for the purpose of educating and training the Untouchables in various skills. However, on the other hand, Gandhi also started propounding the Varna system according to birth. Accordingly, the status of the Untouchables would be transferred from the Untouchable atishudras to Touchable atishudras. This meant their status was still the lowest among the lowly in the Varna system. What had occurred at Satyagraha, Round Table Conferences, the Harijan Sevak Sangh and the attitude of Gandhi allowed Ambedkar to recognise that the Hindus were not sincere in resolving the problem. It was impossible to attain the right of equality within the Hindu fold. He came to believe that the problem of the Depressed Classes could not be solved by social or political means. Therefore, the idea of conversion to a new religion began to seize Ambedkar’s mind:

We tried everything to acquire an equal status in Hindu society and conducted Satyagraha, but that was of no avail. The Hindu society has no room for equality. Only by quitting Hindu religion will our condition be improved. Conversion is the only way for our emancipation.”

Actually, from the year 1929, at the Jalgaon conference, Ambedkar had advised his people to accept any other religion of their choice if they were not unable to bear sufferings as Hindu Untouchables; however, he himself had not decided whether he would remain in or leave Hinduism. Then on October 13, 1935, Ambedkar presided over the Conference in Yeola, Nasik District with the attendant of 10,000 Untouchables who came from various parts of the country. In his over an hour and a half speaking at the conference, Ambedkar narrated the stories of miseries heaped upon the Untouchables by the caste Hindus in all lifestyles, economic, social, education, political and religious. He pointed out that, in spite of these hardships and struggle by the Untouchables, the upper caste coreligionists were not prepared to grant them the minimal civil rights or allow them to live honourable lives in the Hindu fold. Therefore, he advised the Depressed Classes to abandon all agitations as well as for temple-entry privileges that they had been waging for last five years in vain; instead, they should leave Hinduism entirely and embrace another religion which would give them an honourable and equal status. Ambedkar himself declared before 10,000 delegates at the Conference as follows:

Because we have the misfortune of calling ourselves Hindus, we are treated thus. If we are members of another Faith, none would dare to treat us so. Choose any religion, which gives you equality of status and treatment. We shall repair our mistake now. Unfortunately for me I had been born a Hindu Untouchable. It was beyond my power to prevent that. But I declared that it is within my power to refuse to live under ignoble and humiliating condition. I solemnly assure you that I will not die as a Hindu."

He would further repeat his message at public meetings across India. This was the first time Ambedkar officially stressed the importance and necessity of conversion for his people who were only known as ‘Untouchables’ within the fold of Hinduism. However, Ambedkar also advised his followers that they should be very careful in choosing their new faith to avoid something regretted

The announcement of religious conversion of Ambedkar shocked people and created different reactions in Indian society. In the Hindu world, Gandhi and other leaders expressed their regret in the matter. They condemned the resolution as an unfortunate one and appealed Ambedkar to withdraw his decision. The leaders of contemporary religions such as Muslim, Christian, Sikh and Buddhism called him to joint their religion with favouring promises. He told the delegation in Nasik that he would wait for five years before implementing his decision to convert. During these five years, if the upper caste Hindus would instituted real and positive changes for Untouchables, not by mere words but of a real change of heart, he would be willing to reconsider his decision.

Election Campaign

The Government of India Act of 1935 was passed on the basis of the report of the Simon Commission, the outcome of the Round Table Conferences and the White Paper issued by the British Government in 1933. This Act contained many important changes over the previous Act of 1919. The Act promised provincial Autonomy to the people of British India and announced the elections to the provincial assemblies that would be held in 1937. This was the first occasion people of British India had to elect their representatives in various provinces by adult franchise. Therefore, from the beginning of 1935, political leaders of different parties started their activities to get supporters for the coming election. Ambedkar, in last few years, very disillusioned by the attitude of the upper caste Hindus, especially after the fade of Poona Pact, tried to set up a political party to continue to pursue an election-based strategy. In this atmosphere of the year of 1935, he rallied his friends and lieutenants and founded a new party, the Independent Labor Party (ILP) in August 1936. The ideology of ILP, as its name indicated, was not confined to the Untouchables, but extended to all laborers in all hues of society. Its main purposes were to reform socially and meet the immediateneeds as well as voiced the grievances of the landless persons, poor tenants, agriculturists and industrial workers.

Ambedkar felt that he needed some rest and change in order to equip himself better for the forthcoming election, so he made a trip abroad. On November 11, 1936, he left for Geneva. From there, he traveled to Vienna, Berlin and then London. He returned to Bombay on January 1937. Immediately, he started his election campaign in the districts of Bombay. He explained the purpose and objectives of the Independent Labor Party to audients. He also further courted the support of enlightened candidates of other parties such as L. B. Bhopatkar, the leader of Democratic Swaraj, N. C Kelkar, etc who admired Ambedkar a lot and favorably responded to his appeal.

The Election took place on February 17, 1937 and declared its results some days later. The Indian National Congress emerged in power in all the provinces except Bengal, Punjab, and Sindh. The All Indian Muslim League failed to form a government in any provinces. Ambedkar came out victorious by beating his rival by a large margin of votes. It was remarkable that among seventeen candidates put up by Ambedkar, fifteen candidates were elected. The success raised a wave of delight among the Dalits of Maharashtra. An another good news for the Untouchables was that, on March 17, 1937, the Bombay High Court delivered a verdict regarding to the use of water of Chowdar Tank for Untouchables.

On July 19, 1937, the Congress formed a government in the province of Bombay. One of articles of a new Bill recommended the term Harijan (People of God) to be used for the Untouchables. Ambedkar and Dadasaheb Gaekwad, a Dalit leader in Nasik, criticised the Bill. Gaekwad said that, if the Untouchables were the People of God, were the Touchable Hindus assumed to belong to the monsters? According to Ambedkar, it was no use only giving the Untouchables a sweet name. The change of the name would not result in real change in their condition. Instead of changing the name, something practical should be done to ameliorate their condition. Most of other Untouchables also opposed the term Harijan; however, it was thrust on them by the other Hindus castes because they controlled the overwhelming majority of the Congress members in the Assembly.

Ambedkar and the Working Class

As we mentioned earlier, when Ambedkar founded the Independent Labor Party, he already included the working classes within his Party. The Indian laborers in Indian society at that time, according to Ambedkar, were victims of both Brahmanism and Capitalism, the two systems dominated by the same group. Therefore, he was strongly opposed to them. At a meeting at Manmad in 1937, he said with the Untouchables workers that, “Brahmanism and Capitalism are the two enemies of labor, for these are against equality, liberty and fraternity.”

Therefore, while continuing to champion the cause of the Untouchables, Ambedkar did not forget to fight for the rights of all laborers. Also in the year 1937, when the election was in process, Ambedkar used some of his time to support several social works to protect the proper rights for the laborers in general. Under such spirit, Ambedkar introduced a Bill to abolish the Vatani custom, which made the village Mahars serve with public works as slaves around the clock. He also represented another Bill to abolish the Khoti System in the Konkan region that was like a landlord system which made the famers the serfs of agricultural interests. It can be said that, Ambedkar was the first person in India to show concern about this evil policy that had been existed for the past several centuries. However, he could not get the Bills passed because he was in the opposition. On November 7, 1938, Dr. Ambedkar continued to champion for the right of workers. He held the one-day-strike for all the mill workers to oppose to the Industrial Disputes Bill issued by the Bombay Legislative Assembly. Both Ambedkar and Jamna Das Hehta considered the Bill as capitalistic which unjustly favored the industrialists at the cost of workers. The strike was successful. Thus, Ambedkar, besides his role of the leader of Depressed Classes, was also known as a respected brother and leader of the laborers.

World War II and Member of Viceroy's Executive Council

World War II broke out on September 3, 1939. The Congressmen leading by Mahatma Gandhi thought that, in the critical situation of war, the British had no choice but to acknowledge the freedom of India. Therefore, they stated that for the continued support of Britain in the war effort that the British immediately return independence to India. Ambedkar acted differently, during the Second World War; he called upon Indians to join the Army to defeat Nazism without condition.236 That was because he observed that, Nazism was another name of Fascism. The victory of Nazism would spell the doom of values like equality, fraternity and liberty. The war against Nazism was not merely a war by two great powers for territorial ambitions but it could change the order of the world. Ambedkar’s action was not to support the Britishers or to oppose to Nazism specifically, but to support the values of life and to oppose to fascism in general. Therefore, when he was appointed to the Defence Advisory Committee of the Viceroy's Executive Council in the July 1941, he exerted pressure within the military establishment for a Mahar regiment and appealed to the Mahars to join the Army in large numbers.

The British did not accept the condition of the Congress. Instead, they sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India to discuss the issue with leaders of Indian parties and communities. In fact, there was nothing new in Cripps' proposals. It mostly related to the future while offering nothing to Indian immediately. Only one thing changed and that was that the Viceroy's Executive Council would consist of Indian members during the war. On the third week of June 1942, the Viceroy and Governor General of India decided to expand his Executive Council. Ambedkar was one of these additional new members. The event of Ambedkar included in to the Executive Council was very welcomed. The times of India in Bombay appropriately pointed out that, this was the first time in the history of the country that an untouchable would have been appointed as a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council.

All-Indian Depressed Classes Conferences: Educate, Agitate and Organize

When Ambedkar arrived in Nagpur to address the All-Indian Depressed Classes Conference on July 20, 1942, he was extended a hearty reception by over fifty thousand Dalits at the station. There were about twenty-five thousand Depressed Classes Women presented at the conference too. At the conference, Ambedkar told his people that, in the present circumstances, they needed to be more organised and alert:

You have less need of an assurance from me that I will fight for the ideal. I stand in greater need of an assurance from you. You have assured me of your love and affection. It is unnecessary. I want an assurance of another kind. It is an assurance of strength, unity and determination to stand for your rights, fight for your rights and never to return until we win our rights. You promise to do your part. I promise to do mine.With justice on our side, I don’t see how we can lose our battle. The battle to me is a matter full of joy. The battle is in the fullest sense spiritual. There is nothing material or sordid in it. For our’s is a battle, not a battle for wealth or for power. It is a battle for freedom, it is a battle for the reclamation of human personality, which will continue to be suppressed and mutilated if in the political struggle the Hindus win and we lose. My final words of advice to you are educate, agitate and organize; have faith in yourselves and never lose hope. I shall always be with you as know you will be with me.”

As a result, the conference put forth the All-India Scheduled Castes Federation to gather all Untouchables into a united political party. The Government was urged to construct independent colonies for the Untouchables and appoint a Settlement Commission for the purpose.

Two days later, on July 20, in the Conference of All Indian Depressed Classes Women, Ambedkar continued to express his interest in the advancement of marginalized women. He asked them to keep free from all vice and give education to their children. He tried to remove them from all inculcating inferior complexes, at the same telling them how great they were. He also sincerely gave them intimate advices about marriage and how to make their lives better:

Don't be in a hurry to marry, marriage is a liability. You should not impose it upon your children, unless financially they are able to meet their liabilities arising from marriage. Those who will marriage will bear in mind that to have too many children is a crime. That parental duty lies giving each child a better start than its parents had. Above all, let each girl who marries stand up to her husband, claim to be her husband's friend and equal and refuse to be his slave. I am sure if you follow this advance, you will bring honour and glory to yourselves and to the Depressed Classes.

While he was in Nagpur, the Viceroy granted him the position of Labour Ministerin the Executive Council. On July 27, 1942, Ambedkar left for New Delhi to take up office. However, because of this, he was bitterly criticised by the Congress Party. At the reception held by the Depressed Classes Welfare Association on August 23, 1943 in New Delhi to honour him, he explained that, the high office had no charm for him. He would quit and go back to Bombay if he found that his effort as the Labour Member were unsuccessful in improving the conditions of the workers and toilers of the country.

By August 8, 1942, Gandhi and the Indian National Congress had launched the Quit Indian Movement, and demanded that British withdrew from India immediately. However, the movement petered out after a few months of upheaval because not many Indians supported the Movement. The British imprisoned most of the Congress leaders while hundreds of innocent people died in the violence which accompanied with the movement. Gandhi decided to go on a fast for twenty-one days (from February 10, 1943) at the Agha Khan Palace. The whole country shocked by this news brought pressure to bear on the Indian Members of the Executive Council to resign. Consequently, Sir Honi Modi and Sir N. N Sarkar tendered their resignation. Ambedkar did not follow suit because he publicly disagreed with Gandhi and the Congress Party on the issue. In addition, he felt that, as a Labour Member in Executive Council of the Viceroy, he might help the cause of the labour classes.

By 1945, the Second World War was coming to an end. The British Government was now under pressure from the United States and Russia to liberate India. Accordingly, Lord Wavell issued a Statement, known as Wavell Plan. "The Wavell Plan was designed to end the continuing political deadlock and to carry India towards greater self-government. The plan included bringing into operation, a new constitution treaty between India and His Majesty's Government." The Viceroy ordered the release of all the Congress leaders from jails and convened a conference at Simla in the last week of June 1945. Wavell also sought to resolve the political deadlock by setting up an Executive Council consisting entirely of Indians to run an interim government. Ambedkar, being a member of Viceroy's Executive Council, could not take part in it though his name was included to represent the Depressed Classes at the conference. Indeed, he sent Rao Bahadur N. Shivraj to represent him at the conference. Ambedkar tried to impress upon the Viceroy and British Government the interest of Depressed Classes. His contention was that on the basis of demography, the Scheduled castes should have three seats in the Central Executive if the Muslims had five. The Simla conference collapsed because of the difference of opinion between the Congress and Muslim League relating to the issue of their representatives. The Congress tried to prove that their party, irrespective of religion, represented all the communities living in India while the Muslim League claimed that it was the only representative party of the Muslims in India and persisted for Pakistan.

With the failure of the Simla Conference, Lord Wavell announced that the elections of the central and provincial legislature might be held in the winter of the same year. In August 1945, he went to London to take counsel. In the middle of September, he returned to India and announced the general election. All the parties rushed in to the election campaign. The Congress Party had its campaign with a slogan "Quit India", Muslim League with its "Pakistan or Perish" slogan. Other political parties such as the Hindu Mahasabha started their campaign with a slogan named "Independence and Integrity of India." The Schedule Caste Federation of Ambedkar also launched its campaign despite a lack of funds. Ambedkar addressed several meetings in Poona, Ahmedabad, Manmad, Akola, Nagpur and Madras in order to exhort the Depressed Classes to capture political power on their own. He asked his followers that they should not believe in the leading of the Congress because the Congressmen had never tried to remove their disabilities and to redress their grievances. Therefore, they should try their best to appropriate political power in their own hands.

Meanwhile, the Labour Party won in the General elections in England. This inspired hopes among Indian leaders, because the Labour Party had sympathized with the struggle for independence of Indians. In March 15, 1946, The British Government finally accepted the idea of the political independence of India. However, the announcement of the British Prime Minister Attlee on March 16, 1946 that, “We will not allow the Minority group to be an obstacle in the progress of the Majority” made Ambedkar alert and cautious. Attlee sent Sir Stafford Cripps as the leader of the delegation to India to discuss and finalize the plans for the transfer of power. The delegation reached Delhi on March 24, 1946. Atlee and his team had a discussion with leaders like Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, M. A. Jinnah, S. P. Mookerjee, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and the Nawab of Bhopal State who represented the Indian Princes. The British delegation also met Ambedkar and Master Tara Singh on April 5, 1946. In the course of his discussion, Ambedkar placed a memorandum in which he proposed some safeguards for scheduled Castes in the future Constitution as a condition for supporting an interim government. He also demanded separate elections for the Untouchables, but the Mission was not impressed. The Mission gave its verdict in the form of a State Paper, which proposed a Federation of India along with the formation of the Constitution Assembly and an Interim Government at the Centre. The Interim Government consisted of fourteen members in whom six members were from Congress, five from Muslims, one from Sikh, Indian Christian and Parsi communities was nominated by the Viceroy. However, it did not make any mention of the demand of the Scheduled Castes. Although there was a Scheduled Caste person included in the list of Muslims and one in the Congress, in fact, the demand of the Schedule Castes Federation was totally disregarded. They were not given any separate representation in the Interim Government. After the release of the State Paper, the Viceroy dissolved his Executive Council and Ambedkar came back to Bombay in the last week of May 1946.

Meanwhile Ambedkar returned to Bombay and plunged in educational activities. He established the Siddharth College in Mumbai on July 20, 1946 under the patronage of People's Education Society that he had founded on July 8, 1945. Siddharth College provided educational facilities to the underprivileged members of the great Indian Community and thereby promoting their social and economic uplift. The People's Education Society also founded the Milind College at Aurangabad in September 1951 and several institutions at various places in Maharashtra later. Ambedkar had visited these institutions quite often. He addressed the staff and students about his own experiences. Any time he visited, he always stayed in a small room instead of hotel, because he thought that it wasteful to spend money in unnecessary ways. "Ours is a society meant for poor people. I am fully satisfied with this arrangement. What I need is just Bhaji Bhakar (vegetable and bread), he said.

Interim Ministry

The Elections for the Central Legislature were held in December 1945 and the Provincial Elections held in early 1946. On August 24, 1946, the names of the Interim Ministry were announced. The list included Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, C. Rajagopalachari, Shri Sarat Chandra Bose and Jagjivan Ram. The Muslim League did not cooperate with the Viceroy in the formation of the Interim Ministry in the initial stages, therefore the Muslim posts were filled by other Muslim leaders. On that particular day, Ambedkar was attending the Working Committee of the Scheduled Castes Federation in Poona. He and his colleagues were greatly disappointed at the inadequate representation given to the Scheduled Castes in the Interim Ministry. He said that the Labor Party had let down Untouchables and betrayed their cause. In a final bid to ensure adequate representation for the Scheduled castes in the new Government of India, he left for London on October 15, 1946. The Muslim League joined the Interim Cabinet on October 26, 1946 when he was away. On reaching England, Ambedkar had detailed discussion with the British Prime Minister Attlee, the Secretary of State, Winston Churchill and several others about India. However, it soon became apparent to him that neither the British Government nor any of major British political parties were prepared to listen to his demands. There were lips, which sympathized here and there, but none of them was willing to make changes at this late date. Some advised him to adjust himself to the changed situation and to try his luck in the Constituent Assembly. Utterly distraught, he left London and returned to Bombay only in November 1946 .

On April 29, 1947, the Constituent Assembly declared that "the Untouchability in any form is abolished and in the composition of any disability on that account shall be offence." The Untouchables were in principle freed and emancipated from the stigma of untouchability. The international press praised Gandhi and the Congress party for this great achievement. However, Ambedkar’s role in this accomplishment was not duly recognized.

Architect of the Constitution

When the British Government passed the Act of Indian Independence on July 15, 1947, Nehru called upon Ambedkar to ask him whether or not he would like to join the new Cabinet of Free India as Minister of Law. Nehru promised Ambedkar that he would be given the portfolio of Planning of Development. Ambedkar accepted it and became the First Law Minister of Independent India. The Legislative Congress Party in Bombay also chose Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly. The Congress Ministry of Bombay made considerable headway in removing social injustice. It passed that Temple Entry Bill in September 1947. Temples like Vithoba at Pandharpur, Duyaneshwar at Alandi and Kalaram at Nasik were thrown opened to the Scheduled castes.

The Constituent Assembly of Independent India made Ambedkar the Chairperson of the Committee to draft the Constitution for the world’s largest democracy. Ambedkar’s vast experience in law, economics, and politics made him the bestqualified person for this task. Although there were seven members in the Draft Constitution Committee, in fact, Ambedkar had to carry single-handedly the responsibility alone. T. T. Krishnamachari, a member of the Committee said at the Constitution Assembly that, "Ultimately, the burden of drafting the constitution fell on Dr. Ambedkar and had no doubt that we are grateful to him for having achieved this task in a manner which is undoubtedly commendable".

The Draft Constitution prepared by Ambedkar was completed at the end of 1948. After completing the Draft Constitution for Independent India, Ambedkar was mostly exhausted and fell ill. He came back to Bombay in order to recuperate. Here he met Doctor Sharda Kabir and then married her. The marriage took place on Thursday, April 15, 1948 at New Delhi under the Civil Marriage Act. The Wedding was attended with a few his friends.

On November 4, 1948, he presented the Draft Constitution to the Constituent Assembly. Speaking before the Assembly, Ambedkar expressed his concern about the fu ture of India. He pointed out of the historical events of Indian and said that, India had lost its freedom only because of its divisiveness

Will history repeat itself?

This thought fills me with anxiety. This anxiety is deepened by the realization of the fact that in addition to our old enemies in the form of caste and creeds we are going to have many political parties with diverse and opposing political creeds. Will Indians place the country above their creeds or will they place creeds above country? I do not know. But this much is certain that if the parties place creeds above country our independence will be put in jeopardy a second time and properly is lost forever. This eventuality we must all resolutely guard against. We must be determined to defend our independence with the last drop of our blood.

The Draft Constitution underwent three readings by the Constituent Assembly. All the members of Constitution Assembly scrutinized the Draft Constitution very thoroughly. It was finally adopted on November 26, 1949. On this occasion, Ambedkar also delivered a speech, in which he appealed all Indians to totally discarded the caste system as well as remove the inequities in social and economic life at the earliest possible moment if they did not want to put their political democracy in peril. If not, the political democracy, which the Assembly had so laboriously built up, would be blown up by those who suffered from inequality. On the completion of the final draft of the constitution on January 24, 1 50, all members of the Constitution Assembly expressed their appreciation of the monumental work done by Ambedkar. Many members and the press hailed him as the "Modern Manu." The Gandhian, a political and economical weekly of India compared Ambedkar with the Venerable Upāli who rehearsed the Vinaya Piaka to the Buddhist convocation after the Mahāparinibbāna of Buddha.

Hindu Code Bill

Besides drafting Indian's Constitution, Ambedkar revised and submitted to the Constitution Assembly the Hindu Code Bill on October 1948. In fact, as early as 1941, the colonial government had constituted a Committee under the leadership of B. R. Rao for the purpose of revising and codifying the Hindu Law. The Committee toured the country to hear various views and drafted the Hindu Code Bill. The Bill had been in and out of the Central Assembly since 1946. Ambedkar, as a Minister of Law, took it upon himself the task of finalizing it. He made extensive modifications to the Bill, especially parts relating to join family and women's property. The Bill as amended by Ambedkar, for the first time, gave Hindu women the right to inherit property. This created a storm of controversy all over the country. Some people hailed the Bill as a revolution in nature and content. However, others who mostly were conservative lawmakers and clerics opposed it, thinking that the draft would undermine the Hindu religion and tradition at its very roots. Ambedkar himself explained that the Bill did not aim at opposition to the orthodox practices; its solo aim was to bring benefits to the country as the whole. According to him, Laws should be applied to all in society irrespective of regional and religious barriers and the government should not thrust any particular religion on people. Furthermore, he wrote an article The Rise and the Fall of the Hindu Women on the Maha Bodhi Journal, to explain that not Buddha but Hindu canons were responsible for the status of women in India.

Although Ambedkar had worked very hard in amending and re-amending several times the Hindu Code Bill, however, "it was killed and buried unwept and unsung" in the Assembly. He was hurt and deeply disappointed that the Bill was not ultimately passed. Matters reached the flashpoint when the Prime Minister Nehru expressed his unfavourable attitude to him and his Bill; Ambedkar had no option but to resign from the Cabinet in 1951. Ambedkar’s resignation from the Cabinet essentially marked the end of his political career. Though he was elected to the Rajya Sabha of Council of Bombay in March 1952 and continued as a member of the Upper House carried until the end of his life, he in fact devoted more time to the welfare of the Scheduled Castes and communities.

Conversion to Buddhism

Ambedkar leanings towards Buddhism became more prominent after 1947. In 1949, he addressed the World Buddhist Conference in Kathmandu and shared his views in a long essay titled Marxism verses Buddhism. In December 1950, he attended the World Buddhist Conference in Sri Lanka, and in the following year formed the “Bharatiya Bauddha Janasangh.” In May 1954, he again participated in the Third Conference of the World Fellowship of Buddhists in Rangoon, Burma. After the Conference, the delegates were taken to see Mandalay, the former capital of Upper Burma. Here, Ambedkar announced that he and his followers would formally embrace Buddhism in the 2500th year of the Buddhist era, i.e. in 1956. Five months after his visit to Burma, Ambedkar re-formed and registered the Indian Buddhist Society. On December 25, 1955, he installed an image of the Buddha and placed it in a temple, which was built by members of the Scheduled Caste Community at Dehu Road, near Poona built entirely by the contribution of the members of the Scheduled Caste families.

It was also during this period that Ambedkar wrote several books and commentaries on Buddhism. These included books like Bauddha Upasana Patha, Buddha and His Dharma, Revolution and Counter Revolution in India, and Buddha and Karl Marx. In May, Ambedkar was invited to talk about Why I like Buddhism by the British Broadcasting Corporation, London. The year 1956 was the 2500th Buddha Jayanti. On in this special Celebration, Ambedkar addressed a meeting at Nare Park in Bombay in May 24, 1956 and declared that he would embrace Buddhism in October.

Ambedkar arrived in Nagpur on October 14, 1956 in a silk dhoti and a white coat. Bhikkhu Chandramani assisted by four other Bhikkhus performed the initiation ceremony for Ambedkar and his wife according to traditional rites. His conversion over, Ambedkar proceeded to convert a large number (almost 500,000) of his supporters. He also prescribed 22 Oaths that were formulated by him for the converts. Ambedkar’s conversion was reported by leading newspapers such as the Indian Express of Bombay and Hitavada of Nagpur, said that Buddhism originated from India; therefore, the conversion of Ambedkar actually was a conversion to a nonVedic Indian religious system. After taking refuge in the Three Jewels at Nagpur, Ambedkar travelled to Kathmandu in Nepal to attend the Fourth World Buddhist Conference inaugurated by King Mahendra on November 15, 1956.

The Last Departure

After Nepal visit, Ambedkar’s health began to deteriorate quickly. However, neither he nor his wife who was herself a doctor suspected that his was so close. They had made plans to leave for Bombay on December 14, 1956.

However, Ambedkar passed away in his sleep on the morning of December 6, 1956. Upon hearing the news, Nehru and other leaders came to his house to pay their last respects. Meanwhile, thousands of admirers and followers assembled outside his residence and followed the funeral procession from his house to the Delhi airport. His body was then taken to Rājagiha, his residence in Bombay. Workers in most factories, railway workshops, docks and textile mills in Bombay and other places such as Nagpur and Sholapur came to stand still. Schools, colleges, and cinemas were closed. More than half million people attended the funeral and over a lakhs of people embraced Buddhism at the crematorium to fulfil the last wish of their departed Leader. At 7.30 pm on December 7, after the performance of the last rites by Buddhist monks, his son Yashwantrao lit the funeral pyre.

Conclusion

Only shortly before his last departure, he had told his close attendant Rattu that: Tell my people, whatever I have done, I have been able to do after passing through crushing miseries and endless trouble all my life and fighting with my opponents. With great difficulty, I have brought this caravan where it is seen today. Let the caravan march on despite the hurdles that my come in its way. If my lieutenants are not able to take the caravan ahead, they should leave it there, but in no circumstances should they allow the caravan to go back. This is the message to my people.According to Arun Kumar Sinha, the life of Ambedkar can be categorized into four stages. The first stage was (1919 – 1929) when Ambedkar launched an opening struggle for the untouchables to fight for their right to access to public places and utilities. The second stage (1929 – 1935) which was spent in soulsearching and mentally preparing to exist the Hindu fold. In fact he indicated this in May 1929 at Jalgaon, and again at the conference of Depressed Classes on October 13, 1935 when he declared that he was born as an untouchable but would certainly not die as a Hindu. The third stage (1935 – 1950) in which he worked for securing political, social, economic, and educated rights for the scheduled castes as means of upliftment their conditions. In the Fourth stage (1950 – 1956), Ambedkar along with a large number of the Untouchables finally converted to Buddhism.

Sinha’s categorization of Ambedkar’s political career notwithstanding, It cannot be denied that a holistic reading of his life demonstrates that Ambedkar was a multifaceted talented person. An Jurist, political leader, Buddhist activist, philosopher, thinker, chronologist, historian, orator, prolific writer, economist, scholar, editor, and a revolutionary, Ambedkar was able to bend the idea of social emancipation with the political goals of freedom and independence of India. “The Depressed Classes,” he said, “also did not lag behind in their love for India’s freedom; but they wanted the independence for their community along with the independence of the country.”

But over and above his role of a political leader. Ambedkar represented the only hope to millions of marginalized and oppressed Indians – the hope of better and egalitarian future. Rattu, his personal assistant, captures the sentiment in a moving paragraph:

Dr. Ambedkar is no more, but he is a silent force that is moulding the destiny of crores of the oppressed and depressed. He was a remarkable man who richly deserves the salute of then Indian Nation. The rise and fall of empires, passing away of mighty kings and dictators, the conquest of space and discovery of the Atom bomb – all these will fade into the dim history of the past, but the reverberating voice of Dr. Ambedkar, the fearless champion of the oppressed communities of India, will echo through the ages reminding us to serve the suffering humanity. His name will thus, forever, shine like the morning star in the skies with distinction and the future generations will adore and gratefully remember him for what he has done for the oppressed humanity and the country at large.

Nanak Chand Rattu, Last Few Years of Dr. Ambedkar, New Delhi: Amrit Publishing House,

1997, p. 217.

https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/186441/4/complete-thesis-19-100.pdf

Castes and Myths – Bust the Myths

Hinduism is a conglomeration of superstitions and myths. – Arthur Miles

Castes are unreal. Unlike other forms of discrimination which can be attributed to physical aspects (like the skin colour, disabilities, and gender, to name a few) and visible forms (like people’s economic status), caste is not based on any visible attribute.

Castes are based on the myths. The studies of myths have shown that human societies used myths to organise and to create a common communal experience for its members. Like all the stories, the myths have characters and they have their roles to play, and follow their scripts. The Hindu mythologies are all woven around the myth that some people are born privileged and some people are born without any privileges at all. The myth of Brahma as the creator of the four-fold varna system and of Krishna as the defender of that four-fold Varnashrama Dharma makes individuals to participate subconsciously depending on the roles assigned to them in the myths.

Supremacy of the Brahmans is yet another myth, which is woven into all the myths that are popular in Hindu society. The breaking of these powerful myths is a big challenge. There is an ideological India created on the basis of these myths. Hindu religion is a tribal and archaic system of thoughts and there is nothing in it which supports the modernist values like liberty, equality, and fraternity. It is really challenged by the western impact on India. It is challenged by the mighty myths that Jyotiba Phule created in which he turned the myths on their head.

There can be basically two strategies:

1. Like Phule did, turn the myths upside down, reinterpret, rewrite, and revise it to make them more accessible to the modern mind. This has been a difficult job. But yes, this is an important task, in which the myths can be used against those who have been benefited by those myths.

2. Bring in more secular myths, or destroy the myths of the past by presenting science-based universe and reality and experimentally proved facts of the world. The scheme of caste cannot stand before any scientific and sociological testimony that seeks the truth of human existence.

Author – Mangesh Dahiwale, Human Rights Activist

Theft in Caste System

When Prof. Kancha described Bania capitalism in India as social smuggling, the Banias in South threatened with violence and death threats. He had to undergo self-imposed house arrest. The word he used to describe them to express the Bania capitalism as “social smuggling”, and it seems to be a right metaphor for what has been happening in Indian economy.

It is now well documented how the Banias took advantage of the rising tide of capitalism and the advent of the British Raj in India. The Bania merchants were in fact forefront in creating neo-Hinduism through their wide financial support and some of them even gave their lives (for example, Gandhi) to save Hinduism and its heinous caste system. The Kshatriyas (the landholders) lost their power and privileges when the commercialisation of land began. When the capitalism started becoming the ideology, the aristocracy lost its power and it shifted to the merchants as they could earn huge profits by trading.

In case of India, a similar thing happened. The landholding castes, mainly farmers, lost a lot of their power, as the Banias started taking their profession to next level by their commercial activities. The commercial activities and success of Bania capitalism are based on the caste system.

The “upper castes” in India are not only stealing the privileges of the “lower castes” from the time immemorial, but the process of theft continues even till date. The Dalit Adivasi Jeevan Jyoti Foundation which is based in Noida has filed a complaint on “upper caste” taking fake caste certificates and cornering the reserved seats. The National Commission of Scheduled Caste (NCSC) found that there is a theft of the privileges. There are thousands of cases of such thefts throughout India. And guess, which state is leading the thefts of the caste certificates? Maharashtra!!

Author – Mangesh Dahiwale

The Legacy of Rishis / Munis 

Dr. Baldev Singh 

316 R Glad way, 

Collegeville, PA 19426, USA

Introduction 

Throughout human history the conquerors have justified their actions by invoking divine sanctions and declaring themselves morally, intellectually, socially and racially superior to their victims. The slave master with whip in hand standing under the shade of an umbrella used to holler at the slaves toiling under blazing hot sun, “ O you lazy bums! You so and so¾when will you learn to work hard?” The Muslims regarded the killing and coercing of kafirs (infidels, non-Muslims) to bring them into the fold of Islam as the Will of Allah. The Christians carried out genocide of native populations, enslaved them, colonized them and inflicted untold atrocities on them on the pretext of “saving the soul of heathens” and “civilizing the savages” turning the meaning of civilized “upside down”. The “soul saver”¾missionary with a Bible in hand used walk behind the Christian soldier with a gun in hand. 

Since 1947 Hindu intellectuals have started rewriting Indian history. They blame the British and Muslim rulers for the ills and the division of the Indian society. They are right, as rulers use the policy of “divide and rule” to exploit their subjects and keep them under their grip. However, they forget that their ancestors, the so-called Aryans were also invaders / conquerors who destroyed the Indus Valley Civilization of the native Indians known as Dravidians. They also turn a blind eye to the atrocious Varna Ashrama Dharma / Caste System when they project India before the conquest by Muslims as a land of peace and harmony and milk and honey¾utopia¾Ram Raj. Moreover, they regard their ancient seers / sages (Rishis / Munis) as paragon of virtues¾the fountainhead of civilization. Nothing could be further from truth than these absurd claims. 

It should be pointed out that India’s next door neighbor, Nepal, which is far worse than India in every respect, has been ruled continuously by Hindu kings since antiquity. So the problems of modern India can not be simply blamed on past Muslim and Christian rulers. 

Discussion 

Varna Ashrama Dharma / Caste System 

The ethics of the modern Hindu elite reflect the teachings of the two most renowned Hindu thinkers, Manu and Kautilya (Chanakya), who were the founders of the policy of “divide and rule” and were responsible for shaping the destiny of Hindu society. 

Permanent human inequality by birth is the summum bonum of Brahmanical ideology. The Brahmans proclaimed that Prajapati (God) created the caste-system and the Sudra as a slave of the other castes. Moreover, Prajapati was the God of Aryans only, from whom the Sudras were excluded. It was also claimed that gods do not associate with every man, but only with an Arya, a Brahman, or a Kashtriya, or a Vaisya, who can make religious sacrifices to gods. Nor one should talk with everyone, as God does not talk to everybody but only to an Arya. The order and rank of castes is eternal as the course of stars and the difference between the animal species and human race. Thus the Sudra was excluded from the domain of religion and barred from any religious activity. 

Manu claimed that Brahma (God) enacted the code of the caste system, and taught it to him and he taught it to Bhrigu and the later would repeat it to the sages. It was Manu who codified Varna Ashrama Dharma / Caste System dividing the Indian people into four castes and myriad of sub-castes. It is based on the avowed principle that “men are for ever unequal”. Caste-system is the most rigid social mechanism devised by human ingenuity to entrench human inequality and hierarchy. It raised “caste status” above “economic status” and “political status”. It compartmentalized the economy according to its own social patterns, and prevented the economic forces from attaining to their unhindered growth and stature. The caste system also made political power subservient to political patronage. In fact, the preservation of the caste or sub-castes became the over-riding motive / consideration of the Brahmanical order. 

This system was designed to serve the interests of a small minority of people, the Brahmans, at the expense of the vast majority belonging to other castes, the bulk of whom belonged to the Sudra caste. Lower still were the Antyaja (untouchables / outcastes), whose mere shadow could pollute the upper castes. The entire conquered / enslaved population of Advasis (aboriginal tribes) called Dravidians was forced into Sudra and untouchable / outcaste ranks. Never in the history of mankind such an “evil and cruel system” was conceived by intelligent but devious men for the exploitation of man by man. It took away the human dignity of vast majority of the Indians and subjected them to untold injustices and atrocities. The untouchables / outcastes were treated worse than animals for thousands of years and this is continuing in villages across India even today. 

Brahman was the kingpin of the caste system in more than one way. He was the ideologue as well as the focal point around which the system revolved. Brahman caste was like a wheel within a wheel¾ the axis of the caste-system. It was this caste which set the guidelines of the system, and determined the direction of its course. It is the Brahmans who have profited most from the system and are mainly responsible for its maintenance and furtherance. 

Sacerdotal functions were made the sole monopoly of the Brahman caste. Manu declared that Brahman alone was to teach the Vedas and a Kshatriya was never to usurp a Brahman’s functions. It was not merely an empty declaration; it became fixed rule in the caste order. Kshatriya rulers who defied the supremacy of the Brahmans were dislodged and replaced by others like the Huns (Rajputs) who replaced the old Kshatriyas. According to one legend, Parsurama, a Brahman destroyed all the Kshatriyas and installed another royal caste in their place. So the Kshatriyas were made and unmade according to the will of the Brahman. Manu has described the names of Kshatriya races, who by their omission of holy rites and disrespect for the Brahmans gradually sunk among men of the lowest of the four castes. 

The Vis (the later day Vaisyas) of the Vedas were not limited to a caste, but included everyone in the Aryan population which was not distinguished by sacerdotal functions or aristocratic rank. They formed a bulk of the free men of the Aryan nation. The caste system gradually reduced them to a derogatory social position, very near the borderline of the Sudras. According to Aitareya Brahmana Vaisya is to be lived on by another and to be oppressed at will. Bhagvadgita puts women, Sudra and Vaisya in the same category of people to whom eligibility to absolution through Bhakti (devotion) is conceded by the Lord. One explanation given for downgrading the peasants, who constituted the bulk of Vaisyas, is that ploughing involved the killing of worms and insects. If this is correct, it only serves to show how little consideration the Brahmans had for the bulk of the people of their own Aryan stock, since they could be penalized for ever on such flimsy grounds. 

The cunning Brahman invoked divine sanctions to perpetuate this system for eternity. Sacred Hindu scriptures proclaim that the caste division has divine sanction. Manu declared that the soul of one who neglected his caste-duties might pass into demon. The Bhagvadita preaches that according to the classification of actions and qualities of people, God creates the four castes. According to a passage in Mahabharta: as cisterns for cattle, as streamlets in a field, the Smriti (code of caste system) is the eternal law of duty, and is never found to fail. The Dharma-Sutras enjoined that a King has to rely on the Vedas and Dhrma Sastras for carrying out his duties. To combat Buddhism strict adherence to Dharma (caste system) and obedience to Brahmans is constantly insisted upon in Mahabharta. According to Bhgvadgita if anybody wants to quit the works and duties of his caste and adopt those of another caste, even if it would bring a certain honor to him, it is a sin, because it is a transgression of the rule. 

Next came the doctrine of Karma to desensitize people’s sense of justice and compassion against atrocities committed on the masses to enforce the caste system. According to this divine law, one reaps the fruit in this life for the deeds performed in the previous life. So, if a person is subjected to injustice and cruelty in this life, it is the due to one’s own actions in previous life, not due to the perpetrators of cruelty and injustice. By observing the caste rules strictly and serving the superior castes faithfully one can earn the reward for the next life. The Karma theory is a cruel and unconscionable joke on the Sudra and untouchable ¾ as only faithful commitment to the duties of his caste would earn him a reward in next life! 

Under the caste system some sections of the Indian population were regarded as almost bestial rather than human. The whole conquered Sudra race (Dravidians) was equated with burial ground. Aitareya Brahmana describes Sudra as “Yatha-Kama-Vadhya” (fit to be beaten with impunity) and “Dvijatisusrusha” (menial service was his prescribed lot). One text puts the murder of a Sudra on the same level as the killing of a crow, an owl or a dog. A Sudra could be killed at will. The excessive contempt, humiliation and degradation of the Sudra reached its climax in the permanent institutions of untouchability and unapproachableness. 8 The Sudra was prohibited from amassing wealth as it would subject his superiors to him. Sudra was also barred from the realm of religion and prohibited from making religious sacrifices open to other castes.8 The exploitation of the masses reduced them to the level of dumb driven cattle. 

On the other hand any kind of harm or disrespect to the Brahman is unpardonable sin and any type of crime by the Brahman is forgivable. 

According to Manu Smriti all the wealth and resources in the world belongs to the Brahmans because they are created from the mouth of Brahma (God). So it should not be construed that a Brahman is using someone else’s goods when he accepts charity from others or takes goods from others to give to someone else. 

If a king discovers a hidden treasure, he should give half to the Brahman. 

A Brahman may be an idiot or an erudite, he is god (devta). 

The king should not punish a Brahman for committing theft because it is the king’s negligence, which made the Brahman so poor that he is forced to steel. 

According to Brihat Prasar Sanhita if a Brahman wants to be a cultivator, he can have as much land as he wants without paying any kind of tax because every thing belongs to the Brahmans. 

A Brahman remains sin free even after violating the teachings of Vedas as fire destroys combustible matter to ashes or woman remains blemish free after enjoying sex with her lover. 

Al-Biruni, the celebrated mathematician and astronomer came to India in the wake of the invading forces of Mahmud of Ghazni in the 11th century AD, and he spent several years studying the Indian people and their literature. He is regarded as one of the foremost Indologist. He recorded the following information about caste system. 

The highest caste of Brahmans was created from the head of Brahman (God). The next caste of Kshatriyas was created from the shoulders and hands of Brahman. The next two castes, Vaisya and Sudra were created from the thighs and feet of Brahman, respectively. After the Sudra follow the people called Antyaja (untouchable), who render various kinds of services, who are not reckoned amongst any caste, but only members of certain craft or profession. . 

He observed that Hindus believe that people are unequal in every respect, whereas Muslims consider all men as equal, except in piety. This is the greatest obstacle, which prevents any approach or understanding between Hindus and Muslims. 

Hindus totally differ from Muslims in Religion, as Muslims believe in nothing in which Hindus believe, and vice versa. On the whole, there is very little disputing about theological topics among themselves, at the utmost they fight with words, but they will never stake their soul or body or their property to defend their religion. On the contrary, all their fanaticism is directed against those who do not belong to them¾against all foreigners. They call them mleccha, i. e. impure, and forbid having any connection with them, be it intermarriage or any other kind of relationship, or by sitting, eating, and drinking with them, because thereby they think they would be polluted. They consider as impure any thing which touches the fire and water of a foreigner, and no household exist without these two elements. 

The Brahmans teach the Veda to the Kshatriyas. The latter learn it, but are not allowed to teach it, not even to a Brahman. The Vaisya and Sudra are not allowed to hear it, much less to pronounce and recite it. If such a thing can be proved against one of them, the Brahman drags him before the magistrate, and he is punished by having his tongue cut of. 

Maitrayani Samhita identifies women with evil. The Satapatha-Brahmana declares woman, Sudra, dog and crow as falsehood. A woman is never fit for independence. Manu made the subjection of woman to man almost servile in character. He laid down the law that husband had absolute rights over the wife to the extent of inflicting corporal punishment and of discarding her immediately if she said any thing disagreeable to him. A wife was to worship her husband as a god, even though he might be destitute of virtue or is seeking pleasure elsewhere, or is devoid of good qualities. Thus the woman is reduced, at least spiritually, to the status of Sudra and this is clearly reflected even in Bhagvadgita. 

The system of Sati (one who burns herself alive on her husband’s funeral pyre) is not recommended by Dharmsastra, or by earlier Smritis, but the practice is very old one. It is recorded in the Mahabharta and by Greek writers. Later it received religious sanction, as it is recommend in Vaikhanasa Grihya-Sutra and later Smritis like those of Sankha, Angiras, Dakhsha and Vyasa. This diabolical practice did not excite in the Indian society the same degree disapprobation and disgust as it did among its Greek witnesses. Moreover, this custom was surrounded by a kind of halo and served to raise or maintain the index of social status, as it was more common in the ruling and warrior castes. Among the upper castes, it was considered an outright sin for a girl to reach puberty without being married, and this custom was indicative of social superiority. Manu prescribes that a man of thirty shall marry a maiden of twelve, or a man of twenty-four a girl of eight. Yajnavalyka insists that girls should be married before the age of puberty. Man could marry a woman from his caste and from castes lower than his caste, but not from a caste higher than his caste. Thus a Brahman could marry a woman from any caste. 

The heinous crime of infanticide is not peculiarly Indian in its inception, but here again female infanticide was indirectly encouraged by the attitude of Brahmanism toward woman. The birth of a daughter is deplored and regarded as a source of misery. The abnormal climate of status-consciousness created by the caste system further aggravated this evil. Whereas in other countries generally infanticide was often the result of poverty, in India female-infanticide was practiced precisely by the upper castes like Rajputs. 

Hindu Dharma 

In the ever-changing scene of the shifting importance of deities, creeds, racial antipathies and other considerations, there was one factor, which was persistent and constant. It was the concept of Hindu Dharma. This concept was synonymous, or very closely interwoven with the social order of Brahmanism¾Varna Ashrama Dharma / caste system. Like the banks of a river it determined the limits within which the current of Indian social life must flow and direction in which it must move. So long as the current remained confined within the prescribed social limits, all varieties and sorts of dogmas, ideas, faiths, creeds, customs and practices were tolerated and allowed to be the a part of Hindu Dharma. But any threat to the framework of the social order was frowned upon or combated against, depending upon the seriousness of the threat posed. When a Hindu ignored the duties of the caste of his birth, he destroyed his dharma. It was only through caste that one belonged to the Hindu community, without caste identity one was a pariah. 

One of the most outstanding features of Buddhism is its compassion and tolerance. Lord Buddha himself showed respect to Brahmans and Asoka the great advocated respect for them in his edicts. Then, why were the Buddhists, of all the creeds of Indian origin, singled out for special punitive treatment, and purged out of the Indian body politic in a manner the human system eliminates a foreign element? 

This hostility could not be because Buddhists were atheists, as other atheistic creeds like the Sankhya were left untouched. Moreover, Buddhism and Jainism are far less divergent than the multitude of widely different paths of Hindu Dharma. 

The Buddhists were singled out for destruction because they did not recognize the authority of Vedas and other Hindu scriptures, and they undermined the supremacy of the Brahmans by rejecting the caste system¾unpardonable sin in the eyes of Brahmans. 

To cover their heinous crimes against the Buddhists and to hoodwink the Indian people and historians, the Brahmans came with a clever idea. After the eradication of Buddhism from the soil of its birth, the Brahmans proclaimed Lord Buddha as an Avatar, reincarnation of Vishnu. 

On the other hand from a purely theological point of view, Jainism was no less heretic than Budhism, but the Jains suffered far less persecution than the Buddhists. It was so because, if the necessity arose, Jainsim was willing to admit a god of popular Hinduism to their galaxy of gods. Besides, it was also not opposed to the theory of caste. It was thus very much less hostile and more accommodating to Brahmans. 

Al-Biruni wrote that he did not find any Buddhist literature or met any Buddhist during his stay in India.

Al-Biruni’s observation is not surprising as by the time of Fa-Hein’s visit to India in the 5th century AD, Kapilvastu had become a jungle and Gaya had been laid waste and desolate. Saivite Brahman king Sasank of Bengal carried out acts of vandalism against the Buddhists, destroyed the footprints of Lord Buddha at Patliputra, burnt the Bodhi tree under which he had meditated, and devastated numerous monasteries and scattered their monks. 

The rise of Adi Shankaracharya in the late 8th-early 9th century saw the intensification of Brahman-Buddhist conflict. He traveled widely converting Buddhist centers into Brahmanical centers of learning, maths, at Badrinath in the north, Sringeri and Kanchipuram in the south, Puri in the east and Dwarka in the west. The impact of his militant campaign against Buddhism was all pervasive, as Buddhism almost disappeared from India. Over the next couple of centuries, aptly termed Dark Age, it flickered in different regions before it finally became extinct. 

Even modern Hindus “Avatars” like Gandhi and Vivekananda were diehard advocates and defenders of the caste system. 

I believe in Varna Ashrama (caste system) which is the law of life. The law of Varna (color or caste) is nothing but the law of conservation of energy. Why should my son not be a scavenger if I am one? 

Mahatma Gandhi, Harijan, 3-6-1947. 

He, Sudra may not be called a Brahman, though he (Sudra) may have all the qualities of a Brahman in this birth. And it is a good thing for him (Sudra) not to arrogate a Varna (caste) to which he is not born. It is a sign of true humility. 

Mahatma Gandhi, Young India, 11-24-1927. 

There is something in caste, so far as it means blood: such a thing as heredity there is, certainly. Now try to [understand]—why do you not mix blood with the Negroes, and the American Indians? Nature will not allow you. Nature does not allow you to mix your blood with them. There is unconscious working that saves the race. That was the Aryan’s caste. … The Hindus believe—that is a peculiar belief, I think; and I do not know, I have nothing to say to the contrary, I have not found anything to the contrary—they believe there was only one civilized race: the Aryan. Until he gives the blood, no other race can be civilized. 

Strict observance of caste rules and regulations was made the essence of Hindu religion and transgressors were severely punished. To protect Brahmans and their defenders the Kshatriyas from the rage of inhumanely treated masses; it was declared sinful to wear arms and keep arms by people other than the Kshatriyas. Even blacksmiths and carpenters, the so-called progeny of the mythical “supper engineer,” Vishava Karma, who made the weapons, were not allowed to use the weapons. They were not allowed even to fit the plowshare with an iron tip because it could injure the bullock, offspring of the holy cow. After 1947, a large number of Sikh farmers were settled in Haryana and Uttar Pardesh. Their Hindu neighbors were surprised that Sikh farmers were using European style iron plows or iron-tipped plowshares Thus the clever Brahman disarmed the entire Hindu population other than the Kshatriyas. The agriculturist tribes - Jats, Gujjars, Sainis, Yadavs, Ahirs, Patels, Kurmis, Kamas, Reddys and many others were allowed to keep only wooden clubs (luth, lathi, soti, dang), which they used very effectively to split each other’s heads, and beat their animals, wives, children and Dalits. 

The Bitter Fruit of Caste System 

The caste system not only destroyed the vitality and creativity of the people but also the glue of love and compassion for fellow human beings, which is essential for a healthy society. In due course of time India was like giant dead tree whose roots had been eaten by termites and was waiting to be toppled by a wind gust or in Indian parlance like a sick Brahma bull ready to be devoured by wild dogs and vultures. 

In 710 AD, a young Muslim commander, Mohammad Bin Qassem led an expedition to Sindh. After defeating the Indian forces, he marched deep into the Northwest territory meeting very little resistance, because the populace was disarmed due to the imposition of strict caste regulations, which allowed only Kshatriyas (Rajputs and Khatris) to wear arms. He plundered towns and temples, and murdered people by the thousands and went home taking away thousands of Indian men and women as slaves. The news of his victory spread like a wild fire in the Muslim world. Muslim daredevils from Afghanistan and central Asia made their own forays into India. Small bands of Afghans and Turks carved out small and large principalities for themselves all over India, and finally the Mughals established their own empire in India. 

There was essentially very little resistance to Muslim invaders. They marched into India at will. Mahmud Gazhnavi attacked India seventeen times. Neither Ramyana nor Mahabharta nor the bloodthirsty reincarnation of Shakti¾Durga, Kali and Chandi inspire the so-called warriors¾Kshatriyas (Rajputs and Khatris) to take up arm in defense of the motherland. 

Al-Biruni says that no Muslim conqueror passed beyond the frontier of Kabul and the river Sindh until the days of the Turks, when they seized power in Ghazna under the Samani dynasty, and the supreme power fell to the lot of Nasiraddaula Sabuktagin. This prince chose the holy war as his calling, and therefore, called himself Al-ghazi (i.e. warring on the road of Allah). In the interest of his successors he constructed, in order to weaken the Indian frontier, those roads on which afterwards his son Yaminaddaula Mahmud marched into India during a period of thirty years and more. God be merciful to both father and son! Mahmud utterly ruined the prosperity of the country, and performed there wonderful exploits, by which the Hindus became like atoms of dust scattered in all directions, and like a tale of old in the mouth of the people. Their scattered remains cherish, of course, the most inveterate aversion towards all Muslims. 

In the history of the fateful forty-five years (1295-1345) traced by us so far, the one distressfully disappointing feature has been the absence, in Maharastra, of the will to resist the invaders. The people of Maharastra were conquered, oppressed and humiliated, but they meekly submitted like dumb driven cattle.28, 29 

What is painful is that, sometimes, a handful of foreigners overran vast tracts of the land without countering any sizable resistance. Shihab-ud-din Gauri won the second battle of Tarain (near Delhi) in 1192, and within fourteen years his Genral, Bakhtiyar Khilji had reached the bank of Brahmputra. Nadiya was occupied with an advance party of no more than eighteen horsemen and this opened the way for the establishment of Muslim rule in Bengal.28, 30 

During the onslaught of Muslims, the Khatris and Rajputs, who used to practice their martial art on the defenseless down trodden lower castes, were nowhere to be found to defend the motherland and its people. The entrepreneurial Khatris offered their services to their conquerors, whom they called malesh (uncivilized, impure, unclean) in private. 

Earlier pagan invaders from the Northwest like Greeks, Huns (Rajputs), Sakas ( Jats) and Gujjars were easily accommodated in the web of Brahmanism, but Muslim invaders came with monotheistic belief. They were idol breakers, not idol worshipers, so the Brahmans came up with a different strategy to deal with them. 

The Brahmans who lost their position as raj mantri (minister of state), raj guru (religious advisor to the king) and raj prohit (family priest of the king) after the defeat of Rajput rulers devised a clever strategy to get back not only into the Mughal court but also in the Mughal palace. They advised the Rajput rulers to give their daughters in marriage to Emperor Akbar. It was (is) an anathema even for an ordinary Rajput to marry his daughter to a non-Rajput Hindu what to speak of a royal Rajput marrying his daughter to a Muslim, whom he considered as malesh. But this case was different as this matrimonial alliance was blessed and sanctified by the Brahman. The Rajput rulers led by the Ambar family accepted this proposal without blinking an eye. This opened the door for Brahmans, Rajputs, and other Hindus in Akbar’s administration. Many of them held prominent positions, Birbal and Todar Mal were among the “jewels” of Akbar’s court and Raja Man Singh was a very distinguished commander in the army. In gratitude, Akbar cancelled the Jazia (tax on non-Muslims) imposed by the earlier Muslim rulers. The Rajputs played a major role in the expansion and consolidation of Mughal Empire. The Brahmans coined a new mantra “Eeshvro va Dilishvro va, (The emperor of Delhi is as great as God).” 

Akbar’s Rajput in-laws made it sure that there was no royal Rajput left who would taunt them, “You have sent to your daughter to the haram of a malesh.” The only Rajput sovereign, who refused to kowtow to Akbar, was Maharana Partap. All the Rajput vassals joined Akbar in defeating this valiant man. 

The invasion from the Northwest continued until the Khalsa forces put an end to it. The British who came to India as traders replaced the Mughal Empire. The British work force was never more than 200,000 at any time during their rule over India. It was the Indian elite who supported the British occupation, and ran the lower level administration. The British left India in 1947 after partitioning it into Hindu and Muslim states. The later further split into Pakistan and Bangladesh. The three countries are a living hell for minorities and downtrodden. This is the legacy of Mahan Rishi Manu. 

Thousands of years before the Italian writer and statesman Machiavelli, Kautliya (Chankya) was teaching his “kutil niti” (perverse policy) to the Indian rulers that morality has no place in the affairs of the government. Since 1947 the Indian rulers have been following this policy and this policy is reflected in the thinking of the modern Hindu elite. 

Moreover, this policy is reflected in the sermons of Lord Krishna in Bhagvadgita¾ perverse morality ¾morality turned upside down where good becomes evil and the evil becomes good. Lord Krishna urges the reluctant Pandvas, who not only gambled away their kingdom but also their only wife, to declare war on their cousins, the Kaurvas. When the Pandvas start loosing the war, Lord Krishna urges them to use all means: deception and lies to win the war by breaking all the rules, which both sides agreed to observe before the start of the war. The Pandvas win the war through treachery. 

The hard working and law abiding Kaurvas, who fought fair battles up to the end, are called evil. The high stake gamblers, who sold their only wife to pay their debt, and who won the war through treachery, are called righteous. 

For Lord Krishna, victory is every thing. He teaches that¾ treachery and foul means to achieve victory¾is moral¾and he is regarded as reincarnation of God. 

Dropti is considered a virtuous woman, an idol for young girls to emulate. Her obvious virtue is that she complied with her mother-in-law’s wishes to be a wife to five brothers to keep peace in the family! What kind of a role model is Dropti for any young girl? She accepted to be treated like cattle and was disposed of like cattle to pay the debt! 

Bhagavadgita is a document, which is specifically designed to transform a vulnerable person into a killer. In fact that is exactly what Krishna is doing to Arjuna in Bhagavadgita. Bhagavadgita is a part of Mahabharata (which is a war document) and as such never existed as a separate text until 1785 when it was translated into English under the title Bhagavadgita. 

Krishna’s sermons are considered the essence of Hinduism. Mahatma Gandhi, the so-called apostle of peace considered Bhagavadgita as his most favorite scripture in spite of the fact that the battle of Mahanbharata was fought between kith and kin, and more people were slaughtered in the battle of Mahanbharat than any other battle according to the story. So Gandhi’s pacifism runs parallel to Lord Krishna’s moral teachings. No wonder, the renowned Indologist, Al-Biruni remarked, “The Hindu mind is incomprehensible to non-Hindus.” 

Gurbakhash Singh Kala Afghana has carried out a detailed analysis of the life of Lord Rama (Ram Chandar, son of King Dasrath) described by Goswami Tulsi Das in Ram Chrit Manas Granth.31 Though Lord Rama is regarded as reincarnation of God but he takes advice and directions from Brahmans and Rishis. He does what the Brahman and Rishis ask him to do. Brahmans regard him as Maryada Parshotam (upholder and defender of Hindu Dharma / caste system) and his reign (Ram Raj) is regarded as an ideal form of government. Ram Chandar’s life is not morally inspiring as it is mainly based on myths, superstition, deception and lies. For instance, the story of Lord Rama versus King Ravana is an example of “perverse morality”. Lord Rama’s younger brother Laxman was a bal-jati (born celibate, suffering from congenital sexual dysfunction). It is said that Ravana’s younger sister was charmed by Laxmana’s looks, so she flirted with him casting her amorous glances at him. Feeling insecure and inadequate about his masculinity, he treated her in a cowardly and shameful manner¾ he chopped off her nose. In revenge Ravana kidnapped Sita, Rama’s wife. Being an honorable man Ravana did not cast even an evil glance at Sita. 

Lord Rama and Laxmana who treated Ravana’s sister in a cowardly and shameful manner are considered as righteous and great warriors whereas Ravana who treated a captive woman honorably is called evil! 

Sita suffered for the despicable actions of Laxmana. Back in Ajudhiya, one day Lord Rama overheard the taunt of washerman to his wife: “I wont take you back like Lord Rama took Sita back.” Stung by this taunt when Rama came home, he asked his wife, Sita to prove her chastity through Agni Priksha (throwing oneself into the fire, chaste woman is not harmed by the fire). This is how Lord Rama, the protector of Hindu Dharma treated his innocent and faithful wife, who suffered so much for the misdeeds of his impotent brother! Lord Rama’s cruelty is beyond human comprehension, he sent his innocent pregnant wife into exile. 

Al-Biruni has described how the Sudras, who constituted vast majority of the population were treated under the traditions established during Ram Raj (reign of Lord Rama). 

The Sudra is like a servant to the Brahman, taking care of his affairs and serving him, If, though being poor in the extreme, he still desires not to be without a yajnopavita (sacred thread), he girds himself only with the linen one. Every action which is considered as the privilege of a Brahman, such as saying prayers, the recitation of Vedas, and offering sacrifices to the fire, is forbidden to him, to such a degree that when, e.g. a Sudra or Vaisya is proved to have recited the Veda, he is accused by the Brahman before the ruler, and the later will order his tongue to be cut off. However, the meditation on God, works of piety, and alms giving are not forbidden for him. 

Every man who takes to some occupation which is not allowed to him by his caste as, e. g. a Brahman to trade, a Sudra to agriculture, commits a sin or crime, which they consider only a little less than crime of theft. 

Al-Biruni then recounts one of the traditions of the Hindus, that in the days of King Rama human life was very long and well defined, so that a child never died before its father. Once, however, a son of a Brahman predeceased his father. The father brought him to the King’s palace, bewailing that there is something rotten in the country. Then Rama began to inquire into the cause of this, and finally they pointed out to him a Candala (untouchable) who took the greatest pain in performing worship and self-torment. The King rode to him and found him on the banks of Ganges, hanging on something with his head downwards. The King bent his bow, shot at him and pierced his bowels. Then he spoke: “I kill thee on account of a good action, which thou are not allowed to do.” When the king returned to the palace, he found Brahman’s son alive. 

The treatment meted out to Sudras by Lord Rama raises serious questions about Rishi Valmiki? According to the legend, Valmiki, the author of Ramayna was a Koli, a member of one of the most despised aboriginal tribes on the Bombay coast. When Sudars were not allowed even to pray, how did Valmiki learn to read and write? Moreover, why Valmiki would admire and worship an Aryan king who was so cruel to his people? It was the Aryan invaders who enslaved the aboriginal tribes by making them Sudras and untouchables. I think making Valmiki, an Advasi (aboriginal) as the author Ramayna is a clever ploy by the Brahman to hoodwink the Advasis (aboriginal tribes) into believing that Lord Rama was loved and venerated by them. The story about the offer of tasted sweet berries by Bhilni to Lord Rama was concocted to convey the same message. I urge Dalit scholars to analyze the contents of the so-called Valmiki Ramayna to set the record straight¾who was Valmiki? 

Casteism in India 

http://justicefordalits.blogspot.in

ALL GONE: A resident of Naikkankottai in Dharmapuri looks anguished over the loss of his belongings. Photo: E. Lakshmi Narayanan 

Most of the youth were working outside district when the attack took place 

Even as Dalit colonies in a village in Dharmapuri district, which witnessed a caste flare-up on Wednesday evening, limped back to normality, the victims have alleged that ‘systematic destruction’ of their properties and livelihood resources has taken place. 

The Dalit settlements of Natham, Kondampatti and Annanagar in Naikkankottai bore the brunt of mob fury following the suicide of a caste Hindu over the elopement of his college-going daughter with a Dalit youth. 

An official estimate, though preliminary as claimed by Collector R. Lilly, has put the number of damaged households at 268. The three colonies in total have 500 houses, a strong concentration of Dalits in one single block in the district. 

Almost all the able-bodied youth from these colonies are working in Bangalore as construction workers, godown boys and collectors of used paper market for recycling. Their hard-earned money serves as solid investments in their native village. Some have become landholders. They grow maize, turmeric and tapioca in rain-fed conditions. 

“For the past one decade, I have been working in a godown in Bangalore where they pay me Rs. 200 a day. I leave my wife and children back at the village. Our small but hard-earned savings of all these years have gone up in smoke in one single night of riot,” laments Muniappa of Anna Nagar. 

Those who have suffered extensive damage claim that the mob, armed with deadly weapons and petrol bombs indulged in four-hour looting. “We were chased out before they began their act. Almirahs were broken and valuables such as gold jewellery and cash stolen before the houses were either set on fire or damaged,” said Rajalingam in Natham colony who runs a lucrative business in used paper market in Bangalore. 

Caste systems 

Caste systems are any ranked, hereditary, endogamous occupational groups that constitute traditional societies in certain regions of the world, particularly among Hindus in India. There, caste is rooted in antiquity and specifies the rules and restrictions governing social intercourse and activity for each group based on their occupation and social status. The different castes practiced mutual exclusion in many social activities, including eating, as well as marriage. In addition to the major castes, there also existed another group, the "outcastes," who were relegated to the worst occupations if any employment at all. Ranked below the castes, they were treated as sub-human—"unseeable" and "untouchable." 

Definition 

While the Indian caste system is the most well-known, other cultures have had similar structures. While most are no longer in force, one common attribute, and one that persists despite official rulings against it, is the existence of an "outcaste" group. Those classified in this way, whether they be Dalit in India, Burakumin inJapan, or Baekjeong in Korea, have suffered discrimination throughout their history. While the caste system in general is no longer considered acceptable as it denies people many opportunities now considered human rights based on their lineage, it is those that suffer the greatest loss of rights and opportunity, the outcastes, for whom the caste system remains most strongly a reality. 

Caste is defined by the American Heritage Dictionary as "an endogamous and hereditary social group limited to persons of the same rank, occupation, and economic position." The word caste is derived from the Romance word casta (seen in Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian), which (in addition to representing the same concept as English caste) can mean "lineage" or "race." It comes from Romancecasto, which can mean "pure" or "chaste." Casto in Latin means "chaste," which is derived from castus, meaning "pure, cut off, separated." 

As a religious concept relating to Hinduism, the Oxford English Dictionaryrecognizes caste as "each of the hereditary classes of Hindu society, distinguished by relative degrees of ritual purity and of social status" and as "any exclusive social class". Anthropologists use the term more generally, to refer to a social group that is endogamous and occupationally specialized. Such groups are common in societies with a low degree of social mobility. In its broadest sense, examples of caste-based societies include colonial Latin America under Spanish and Portuguese rule, Japan, Korea, some parts of Africa, as well as across the Indian subcontinent. 

Many of these cultures show only the remnants of a caste system that divided the population into what might today be regarded as different social classes, based on lineage and on the role they performed in society. What remains, however, and is common to many cultures is the "outcaste," the people considered below the level of common humanity of all the others, "untouchable." They and their descendants, the dalit in India, the burakumin in Japan, the baekjeong in Korea, all have faced discrimination, and some continue to do so today. 

Castes in India 

The traditional hereditary system of social stratification of India, in which all social classes exist in thousands of endogamous groups is termed as Jāti. The jāti system, usually with politically and economically derived hierarchies, has been followed across the Indian subcontinent with regional variations across India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. Different religious denominations have traditionally followed different kinds of jāti stratification. While the prevalence of the jāti system has reduced significantly over the course of the twentieth century, remote and rural areas of the subcontinent continue to adhere to the system of jātisegregation. 

"Caste," on the other hand is a theoretical construct of the Brahmin scholars to describe and categorize (Varna) the complex social arrangement of which they were themselves a part. In the absence of any other better word, Varna was translated as "Caste" by the Europeans, with its connotations of racial purity. Contrary to popular belief, historically there was a great deal of mobility and intermingling within Indian castes, other than Brahmins, largely based on economic or political status of the concerned group. 

The Brahmins were enjoined by their scriptures and texts (including the Manusmriti) to live in poverty and to shun possessions and temporal power, and instead devote themselves to study the teachings of scriptures, pure conduct and spiritual growth. They subsisted mainly on alms from the rest society. 

Caste became an important element of Indian politics after the British used the entirely theoretical construct of Varna (literally meaning "color") as the basis of classifying the Indian population, especially the Hindus, in the Population Censuses of late nineteenth century. This became more specific in the 1901 Census, because the Indian population did not understand what was meant by "Caste" and gave their occupation, religion and education as their "Caste." In the 1901 Census, the people were asked to classify themselves, or were classified by enumerators, as members of the specific castes of Brahmin, Khshatriya, Vaishya, or Shudra. This was ostensibly done to simplify an otherwise difficult to categorize society, with subtle hierarchies, for the purposes of better statistical manipulation. 

Outside the caste system (literally "outcastes") is the fifth and lowest class called the Dalit or "Untouchables," seen as untouchable because of the job functions they performed. Some of the untouchables were so polluted that they were called "unseeables" and therefore were supposed to keep out of sight, being able to do their jobs only at night. 

Thus, a purely theoretical construct of "Varna" or "Caste" now became a living entity and became embedded in the minds of intellectuals and common people alike as an "ancient" system of social segregation. 

Hindu caste system 

The Indian caste system, prevalent also among local Muslims and Christians, exhibits some differences from those of other countries. Elsewhere, the separation between one group and the other is usually along racial lines. Within India, that is not so. Nor is there any discernable dichotomy (white/black or high/low) because the caste system forms a continuum that defies such ready definition. Lower-caste people live in conditions of great poverty and social disadvantage, though efforts by the Indian government to emancipate the lower castes with affirmative action have achieved some success in recent years.

The concept of 'upper' and 'lower' caste is simply a matter of social standing and assimilation. Some castes do not allow other caste members (whom they consider to be "lower") to touch them, and in such case would wash themselves or their possessions. In some parts of India, there was the practice of defining the physical distance one should keep from persons of another caste. As a result of this, children who attended a school where children of lower castes were present had to bathe before returning home. In some parts of the world, as well as in India, such discrimination still exists, though it is punishable by law and unconstitutional in India. The Indian constitution was drafted by Ambedkar, himself of low-caste origins, who is regarded as an emancipator of the Dalits.

Mythical origin of castes 

In the Puranas, it is said that the creator of the universe Lord Brahma created some humans from his mouth—they became reciters of the Veda and became the Brahmins. Then he created other humans from his arms, they became the Kshatriyas, bearers of arms, the warrior and ruling class. Brahma then created some from his abdomen, who became the Vaishyas or merchants. Finally, Brahma created humans from his feet. They served the other castes even as the feet serve the man; they came to become the Sudras (manual laborers and artisans). Thus, the whole universe is held to be one organic entity, the body of the almighty. 

Jāti 

Major castes were subdivided into hundreds of sub-castes or Jātis. Each jāti typically has an association with a traditional job function in Hindu society, although religious beliefs or linguistic groupings define some jātis. A person's surname typically reflects a jāti association: asari meaning carpenter, thattar meaning goldsmith, muusaari coppersmith, karuvar ironsmith, ambattarclothes-washer, parayar cobbler. 

In any given location in India five-hundred or more jātis may co-exist, although the exact composition could differ from district to district. Endogamous marriages (including polyandry) and other associations within caste were strongly enforced. Since most marriages were arranged, based on the existing networks of kinship and caste, it was very unusual to marry someone of different status. People were born into their jāti, and that defined their occupation and lifestyle. 

Modern developments 

With rapid urbanization and education of India's largely rural, agrarian population, the significance of caste has diminished, except in government mediated interventions in the form of quotas and reservations in education, jobs, and promotions for the socially "lower," but numerous and thus politically important, castes. 

The caste system and its attendant practices have been outlawed and declared punishable offenses, but these laws are difficult to implement. There are occasional violations of human rights of Dalits (outcasts - also called untouchables) by the higher castes, including forcing Dalits into their traditional professions. Dalits in rural areas have often been victimized by other castes. The government of India provides freeships, scholarships, reservations for government jobs and of university seats in programs of higher education for people hailing from Scheduled castes, Scheduled tribes, and Other Backward Castes. Upper caste Hindus and several secular elements counter-argue that unmeritorious Dalits are exploiting this constitutionally obligatory discrimination to their unfair advantage and meritorious candidates are being sidelined. 

Caste system among Indian Christians 

Converts to Christianity have retained the old caste practices. In particular, Dalit Christians are regarded as an undercaste by upper caste Christian clergy and nuns and are discriminated against in society. 

Caste systems similar to India 

Balinese caste system 

The Balinese caste system resembles the Indian system with a four-fold division of society. Shudras make up approximately 97 percent of the society. 

Nepalese caste system 

The Nepalese caste system, like the Indian caste system, is highly complex and continues the traditional system of social stratification of Nepal. The caste system defines social classes by a number of hierarchical endogamous groups often termed asJāti. This custom is found in both the Hindu and Buddhist communities of Nepal. 

In ancient times, Muslims attacked Aryans in India causing them to move east into Nepal. Over the years they slowly moved west to east. Thus, the Aryans came in contact with native tribes (most of Mongolian descent) of modern Nepal. There were 36 tribes at that time, classified as 36 Varnas. Aryans treated the people of the 36 Varnas as Baishyas of their society. 

Pakistani caste system 

The same caste system practiced by Indian Muslims is practiced in Pakistan, with divisions into tribes such as the Pushtun, Pathan, as well as divisions by religious denomination such as Ahmadiyya, Mojahir, and so forth. Pogroms against Ahmadiyya Muslims and Mojahir Muslims in Pakistan have occurred. Gang-rapes of lower caste women such as Mukhtaran Mai by upper caste men have also occurred in Pakistan. The ethnic Balochi in Pakistan are often discriminated against by the Punjabi and Sindhi people in Pakistan, leading to an armed separatist insurgency in Balochistan formerly led by the late Nawab Akbar Bugti. 

Educated Pakistani women from the lower castes are often persecuted by the higher castes for attempting to break the shackles of the restrictive system (that traditionally denied education to the lower castes, particularly the women). An example is the case of Ghazala Shaheen, a low caste Muslim woman in Pakistan who, in addition to getting a higher education, had an uncle who eloped with a woman of a high caste family. She was accosted and gang-raped by the upper-caste family. The chances of any legal action are low due to the Pakistani government's inability to repeal the Huddood ordinance. 

The social stratification among Muslims in the "Swat" area of North Pakistan has been compared to the caste system in India. The society is rigidly divided into subgroups where each Quom is assigned a profession. Different Quoms are not permitted to intermarry or live in the same community. These Muslims practice a ritual-based system of social stratification. The Quoms who deal with human emissions are ranked the lowest. 

Sri Lankan caste system 

The Sri Lankan system resembles the South Indian Jāti system with numerous Jāti divisions without a Varna system superimposition. Furthermore, the Sri Lankan Tamils see themselves as superior to Tamils of Indian background. 

Castes in Japan 

Burakumin (buraku community or hamlet + min people), or hisabetsu buraku "discriminated communities/discriminated hamlets") are a Japanese social minority group. The burakumin are one of the main minority groups in Japan, along with the Ainu of Hokkaido and residents of Korean and Chinese descent. 

Japan has historically subscribed to a feudal caste system. While modern law has officially abolished the caste hierarchy, there are reports of discrimination against the Burakumin undercastes, historically referred to by the insulting term Eta. Studies comparing the caste systems in India and Japan have been performed, with similar discriminations against the Burakumin as the Dalits, with the Burakumin regarded as "ostracized". 

As early as 1922, leaders of the hisabetsu buraku organized a movement, the "Levelers Association of Japan" (Suiheisha), to advance their rights. The Declaration of the Suiheisha encouraged the Burakumin to unite in resistance to discrimination, and sought to frame a positive identity for the victims of discrimination, insisting that the time had come to be "proud of being eta." The Levelers Association remained active until the late 1930s. 

After World War II, the National Committee for Burakumin Liberation was founded, changing its name to the Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaihou Doumei) in the 1950s. The league, with the support of the socialist and communist parties, pressured the government into making important concessions in the late 1960s and 1970s. One concession was the passing of the Special Measures Law for Assimilation Projects, which provided financial aid for the discriminated communities. 

Even into the early 1990s, however, discussion of the 'liberation' of these discriminated communities, or even their existence, was taboo in public discussion. In the 1960s, the Sayama incident, which involved a murder conviction of a member of the discriminated communities based on circumstantial evidence, focused public attention on the problems of the group. In the 1980s, some educators and local governments, particularly in areas with relatively large hisabetsu buraku populations, began special education programs, which they hoped would encourage greater educational and economic success for young members of the group and decrease the discrimination they faced. 

Yemeni caste system 

In Yemen there exists a caste-like system that keeps Al-Akhdam social group as the perennial manual workers for the society through practices that mirror untouchability. Al-Akhdam (literally "servants"; Khadem being plural) is the lowest rung in the Yemeni caste system and by far the poorest. 

The Khadem are not members of the three tribes (Bedouin, Berber, and Rif) that comprise mainstream Arab society. They are believed to be of Ethiopian ancestry. Some sociologists theorize that the Khadem are descendants of Ethiopian soldiers who had occupied Yemen in the fifth century but were driven out in the sixth century. According to this theory the al-Akhdham are descended from the soldiers who stayed behind and were forced into menial labor as a punitive measure. 

The Khadem live in small shanty towns and are marginalized and shunned by mainstream society in Yemen. The Khadem slums exist mostly in big cities, including the capital, Sana’a. Their segregated communities have poor housing conditions. As a result of their low position in society, very few children in the Khadem community are enrolled in school and often have little choice but to beg for money and intoxicate themselves with crushed glass.. A traditional Arabic saying in the region goes: “Clean your plate if it is touched by a dog, but break it if it’s touched by a Khadem. Though conditions have improved somewhat, the Khadem are still stereotyped by mainstream Yemenese society, considering them lowly, dirty, ill-mannered and immoral 

African caste system 

Countries in Africa that have societies with caste systems within their borders include Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Algeria, Nigeria, Chad, Ethiopia and Somalia. 

The Osu caste system practiced by the Igbo in Nigeria and southern Cameroon is derived from indigenous religious beliefs that discriminate against the "Osus" people as "owned by deities" and outcastes. 

Caste systems in Somalia mandate non-Arab descended "outcastes" such as Midgan-Madhiban, Yibir, Tumal and other groups deemed to be impure and are ostracized from society. Similarly, the Mande societies in Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast and Ghana have caste systems that divide society by occupation and ethnic ties. The Mande caste system regards the "Jonow" slave castes as inferior. Similarly, the Wolof caste system in Senegal is divided into three main groups, the Geer (freeborn/nobles), jaam (slaves and slave descendants) and the outcasted neeno (people of caste). 

Other caste systems in Africa include the Borana-speaking caste system of North East Kenya with the Watta as the lowest caste. The highest class is Borana Gutu (Pure), followed by Gabra, then Sakuye, with wealth and prestige being measured in cattle and livestock. To understand the nature of "Ubuhake" caste in Rwanda and Burundi, one must know the structure of society in pre-Colonial Rwanda, where caste was largely an economic division between landed gentry living a sedentary lifestyle, and less-wealthy who did not own land. The "Hutu" were largely a service-based class (the underclass) in Rwanda who later, as the majority population, committed genocide against the "Tutsi" overlords in the now infamous 

‘Untouchability’ wall 

DC | S Irshad Ahmed | 11th Dec 2012 

Thanjavur: In a shocking incident, government officials have raised an “untouchability wall” between cremation sh­eds, segregating dalits and caste Hindus, in Ko­nur village in Amma­pe­ttai union in the district, that too under the Tamil Nadu Village Reha­bil­tat­ion Imp­rovement (THAI) sc­heme. The segregation has dra­wn flak from social activists. 

Under the THAI scheme, this year four cremation sheds were constructed in a row by officials of Am­m­p­ettai union at Ko­nur vil­la­ge in Nell­ithoppu panch­ayat at a cost of Rs 7 lakh.

Yie­lding to pressure from caste Hindus, the officials ha­ve raised a 4-foot high wa­ll between the cremation sheds, segregating the residents in terms of caste. The cremation shed now has two separate entra­nc­es, one for the caste Hi­n­d­us and the other for dalits.

Worse, the officials have shown caste discrimination by laying a cement road to the cremation sheds for caste Hindus while the cremation sheds for dalits have only a mud approach road.

Terming the act of Amm­ap­ettai union officials highly outrageous, K. Abi­m­annan, district president of Tamil Nadu Unto­uch­ability Era­di­cation Fr­ont, urged the state govern­ment to take measures to immediately de­molish the “untouchability wall”.

Abimannan also dema­nded that action be taken aga­inst the officials res­po­nsible for the disgraceful act and asked that a common path be laid to the cremation sheds.

S. Sriram, block development officer of Amm­ap­ettai union, however, said the wall was raised with the consent of dalits of the area. He, however, had no answer when asked how government officials could raise a wall segregating people in terms of caste and that too under a gover­nment scheme. He also said that a cement road co­u­ld not be laid to the crema­ti­on sheds for dalits bec­ause of a financial crunch.

Tahsildar Natarajan of Papanasam taluk office also said that the wall was raised with the consent of dalits of the area. He, however, said that a cement road would soon be laid to the cremation sheds for dalits.

Caste system in Kerala 

From Wikipedia

The caste system in Kerala differed from that found in the rest of India. While the Indian caste system generally modelled the four-fold division of society into Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras, in Kerala the Nambudiri Brahmins formed the priestly class and only rarely recognised anyone else as being other than Shudra or untouchables outside the caste system entirely. Thus, the Kerala caste system was ritualised but it was not the varna model found elsewhere. 

History 

A theory presented by Pullapilly and also by Rene Barendse, who as of 2012 is a Fellow of the International Institute for Asian Studies, claims that the caste system established by Nambudiri Brahmins of Kerala was in accordance with the will of Parasurama, an avatar of Vishnu[clarification needed].The Nambudiris had control of 64 villages and asserted that they had powers given to them by the gods, so much so that they considered even other Brahmin groups to be outside the caste hierarchy. Both writers consider this to be the traditional Nambudiri myth of origin. The Nambudiri Brahmins were at the top of the ritual caste hierarchy, outranking even the kings. Anyone who was not a Nambudiri was treated by them as an untouchable.

By the late nineteenth century, the caste system of Kerala had evolved to be the most complex to be found anywhere in India, and the exploitation of it had become considerable. Barendse explains this development: 

... it turned to gross unrequited exploitation only in the nineteenth century when the British colonial pacification removed the threat of the peasant harvests being ravaged by armies or robbers and their huts being burned to the ground.

By this time there were over 500 groups represented in an elaborate structure of relationships and the concept of ritual pollution extended not merely to untouchability but even further, to un-approachability and even un-seeability. The system was gradually reformed to some degree, with one of those reformers, Swami Vivekananda, having observed that it represented a "mad house" of castes. The usual four-tier Hindu caste system, involving the varnas of Brahmin (priest), Kshatriya (warrior), Vaishya (business person, involved in trading, entrepreneurship and finance) and Shudra (service person), did not exist. Kshatriyas and vaishyas were rare.kshatriya castes such as Varma and vaishya castes as such a vaniyan,vanika,vanika vaishya,arya vaishya constituted less than 2% of the total population. The roles left empty by the absence of these two ritual ranks were taken to some extent by a few Nairs and by Syrian Christians, respectively.

The process of amelioration of caste distinctions by various social reform movements were overtaken by the events of 1947. With independence from Britain came the Indian constitution, and Article 15 of that document outlawed discrimination on the grounds of caste and race.[Myron Weiner has said that the ideological basis for caste "... may be (almost, but not quite) moribund" and that: 

no political parties, and no political leaders, no intellectuals support the idea that caste is part of a natural moral order based on hierarchy, ... that caste is occupationally linked and hereditary, that each caste (jati) embodies its own code of conduct (dharma), and that low-caste membership is the consequence of transgressions in one's previous life.

Weiner points out that despite the ideological demise: 

... as a lived-in social reality it is very much alive. The demise of orthodoxy, right beliefs, has not meant the demise of orthopraxy, right practice. Caste remains endogamous. Lower castes, especially members of scheduled castes, remain badly treated by those of higher castes. But the gap between beliefs and practices is the source of tension and change. The lower castes no longer accept their position in the social hierarchy, and no longer assume that their lower economic status and the lack of respect from members of the higher castes are a "given" in their social existence. But the movement for change is not a struggle to end caste; it is to use caste as an instrument for social change. Caste is not disappearing, nor is "casteism" - the political use of caste — for what is emerging in India is a social and political system which institutionalizes and transforms but does not abolish caste.

Although distinctions between the various communities are outlawed, the Indian governments – both at national and at regional level – do still recognise them, but this recognition is for the purpose of positive discrimination. Throughout post-independence India, including in Kerala, there exists a framework of reservation which is fluid in nature and attempts to recognise the socio-economic disparities between various castes. Depending both on local circumstances and on the changing modern socio-economic environment, castes are classified as Forward Classes (or General), Other Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes, and the Scheduled Tribes. These classifications determine what - if any - assistance a caste community receives in any given area. Formal classification lists are compiled for the latter three groups; any community which is not listed in any of those categories is, by default, a Forward Class.

Writing in the context of violence against Dalits elsewhere in India, Frontline magazine said in 2006 that: 

Successive governments have brought in legislation and programmes to protect the rights of Dalit communities. The safeguards enshrined in the Constitution stipulate that governments should take special care to advance the educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, that untouchability is unacceptable and that all Dalit communities should have unrestricted entry in Hindu temples and other religious institutions. There are political safeguards in the form of reserved seats in State legislatures and in Parliament ... But prejudices die hard.

However, Frontline goes on to note that the situation in Kerala now, is not as severe, to the extent that those seeking to research: 

... continuing inequality and deprivation among traditionally disadvantaged groups in Kerala do not include Dalits any longer in their list of communities that still represent "distinct pockets of deprivation". The list includes only the traditional coastal fishing communities, the S.T.s [Scheduled Tribes] of North Kerala, and the new underclass of Tamil migrant workers ...

Untouchables 

The Nambudiris had varying rules regarding the degrees of ritual pollution while interacting with people of different castes, which also included other Brahmins- such as Iyers, whose touch required a Nambudiri to bathe before resuming rituals. In a similar manner, most castes practised the principles of untouchability in their relationship with the other regional castes. Untouchability in Kerala is not restricted to Hindus, and George Mathew says that, "Technically, the Christians were outside [the] caste hierarchy, but in practice a system of inclusion and exclusion was developed ...". Among Christians, the established Syrian Christians also practised the rules of untouchability. In the colonial period, many lower castes were converted to Christians by the European Missionaries, but the new converts were not allowed to join the Syrian Christian community and they continued to be considered as untouchables even by the Syrian Christians. Syrian Christians derive status within the caste system from the tradition that they were elites, who were evangelised by Thomas the Apostle. Anand Amaladass says that "The Syrian Christians had inserted themselves within the Indian caste society for centuries and were regarded by the Hindus as a caste occupying a high place within their caste hierarchy." Syrian Christians followed the same rules of caste and pollution as that of Hindus and they were considered as pollution neutralisers. Rajendra Prasad, an Indian historian, said that the Syrian Christians took ritual baths after physical contact with lower castes . 

The rules of untouchability were severe to begin with, and they were very strictly enforced by the time of the arrival of the Dutch East India Company in the seventeenth century. Robin Jeffrey, who is a professor specialising in the modern history and politics of India, quotes the wife of a Christian missionary, who wrote in 1860 that: 

... a Nair can approach but not touch a Namboodiri Brahmin: a Chovan [Ezhava] must remain thirty-six paces off, and a Pulayan slave ninety-six steps distant. A Chovan must remain twelve steps away from a Nair, and a Pulayan sixty-six steps off, and a Parayan some distance farther still. Pulayans and Parayars, who are the lowest of all, can approach but not touch, much less may they eat with each other. 

Nonetheless, higher ranked communities did have some social responsibility for those perceived to be their inferiors: for example, they could demand forced labour but had to provide food for such labourers, and they had a responsibilities in times of famine to provide their tenants both with food and with the seeds to grow it. There were also responsibilities to protect such people from the dangers of attack and other threats to their livelihood, and so it has been described by Barendse as "an intricate dialectic of rights and duties". 

Sambandam 

Sambandham or sambandham (literally "relationship") was a marital system primarily followed by the Nair and Ambalavasi castes in the state of Kerala. All of these were matrilineal communities. The hypergamous institution of sambandam was involved in the establishment of and competition for status among these higher caste groups.The custom is no longer observed. 

Demographics 

Around 2003, the Government of Kerala recognised 53 Scheduled Castes, 35 Scheduled Tribes and 80 Other Backwards Classes. The 2001 Census of India recognised 68 Scheduled Castes, who comprised 9.8% of the population. They were 99.9% Hindu, with a negligible number of Sikhs and Buddhists. The Census recognised 35 Scheduled Tribes, comprising 1.14% of the population and with 93.7% being Hindus. A further 5.8% were Christian, and the remainder Muslim or "not stated" 

“People who oppose caste-census are less in numbers, but are powerful and they run this country” 

“People who oppose caste-census are less in numbers, but are powerful and they run this country” 

An interview with Dilip Mandal Dilip Mandal, a senior journalist and writer, is currently associated with Indian Institute of Mass Communication (IIMC), New Delhi. 

He has been consistently writing on some of the most important socio-economic issues before our country, in newspapers and on internet. He has recently edited a book ‘Caste Census: Parliament, Society and Media’ (in Hindi). Here he is interacting with Insight members – Gurinder Singh Azad, Anup Vimal, Noopur and Anoop Kumar – on the issue of caste census. This interview is also being published in Hindi here. What is the need for holding caste-based census? Why this demand for counting people on the basis of their castes? There are many reasons for holding caste-based census in our country. Even if we discount these reasons, then also the need remains as there are many caste-based government policies. Caste has been cited for more than 25 times in our Constitution. The makers of our Constitution were aware that caste is not something that could be annihilated by mere Constitution and therefore they provided for caste-based specific policies to make some dent on caste-based hegemony of all those who have been deriving benefit from the age old caste system. The caste-based census is nothing new. Till now some castes are counted and many are not. 

The government has been counting scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in every census. But there is another community for which we have policies; we have OBC commission, OBC component plan, OBC Finance Commission. We have number of policies, even that of building hostels for OBC students but we don’t have their numbers. So, suppose, while implementing these government policies, the central government wants to allot some funds to different states, for example to Karnataka and Bihar. The fund allotted is not decided on the total population of OBCs in the state because nobody has the clue about its population. It is decided on the basis of the total population of the state. In such case, Bihar will be allotted much more fund due to its higher total population even if the number of OBC population is more in Karnataka than in Bihar. There are many such anomalies which need to be rectified provided we have specific data. So not having data is not an option for proper implementation of government policies. Many government agencies, from time to time, have clearly stated that we must have data on OBC population. Planning Commission has said this, Social Justice Ministry has stated about the need. Even Department of Personnel and Training has mentioned clearly that it needs such data to frame policies for carrying recruitment in different states. Supreme Court has mentioned this in its three judgments on the unavailability of such data. In fact in its latest judgment on 69 % reservations in Tamilnadu and Karnataka, the court has clearly stated the need of data, countable data. So we need authentic countable data to frame our policies. Even during the implementation of  Mandal Commission Report and on 27 % OBC reservations, same questions were raised. Many anti-reservationists opposed its implementation citing the lack of specific data on the OBC population in the country. But now the same set of people is opposing the caste census. Yes, if we don’t have specific data then these questions are bound to be raised and therefore we need caste-census so that we have authentic data. It is interesting how the same people who opposed OBC reservations pointing towards the lack of data are the ones who are opposing caste-census now. Another thing in regards with OBC reservation is that during its implementation, the Indian government had decided that it would review the policy after every 10 years to see if there is any community that has been empowered and needs to be taken off the OBC list or some new communities to be added which are less empowered. How we will do such review if we don’t have any data on their total population, the number of graduates, how many of them have pucca houses etc? Unless and until you collect and correlate such data, how you will be able to figure out which community has got empowered and there is no need for any affirmative action for that community? So for all the policies for the development process of this country, for affirmative action, the caste based census is a must. The last caste-census was held in 1931 and after that the caste was stopped from being counted except in the case of SCs by even the British-India government. This is not true. It is a myth that British government stopped caste census and this is being propagated to sabotage our demand. Actually it was the Nehru government that stopped caste census from 1951 onwards, not the earlier colonial government. In 1941 census, the then British government had included caste like earlier censuses and collected the data but due to Second World War, the government refused to grant money for its tabulation and hence the data never came out. All the sociologists of this country know this fact but they will never come out with this as this will expose the brahminical ruling class of this country. That is indeed an eye-opener. So post-independence the demand for caste-census is a new one or there is a history behind this? The demand for caste census is nothing new. Right from the time of Kaka Kalekar Commission (1955) to Mandal Commission (1979), there has been persistent demand on this. Mandal Commission had clearly written that without contemporary data it is very difficult to frame policies as every time it had to refer to the data of 1931 census which might have gone through lot of changes in due course of time. So the demand is not at all new. Even if you see the questions raised in parliament, you will find that every year, whether that is census year or not, our representatives have asked this question again and again on whether the government is going to collect data on caste or not. Even before 2001 census, this demand was raised and in fact during the prime minister ship of Mr Devegowda a cabinet note was circulated on government agreeing for caste-based census. Many people now say that his government was toppled for precisely this reason as he was triggering caste-based census as this would have generated lot of debates which would unsettle the ruling elite class of this country. And when Advani becomes the Home Minister, he clearly states on this cabinet note that we are not going to have caste-based census. Why certain people oppose holding of caste-based census when it is very clear that we need such census for proper governance? What are their arguments? 

There are two faces of the opposition against caste-based census. One that is being articulated, being said on various public platforms and other which is left unsaid but is the real threat which motivates these people to oppose caste based census. Even if we analyse what they are arguing leaving behind their real intentions, you will see that none of their arguments holds merit. They claim that due to caste-based census, the casteism will increase; the caste which is a sociological identity will get perpetuated and institutionalized because the government will now ask everyone their castes. Secondly they claim that without doing caste-census, the government can get the required data through tools like NSSO and frame its policies. Then they come with a very absurd argument that with caste-census, the country will break. Such are the logic that are being forwarded against the demand and these are being articulated by big people, media, and intellectuals including those who are considered great sociologists of the country. Another argument that is being floated against the caste-census is that people will try to provide inflated figures for their respective castes and will try to provide wrong information so as to make a claim for government’s caste-based affirmative policies. Now if we analyse all these arguments, we can very easily see that none of these hold water but are just red herring against caste-based census. Take the last argument of people deliberately providing wrong information, suppose if I tell to census people that I am SC and by telling so will I automatically get SC caste certificate? Does a brahmin will get an OBC certificate if he merely claims to be from yadav caste in census? The people are conveniently forgetting that according to Census Act, 1948, no one can reveal any individual’s data in census. It is a punishable crime. You can get communities’ data, state wise data, country wise data from the census but any individual’s data cannot be revealed. So whatever I tell to census people will in no way going to help me as person, anywhere. Then people are claiming ‘country in danger’ and country will break if such happens. 

This is a very weird argument. If we look at our history, the country got divided only once and that too on the basis of religion. But on every 10 years, a census enumerator comes to your house and asks for your religion. Then you have no problem! More than 7-8 thousand people died in the past on the issue of language in this country. Our memories are still fresh with Khalistan movement, Tamil-Kannada riots, Tamil-Hindi riots and there is much more that has happened in the name of languages but still there is a column for language in the census. People are also talking about how a particular caste can inflate their numbers in the census. Does this argument make any sense? Now, this logic too is quite weird in itself. What would one do so as to inflate the number in the census?! It’s not possible for any particular caste to do so. For example, if kurmi decides to inflate their number in the census, what method could possibly he follow. If there are three people belonging to his caste in the village, will he be able to increase the number to six or would he be able to convince other people from his village to enumerate themselves as kurmi? It’s definitely not possible in any way and people who know census and Indian sociology know it very well that this is impossible. People have been propagating such illogical arguments just for the sake of hiding their real intentions of opposing caste census. What about the alternatives like NSSO, which some are claiming, can provide the required data? Yes, this argument is being put very strongly. But I really fail to understand how with a sample size of just few thousand people (as is done in NSSO), you can make policies for such a diverse country like ours with a one billion plus population and also for that you are ready to spend huge money but are not willing to add just one more column with ongoing census process. Also if you are willing to generate such data through NSSO, then what is your problem against generating the same through caste census which will be much more comprehensive and authentic? Moreover the census process has the legal sanctity whereas if you undertake anything based on the NSSO data, it can be challenged in the courts. The data generated through census has much legal validity and cannot be compared with the NSSO data by any means. There is one more argument that is pitched forward that why do we need to collect data of all the castes, only OBC enumeration will do? Let us just count all the OBCs. Yes, some ‘liberal’ sociologists have come out with this argument too. This is again an old trick to make caste problem appear to be only that for OBCs and SCs and rest are presumed to be ‘caste blind’ and have nothing to do with caste problem. They very conveniently create a space for themselves and ask us, “Where is caste? Everything is in proper place. I don’t know about my caste or I will not tell about my caste.” These are the people who, essentially, belong to the upper hierarchy of caste system and have reached wherever they are because of the advantages that their caste background has provided them. But such is not the case with everyone. Caste is a big disadvantage for majority of the population but for the people from higher caste hierarchy, caste has never been a problem. Whereas if you see, the same set of people will put matrimonial ads based on their castes, develop social relations, recruit people, and move around with people from same caste background. Caste operates at all levels of their personal and professional lives then why this hypocrisy? You say that people opposing the caste census are not coming forward with their real intentions or what they see as real threats. Why are these people so scared about the caste census? What are the real threats to them? Their real fear stems from the fact that if such caste data are generated and are correlated with socio, economic and educational indicators then a true picture in this country of each caste will emerge. Then we will be able to get some very curious data and might be able to find out, for example, that even after 60 years of independence, there is one caste that is just 2-3 % of the total population but is occupying more than 50 % of the seats in media, bureaucracy and judiciary. We might get such data. There is every possibility. It might also happen that we come across a community that is 12-15 % of the population but does not have even access to 1 % of total country’s resources. All such data can trigger for a demand of proper diversity in every field, equal access to resources and resentment against the monopoly of few castes that are garnering all the resources. This is where their real fears are coming from. Castes that are small in number but holding huge chunk of the country’s resources are scared as this census will raise many debates. It will not just affect the public sector but the private sector as well. The repercussions will also be seen in the academia too as the domination of particular kind in the academics will also then be questioned. A caste-census is a direct threat to their monopoly over country’s resources and I am sure that the ruling caste elites of this country will never allow caste-census to happen if we are not able to create a very strong mass-based movement demanding caste-census. They are very well aware that the caste census will take us towards the new phase of Indian polity and economy and is going to have much bigger impact than Mandal – I or II. Another argument is that the OBC will become too powerful, too politicised and well organised once they come to know about their large numbers through caste-census. This argument is being propagated by those who claim to be pro-Dalit and argue that the oppression of Dalits will increase as the post caste-census OBCs will wield too much political power. Given the history of caste atrocities perpetuated by dominant OBC castes on Dalits, what you have to say on this? One thing is clear that for these people OBC means only either jat or reddys or kurmis but they conveniently forget that the majority of OBC constitutes castes that are socially, politically and economically marginalised like that of weavers, barbers, blacksmith etc. Also see, everyone calls Western UP as Jat land but I feel that once the caste-census happen, we will come out with the data that the largest community in this area is jatav (a Dalit sub-caste). This is my belief as I have covered this area during my reporting on elections. All such myths will get shattered with caste-census. Jats are powerful in this area not because of their numerical strength and the caste census is in no way going to add on its power. They are powerful because they control everything there. Democracy is all about numbers and caste-census can open new vistas and their monopoly over resources, then, can more easily be challenged. Regarding OBCs voting as a bloc, if such was the case then VP Singh would never have lost the election. OBC is a very large collection of varied castes and if we see their political manifestation one can find many internal contradictions. Take an example of Bihar, look at yadav and mallah (boatmen). Do you think that given their respective places in rural economy, they will go together? Those who feel threatened about OBC domination after the caste census must be told that such threat is there even without the census. No one needs the census to tell that OBC is the biggest voting bloc. All the OBCs are already aware of this fact. The figure of 51 % and OBCs being in majority is there since 1931 census and the current percentage will not vary much from 1931. So the caste census is not going to bring some new fact that is going to change the voting patterns of OBCs overnight. OBC as one voting bloc can never work in India. This is too diverse a bloc. Many of our political and social commentators are also saying that our caste-enumerators are not informed people and they will not be able to classify people according to their castes and will lead to lot of confusion. This is anyways not the job of caste enumerators. His/her work is just to ask people about their castes and write it down in the form. After that only people can be put into different categories according to the SC/ST/OBC lists provided by state and central government. About enumerators not being informed enough, one must know before arguing such thing that the enumerator is most often the teacher of that area and is definitely much more informed about castes in that area than India’s best sociologists. Then there is another argument forwarded by many about what will be the caste of children from intercaste marriages? In last census, more than 7 lakh people told that they did not believe in any religion. They were enumerated separately. So, such options can be included for those who say that they don’t have any caste. They can be counted separately. Even for children born out of inter-caste marriages, there is a clear cut legal provision that the child will carry father’s caste. Let there be choice of inter-caste column too. America comes out with data on inter-racial marriages taking place there, every year. For example, 17.8 % of the total marriages in USA were inter-racial in 2008-09. They do not stop with this data only. They go further within inter-racial marriages and have exact data on how many such marriages have been between Blacks and Hispanics, Hispanics and Asians and all such combination. Earlier in USA, they used to have columns like black, white or mixed, now they have gone a step further. They ask for the racial identities of the parents of mixed race people. Such data is freely made available on the internet and is collected every year. However in India, such data on intercaste marriages is impossible to get. We don’t even know whether it is Bengal or Kerala or any other state which leads in intercaste marriages and hence we might never be able to capture the factors that are responsible for more inter-caste marriages there. Such marriages are necessary for the annihilation of caste but we have no clue about this phenomenon as we are not yet ready to generate the required data. But there is one fear that is plaguing our minds also regarding caste-census. The census enumerators are basically primary school teachers and other government officials, who go to each household to fill up the census forms but majority of them, especially in states like UP and Bihar, belong to either brahmin or other ‘upper’ caste groups. There is a strong feeling that these enumerators avoid going to Dalit and Muslim’s colonies and fill up their forms from their homes/offices and hence giving deflated data on population of both these groups. In case of caste-based census, this threat increases manifold given its high political overtones. Yes, this threat has always been there. Such things do happen in census and are often done very deliberately with a purpose. Take the example of Scheduled Tribes that are almost 100 million in this country. These do not belong to any caste-hierarchy of Hinduism. Tribals have their own gods, rituals, social systems, culture and traditions and they don’t even marry according to Hinduism but have been clubbed within Hinduism through census only so that the number of Hindus increases in this country. Similarly there is a long debate on whether Dalits, being outcaste or out of Hindu castes hierarchy, are part of Hinduism or not. Throughout Dalit movement’s history, people have strongly contested against Dalits being Hindus. So there have always been efforts to show higher numbers of Hindus in this country and in the context of counting OBC population also, there are chances of deliberate mistakes. So, I agree that there are such threats given the caste biases of enumerators, still let us go ahead with our demand on caste-census. The Census Act has strong legal provisions against supplying wrong information and there are provisions for scrutiny and cross check. And if such needs arise we must demand that and challenge the data. The government has yet to formulate how they are going to do caste census after that only we can see how this threat can be minimised. There has been lot of churning among the Indian intelligentsia but not much is coming out officially from the Indian government side. How has the Indian government manifested itself in this whole debate of caste census? Government has tried every trick and has given every excuse not to have the caste-census. When this question was raised in the parliament and when even the Planning Commission specifically asked for caste-based data, then government made Registrar General of India to come out with a statement that this is not possible. He said there are too many OBCs, how would we count! Then many in government said that this will result in institutionalisation of caste. They also came up with an excuse that now it is very late to add caste column for 2011 census. Suddenly government changed the track and said, ‘let us only count OBCs’ in this census. Then it said that no, we will do it with UID, in the biometric phase during the collection of finger prints etc that is supposed to complete in 15-20 years. Now the government has come up with something much more hideous. It wants to delink the counting of caste from the census and wants to hold it separately. The government is ready to spent 2000 crores for this but is not agreeing to add just one more column for caste in the census form. So you see how our system works in conspiracies and is trying hard to deny any chance of holding caste census and if that is not possible then they want this to get delinked with census. Till now the Indian government has no intention to hold it. It is just trying to waste as much time as possible so that in the end, it can very easily say that such is not possible in 2011, due to lack of preparation or time constraints. The parliament, which is the largest democratic body of the country, every political party has agreed to caste-census then also the Indian govt formed a Group of Ministers (GOM) to ask for the views of political groups. They wasted two months on this. When all the political parties again reiterated the need of caste census before GOM, the government came out with a proposal to do that together with UID and went back to all the political groups again to take their views on the methodology to be involved! When pressurised, now the government has come up with counting caste in a separate process which is utter waste of resources and nothing but an eyewash. Why you are opposing the recent government proposal of delinking caste-counting from census and doing it separately? Why you are calling it an eyewash? Recently government has come out with a cabinet note. Three things are to be noted from this. First, that the caste census will be done separate from the census, second that a separate legal framework will be formulated for this and third that an expert committee will be appointed in order to analyze and tabulate the data. My main contention is if castes are counted through census by including just one more column, then together with castes’ numbers we will also get their socio-economic status after correlating with different socio-economic indicators that are included in every census. And that is what exactly the kind of data we require for better governance of this country, equitable distribution of resources and for the correct picture of Indian society to emerge. But the Indian government and the ruling class of this country don’t want such data to come in public knowledge so they are going to spend 2000 crore for just asking castes of people in a separate process. You will just get the numbers devoid of any socio-economic mapping of castes. So you will know the numbers of yadavs, balmikis, thakurs but not how they fare socio-economically in this country and their relative accesses to national resources. I feel this 2000 crore are not for revealing facts but government is spending to hide the facts. However let me tell you something, even these numbers are not going to come easily for us. The government is talking about formation of an expert committee that will undertake a study on each caste, case by case and decide which caste to go in which groupings and then only to come out with data. Why do we need this expert committee now when we already have central and state lists of SC, ST and OBC? This committee has been approved by the Indian cabinet now. The data collected on caste from February till September next year will be then given to this expert committee to decide on the placing of these castes in different groups. Now this is a great potential situation for disaster. Just imagine how many court cases would be filed, how many agitations will surface and there is bound to be total chaos. People would say, we are from this caste, why we are not been included in OBC? Gujjars would say, put us in ST. There will be similar situation in almost every state and believe me in such situation, forget about any data for at least next ten years. Compare this scenario with a situation when caste counts happen together with census where you not only get the caste numbers but also the socio-economic status of each caste. Once such data is available, the government can undertake any number of groupings and regroupings of castes. That is much more scientific way to go about than appointing an expert committee to do so with no authentic socio-economic data. The census process is constitutional, is a serious affair, and has the capability to organize 25 lakh enumerators in just one notice. This would be difficult if the caste counting is done separately. Then another question arises whether government is going to spend 2000 crore and more every ten year to conduct the caste count separately? Actually the government doesn’t want socio-economic data of each caste to be generated and therefore trying everything that can derail this, create controversies and consume time. And the worst part is they are going to spend crores of your, mine and our money for doing so. Given such scenario, do you see any chance of caste-census happening in near future? The people who oppose caste-census are very less in number, but they are very powerful and they run this country. They will not let this happen so easily unless there is a strong demand that comes from within the society. Our people have to understand that if this country belongs to them, then they have equal rights towards all the resources of the country. For the all round growth of the country just few castes cannot be allowed to keep on monopolising the country’s resources. What you do with the data is a secondary issue but if you see sociologically, not having the data is not an option. Take the case of voter list, which is a tool to further the democratic process but from the same list one can clearly deduce other’s identity and misuse it in communal riots. This has happened in recent past. But does it means that you will never come out with authentic voter list? Can democracy function then? Not having data on its population is not a healthy sign for any modern democratic country. Every major democratic country be it South Africa or any European country, every kind of data is collected there. Countries are collecting data on micro level but here in our country, people are so afraid of data. They are afraid because they know that if such data comes, you will become aware of the truth of this country and raise uncomfortable questions. Knowing all the debates that are going on caste census and on other issues of social justice, we feel that we have to tread a very long path. Unfortunately, in last 20 years, we witness a severe backlash from the upper caste dominated institutions like academia and media on such issues that are supposed to be liberal and progressive. Yes I agree. No matter what opinions we have for the politicians of this country but the truth is, in our country, Politics and Parliament remain the only democratic process and institution. The elites in our country claim to be apolitical and hate politics. They never lose any opportunity to strongly assert that ‘politics is bad’ and ‘politicians are evil’ just because the strongest voice for the empowerment of marginalized communities comes via politics only in this country. Just look at Indian media and compare with our political system and the way it deals with the issue of social justice. According to a recent survey of all the newspapers, channels and magazines, one can clearly find out that our media is essentially an ‘upper’ caste Hindu male media. I have collected 15 editorials from the major Indian newspapers and one can clearly see how they have a consensus among themselves to not let the caste-census happen. So we come across a scenario where in the Parliament there is a consensus in favour of caste census but Indian media being run and controlled by ‘upper’ caste Hindus totally oppose it. ‘Upper’ caste scholars and intellectuals should become little liberal and sensitive. They should learn from the American society that has manifested itself very democratically on the issue of racial discrimination by electing Obama as their President. He could never win without the support of whites there. But here in India one can clearly see that the people who are against caste based reservations, they are the ones against the caste census too and at the same time support women reservation but without sub-quota for women from backward communities! So it’s very unfortunate to not have liberal voices from the ‘upper’ castes. Our aim is to build a better society with equality and no where we are asking for hating ‘upper’ castes. We are just claiming for our rights of having an equal share. They must understand that due to monopoly of resources in the hands of few castes, our country is not developing. We are ranked 134 in Human Development Index, below even to many Sub-Saharan countries. If our country could develop in the hands of a few people, it would have developed long back. This should be an issue of concern for all those who claim to be patriotic. Look at the condition of common wealth games. We are not able to even organize this properly in one city whereas South Africa within 2 decades of ending apartheid organized FIFA World Cup, the largest event on earth, hoisted in 9 cities. Cleary, this country isn’t safe in the hands of the people who claim to be ‘meritorious’.

 [You can write to Dilip Mandal at dilipcmandal@gmail.com. Anup Vimal and Noopur are doing their MSW (IInd Year) from TISS

, Mumbai.] 

Is Caste only a Hindu Problem? (part 1) 

 by Editor

It has been noticed that Hinduism being the oldest of the practicing faith in the world, it is targeted by the latterly emerged diverse faiths for right and wrong reasons with mostly vested interests; caste is one such factor. The interest lies in evangelism to build a number game. Christianity has the highest numbers in its fold (about two billions inclusive of all factions) while Muslims (Islam) are now next in number game to the tune of about 1.2 to 1.5 Billions (inclusive of all).Hinduism perhaps oldest as it is; with the growth of the various communities globally, slowly faced two distinct problems: One the older it got, the more rotted and rusted it became with the passage of time. Second it faced a distinct competition from the different and diverse ideologies, especially the Abrahamic groups that affected it tremendously and adversely, in fact unexpectedly. Apart from the multiple basic differences of belief and faith, Hinduism starkly differed vastly on points of conversions and tolerance towards other faiths. Thus it never indulged in fracas with other societies on the ground of faith in comparison to the Abrahamic faiths. Both the Christians and Muslims, by contrast, have a gory record on this count with grim history of various crusades, massacres, genocides and ethnic cleansing. Unfortunately as we boast ourselves of the twenty first century of its dramatic soaring scientific and civilisational developments, nothing has changed on this basic human instinct. If anything, it has only become worst. The sordid stories of the various conflicts and surging wars in the present day Islamic world are a grim reminder of our basic conflicting human nature. Twenty first century is tinged with the deadliest history of gory wars. 

Hinduism on the other hand had appreciated it long ago through their Srutis and Smritis; thus developed the methods to tackle this negative aspect of human behaviour through the various techniques of Yoga, Meditation (Sadhana) and its allied philosophies. Some of the scientific developments of today were well known to the older Rishis of yore e.g. Vimanas or aeroplanes of today. They had boats to travel on water though they may not have been as elaborate as on today. 

Hinduism being the oldest culture, religion or belief; it is blamed for such deficient practices especially when befitting reply was also considered undesirable on civil and religious grounds. Those who are conversant with the various Hindu scriptural teachings will appreciate the gravity of my statement. Mahatma Gandhi evolved his technique of non violent resistance based on the similar ideology. Fortuitously, the well known Muslim leader viz Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan aka Frontier (Sarhadi) Gandhi was a devout Muslim, his close association with Mahatma Gandhi turned him also into a devout believer in non violent ideology of Gandhi and he later on formed his famous Red Shirt (Shurkh Posh) army – is well known for its vow of non-violence. He was a devout Muslim but believed in secular ideology. His son Abdul Wali Khan inPakistantoday also believes in secularism despitePakistanbeing a diehard Islamic Republic. With such a background of Indian leadership like Mahatma Gandhi, any conceptualisation of caste or discrimination on any ground is hard to believe that there has not been any attempt to redress or eradicate the social evil of caste. Gandhi had directly confronted the issue of caste menace in various ways especially by addressing the untouchable class as “Harijans” (Godly people). The ex President of India and a great philosopher, educationist and an enlightened visionary and freedom fighter – Dr S. Radhakrishnan had also tried to trace the development and origin of the caste sub-division starting from its ancient Vedic texts and other scriptures only to highlight its demerits towards the development of the entire societal groups irrespective of the status. A glimpse from his various literary collections is obviously and elegantly comprehensible. More details can be perused in my 11 Chapter series: Caste or Class Systems versusIndiain Global Perspective. 

Caste in Dynasty of Ismail (pbuh) 

Muslims are no exception despite the claims of secularism and egalitarianism in their society. Islam originated about fourteen centuries ago in what is known today asSaudi Arabia- a desertlandofBedouinsand the illiterate tribal warring communities with no existent civilisation, which majority of the people in that bed are still like that only. InSaudi Arabia, there is an idiom, “From Camel to Cadillac” to summarise the life style of the local people. There are hardly any facilities for infrastructure in the society for developing the modern education, scientific background, health services, electric supply, potable water supply, and etc. 

Unfortunately there is a direct clash of the ideology with the development of these mechanisms. Female education is forbidden and the physical examination of a female patient even for non gynecological problems by a male doctor is not permitted. With this sectarian background, let us examine some of the issues that pertain to certain caste based issues in the Islamic societies. I have deliberately used ‘Islamic societies’ here because that group is now most inharmonious society even in this short spell of fourteen centuries. 

We all know about the two major groups – Sunnis (80%) and Shias (20%) for practical purposes. We are also aware of the hatred of Sunnis for the Shias in the entire Islamic world. It is reflected in the gross violence unleashed against the Shias especially inPakistan,Iraq,Bahrain, and other parts of Islamic countries. 

There are lesser well known subgroups also in them. As one looks through on this topic, it is amazing to find the number of castes and subcastes in the Muslim society. On perusal of the literature for it, one finds a bewildering number of multitudes of divisions. Some have openly conceded while others have either apologetically rejected or accepted half heartedly. I quote some excerpts from the various authors in the literature. 

Quote: “In some parts ofSouth Asia, the Muslims are divided as Ashrafs and Ajlafs. Ashrafs claim a superior status derived from their foreign ancestry. The non-Ashrafs are assumed to be converts from Hinduism, and are therefore drawn from the indigenous population. They, in turn, are divided into a number of occupational castes. 

Sections of the ulema (scholars of Islamic jurisprudence) provide religious legitimacy to caste with the help of the concept of kafa’a. A classical example of scholarly declaration of the Muslim caste system is theFatawa-i Jahandari, written by the fourteenth century Turkish scholar, Ziauddin Barani, a member of the court of Muhammad bin Tughlaq, of the Tughlaq dynasty of the Delhi Sultanate. Barani was known for his intensely casteist views, and regarded the Ashraf Muslims as racially superior to the Ajlaf Muslims. He divided the Muslims into grades and sub-grades. In his scheme, all high positions and privileges were to be a monopoly of the high born Turks, not the Indian Muslims. Even in his interpretation of the Koranic verse “Indeed, the pious amongst you are most honored by Allah”, he considered piety to be associated with noble birth. Barani was specific in his recommendation that the “sons of Mohamed” [i.e. Ashrafs] “be given a higher social status than the low-born [i.e. Ajlaf]. His most significant contribution in the fatwa was his analysis of the castes with respect to Islam. His assertion was that castes would be mandated through state laws or “Zawabi” and would carry precedence over Sharia law whenever they were in conflict. In theFatwa-i-Jahandari (advice XXI), he wrote about the “qualities of the high-born” as being “virtuous” and the “low-born” being the “custodian of vices”. Every act which is “contaminated with meanness and based on ignominity, comes elegantly [from the Ajlaf]“. Barani had a clear disdain for the Ajlaf and strongly recommended that they be denied education, lest they usurp the Ashraf masters. He sought appropriate religious sanction to that effect. Barani also developed an elaborate system of promotion and demotion of Imperial officers (“Wazirs”) that was primarily on the basis of their caste. 

In addition to the Ashraf/Ajlaf divide, there is also the Arzal caste among Muslims, who were regarded by anti-Caste activists like as the equivalent of untouchables. The term “Arzal” stands for “degraded” and the Arzal castes are further subdivided into Bhanar, Halalkhor, Hijra, Kasbi, Lalbegi, Maugta, Mehtar etc. The Arzal group was recorded in the 1901 census in India and are also called Muslims “with whom no other Muhammadan would associate, and who are forbidden to enter the mosque or to use the public burial ground”. They are relegated to “menial” professions such as scavenging and carrying night soil. 

Some South Asian Muslims have been known to stratify their society according to Quoms. These Muslims practise a ritual-based system of social stratification. The Quoms who deal with human emissions are ranked the lowest. Studies of Bengali Muslims in India indicate that the concepts of purity and impurity exist among them and are applicable in inter-group relationships, as the notions of hygiene and cleanliness in a person are related to the person’s social position and not to his/her economic status. Muslim Rajput is another caste distinction among Indian Muslims. 

Some of the backward or lower-caste Muslim caste includes Ansari, Kunjra, Dhobi and Halalkhor. The upper caste Muslim caste includes Syed, Sheikh, Pathan, Mirza, Kalal and Mallik. Genetic data has also supported this stratification. 

The report commissioned by the government of India and released in 2006, documents the continued stratification in Muslim society.” 

Religious, historical and socio-cultural factors have helped define the bounds of endogamous groups for Muslims in South Asia(where altogether 260 million untouchable people are said to live. Indiais not alone in it – Author). There is a preference for endogamous marriages based on the clan-oriented nature of the society, which values and actively seeks similarities in social group identity based on several factors, including religious, sectarian, ethnic, and tribal/clan affiliation. Religious affiliation is itself multi-layered and includes religious considerations other than being Muslim, such as sectarian identity (e.g. Shia or Sunni, etc.) and religious orientation within the sect (Isnashari, Ismaili, Ahmedi, etc.). Both ethnic affiliation (e.g. Sindhi, Baloch, Punjabi, etc.) and membership of specific biraderis or Jat/quoms or Jatis are additional integral components of social identity (slightly modified). Unquote. 

(More at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caste_system_among_South_Asian_Muslims) 

From the above statement, it becomes amply clear that in Muslim societies there are deeper factors responsible for the caste divisions other than their proximity or conversions of Hindus as exemplified by the Turkish scholar, Ziauddin Barani on the Indian Muslims. Ziauddin Barani is well known for his mean casteist ideas in Muslims. Then there are more divisions in oonchi Jat (jati) referred to as ‘Jajmans’ andneechi Jat referred as ‘Kamins’. 

It is known that on contact with a low-caste Muslim, a higher Jat Muslim had to purify himself by taking a small bath in absence of other purificatory rites. In Bihar and UP states ofIndia, well known for its casteist culture inIndia, cases have been reported in which the higher caste Muslims have opposed the burials of lower caste Muslims in the same graveyard. I hope to draw the attention of the journalist friends fromBihar to take note of this menace in the contemporary Muslim society. This menace of caste extends its tentacles way beyond the Hindu community. 

It begs a question, if Muslims could be polluted in a short span of fourteen centuries only; one has to consider a vibrant Hindu culture living since millennia, “How vulnerable could it be to such impurities more so when its land was also vitiated by the presence of alien people with divergent views and faiths carried in the sceptre and barrels to impose upon”? 

Thus the argument of egalitarianism and equality in Islam is not tenable. Hence conversion has no meaning and blaming Hinduism is also opportunistic only. In the preceding Wikipedia link, it further states: 

“An illustrious figure in Indian politics and the chief architect of the Indian Constitution. He was extremely critical of the Muslim Caste System and their practices, quoting that “Within these groups there are castes with social precedence of exactly the same nature as one finds among the Hindus but worse in numerous ways”. He was critical of how the Ashrafs regarded the Ajlaf and Arzal as “worthless” and the fact that Muslims tried to sugarcoat the sectarian divisions by using euphemisms like “brotherhood” to describe them. He was also critical of the precept of literalism of scripture among Indian Muslims that led them to keep the Muslim Caste system rigid and discriminatory. He decried against the approval of Shariah to Muslim casteism. It was based on superiority of foreign elements in society which would ultimately lead to downfall of local Dalits. This tragedy would be much more harsher than Hindus who are ethnically related to and supportive. This Arabian supremacy in Indian Muslims accounted for its equal disapproval by high and low caste Hindus during 1300 years of Islamic presence in India. He condemned the Indian Muslim Community of being unable to reform like Muslims in other countries like Turkey did during the early decades of the twentieth century. 

Pakistani-American sociologist Ayesha Jalal writes, in her book, “Democracy and Authoritarianism inSouth Asia“, that “Despite its egalitarian principles, Islam in South Asia historically has been unable to avoid the impact of class and caste inequalities. As for Hinduism, the hierarchical principles of the Brahmanical social order have always been contested from within Hindu society, suggesting that equality has been and continues to be both valued and practiced in Hinduism.” 

It is also noticed that some people born and brought up inIndiahave absorbed some ideas in the local Hindu society superficially and mushroomed their stories to suit their agendas. Even if a problem exists, its interpretation can be extremely modulated by the way it is put. As the old English saying goes, “It doesn’t matter what you say but the way you say it”. 

Aharon Daniel, a Jew, was born in Mumbai, Indiaand resides in Israel. As an Indian born who studied there in school, he had some knowledge about India. Quoting him, “Religiously anyone who does not belong to the four Varnas is an outcast and untouchable. It means, all foreigners and non-Hindus are all supposed to be untouchables.” This is the opening line of his article. His statement casts the die for others who want to find their paradigm in as they hope to apply. Such statements could not be accepted as casual or innocuous especially when the person is well acquainted with the Hindu society and their culture to some extent. Further Mumbai is the single most metropolitan city in India which has maintained its cosmopolitan character despite its odd hiccoughs from time to time. 

Even Daniel expresses his views on the Indian Muslims in these words: Among the Muslims of India there has developed a two-tier hierarchy. “The upper class, called Sharif Jat, includes Muslims who belonged to the higher levels in caste hierarchy and also Muslims who arrived to India from foreign countries. The lower class, called Ajlaf Jat, includes Muslim converts from lower castes. As in the world, the upper classes do not have close social relations with lower classes, the same way the Sharif Jat do not normally have close social relations with Ajlaf Jat.” 

Masood Alam Falahi wrote in his research paper presented in Columbia University, New York for “Caste and Contemporary India” conference on 17th Oct. 2009 Published on the Pasmanda Muslim Forum here

Prior to independence ofIndia, it was common that low caste Muslims were not allowed to cook good foods and even not allowed to choose good names for their children. 

Presently there are three major categories among Indian Muslims, (1) Asharaf (2) Ajlaf (3) Arzal. Among these categories there are many sub-castes and in every category there are low castes and upper castes like Hindu caste system. 

* Some 25 years ago there was a sufi “Shah Masood” (pupil of famous sufi Shaikh Abdul Qadir Raipuria) in a village Behat of districtSaharanpur. He never allowed low caste Muslims to make Pakka (with cement and brick) house in his village. 

* In “Atki”, “Hind Paddi” villages of districtRanchiin Jharkhand, the Arzal Muslims used to eat in a separate line in marriage ceremony. The same condition is in Barabanki of U.P state. One of my casteist teachers narrated the same story of hisvillageofAzamgarhdistrict, UP. 

* Dr. Azmat Siddiqi from Centre for Women Studies of Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, told in her speech that in her village “phoolpur” of Allahabad, U.P, ashraf don’t eat food from sweeper / halalkhor community. She was against casteism and once she ate with them. Her cousins boycotted her as she ate with Halalkhor community. 

* Professor Imtiaz Ahmad told me the following incident in a meeting, even he writes it in one of his articles: 

“We had a Lalbegi woman come to clean the toilets in our house. She was on the best of terms with my mother and would sit for hours together gossiping with my mother. Whenever my mother would offer her pan, she would wrap her hand with her dupatta to receive it. My mother used to drop the pan in her hand, making sure that her hand did not touch the Lalbegi woman’s hand. On occasions of marriage the family would come and sit in a corner and wait until all guests had eaten and left. It would then be given food in vessels they brought with them. They did not eat the food there, but instead took it with them to be eaten at home. On sacrificial eid the family was not given any portion of the meat. It was given the intestines which were kept aside for them. It is possible that some of these forms of discrimination have changed, but there is no evidence to show that they have disappeared. 

Some evidence exists to show that there is discrimination against these Muslim castes in the religious spheres. I found during fieldwork in eastern Uttar Pradesh that members of these castes did not go to the mosque for prayers and if they went they had to stand in the back rows. It has been mentioned by many observers that such groups often have their own mosques. N. Jamal Ansari notes that ‘in certain areas of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar there are separate mosques and burial grounds’ for these castes (Paper presented at the seminar on Dalit Muslims organized by Deshkal Society,New Delhi, 2004). Establishment of own mosque would call for a level of prosperity for the groups as a whole. Whether they have attained such levels of prosperity is something on which very little information exists.” 

* Once I visited Nakhas Mohallah (street) of Lucknowon 30th of September 2009. This is a Muslim area. I saw a small mosque with a small madrasa, written on the mosque “Masjid-e-Rayeen” (Mosque of vegetable sellers). In front of this mosque there is an Imam barah of Imam Baqir, belongs to Shait sect of Muslim. This small masques shows that there is discrimination against the vegetable seller caste, so they made the separate mosque. 

* Dr. Ghauth Ansari writes same cases of caste based discrimination in U.P. He also adds that even ‘low’ caste Muslims are not allowed to pray in the mosque some time. They pray outside the mosque. 

* The former editor of “Qawmi Morcha” Daily (National Front, Urdu News Paper) (Banaras) Mr. Tajuddin Ash’ar Ram Nagri wrote a letter to me after reading my book. He wrote that before independence ofIndia, Muslim sweepers were not allowed to enter into the mosque inBanaras, U.P. 

* In “Desna” village of Nalanda, low castes are not allowed to sit in the first row of the mosque. Even low caste like Ansari and kalal castes do not allow Pamariya caste to sit in the first row while offering Namaz in the “Pandara”village ofLohar Dagga district. 

* In “Ouchwa” thevillage ofGorakhpur, Upper castes wash the mosque in case somebody from low caste Muslim enters into the mosque. 

* The famous news paper “Tehelka”New Delhi reports in its issue dated 18 Nov.2006 AD: 

“In Bihar, the Bakkho sub-caste- formally a nomadic tribe- is held by other Muslims to be untouchables despite Islam categorically forbidding any such division… when someone in an upper caste family dies; we go to his house to condole, like we would go to any other Muslim home. But when someone from our caste dies, the upper castes people never come for the same.” 

* In Rampur BariyavillageofChamparanDistrict ofBihar, a low caste groom was insulted and beaten up by upper caste Muslims because he was sitting on horse. In the same village upper caste Muslims broke the mosque built by low caste Muslims. They also burnt their houses. 

* In my village there is only one graveyard and every caste has specific place for burial purpose. I don’t know the exact reason. But there are various reports that upper castes Muslims don’t allow low caste Muslims to bury dead bodies in the common graveyard for community. This is the reason low caste Muslims have separate graveyards. 

* In “Mohabbat Pur” villageof VaishaliDistrict in Bihar, Jugal Khalifa died. His dead body was not allowed by Shaikh caste to be buried in the common graveyard as he was a Nat (dancer and impersonator – Author), a low caste Muslim. Police took action and arrested many of upper caste members then only his dead body got buried. 

* This is not enough, even in some places the low caste Muslims are not considered as Muslims by upper caste people. I have seen in my district Sitamarhi, Bihar, Shaikh castes consider them only as Muslim and others as non Muslims. They use the term “we Muslims” for themselves and for others ‘low castes’ and used to call them with bad names like Julaha, Dhuniya, Kujda, Kasai, Nai etc. 

* In some places Upper caste Muslims are taking “badhuwa Mazdoori” (work without pay) by low caste Muslims. Sometimes they have abused their women. They are destroying their houses etc. 

(http://writingcaste.wordpress.com/2011/08/10/caste-among-indian-muslims-causes-and-consequences/) 

The preceding expressions by a budding Muslim scholar himself should make one realise that the menace of caste exists grotesquely in Muslim society; though the blame is labeled against the Hindus, offering their apologias for various Abrahamic religions. 

Dr. Radhasyam Brahmachari also observes about this: “The people who blame Hinduism, admire both Christianity and Islam and say that these religions, particularly Islam, is far more humane and socialistic as they do not have any discriminatory and oppressive institution like casteism, and where the rich and the poor pray alike, standing side by side, in a mosque. But the renowned historian Tara Chand, in his History of Freedom Movement in Indiawrites, “All census reports (of India) before 1931 used to give a long list of Muslim castes and there is no doubt whatsoever that in the 18th century, the Muslim inhabitants in India followed the pattern that of the Hindu society. … This was un-Islamic but an awakening against it was impossible at that time” (Vol-1, p-100). As a consequence, the Muslim society of India is also divided into innumerable caste, and even today, there exist more than 20 Muslim castes in a village alone in Uttar Pradesh alone.” 

Radhasyam further adds, “Tara Chand also writes that the Sayeds were at the zenith of the Muslim caste hierarchy. Aurangzeb had strong sympathy for the Sayeds and he believed that they should be respected and honoured by every Muslim and they must not be hurt either physically or mentally. In a nut shell, the position of these Sayeds was as it were for the Brahmins in the Hindu society. Almost all these Sayeds were foreigners from West Asian Muslim countries. When a higher caste Hindu converted to Islam, they were called Sahikhs and used to claim a higher position in the Muslim society. But the lower caste Hindus who, after conversion called Razils, were treated as lower caste Muslims. These Razils were considered no better than kafirs by the Sayeds or by other higher caste Muslims and entering into a matrimonial relationship with these Razils was unthinkable. 

In addition to that, Muslims object to Quadiani and Ahmediya Muslims being called Muslims at all and refuse to allow the burial of a Quadiani in their graveyards. Conflicts between Shia and Sunni, Hanafi and non-Hanafi are a regular feature in Muslim society. In many countries, including India and Pakistan, Shia villages are sacked, looted and razed to the ground by the Sunnis. It is also important to note that Shia-Sunni disputes in India and elsewhere are more frequent and more prolific than Hindu-Muslims riots. In Muslim society, as pointed out above, Syeds, Moghals, Pathans, Shaikhs and the Muslims of foreign origin are considered superior to converted Indian Muslims. These Higher caste Muslims do not enter into any social and matrimonial relations with low caste Muslims like Kalus, Jolas, Nikaris etc.” More at:http://www.faithfreedom.org/one/caste-system-in-muslim-society-of-india-part-i/ 

Professor Yoginder Singh Sikand, Head, Centre for Studies on Indian Muslims, Hamdard University, New Delhi critically analyses in his long essay “Caste in Indian Muslim Society” states without mincing words: “He (Barani) goes on to elaborate a theory of the innate inferiority of the ajlaf, the superiority of the ashrafand the divine right of the Sultan to rule, based on a distorted interpretation of Islam. Thus, he writes that the ‘merits’ and ‘demerits’ of all people have been ‘apportioned at the beginning of time and allotted to their souls’. Hence, people’s acts are not of their own volition, but, rather, an expression and result of ‘Divine commandments’. God Himself, Barani claims, has decided that the ajlaf be confined to ‘inferior’ occupations, for He is said to have made them ‘low born, bazaar people, base, mean, worthless, plebeian, shameless and of dirty birth’. God has given them ‘base’ qualities, such as ‘immodesty, wrongfulness, injustice, cruelty, non-recognition of rights, shamelessness, impudence, blood-shedding, rascality, jugglery and Godlessness’ that are suitable only for such professions. Furthermore, these base qualities are inherited from father to son, and so the ajlaf must not attempt to take up professions reserved by God for the ashraf even if they are qualified to do so, for this would be a grave violation of the Divine Will. Likewise, Barani claims, God has bestowed the ashraf with noble virtues by birth itself, and these are transmitted hereditarily. Hence, they alone have the right and responsibility of taking up ‘noble’ occupations, such as ruling, teaching and preaching the faith.” 

Professor Sikand goes on, “Nu’mani quotes extensively from Barani’s Fatawa-i -Jahandari to show how discriminatory attitudes towards low-caste converts were widely shared by medieval Muslim elites. He also comments on the absence of any effective opposition to such views. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that, ‘From Barani’s time till 1947 the notion of Muslim society being divided into ashraf and ajlaf, high and low, was continuously present’. He refers to some twentieth century Indian ‘ulama of his own Deobandi school as opposing caste-based inequality among the Indian Muslims but laments that ‘this sickness has not as yet been fully eliminated’. He admits that although the caste system is less severe among the Muslims than it is among the Hindus, in that untouchability is absent among the former, with caste playing a determining role only in marriage among Muslims. Yet, he pleads for Muslims to combat notions of caste based superiority and inferiority, for only then, he argues, can efforts to spread Islam among ‘low’ caste Hindus be effective. For this purpose, he says, a radical revisioning of the concept of kafa’a is urgently required.” 

He continues, “Nu’mani sees this restrictive provision as making life for converts to Islam even more difficult and, therefore, making conversion to Islam a difficult choice for non-Muslims. By making this distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Muslims, he says, ‘rather than welcoming our new guests we are insulting them’.[28] Accordingly, he fervently appeals to his fellow ‘ulama 

to relax or abandon this rule, which in any case he sees as having no sanction in Islam. He reminds them that because they insisted on this un-Islamic provision, a large group of Hindus of the Tyagi caste in northern India who were ready to convert to Islam finally decided not to because the Muslim Tyagis refused to intermarry with them on the grounds that ‘old’ Muslims could not establish marital relations with converts. Likewise, Nu’mani writes, it was because of the discriminatory and anti-Qur’anic rules that the ‘ulama have devised on kafa’a that Dr. Ambedkar, the leader of the ‘low’ caste Dalits, declined to convert to Islam, choosing Buddhism instead.[29]” Full details can be perused at: 

Published in “Asianists’ ASIA” 

Edited by T.Wignesan in Paris, France. See:http://stateless.freehosting.net/Caste%20in%20Indian%20Muslim%20Society.htm 

Caste And Caste-Based Discrimination Among Indian Muslims – Part 1 

By Masood Alam Falahi 

Translator’s Note: Very little has been written on the existence of caste and caste-based discrimination among the Indian Muslims. ‘Upper’ caste Muslims, who, although a very small minority among the Indian Muslims, generally deny the existence of caste and caste-based discrimination in the larger Muslim community by arguing that these have no sanction in Islam. However, although these do not have legitimacy in the Quran, their reality cannot be denied. Nor too can the legitimacy that these have sought to be given by numerous supposedly leading Indian Islamic scholars be ignored. 

In 2007, Masood Alam Falahi, a graduate of a madrasa and then a 27 year-old M.Phil. student at Delhi University, wrote a voluminous, almost 600-page, Urdu book titled Hindustan Mai Zat-Pat Aur Musalman (sic. ‘Casteism Among Muslims in India’). Weaving together insights from fieldwork and key writings by influential Indian Muslim scholars, including Muslim clerics on the subject of caste, the book is a pioneering study of caste-based discrimination among the Indian Muslims and of the continued domination of ‘high’ caste Muslims that parallels, in remarkable ways, the Hindu case. 

Realising the importance of this pioneering book, I have begun translating key portions of it, which I plan to send out as articles once every few days. Once the translation is complete I hope to publish it as a book. 

This instalment is a translation of the first thirty pages of the book titled ‘Why I Have Written This Book’. — Yoginder Sikand for NewAgeIslam.com 

02 November, 2010 

NewAgeIslam.com 

[Translated from Urdu by Yoginder Sikand for NewAgeIslam.com] 

Is Caste Only a Hindu Problem? (Part 2) 

 by Editor

Caste in the Dynasty of Isaac 

Prophet Abraham some few millennia ago, had a son with Sarah viz Isaac who later gave rise to two religions – Judaism and Christianity. First the Judaism took its roots via Hebrewism and the well known Prophet Moses among the Jews laid down the Ten Commandments. The Holy Scripture is called the Old Bible or Hebrew Bible or Torah propounded at sometime about 1400 BC. It had a much fractured history of ups and downs; in and out of the then Canaan province, the Israel of today. Later on Jesus Christ took birth in the Jewish community from the womb of Virgin Marry by Divine Providence about two millennia ago. His life and message through the well known teachings in the New Testament or Bible is followed by the two Billion people globally. For reasons not exactly known and by the dint of fate, Jews did not flourish as much as the Christians. Hence the history of Judaism is also limited as compared to the Islam and Christianity. In this issue I wish to deliberate on the caste systems prevalent in both these Abrahamic sects to the best of my epistemology and with no malice. 

Section A 

Caste in Jewish people: 

It is sadly interesting to know that the word “Jew” itself has become blasphemous due to the adverse historical perspectives. It is preferred to say, “Jewish or Jewish person”. If I have erred in my endeavour, I remain to be forgiven. It is not my intention to hurt the sentiments of anyone deliberately and by indulging in needless argumentative heresy. 

Jonah Goldberg has addressed it, “…Anyway, he called and said, “Hey, Jonah, isn’t it sort of bad to call someone ‘a Jew.’” After a brief moment to digest the question, I knew exactly what he was talking about. 

It is bad to call someone a Jew, sort of. 

The newspapers and nightly news shows keep using the word “Jew” where normally you would expect them to say “Jewish” or “Jewish person.” Senator Lieberman is as often as not referred to as “a Jew” in print, television and radio.” 

Thus to call someone ‘Jew’ is as pejorative as the ‘Caste slur’ in present scenario. 

In his article on ‘The Non Hindus in Caste System’, in India, Aharon Daniel, a Mumbai born Jewish now living in Israel, delineated his views on the Jewish caste system in the succeeding excerpt. “In the Konkan coast there is Jewish community called Bene Israel. Some claim that these Jews are from the ‘Lost Tribes’. These Jews who arrived in India after their ship-wrecked near the Konkan coast claim that they and the Kokanastha Brahmans are descendants of the survivals from the same ship. And in their version, it was not an incarnation of Lord Vishnu who converted the Kokanastha Brahmans but a local Brahman. Anyway these Jews do not have gray-green eyes like the Kokanastha Brahmans. 

Different religion followers got different status in different parts of India. The Jews of west India called Bene Israel, had a different status from Jews of south India, Cochini Jews. The Bene Israels professed oil pressing and they had a status equal to a Hindu Jat called Somwar Teli, which also professed oil pressing and were part of Sudra Varna. Some orthodox Hindus treated anyone who wasn’t one of them as untouchable and therefore treated the Jews also as untouchables. But even though the Jews in west India had low status there were among them some who were landlords, businessmen and high rank officers in local armies. 

Comparing to the Bene Israels, the Jews in south India had higher status. The Jews in Kerala were the business community of Kerala. They even ruled a small principality. They had aristocratic rights, such as use of elephants and sedans. They even had servants whose job was to announce their coming to the streets so that the low castes could move away from their way. 

The relations between the Jewish communities of India are sometimes explained as affected by the Indian caste system but these relations can also be explained according to Jewish religious laws. There were three main Jewish communities in India; the Baghdadis, the Bene Israels and Cochinis. The Baghdadi Jews were much strict about religious laws than the Bene Israel Jews. The Baghdadis did not mingle with Bene Israel Jews. The Baghdadis did not allow marriages between their children and the children of Bene Israel. They did not eat food prepared by Bene Israel and they refused to count the Bene Israel as part of the Minyan (the ten necessary to start a Jewish prayer). Many explain these relations as an influence of the Indian caste system on the Jewish communities. According to this explanation, the Baghdadi Jews referred to themselves as higher caste than the Bene Israel Jews and therefore did not mingle with them. But these relations between the Jewish communities can also be explained according to the Jewish Halacha laws. The Baghdadi Jews who were much strict about Jewish laws and diet did not mingle with the Bene Israels because the Bene Israels were secular Jews and they perceived in Bene Israel Jews as impure Jews.” 

However the Jewish community never got concentrated in a place as their nation and after nineteenth century CE, they became capsized by the Anti-Semitic fervour and were largely persecuted resulting in the massive holocaust by Hitler in WW II. It resulted in their present settlement in Israel in 1948. Thus it limits their caste history also. 

The Jewish community in fact became a caste in itself in the midst of the Arab land to find a foothold for them. This led to a Zionist movement in the Arab land finally to the establishment of Israel. 

The total population of Jews world over is estimated at around 15 Millions which make it about 0.24% of the world population. In such a nominally minor population also, who are said to be declining over all; there is a caste division as indicated above. The fact is that due to their threat to survival, one would rather expect cohesion in their residual population of whatever denomination. Hence even this caste division in Jews becomes quite significant in such trying times. 

Section B 

Caste in Christianity: 

Christians form the largest community in the world and still growing in their evangelic efforts. Christians have used both violent and peaceful means depending on the opportunity at hand. The Christian Missionaries have organised themselves under the patronage of their single most patriarch as head priest called Pope based at the Vatican in Rome. He supposedly controls the larger Catholic sect of the Christians to the extent of about more than 80% while the Protestants constitutes about 20% whose head is the British monarch and guided by the Archbishop of Canterbury in London. There are vast number of subdivisions in both Catholics and Protestants also,. 

In India Christianity is said to have first arrived with Saint Thomas in Kerala with a controversial history. He is said to have been helped by the then Travancore Kingdom to settle and they helped him in building about half a dozen churches both in Kerala and erstwhile Madras states. The present Christian history has been marred with controversial accounts, both in India and globally. A retired IAS officer – V. Sundaram wrote a four part article in 2008 under the caption, “Fraudulent myth of the tomb of St Thomas – I”. 

This is the first part . 

Ishwar Sharan has resolutely written in his inimical style all these four posts on his website in the column, “St. Thomas in India: An IAS officer revisits a 400-year-old history hoax – “Baritone” V. Sundaram”. Sharan has added some extra graphics and links to supplement his column. 

Some Christians also oppose the proposed labeling of “Christian Scheduled castes” because they feel their identity may be assimilated. Pastor Salim Sharif of the Church of North India notes “We are becoming another class and caste.” ” 

Incidence: 

“Caste discrimination is strongest among Christians in South India and weaker among urban Protestant congregations in North India. This is due to the fact that in South India, whole castes converted en masseto the religion, leaving members of different castes to compete in ways parallel to Hindus of the Indian caste system. 

There are separate seats, separate communion cups, burial grounds, and churches for members of the lower castes, especially in the Roman Catholic Church. Catholic churches in India are largely controlled by upper caste Priests and nuns. Presently in India, more than 70 per cent of Catholics are Dalits, but the higher caste Catholics (less than 30% by estimates) control 90 per cent of the Catholic churches administrative jobs. Out of the 156 catholic bishops, only 6 are from lower castes. 

There are a large number of various caste groups in Kerala, Goa, Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh in the Christians enumerated in the website of Wikipedia given below. 

Criticism 

Many Dalit Catholics have spoken out against discrimination against them by members of the Catholic Church. A famous Dalit activist with a nom-de-plume of Bama Faustina has written books that are critical of the discrimination by the nuns and priests in Churches in South India. Pope John Paul II also criticized the caste discrimination in the Roman Catholic Church in India when addressing the bishops of Madras,Mylapore, Madurai, Cuddalore, and Pondicherry in late 2003. He went on to say: “It is the Church’s obligation to work unceasingly to change hearts, helping all people to see every human being as a child of God, a brother or sister of Christ, and therefore a member of our own family”.” 

This deposition shows, “How the Church lied to convert the local Hindu lower class people.” 

“With the advent of the Christian missionaries in India under the patronage from the British rule in the eighteenth century, a new chapter of proselytisation began. The missionaries were able to use this weakness in Hinduism to convert those who were worst hit by the caste cancer prejudice. 

These missionaries concentrated their “charity” work mainly in the tribal areas. They told the tribals that they were not Hindus, that their indigenous culture and religion was different from Hinduism. They taught them that Christianity, an alien religion was their own; that Jesus Christ who was born and lived in the Middle-East was also a ‘dalit’ like them and that Christianity was a religion without the caste bias and offered them socio-economic equality. In their desire to lead a life of respect, thousands of tribals got converted to Christianity assuming that they had found an answer to the wretched caste system in Hinduism. 

Little did they know that conversion to Christianity would not redeem them from social discrimination and untouchability, because though Jesus never advocated the caste system, Christianity in India was not free from the caste bias? Christian outfits which criticized Hinduism for its caste system, practised discrimination based on casteism in their Churches. In spite of the fact that around 75 to 80% of the Christians are ‘dalits’ who got converted to Christianity to lose their caste or ‘outcaste’ tag, Dalit Christians within the Church were discriminated against and were denied powers within the ecclesiastical structure.” 

Logically, the term ‘Dalit Christians’ is self-contradictory. How can a person be a ‘Dalit’ when he is a Christian; for Christianity (supposedly – Author) does not recognise the caste system which is an evil prevalent only in the Hindu society (supposedly – Author)? 

K.K Pudur village in Maduranthugam Taluk, Chegalpattu District, 60 kilometers from Madras, has a Catholic population of 2500. Of these, 1500 are Dalit Catholics. The rest of the catholic population belong to the Reddy and the Naidu upper caste. For the past 200 years, these upper caste Christians have oppressed the Dalit Christians by not giving them their due place in the Church and in the graveyard. On 7 May 1994, there was a violent clash between the two classes of Catholics at K.K. Pudur as they were preparing for the celebration of the patron feast of their patron Saint Joseph. The case was filed with the police and eighty-four people from both factions were jailed and the church stayed closed for six months. 

Rev. John Duraisamy, an editor of Sarvaviyabi, a Tamil Weekly from the archdiocese of Pondicherry-Cuddalore published two cartoons consecutively on 4 & 11th July 1999. These cartoons were an insult to the 240 million dalits or the untouchables of India. The Archbishop of Pondicherry who belonged to the same caste as the editor, was silent on the matter. 

Archbishop George Zur, Apostolic Pro-Nuncio to India said while inaugurating the CBCI (Catholic Bishops Conference of India) in 1991: 

“Though Catholics of the lower caste and tribes form 60 per cent of Church membership they have no place in decision-making. Scheduled caste converts are treated as lower caste not only by high caste Hindus but by high caste Christians too. In rural areas they cannot own or rent houses, however well-placed they may be. Separate places are marked out for them in the parish churches and burial grounds. Inter-caste marriages are frowned upon and caste tags are still appended to the Christian names of high caste people. Casteism is rampant among the clergy and the religious. Though Dalit Christians make 65 per cent’ of the 10 million Christians in the South, less than 4 per cent of the parishes are entrusted to Dalit priests. There are no Dalits among 13 Catholic Bishops of Tamilnadu or among the Vicars-general and rectors of seminaries and directors of social assistance centres.” 

In a column published on 20 June 2007, Times of India stated, “”Would the Christians admit that they practise caste system and that Dalits (among them) face social discrimination requiring reservation to uplift their cause? This is not all that easy,” a Bench headed by Chief Justice K G Balakrishnan said granting eight weeks to the Centre to report back to court.” 

It further continued, “Christians claim to be a casteless society. Dalit Christian activists, who have agitated for Dalit status for long, recently got a shot in arm when the Justice Ranganath Mishra Commission endorsed their case. 

Appearing for them, senior counsel Shanti Bhushan cited the Mishra Commission’s report as he argued that the SC category be expanded to include Dalits who have now embraced Christianity and Islam. 

He argued for the scrapping of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, restricting reservation benefits to Dalits only among Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs. 

“It is clear from the commission’s report that a mere change in religion did not bring about a change in their social status,” Shanti Bushan argued. He was supported by senior advocate Ram Jethmalani, appearing for the All India United Christian Movement for Equal Rights. 

Jethmalani said the Congress government had brought in a Bill in 1996 with the objective of giving Dalits equal rights irrespective of the religion they profess. “It is only politics that has deprived the Dalit Christians their legitimate due,” he added. 

How the lies are propagated by the Vatican agents: 

In a news column by Catholic News Agency from Rome, Italy, it is interesting to read the clip. 

Sep 2, 2008 / 04:40 pm (CNA).- In an interview with Vatican Radio, the Archbishop of Ranchi in India,Cardinal Telesforo Placidus Toppo, said that the Catholic Church’s defense of the sacredness of the human person and its opposition to the caste system are what is fueling the violence against Christian minorities in India. 

“In the caste system, equality doesn’t exist. That is why the Church’s commitment to overcome the caste system is not accepted. For us the person is sacred,” Cardinal Toppo said. 

… “There are socio-economic-political factors at play, factors that are at the root of these incidents, of the burning of Christian-owned properties. Another factor is the law against conversions. We have clarified that we do not convert people by force,” the cardinal said. 

In response to these aggressions, he continued, the response of the Church “is that of Jesus, Christians have not responded to the aggressions. I think we will be given help by the central government and by the State,” the cardinal noted, praising the many “good initiatives. And here let me underscore: equality among all is a threat for the fundamentalists.” 

Anyone reading this entire column can make out the blatant white lie being uttered and the crocodile tears shed through an Indian mouth piece to appear as a profound legitimate truth coming out from a person on the spot. They still claim to be the Apostles of peace and truth! 

I logged in Google for “Caste System in Christianity” and got 16, 000, 000 results in 0.16 seconds. One can easily gauge the enormity of the problem. I assert but sadly, in such a vested environment where the high and mighty are hell bent on perpetuating the malaise of divisive political and religious agendas covertly where spoken words do not match the ground realities of actions performed, the larger common masses are left with very little choice to help themselves. A common person is too weak to confront these monstrous designs of the politico-religious powerful institutions. Politics and religions are both equally guilty of this nefarious act and the staged drama. My contention is further fortified by the following excerpt from a leading British news media. 

Nick Cohen in his column in the Guardian.uk, “The secret scandal of Britain’s caste system” observes, “British Asians, secularists and Liberal Democrat and Labour politicians have been trying for years to persuade the government to tackle caste discrimination. They have had no success because the treatment of untouchables is one of the great unmentionables of British politics. They are certainly the victims of a form of religious prejudice – the sanction for the oppression of lower castes in a pre-ordained hierarchy comes from Hindu creation myths. Yet caste prejudice does not fit easily into established views of how discrimination works, because caste divisions exist among Sikhs, Muslims and Christians whose families came from the sub-continent, as well as Hindus.” 

Cohen further adds, “The casual observer of British politics might have thought that a voluble quangocrat, who is always willing to fill empty airtime with heart rending cries for greater equality, would have denounced caste prejudice with unembarrassed vigour. For once, however, Phillips is silent. A search of the Equality and Human Rights Commission records shows that it ignores caste discrimination in Britain.” 

One can go on endlessly, and fruitlessly to deal on this topic of universal social malady wherein directly or indirectly, every existent society is involved with a continued hidden interest. It is being used more as rhetoric and sloganeering to exploit one section than explicitly eliminate it by demoralising. Caste appears like the system of flesh trade, which is denounced by everybody but nobody is prepared to eliminate it. They all like to immerse in it in the darkness of their daytime and enjoy it in the light of night time. Dr. O. P. Sudrania 

Is Caste only a Hindu Problem? (Part 3) 

by Editor 

Dr. O. P. Sudrania 

In this monogram, I would venture to dwell on this caste malaise prevalent in the Sikhs, both in India as well as abroad. It is noteworthy that the origin of the Sikhism started with their Gurus from Nanak Saheb to the tenth Guru Gobind Singhji aka Gobind Rai. 

Prof. Baldev Singh ‘Panthi’ has expressed it fairly well in his long researched essay in these words, “The issue of caste in Sikhism is quite complex, always inviting a diversity of impassioned opinions. One thing we can be certain about is that Guru Gobind Singh had abolished all caste inequality with the inception of Khalsa on 13 April, 1699 and with the institution of Khanday-Ki-Pahul or the Baptism of Sword. Faithful Sikhs do not practice caste discrimination but this is not to say that all Sikhs necessarily act in accordance to their faith. Consequently, the caste does exist in Sikhism, though in a diluted form than found in the rest of Indian society. 

But at the outset one thing can be confidently stated which is that there is no clearly defined caste hierarchy in Sikh society, leave alone a vertically ordered one. Any layperson or author giving a clearly ordered Sikh caste hierarchy is himself mistaken or is purposefully misleading others.” 

This statement is self contradicted by Baldev Singh himself in his same article. We shall refer to it later. As regards misleading is concerned, it is the same concern that has prompted me. 

It is prudent to highlight the beginnings of Sikhs which is very relevant to this subject of much maligned curse of caste. There is an obvious overlap in the description but the astute readers will persevere to see the semblance in it with our topic of “Caste in Sikhism” dealt with later on. 

Guru Nanakji (15 April 1469 – 22 September 1539) was the founder of the lineage or religion of Sikhism; was born in Hindu Khatri family of Bedi clan and the first of the ten Sikh Gurus. He preached equality of all humans including the women and irrespective of any societal discrimination. 

When in the Middle East, the West and the rest of Asia – slavery, varna/class and race discrimination was rife and respect between the different classes and caste was at low ebb, Guru Nanak preached against discrimination and prejudices due to race, caste, status, etc. More at:http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Guru_Nanak 

The tenth Guru was Gobind Singhji aka Gobind Rai who ultimately laid the foundation of “Khalsa Panth (the Granth and the Panth)” and had also declared that the Holy Book called “Guru Granth Sahib” will be their final Guru and guide from now on, i.e. after his departure; there will be no more human Guru. This is their ‘Panth’ i.e. the ‘path’ to follow. 

The meaning of Khalsa translates to “Sovereign/Free”. Another interpretation is that of being ‘Pure’. The meaning of Khalsa translates to “Sovereign/Free”. Another interpretation is that of being ‘Pure’. A Sikh who has been initiated into the Khalsa is titled Singh (males) and Kaur (females) and commonly referred to as Amritdhari. 

Sikhs believe that no matter what race, sex, or religion one is, all are equal in God’s eyes. Men and women are equal and share the same rights, and women can lead in prayers. 

The traditions and philosophy of Sikhi were established by ten specific gurus from 1469 to 1708. Each guru added to and reinforced the message taught by the previous, resulting in the creation of the Sikh religion. 

It is noteworthy that Guru Nanak was born in the era when the most cruel and barbaric Mughal invader Baaber aka Baabur was repeatedly inflicting his tyrannical atrocities to expand his empire in Indian subcontinent from present day Uzbekistan. Baabur also had a great passion to kill people, cut heads of people and create pillars out of cut head. He claimed to have created several such pillars in his autobiography. 

Sikhism and beginnings of Caste curse: 

During those days in Asia as well as in Europe the local kings and rulers used to fight among themselves for most of the times on one or the other pretexts. This was also the case in the life time of the evolution of so called Sikhism in just less than a century and a half of the lives of their ten Gurus. 

Prof. Baldev Singh ‘Panthi’ has written a long document elaborating extensively on the castes in Sikh society. Here are some extracts from his essay. 

“…the Sixth Guru and his successors found that most of the Rajputs of their time were only interested in petty fights and intrigues and had all but abdicated their responsibilities as Kshatriyas. While they toadied up to the Mughal rulers to protect their petty fiefs, they not only did not defend the rank and file of the Hindu society but were often themselves engaged in the oppression of lower caste Hindus. 

Having failed to get the desired response from Rajput rulers after prolonged diplomacy and persuasion, the tenth Guru finally decided to institute a new Order in which each initiated Sikh could play the role of all the four castes. As a Shudra, a Sikh is to believe in the dignity of labour. As a Vaishya, Sikh is meant to engage in commerce with honesty and work for the prosperity of the society. As Kshatriya, the Sikh is meant to carry weapons and not shy away from a just fight. And finally, as a Brahman the same Sikh – who has simultaneously all varnas in his being – is to recite Sri Guru Granth Sahib and also play priestly role whenever needed. 

… Fighting for both one’s life and faith was the greatest need in era of Gurus. Therefore, the Kshatriya part of Sikh’s identity got more highlighted in Sikh society but it does not mean that the Shudra, Vaishya and Brahmin aspects of his personality were to be devalued. Dignity of labour is the cornerstone of Sikh faith and maryada (prestige or honour). Each Sikh is to take pride in doing service or seva.” 

It is this very assertion by Baldev Singh that is self contradictory to his earlier boastings above as regards the caste issue. At the same time it also proves my contention that Sikhs were forced to bifurcate out from their Hindu community to protect them from the atrocities by invading Islamic plunderers and nomadic barbarians. It is certainly disappointing to see that the same class of people who once acted as protectors of Hindus have become disaffected and turned their back against the parent society. 

All of the Sikh Gurus were born in Khatri caste. Guru Nanak’s father Mehta Kalu was also a shopkeeper and he tried his best to make his son follow his caste profession of shopkeeping. 

Baldev Singh further extends his apologia, “The reasons for such petty arguments about each others’ relative social status are unfortunate and are to be seen in the backdrop of colonial era, when the trading castes like Khatri and Baniya were perceived to be usurers and exploiters of the misery of indebted farmers from these landowning and agricultural castes. British policies also played some role in fostering already existing schisms among the Indian castes. 

For some reason British army recruiters considered all of these mercantile castes unfit for military service. Khatri Sikhs were sometimes recruited when they happened to have taken up farming and sometimes because of their knowledge of Pashto, which came in handy to British to deal with the unruly Pathans… While Bhatias mostly did not even find a mention in recruitment manuals of Royal Indian Army, the Aroras were contemptuously dismissed with comments… by the likes of Barstow : “The Arora, whether Sikh or Hindu, is generally unsuited for military service, and men of this class should never be enlisted except under special circumstances.”” 

Professors Niranjhan Singh and Baldev Singh ‘Panthi’ have both done extensive research on this sensitive issue of castes in Sikhs as well as they also mention its ramifications in other religious communities e.g. Muslims and Christians. However the work done by Baldev Singh appears more extensive Vis a Vis Niranjhan Singh. Both have given their detailed accounts in their separate works independently. Both of them have first segregated the various major castes in Sikhs; then enlisted the various subcastes in alphabetical order. 

It is bewildering that in Sikhism, which is now claimed to be a religion, in such a short span of time of mere three centuries, the caste in Sikhs is far more deep rooted than Hindus. Baldev Singh has tried to extend various excuses, apologias and causes for this caste practice in Sikhs; hideously incriminating the British Raj politics also. It certainly was a major factor indeed. 

Baldev Singh and Niranjhan Singh have painstakingly tried to enumerate the groups and subgroups in Sikhs, which will be briefly elaborated on herewith. 

Various castes and subcastes in Sikhs: 

Basically Sikh castes have been grouped under nine major heads altogether with thousands of further subgroups. Anyone interested in detailed bifurcation is requested to ctrl+click on the hyperlinked names which directs to their respective webs with extensive names of various castes and subcastes. As originally enunciated by Guru Nanakji, it should have been a casteless society. By the time of Guru Gobind Singhji, only in a span of one hundred and forty years, it became imperative for the last Guru Gobind Singhji to accept and perpetuate the four Varna systems as enunciated in ancient Hindu tradition which got corrupted over the time. 

Baldev Singh mentions of a debate on castes in Sikhs and states, “There has been a vibrant debate within the Sikh Panth on the issue of the caste since late 19th century. Generally, this debate has been shaped by two broad lines of argument.” (1) Castes Exist But All Castes Are Equal. (2) Caste Should Not Exist At All. 

Who would disagree on it? 

This is clearly a helpless cry towards an indirect debilitating apologia while accepting the caste malaise and suggesting remedies simultaneously. But the remedies have been tried by the Hindus also over centuries, if not millennia; nay there have been painstaking hard societal battles fought by many Hindu socio-political and religious reformist leaders with sincere intention to eradicate it without any fruitful results. 

The causes have been both intrinsic as well as extrinsic from the vested interests of the few powerful institutions or individuals or groups whose benefits were/are linked in its perpetual maintenance. The interests may have been either direct fiscally linked or predatory conversions indirectly or for continuing the clandestine rule by divide et impera. 

Thus the very existence of caste and its multipronged bewildering subdivisions in small Sikh and Jewish communities could be a very good module to study, first the existence of castes; next to evolve the effective means to eradicate it. 

Caste and subcaste groups in Sikhs: 

I have been able to access two leading Sikh scholars on this issue; I shall try to briefly touch on their descriptions separately. Both are going to overlap each other slightly. 

Professor Niranjhan Singh: Anyone wishing to peruse details of his descriptions is requested to peruse the hyperlinked name. He states the various castes under the following heads. 

1. Brahmin surnames: Under two alphabets B and R – 2castes 

2. Kshatriya surnames: Under alphabets A, B, C, K, M, S – 21 castes 

3. Jatt surnames: Under A, B, C, D, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, Y, – 949 castes 

4. Ramgharia surnames: Under B, C, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, S, V – 42 castes 

5. Chimba, Darsi, Taank-Kshatryia and Halvyi surnames: Under B, D, G, J, N, T, V – 9 castes 

6. Chamaar, Lohaar and Churrah surnames: Under B, D, G, K, R, S – 20 castes. This section also has one separate group with ‘M/L i. e. Moonlighters’ who are counted as higher class in this otherwise low caste group. 

It totals to 1043 (One thousand and forty three) names of castes. 

Niranjhan Singh thinks that Gobind Singhji abolished the castes in Sikh communities and it restarted from the period of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the Sikh Missls (from the Persian word “misl” meaning “similar” or “alike” generally refers to the twelve sovereign states in the Sikh Confederacy). However his statement is at variance with the view held by Professor Baldev Singh ‘Panthi’. 

Baldev Singh feels that the four castes/Varnas were started by Guru Gobind Singhji. He thinks that caste was banned by Guru Nanak Devji from the very inception. But for certain reasons beyond his control, Guru Gobind Singh himself created this system in Sikhs during his life time like the four Varnas in Hindus as explained earlier. 

Professor Baldev Singh ‘Panthi’ states in the introductory section of his essay under the section of “Major Sikh Castes and Subcastes” e.g. Arora, Khatri, Ramgarhia, Jat, Saini, Kamboh, Mahton, Chhimba, Mohyal, Chamar, etc. Each caste has its sphere of influence and specialization (same as in Hindus – Author). The order of castes… has been randomly mentioned one before the other. 

Commercial Castes: Arora, Khatri and Bhatia Sikhs 

Aroras and Khatris 

In the cities, Khatri and Arora dominate the sphere of business activities. Khatri and Aroras are essentially identical caste and are primarily a caste of traders, shopkeepers and accountants. Sometimes people belonging to these castes are called “Bhapa Sikhs”. 

Bhatias 

Another minor Sikh commercial caste is that of Bhatias. Bhatias claim origin from Bhati Rajputs who had taken to shopkeeping. 

Zamindar and Agriculturist Castes 

Following Sikh castes are essentially agricultural and landowning castes: Jat, Kamboh, Mahton and Saini. In the estimation of British, only these Sikh castes were temperamentally and physically suited for active military service and warfare like the hardy Scottish Highlanders back home who also made excellent soldiers. The glorious Sikh Regiment, the most decorated regiment of the Indian Army, consisted of these castes primarily, although Labanas and Kalals were also sometimes recruited. 

Artisan Castes 

Ramgarhia is also a prominent Sikh caste. According to McLeod, the present day Ramgarhias are a caste formed by merging of Nais (barbers), Raj (blacksmiths) and Tarkhans (carpenters). They are primarily expert carpenters and blacksmiths. 

Brahman Sikhs 

Brahman, the highest caste among Hindus, does not have the same rank in Punjab, especially among Sikhs. In rural areas most of them are ordinary farmers and generally not as prosperous as Jats, Mahtonsand Sainis etc. They also used to work as cooks in villages… In urban area they also do shopkeeping. 

Nomadic and Wandering Castes 

Another caste within Sikhs worth mentioning is that of Saansis. It is not a Sikh caste with significant numbers but they have produced one of the greatest Sikh personalities, i.e. Maharaja Ranjit Singh. This is a caste of vagabonds and gypsies. They claim origin from Bhati Rajputs and were enlisted as a criminal tribe by the British. 

Labana is another Sikh caste. They were considered to be akin to Banjaras or gypsies but a considerable number of them are also settled in agriculture. Labanas engaged in agriculture are also called Labana Jats. 

Service Castes 

Among the Dalit caste groups are prominent ones – Chamars and Chooras. Both communities are called Mazhabi Sikhs. The word Chamar is derived from Charmakar or leather tanner. They used to be expert shoe-makers. Some poor men and women of this caste also work as laborers in the farms… 

Discrimination against them as stated before unfortunately still exists in Sikh society. For this reason,Mazhbi Sikh brethren are extended reservation as scheduled caste. Mazhbi Sikhs have in the past made sterling contribution to Sikhism both as mystics and soldiers. Bhagat Ravidas belonged to Chamar caste but is accorded highest respect in Sikhism with his poetry being included in Sri Guru Granth Sahib. In recent times Sardar Buta Singh is a well-known Mazhbi Sikh politician. 

Baldev Singh makes a detailed dissection and the above extract does show the real menace on account of castes in the Sikh community. Here is a brief list the Castes he further dwelt upon in his next section in Sikh Caste Names. 

1. Bhatia Sikh subcastes: A, B, C, D, G, J, K, R, S, W – 18 castes 

2. Jat Sikh subcastes: A, B, C, D, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, Y – 995 castes. This group is largest of all, perhaps due to their agriculture profession. 

3. Mahton Sikh subcastes: A, B, C, D, G, H, J, K, L, M, P, S, T, W – 48 castes 

4. Kalal or Ahluwalia subcastes: A, B, C, D, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, R, S, T, Y – 67 castes 

5. Kamboh Sikh subcastes: A, B, C, D, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, S, T – 104 castes 

6. Khatri Sikh subcastes: A, B, C, D, G, H, J, K, L. M, N, O, P, R, S, T, U, V, W – 144 castes 

7. Arora Sikh subcastes: A, B, C, D, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, R, S, T, V, W – 310 castes 

8. Ramgarhia Sikh subcastes: A, B, C, D, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, R, S, T, V, W – 454 castes 

9. Saini Sikh subcastes: A, B, C, D, F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, P, S, T, U, V – 193 castes 

All these numbers adds to a staggering figure of 2643 (Two thousand six hundred forty three). This is no mean figure. Thus this menace of caste curse is as bad in the contemporary Sikhs as it is in any other society. It should be noted that Baldev Singh spells ‘Ramgarhia’ while Niranjhan Singh has spelt it ‘Ramgharia’ and both are same except for the individual variant in its spelling. Perhaps my own inclination would be for Baldev Singh’s spelling. 

It is pointed out that Sikhism is only a toddler in religious history. Jews are only a few millions in number and are fighting for their establishment in Israel; yet both have, more or less, been stung by the hornet of castes. One only needs to stretch their imagination to think of an order vibrantly flourishing since times immemorial, for countless millennia despite being persecuted from time to time by rapacious savage profligates of barren deserts and beyond.. 

Castes in Buddhism – Is Caste Only a Hindu Problem (Part 4) 

 by Editor

By OP Sudrania 

“Hans Wolfgang Schumann has statistically proven that almost all of Buddha’s disciples were high caste people and that the brahmanas comprised the majority of the sangha.” Edmund Weber 

I have split this monogram in three sections for ease of readers mostly to avoid monotony of a long continuous read in one stretch. Section three has distinctly dealt with the various schools and their innumerable subsects with potential influence of their long term divisive propensities. 

Section A: 

This monograph is a part of the series intended to explore the existence of castes in various religions apart from Hindus. It is this aspect that is dealt within the Buddhists’ communities. 

(Edmund Weber: Buddhism: An Atheistic and Anti-Caste Religion?) 

“The historian has to safeguard the strangeness of the past. Therefore, religio-historical research has to scrutinise the reconstruction of the real history of religions by religious ideologies of the present. Very often religious ideologies fall back to the past in order to get an alleged legitimacy for their actual ambitions; however, for that purpose they have to model or falsify the past according to their present ideological needs. 

One of the outstanding examples of such an ideologisation of history of religion is the modern view of Buddhism. Developed by the Western colonialist Indology this ideology portrayed and still is portraying Buddhism as a rationalist-atheistic, anti-brahmanical, anti-caste and egalitarian religion – in contrast to Hinduism which is caricatured as idolatrous, casteistic and brahmanised. The aim of such an ideological interpretation is to demonstrate the alleged Western modernity of Buddhism and the alleged obscurantism of Hinduism. The target of that ideological aggression was the Hinduism. In order to exploit the wealth of India the Western colonialists needed the weakening of the Hindu self-consciousness; therefore they favoured an Indology which produced an not existing Indian Buddhism (2) as an alleged modern alternative to the alleged primitive religion of the ‘Hindoos’. Playing the Buddhism against the ‘Hindoos’ the colonialist attempt to defame the vast majority of the Indian people was very successful. Even Indian religious intellectuals and leaders (i.e. the secularists or the Neo-Buddhists1) are sharing and supporting that colonialist view still today. 

We want to dispute these asserted positions by empirico-historical reasons. First we will discuss the early Buddhism, than Ashoka’s reform program of the dharma and at last the historiographical dilemmata of scholars sharing the colonialist ideology of Buddhism.” He thus continues: 

“Buddha tells about the earlier Buddhas in the so called Mahapadana Suttanta – Great Sermon on the Legends. He refers to their membership of (high) caste as the first characteristic of their full enlightenment. According to this report the Buddhas belonged all to the high castes, to the kshatriyas and brahmanas. Buddha says proudly about himself “And now I, the venerable and fully enlightened one, was born a warrior and have come from the caste of warriors, o monks.” 

However, to Siddharta and the monks that listened to him, not only the varna, the hierarchical class but also the jati, the clan respectively the family were of substantial importance. For example, he tells about Buddha Vipassi that he belonged to the Kondanna clan. About himself Siddharta reports that he is a kshatriya and was born in the Gotama clan.” Edward Weber 

Weber states under the caption, “Buddha and the Dalits” in his monograph: 

“The standpoint which caste a Buddha should belong to has not been revised in Buddhism up to the present day. It is dogmatised in the Lalitavistara in the following way: a Bodhisattva can by no means come from a lower or even mixed caste: “After all Bodhisattvas were not born in despised lineage, among pariahs, in families of pipe or cart makers, or mixed castes."

Instead, in perfect harmony with the Great Sermon, it was said that: “The Bodhisattvas appear only in two kinds of lineage, the one of the brahmanas and of the warriors (kshatriya).”

In which of the two high castes they were born depended on the fact which of the two had the better reputation at that particular moment. “When the Brahmins are especially respected on earth, they were born in a lineage of Brahmins, when the warriors play a greater role, they appear in a noble family.”

According to Buddha, at his time the kshatriyas were above the now impure brahmanas. That is why, only a kshatriya can have the Buddha-ship. “Today the nobility has priority in the world, therefore the Bodhisattvas were born in a noble family.”28 

Worldly reputation determines the Buddhas’ caste, not the moral qualification of the family or the caste. Lower castes have never had the chance to consider Buddha among them namely because they don’t have a good reputation. 

The Bodhisattva explains to the gods that he should be born only in a family of a noble birth and caste. Furthermore the family ought to have procreated only in a direct line and on the man’s side, an adoption is impossible. Otherwise, purity would not be guaranteed. The purity of the family is so essential, that the father-to-be Suddhodana says: “King Suddhodana is pure on the side of the mother and father and was born in a respected family.”29 

For the ancient Indian Buddhists like the author of the Lalitavistara the idea that somebody belonging to a lower caste or even a dalit could become a Buddha was absolutely impossible. On the other side, it was no problem for them that Buddhas could come from a brahmanas’ castes. If they had been decisive opponents of the brahmanas, the way modern Buddhism ideology assumes, they would not have left the genealogies of the early Buddhas without a commentary. 

The preference of the kshatriyas and the brahmanas in ancient Buddhism leaves no place for doubts: Buddha and the so called impure castes were entirely separated from each other. A Buddha had nothing to deal with the dalits. The dalits were unworthy of Buddha-ship.” 

“Besides Buddha, the ancient Buddhism of India worshipped the gods, brahmanas and shramanas. It accepted the caste system and introduced it even itself. A Buddha could be either a pure kshatriya or a pure brahmana; however, a person belonging to a mixed or lower caste could never become an enlightened one, and by no means could a dalit become a Buddha. 

The more we study the reality of the ancient Indian Buddhism we see that it is so extremely related to its contemporary co-religionists and so far from the thinking, working and feeling of modern Buddhists too. Religious people who are fighting against one and another today are nevertheless more related to one another than to their own strange ancestors. 

Therefore, the Ambedkarite Neo-Buddhism belongs to the same modern Indo-genous dharma culture as the Hindu modernism of the Hindutva movement does: both favour the dharma, fight against caste system, propagate nationalism and worship a modernised Buddha as their predominant guru in social affairs. However, that is neither the ancient Buddhism nor the ancient Buddha.” 

There are other sources also which points out to this problem as seen below: 

“When Ywan Chwang traveled to South India after the period of the Chalukyan Empire, he noticed that the caste system had existed among the Buddhists and Jains. 

Buddhism in India, like other religions, has attempted to reform and create a society without classes. Nevertheless, in some parts of India such as Ladakh, with significant historical presence of Buddhists, a caste system existed in a manner similar to caste structure in Tibet. The upper castes belonged to sger gzhis, and were called sgar pa. The priestly caste belonged to monastery, and was called chos-gzhis. Miserwas the serf caste. Serfs, the majority of the people, farmed and paid taxes. An individual’s social status and lifelong occupation was destined by birth, closed, and depending on the family one was born into, the individual inherited a tenure document known as khral-rten. Buddhist castes had sub-castes, such as nang gzan, khral pa and dud chung. Buddhist also had castes that were shunned by their community and ostracized, such as hereditary fishermen, butchers and undertakers. The untouchables in Buddhist regions, as in Tibet, were known as Ragyappa, who lived in isolated ghettos, and their occupation was to remove corpses (human or animal) and dispose of sewage.” 

Understanding the relationship between Buddhism and Shintoism can be confusing for foreigners. A common saying in Japan is, “We live as Shintoists, but die as Buddhists.” 

Japan enjoys full religious freedom based on Article 20 of its Constitution. Upper estimates suggest that84–96 percent of the Japanese population subscribe to Buddhism or Shinto, including a large number of followers of a syncretism of both religions. Due to the syncretic nature of Shinto and Buddhism, most “life” events are handled by Shinto and “death” or “afterlife” events are handled by Buddhism—for example, it is typical in Japan to register or celebrate a birth at a Shinto shrine, while funeral arrangements are generally dictated by Buddhist tradition—although the division is not exclusive and currently there are believed to be only about 4 million Shintos though exact figure is hard to determine. [As of the most recent census (October 2010), Japan's population is 128,057,352; for March 2012 the estimated population is127,650,000] 

In Japan‘s history, social strata based on inherited position rather than personal merits, was rigid and highly formalized. At the top were the Emperor and Court nobles (kuge), together with the Shogun and daimyo. Below them the population was divided into four classes in a system known as mibunsei. These were: samurai, peasants, craftsmen and merchants. Only the samurai class was allowed to bear arms. A samurai had a right to kill any peasants and other craftsmen and merchants whom he felt were disrespectful. Craftsmen produced products, being the third, and the last merchants were thought to be as the meanest class because they did not produce any products. The castes were further sub-divided; for example, the peasant caste was labeled as furiuri, tanagari, mizunomi-byakusho amongst others. The castes and sub-classes, as in Europe, were from the same race, religion and culture. 

Howell, in his review of Japanese society notes that if a Western power had colonized Japan in the 19th century, they would have discovered and imposed a rigid four-caste hierarchy in Japan (as they did in India, yet blame Hindus – Author). 

DeVos and Wagatsuma observe that a systematic and extensive caste system was part of the Japanese society. 

Japan, like China and Korea, had its own untouchable caste, shunned and ostracized, historically referred to by the insulting term Eta, now called Burakumin. While modern law has officially abolished the class hierarchy, there are reports of discrimination against the Buraku or Burakumin underclasses.” 

The Burakumin are descendants of outcast communities of the feudal era, which mainly comprised those with occupations considered “tainted” with death or ritual impurity (such as executioners, undertakers, workers in slaughterhouses, butchers or tanners), and traditionally lived in their own secluded hamlets and ghettos. They are one of the main minority groups in Japan along with the Ainu of Hokkaid?. 

They were legally liberated in 1871 with the abolition of the feudal caste system. However, this did not put a stop to social discrimination and their lower living standards, because Japanese family registration was fixed to ancestral home address until recently, which allowed people to deduce their Burakumin membership. The Burakumin were one of several groups discriminated against within Japanese society. 

According to a survey conducted by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government in 2003, 76% of Tokyo residents would not change their view of a close neighbor whom they discovered to be a burakumin; 4.9% of respondents, on the other hand, would actively avoid a burakumin neighbor. There is still a stigma attached to being a resident of certain areas traditionally associated with the burakumin and some lingering discrimination in matters such as marriage and employment. Read at. Neither laws nor mere shallow attempts at reformation can change the minds and hearts of the people who are mere slaves of the conventional taboos. It did not succeed in Indian model and the Hindus have been ostracised for it globally because they are not able to counter the blasphemous pre-empted strategic verbosity of hideous vested interests. 

The Sachar Committee report of 2006 revealed that scheduled castes and tribes of India are not limited to the religion of Hinduism. The 61st round Survey of the NSSO found that almost nine-tenths of the Buddhists, one-third of the Sikhs, and one-third of the Christians in India belonged to the notified scheduled castes or tribes of the Constitution: In Buddhism, scheduled castes are 89.50% and scheduled tribe 07.40%. Peruse at:

According to the 2001 census there are 7.95 million Buddhists in India out of a population of 1 billion, making it the country’s fifth-largest religion. These Buddhists include a number of groups. There are scattered survivors of the period when Buddhism flourished in India such as the Baruas of Assam, Chakmas of Bengal, the Saraks of Orissa and the Himalayan Buddhists of North-East India; there are also ethnic overlaps from Nepal, Thailand and Burma, such as Tamangs and Sherpas there are converts who have been influenced by the Maha Bodhi Society, the Dalai Lama and so on; and there are refugee Tibetan Buddhists in different settlements. Finally there are the followers of Dr. Ambedkar, who constitute over 90% India’s Buddhists. Dr Ambedkar was the unquestioned leader of the dalits – people considered ‘untouchable’ under the Hindu caste system. He converted to Buddhism on 14 October 1956 with about 300,000 of his followers. All belonged to his lower Mahar caste in Maharastra. 

David Holmes aka Anagarika Tevijjo argues on Buddhism and Caste System on Theravada Dhamma Blog: 

“There is, however, a philosophical theory of `racism” held by some of the religious teachers in the Buddha’s time which is mentioned and criticised in the Buddhist texts. It is associated with two teachers both of whom denied free will to man. One was Purana Kassapa, who denied man’s capacity for moral action in virtue of the fact that he had no free will. The other was Makkhali Gosala, who denied both free will and causation and argued that beings were miraculously saved (ahetu appaccaya satta visujjhanti) or doomed. They argued that human beings belonged to one or another of six species (abhi jati) or specific types; in virtue of which they had certain genetic constitutions, physical traits and habits and psychological natures which they were incapable of altering by their own will or effort. The six types were designated by six colours. They were the black species (kanhabhi jati), the blue species, the red species, the yellow species, the white species and the pure white species. Whether these colours denoted differences in their physical complexions is not clear, but that they were genetically different physical and psychological types is what is implied by the classification. 

To the black species belonged the butchers, fowlers, hunters, fishermen, dacoits, and executioners and all those who adopt a cruel mode of living. They were, incidentally, among the lowest castes and their complexion was on the whole the darkest. The other five specific types differed in virtue of their degree of wickedness or saintliness, which was not in their power to alter. The pure white species were reckoned to be the perfect saints, though their saintliness was considered to be natural to them as much as their physical constitutions, and was in no way achieved by any effort of will on their part. In the opinion of these typologists, human beings who suffered pain in this life were so born to suffer as a result of their inheriting certain physical constitutions and psychological natures. 

He further argues, *Caste names were merely conventional designations signifying occupational differences and, since men were free to change their occupations, these diffe-rences had no hereditary or genetical basis*. As Asvaghosa says, *The distinctions between Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Sudras are founded merely on the observance of diverse rites and the practice of different professions. One who engages in trade comes to be known as a merchant, one who indulges in military pursuits is known as a soldier, and one who administers the country a king. It was not by birth that one becomes merchant, soldier or king but by the actions that one performs or the job one does.* 

To spice it up he adds flavour into it, *The Hindu conception of society was static and was dominated by the idea of caste. The traditional fourfold order of priests, soldiers and administrators, merchants and agriculturists and menial workers was considered not only to be absolute, fundamental and necessary to society but was also given a divine sanction by being considered a creation of God (Brahma).* 

This is a usual apology by most opponents to advance their image over Hinduism by tongue-in-cheek phenomenon. Compare his beginning of the observation in this quote with the subsequent assertions, the glare of dichotomy in his concept on Buddhism is quite obvious. Nonetheless this assertion is indicative of the fact that castes in Buddhism is extant and is no different from the philosophy expounded in the ancient holy Hindu scriptures like Geeta. Ref. Slok 4:13 where it is clearly laid down that according to *Triguna* there have been four divisions of society to systematise the work. In Slok 3:8 again it is exhorted that one must do his decided *Karma* instead of doing nothing. There are unlimited references in various other Hindu scriptures which are uncomparable. Here under is some brief indication about the Vedic descriptions and their purpose which is detailed in the relevant texts. 

The Four Varnas Brahadaranyaka Upanishad 

Stories and episodes (30) 

The four orders of human beings, Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaisya and Sudra seems to be quite ancient. 

The Rg Veda mentions the division. 

Here is an explanation of that system given in an allegorical manner. It is said here that society is complete and perfect on account of the existence of all these four divisions but much more so on account of the law which binds all and which all ought to obey. 

However one will argue that how does it differ from the puritanical original Hinduism as expounded in her scriptures? It doesn’t differ in the least bit. It only got corrupted over the period by the zealots and circumstances. Older it got, worst it became for multitudes of reasons. 

Section B: 

The RSS Sarsanghchalak Prof. Rajendra Singh extols Babasaheb Ambedkar in the following words: “In 1935, because of the highly discriminatory treatment meted out to the Dalits, he announced that though he was born a Hindu, he would never die as one. This caused a lot of commotion in the country, and it is rumoured that he was offered millions of Rupees by the Nizam if he brought the Dalits to the fold of Islam, and similarly by the Christian missionaries. (…) He gave a very important message to the Dalits before embracing Buddhism. He said that he was embracing Buddhism because it promised equality to all and was a path of this very soil with many common features and thereby not taking the Dalits against the culture of this country.” 

We shall like to think so but our research on this aspect does not support Ambedkar’s view of equality to all castes in Buddhism; we have seen it in the preceding paragraphs here as well as we shall try to devolve further on this point. Has Ambedkar read and evolved his thesis of Buddhism on full distillation of the ideology or mere individual hatred perhaps generated via his personal earlier ostracization during the sensitive stage of self-conscious adulthood? It is a matter for debate and discussion. Whereas I am against any kind of alienation based on caste, race, creed, colour, gender, religion, language, or such diversity; despite my personal bitter experiences while passing through the same formative years both at home and abroad, I do not consider that a change of religious identity could alone solve the problem. A dazzling example is Babu Jagjivan Ramji and his most successful high profile daughter viz Ms Meira Kumar the present speaker of India. Ms Mayavati feels that she will change her religion after she gets her Government at the centre. Her argument is contentious but I am highly sceptical of her own credentials in conversion because her track record so far only shows her love for the sculptures and wasteful indulgence in corrupt practices more than the vivacious poor dalits vis a vis Manuwadis. She remains to prove herself a messiah of the oft repeated her dalit clans or is it only another dirty political power game? Let us examine some more views: 

Jeevan Kulkarni argues; “…Most of them have decidedly proved that Buddha had never discarded caste system”. 

Kulkarni calls Western authorities to the witness stand. Sir W.W. Hunter has written: “It would be a mistake to suppose that Buddhism and Jainism were directed from the outset consciously in opposition to the caste system. Caste, in fact, at the time of the rise of Buddhism was only beginning to develop; and in later days, when Buddhism commenced its missionary careers, it took caste with it into regions where upto that time the institution had not penetrated.” This is a profound truth revealed by Kulkarni smashing the acrimonious belief against Hinduism. 

Prof. T.W. Rhys-Davids has given details about caste practices in over 100 Buddhist communities. 

The eminent historian D.D. Kosambi pointed out that in the recruitment of monks, the candidate’s social position was not entirely disregarded: “…runaway slaves, savage tribesmen, escaped criminals, the chronically ill and the indebted as well as aboriginal Nagas were denied admission into the order.” 

Where slavery existed, Buddhism did not abolish it. The Buddha never ordered the masters to set the slaves free, nor the slaves to revolt against their masters. Buddhist monasteries continued the labour arrangements existing in society at large. In his study on slavery in ancient India, the Marxist historian Dev Raj Chanana noticed the stark contrast between the actual history of Buddhist social practice and the more “progressive” picture given by modern writers, who fail to register the existence of serfdom in connection with the Buddhist monasteries: 

“On reading the modern works concerning the Buddhist order in India one gains the impression that no slave labour was employed in the monasteries. One would be inclined to believe that all the work, even in the big monasteries like [those] of Kosambi or Rajagriha, was carried out by the monks themselves. However, a study of Pali literature shows clearly that the situation was otherwise.” 

From the beginning, Buddhism shared the disdain for manual labour expressed by certain Brahminical and ancient Greek sources, which held that philosophical pursuits required a freedom from labour tasks. According to Chanana, this attitude to labour had not always existed in India to the same extent: “This attitude to manual work as an imposition is in contrast with the view expressed in an earlier epoch, in the Rigveda, where there is no expression of any dislike of manual work. This is, in part at least, due to the absence of the division of labour as seen in the well-known verse describing various jobs, intellectual and manual, undertaken by members of one and the same family.” In the case of Buddhism, however, “we must not forget that the Buddha, anxious to free his monks of material preoccupations, had forbidden almost all manual labour to them.” 

To the slaves, Buddhism gave the same justification of their condition as is always scornfully attributed to Hinduism. (cf. slave practices in Africa, Europe and Americas – Author) Chanana summarizes: “On the other hand he advised the slaves to bear patiently with their lot and explained the same as follows. If a person is born a slave, it is the consequence of some bad acts of an earlier life and the best way for him is to submit willingly to his lot. He should submit to all sorts of treatment at the hands of his master and should never allow any feeling of revenge to grow within himself, even if the other should try to kill him. In such cases, a change of destiny is promised to the slave in the next birth. (…).” 

So, the same allegation of using the karma doctrine as an opium for the people to keep them happy in their submission has been levelled against the Buddha as well as against Puranic Hinduism: “That he derived his conclusion from the widely accepted belief in the theory of karma, of the retribution of acts, need not be stressed again and again. To him and his followers birth in a particular group was the consequence of certain good or evil acts. Since the retribution was believed to be inexorable, unvarying, like the working of a machine, he could not but advocate complete submission to one’s destiny (…) we may agree that the Buddha (from what we learn about him in the Tipitaka) sincerely believed in [karma]. But even from this angle it is clear that disobedience on the part of a slave or servant was considered as an evil act. The same view was held of bad treatment on the part of a master.” 

It is giving a Buddhist license for slavery. 

“Everywhere it integrated itself into the existing social and political set-up, from bureaucratic centralism in China to feudal militarism in Japan. There is no known case of any of these branches of Buddhism calling for social reform, let alone for a social revolution as far-reaching as the abolition of caste would have meant in India. After centuries of profound impact of Buddhism, Tibetan society was in such a state that the Chinese Communists could claim in 1950 (with exaggeration, but not without a kernel of truth) that 95% of the Tibetans were living in slavery. Buddhism does not seem to have made Tibet’s traditional feudalism any more egalitarian than it had been in the pre-Buddhist past.” 

On caste divisions it is stated again, “Coming to the specific form of inequality which is the caste system, in a survey of the Buddhist canon, we do find a number of references to this subject. These instances show that Buddhism was not meant as a social revolution, even when it was critical of caste inequality. Thus, in a list of parables from the Pali Canon, we find the well-known simile: “Whether kindled by a priest, a warrior, a trader or a serf, from whatsoever type of fuel, a fire will emit light and heat; even so, all men, regardless of caste, are equally capable of the highest spiritual attainment.” This merely says that the spiritual dimension is common to all, not that the differentiation of men into castes or even the secular inequality between these castes should be abolished.” It does not even lay any concern on account of caste. 

There are more similar references given about castes as related to Buddha and Buddhism. 

“A case could be made that this appropriation of spirituality by the Brahmin caste is what the Buddha criticizes in the Prakriti story and elsewhere. What he objects to is not the existing social system on the basis of caste, but precisely the improper extension of caste division to the spiritual sphere, beyond the worldly sphere where social distinctions belong. We may add that Sri Lankan Buddhists, who have a long history of fighting predominantly Hindu Tamils, and hence a strong sense of separateness from Hinduism,observe their own caste distinctions. 

Buddhism’s lack of interest in social reform was implicitly admitted by Dr. Ambedkar himself, when as Law Minister he defended the inclusion of Buddhists in the category of citizens to whom the Hindu Code Bill would apply. He declared: “When the Buddha differed from the Vedic Brahmins, he did so only in matters of creed, but left the Hindu legal framework intact. He did not propound a separate law for his followers. The same was the case with Mahavir and the ten Sikh Gurus.” That should clinch the issue, it continued. 

In the conclusion Elst states, “The neo-Buddhists are not Hindus, because they say so. Indeed, whereas all the other groups considered developed their identities naturally, in a pursuit of Liberation or simply in response to natural and cultural circumstances, only to discover later that this identity might be described as non-Hindu, the neo-Buddhists were first of all motivated by the desire to break with Hinduism. The most politicized among them, all while flaunting the label “Buddhist”, actually refuse to practise Buddhism: because it distracts from the political struggle, and perhaps also because the Buddhist discipline is too obviously similar to the lifestyle of the hated Brahmins in its religious aspect.” More at: 

Let us continue our quest further: 

“…The most interesting of these arguments is that one could have been high caste, low caste or outcaste in one’s former life or that one might be in the next life, and that one’s future is conditioned by one’s behaviour in this life (i.e. kamma), not by which caste one belongs to. 

Despite the Buddha’s repudiation of caste, less extreme variations of the system exist in most Buddhist countries. For example, the paya kyun of Burma are the descendants of monastery slaves, and the burakuof Japan and the ragyapa of Tibet, were originally degraded because they worked as fishermen, scavengers or butchers. These groups are marginalized by their respective societies. Sri Lanka’s monastic sects are all divided along caste lines. Since the 1950’s, millions of low caste and outcaste people in India, following the example of their leader Dr. Ambedkar, have converted to Buddhism to escape the indignities of the Hindu caste system.” As exemplified in “Buddhism and the Race Question, J.N. Jayatilleke, 1958.”More at: 

Koenraad Elst further expresses about Castes in Buddhism, “The Buddha also didn’t believe in gender equality. For long he refused to recruit women into his monastic order, saying that nuns would shorten its life-span by five hundred years. At long last he relented when his mother was widowed and other relatives, nobly-born Kshatriyas like the Buddha himself, insisted. Nepotism wasn’t alien to him either. But he made this institution of female monastics conditional upon the acceptance that even the most seasoned nun was subordinate to even the dullest and most junior monk. Some Theravada countries have even re-abolished the women’s monastic order, and it is only under Western feminist influence that Thailand is gradually reaccepting nuns.” 

Buddhist monk Jivaka wrote: “In India the movement started by Ambedkar was not Buddhism but a campaign for social reform under the name Buddhism, and he has promulgated the idea that bhikkhus are for the purpose of social service. But his book ‘The Buddha and His Dharma’ is misnamed for he preaches non-Dharma as Dharma, even sweeping away the four Aryan Truths as a later addition by scholar-monks, maintaining that the Buddha distinguished between killing for a good reason and purely want only, and saying that He did not ban the former; and to cap it all he writes that the Dharma is a social system and that a man quite alone would not need it (…) Hence the so-called New Buddhists or better named, Ambedkarists, surround bhikkhus aggressively and tell them what they should do and abuse them if they are not actively engaged in social work or preaching reform. The result is seen in the acts of violence they have committed, the rioting that has taken place in Nagpur and Jabbulpur and other places. For Ambedkar entered on his new religion with hate in his heart (against Hindus – Author) and his followers are still nourishing and fanning the flames of hate in the uneducated masses they lead.” I am in agreement with Jivaka on this gross observation. 

At any rate, nothing in Buddhist history justifies the modern romance of Buddhism as a movement for social reform. Everywhere it went, Buddhism accepted the social mores prevalent in that country, be it Chinese imperial-centralistic bureaucracy, Japanese militaristic feudalism, or indeed Hindu caste society. Buddhism even accepted the religious mores of the people (a rare exception is the abolition of a widow’s burial along with her husband in Mongol society effected by the third Dalai Lama), it only recruited monks from among them and made these do the Buddhist practices. In “caste-ridden India”, the Buddhist emperorA?oka dared to go against the existing mores when he prohibited animal-slaughter on specific days, but even he made no move to abolish caste. 

In a report to his Government in 1992, the Sri Lankan High Commissioner to India, Mr. Neville Kanakaratne, noted the “regrettable fact” that a great majority of Indian Buddhists were members of the Scheduled Castes who converted under Dr. Ambedkar’s leadership in order to assert their political rights “rather than through honest self-persuasion and conviction”. By contrast, the effort by the Mahabodhi Society to spread Buddhism through proper information and teaching had achieved “very little”, according to the Sri Lankan High Commissioner. 

Buddhism wasn’t more casteist than what went before. It didn’t bring caste to India anymore than the Muslims or the Britons did. Caste is an ancient Indian institution of which the Buddha was a part. But he, its personal beneficiary, didn’t think of changing it, just as his followers in other countries didn’t think of changing the prevailing system.” Elst continues. 

A less controversial but essentially similar Buddhist presence is the Vipassana association of the Burmese master Sayagyi U Ba Khin as represented by S.N. Goenka. As I have been able to see for myself, this tradition of Buddhist meditation has struck firm roots in Ambedkar’s own Maharashtra, mainly through its Vipassana International Academy in Dhammagiri near Jalgaon where 10-day courses for laymen are offered. This way, a process of rapprochement between traditional Buddhists and Ambedkarite neo-Buddhists is already visible, so that we are probably witnessing the genesis of a genuine new Indian Buddhism. (It is Elst’s personal opinion) 

However, the exercise can also be tried on the Buddha. Indeed, one V.N. Utpat wrote a booklet Riddles of Buddha and Ambedkar in reply. It points out that the Buddha’s conception was even more illegitimate …: his mother was visited at night by a white elephant. Heartless as the Buddha was, he left his wife and child behind without asking their opinion, to set out on his selfish quest for personal liberation. By giving up his throne, he also robbed his own son of the inheritance of the throne, and when later his son came to ask him for his rightful inheritance, the Buddha cynically offered him initiation into his miserable monk order. And so on: people (including the human being Siddhartha Gautama the Shakyamuni) have to make choices in life, and in their decisions there will always be a dark side available for foul mouths to pick on (very well observed by Elst who perhaps is no exception to the rule). More at: 

Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) chief Mayawati and her followers will embrace Buddhism after the BSP gains an absolute majority at the Centre, reported in The Hindu, Oct 17, 2006 with caption – “Prominent Indian female politician to embrace Buddhism” 

Ms. Mayawati announced this on Monday at the conclusion of the seventh day rites of party founder Kanshi Ram which were conducted according to Buddhist traditions at her New Delhi residence. 

“It was Manyavar’s dream to see the BSP in power at the Centre, and in the States, before the 50th anniversary of Babasaheb’s conversion. Unfortunately, that did not happen,” she said. 

What was the connection between political power and religious conversion? The BSP chief said power was essential to spread any faith. 

“It is not about me becoming a Buddhist. I could do it today but it would be just me. We have to spread the faith for which absolute majority at the Centre is a pre-requisite.” Peruse at: 

Hence Mayavatiji again refers to social transformation more than religion or egalitarianism in Buddhism. One wonders, could she have not tried it within her current milieu which have given her sufficient power in UP instead of indulging in building personal fanciful sculptures and wasting the taxpayers’ money wantonly without any fruitful returns. If she is looking for similar opportunity at centre, I am afraid, she better not get the desired “power or mispower”. In her pursuit for power, she has crossed all barriers of principled politics by dilly-dallying from attracting the different castes for her vote bank including her most hated Manuwadis. One wonders: Is this what she wants or expects from Buddhism after power grab? Thus is Buddhism an instrument for grabbing power or is it an ideology that has pulled her and her cohorts? 

Let us examine another side of the spreading hate cult among the Arihants: 

Japanese-born Surai Sasai emerged as an important Buddhist leader in India. Sasai came to India in 1966 and met Nichidatsu Fuji, whom he helped with the Peace Pagoda at Rajgir. He fell out with Fuji, however, and started home, but, by his own account, was stopped by a dream in which a figure resembling Nagarjuna appeared and said, “Go to Nagpur”. In Nagpur, he met Wamanrao Godbole, the person who had organized the conversion ceremony for Dr. Ambedkar in 1956. … In 1987 a court case to deport him on the grounds that he had overstayed his visa was dismissed, and he was granted Indian citizenship. Sasai is one of the main leaders of the campaign to free the Mahabodhi Temple at Bodh Gaya from Hindu control.” 

It is sad to learn that these foreign born current itinerant ignorant young Buddhists who care less for the historical roots of their faith and indulge in chauvinism and perhaps even attempt to exhibit extrovert loyalty to the surrounding people for an oneman upship posture but unmindful of the fact that their patron Saint never advocated such violence and hatred. Is he true to his faith? Perhaps doubtful! 

Ipso facto the custom is aboriginal. The Hindu priests in Bodh Gaya shrine are right from the inception when there was no other Bodhisattva and Buddha himself must have been building his empire of followers from among Hindus. There were only Hindus at that time to help him and to lean on. Any forceful eviction of these priests will amount to an act of blasphemy and disrespect to Lord Buddha himself or the ancestry of his followers. This custom is as old as the Buddhism itself and it must have been endorsed by their ancestors with full ascendency. At the same time it is bound to taint and corrupt their image of a peaceful and non-violent ideology. It does not make Buddhism a very peaceful religion! 

Man’s quest for security and lasting happiness never ceases, but it is never quenched by soft pandering to his desires as a result of which he is continually in a state of flux. What brought men together was the realization of their common lot and their common humanity. All men of whatever race were subject to disease, decay and death. All men were likewise impelled by the desires within them—the desire for sense-gratification, the desire for life or personal immortality, and the desire for domination over death. But deep within this fathom-long body, says the Buddha, is the final goal we all seek and it is only by dis­covering this eternal peace and happiness within us that we realize the highest that we are capable of. 

Unlike the Dalai Lama, who emphasizes the closeness of Hinduism and Buddhism before his Indian hosts, the Ambedkarite tendency in Buddhism is overtly anti-Hindu and tries to maximize the separateness of Buddhism, asserts Koenraad Elst. 

Section C: 

Various Buddhist Schools Vis a Vis hidden class or caste divisions: 

Buddhism has several divisions now which differ vastly in their practices and remain isolated on this count. There is also some variation in the different accounts e.g. some say that Buddhism has only two major divisions e.g. Theravada and Mahayana. While others divide it into further subgroups like Vajrayana and Hinayana apart from the recent Ambedkarite group representing the Dalit sections in India after the advocacy by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. There are further subgroups in each of these branches which are classes or castes are a matter for discussion but they do represent various distinct sections. 

There is another section that has emerged recently in India called Vipassana on the lines of Sayagyi U ba Khin of Myanmar as taught by the Guruji Sri S. N. Goenka at Dhammagiri, Igatpuri in Maharashtra. Thus it is noticeable that with the passage of time, any ideology is also bound to create diversity since it is the very human nature to differ among them selves. This leads to strong irreconcilable differing subgroups that depend upon the mass appeal and acceptance. It assumes more materialistic outlook than spiritual one over the passage of time and then the things start going wrong. Another human weakness that leads to disaster is its faltering weaknesses like ego, anger, greed, passion, jealousy, hatred and etc which sway the opinions of various individuals and create differing strong subgroups; whether in castes, classes or races. Ultimately all lead to the same divisions and diversity. 

In perusing the various available literatures on Buddhism, it is again highly misleading, e.g. “while describing the Shramana (Sanskrit ?rama?a; P?li sama?a) movement was a non-Vedic movement parallel to Vedic Hinduism in ancient India. The Shramana tradition gave rise to Jainism, Buddhism, and Yoga, and was responsible for the related concepts of sa?s?ra (the cycle of birth and death) and moksha (liberation from that cycle).” 

It may be noted here that ‘Yoga’ is very much a technique intimately linked with Vedas and other Hindu scriptures. Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism all have a similarity on one count that they propound the ultimate aim of their teachings as the “Liberation” of the soul from the worldly misery and sufferings which this universe is comprised of. There are differing opinions on the various practices and methods. If these differing methods will not exist, then there is no need for existence of these differing various groups. Why these differing groups? A deeper unbiased analysis may depict that either it is human ignorance or their materialistic greed or other weaknesses. Unfortunately the masses in any or every community are like a flock of sheeps which move in herds, led by the front leader. They hardly seem to have their individual say. Thus the so called human societies behave no different in this respect. Another human aspect of sensibility is a sentimental phenomenon which help create a mass movement; political, religious, sports, games, nationalism, or otherwise. All these factors work in tandem to divide et impera. In such matters, the individuals hardly seem to have their choice. There are extraneous factors also with their vested interests in creating further diversity e.g.: 

“The British employed the Roman principle of divide et impera to enslave colonial peoples. The US has taken up the tradition. “Our endeavour,” remarked Lieutenant-Colonel Coke, Commandant of Moradabad during the middle of the nineteenth century, “should be to uphold in full force the (for us fortunate) separation which exists between the different religions and races, not to endeavour to amalgamate them.Divide et impera should be the principle of Indian government (13).” Lord Elphinstone, Governer of Bombay, seconded the motion. “Divide et impera was the old Romon motto, and it should be ours (14).” It continues further: 

“Adumbrating US imperial tactics in Iraq, the British devised a system of separate electorates in India and separate representation by religion, caste and ethnicity. Sound familiar? “The effect of this electoral policy,” observed one commentator, was “to give the sharpest possible stimulus to communal antagonism (15).” Prior to British rule in India there was no trace of the type of Hindu-Muslim conflict that later emerged under British rule . 

“There is no natural inevitable difficulty from the cohabiting of differing races or religions in one country .” Muslim and Hindu lived side-by-side peacefully until the British arrived in India; Sunni and Shiite commingled peacefully before the US imposed its occupation on the country. “The difficulties arise from social-political conditions. They arise, in particular, whenever a reactionary regime is endeavouring to maintain itself against the popular movement .” 

In the USSR, diverse religions and races lived together amicably. Germans and Jews lived together peacefully under Germany’s Weimar Republic. It wasn’t until the Nazis emphasized national identity to weaken growing working class consciousness that systematic persecution of Jews began. 

The strategy is simple. The last thing an occupying power wants is for the people it’s dominating to recognize their common situation and interests. Were they to do that, they might mobilize their energies to fight their common enemy. So the occupied countries are organized by their occupiers along color, religious and ethnic fault-lines. Iraqis mustn’t think of themselves as Iraqis, but as Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, locked in a struggle with each other for access to resources.” 

The Buddha (meaning “the awakened one” in Sanskrit and P?li). Buddha derives its etymology from the root word ‘dhi’ which means knowledge and wisdom. It is related to his enlightenment. 

Buddhism is a religion indigenous to the Indian subcontinent that encompasses a variety of traditions, beliefs, and practices largely based on teachings attributed to Siddhartha Gautama, who is commonly known as the Buddha (meaning “the awakened one” in Sanskrit and P?li). The Buddha lived and taught in the eastern part of Indian subcontinent sometime between the 6th and 4th centuries BCE. He is recognized by Buddhists as an awakened or enlightened teacher who shared his insights to help sentient beings end suffering (dukkha) through eliminating ignorance (avidy?), craving (ta?h?), and hatred, by way of understanding and seeing dependent origination (prat?tyasamutp?da) and non-self (an?tman), and thus attain the highest happiness, nirv??a (nirvana). Although Buddhism is known as the Buddha Dharma, the Buddha referred to his teachings as the Arya Ast?nga M?rga, Brahmay?na, Dhammavin?ya, and Jinas?sanam. (Cf. Patanjali’s Ashtanga Sutras) 

Two major branches of Buddhism are recognized: Theravada (“The School of the Elders”) and Mahayana(“The Great Vehicle”). Theravada has a widespread following in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. Mahayana is found throughout East Asia and includes the traditions of Pure Land, Zen, Nichiren Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism, Shingon, Tiantai (Tendai) and Shinnyo-en. In some classifications, Vajrayana—practiced mainly in Tibet and Mongolia, and adjacent parts of China and Russia—is recognized as a third branch, while others classify it as a part of Mahayana. There are other categorisations of these three Vehicles or Yanas. 

Theravada, Sanskrit: ????????? sthavirav?da, ; literally, “the Teaching of the Elders” or “the Ancient Teaching,” is the oldest surviving Buddhist school. It was founded in India. It is relatively conservative, andgenerally closer to early Buddhism than the other existing Buddhist traditions. For many centuries, it has been the predominant religion of Sri Lanka (now about 70% of the population) and most of continental Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand). Theravada is also practiced by minorities in parts of southwest China (mainly by the Shan and Tai ethnic groups), Vietnam (by the Khmer Krom),Bangladesh (by the ethnic groups of Baruas, Chakma, Magh, and Tanchangya), Malaysia and Indonesia, while recently gaining popularity in Singapore and the Western world. Today, Theravada Buddhists, otherwise known as Theravadins, number over 150 million worldwide, and during the past few decades Theravada Buddhism has begun to take root in the West and in the Buddhist revival in India. 

According to its own accounts, the Therav?da school is fundamentally derived from the Vibhajjav?da (or “doctrine of analysis”) grouping which was a division of the Sthavira (“Elders”) stream. (The Sthavira were in turn a breakaway group from the majority Mah?s??ghika during the Second Buddhist council.) (Sanskrit “Sthavira” and the Pali “Thera”) Theravadin accounts of its own origins mention that it received the teachings that were agreed upon the Third Buddhist Council, around 250 BCE, and these teachings were known as the Vibhajjavada. The Vibhajjav?dins in turn split into four groups: the Mah???saka, K??yap?ya,Dharmaguptaka, and the T?mraparn?ya (which means “the Sri Lankan lineage”). 

According to the P?li chronicles of the Sinhalese tradition, Buddhism was first brought to Sri Lanka by Arahant Mahinda, who is believed to have been the son of the Mauryan emperor Asoka, in the third century BCE, as a part of the dhammaduta (missionary) activities of the Asokan era. In Sri Lanka, Arahant Mahinda established the Mah?vih?ra Monastery of Anuradhapura. 

Over much of the early history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, three subdivisions of Therav?da existed in Sri Lanka, consisting of the monks of the Mah?vih?ra, Abhayagiri Vih?ra, and the Jetavana Vih?ra. According to A.K. Warder, the Indian Mah???saka sect also established itself in Sri Lanka alongside the Therav?da, into which they were later absorbed. Northern regions of Sri Lanka also seem to have been ceded to sects from India at certain times. 

Traditionally, Theravada Buddhism has observed a distinction between the practices suitable for a lay person and the practices undertaken by ordained monks (in ancient times, there was a separate body of practices for nuns). While the possibility of significant attainment by laymen is not entirely disregarded by the Theravada, it generally occupies a position of less prominence than in the Mahayana and Vajrayana traditions, with monastic life being hailed as a superior method of achieving Nirvana. The view that Theravada, unlike other Buddhist schools, is primarily a monastic tradition has, however, been disputed.More at: 

Mah?y?na (Sanskrit: ?????? mah?y?na, literally the “Great Vehicle”) is one of the two main existing branches of Buddhism and a term for classification of Buddhist philosophies and practice. Mah?y?na Buddhism originated in India, and is associated with the oldest historical sect of Buddhism, the Mah?s??ghika. 

The Mah?y?na tradition is the larger of the two major traditions of Buddhism existing today, the other being that of the Therav?da school. According to the teachings of Mah?y?na traditions, “Mah?y?na” also refers to the path of seeking complete enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings, also called “Bodhisattvay?na”, or the “Bodhisattva Vehicle. 

In the course of its history, Mah?y?na Buddhism spread from India to various other Asian countries such as China, Japan, Vietnam, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Nepal, Tibet, Bhutan, and Mongolia. Major traditions of Mah?y?na Buddhism today include Zen/Chán, Pure Land, Tiantai, and Nichiren, as well as the Esoteric Buddhist traditions of Shingon, Tendai and Tibetan Buddhism. 

According to Jan Nattier, the term Mah?y?na (“Great Vehicle”) was originally an honorary synonym forBodhisattvay?na (“Bodhisattva Vehicle”) — the vehicle of a bodhisattva seeking buddhahood for the benefit of all sentient beings. The term Mah?y?na was therefore formed independently at an early date as a synonym for the path and the teachings of the bodhisattvas. Since it was simply an honorary term forBodhisattvay?na, the creation of the term Mah?y?na and its application to Bodhisattvay?na did not represent a significant turning point in the development of a Mah?y?na tradition. 

The earliest Mah?y?na texts often use the term Mah?y?na as a synonym for Bodhisattvay?na, but the termH?nay?na is comparatively rare in the earliest sources. The presumed dichotomy between Mah?y?na andH?nay?na can be deceptive, as the two terms were not actually formed in relation to one another in the same era. More at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahayana 

Vajray?na Buddhism (Devanagari: ???????; Tibetan: ??????????????, rdo rje theg pa;) is also known asTantric Buddhism, Tantray?na, Mantray?na, Secret Mantra, Esoteric Buddhism and the Diamond Vehicle. Vajrayana is a complex and multifaceted system of Buddhist thought and practice which evolved over several centuries. 

According to Vajrayana scriptures Vajrayana refers to one of three vehicles or routes to enlightenment, the other two being the Hinayana and Mahayana. 

Its main scriptures are called Tantras. A distinctive feature of Vajrayana Buddhism is ritual, which are Skillful Means (Upaya). They are being used as a substitute or alternative for the earlier abstract meditations. 

Although the first tantric Buddhist texts appeared in India in the 3rd century and continued to appear until the 12th century, scholars such as Hirakawa Akira believe that the Vajrayana probably came into existence in the 6th or 7th century, while the term Vajrayana first came into evidence in the 8th century. Prior to the Vajrayana developed the Mantrayana, and after the Vajrayana the Sahajayana and Kalachakrayana developed. 

The period of Indian Vajrayana Buddhism has been classified as the fifth or final period of Indian Buddhism. The literature of Vajrayana is absent from the oldest Buddhist literature of the Pali Canon and the Agamas. More at: 

H?nay?na (??????) is a Sanskrit and P?li term literally meaning: (H?na = mean or lowly, y?na = vehicle) the “Inferior Vehicle”, “Deficient Vehicle”, the “Abandoned Vehicle”, or the “Defective Vehicle”. The term appeared around the 1st or 2nd century. 

H?nay?na is contrasted with Mah?y?na, which means the “Great (Mah?) Vehicle.” There are a variety of interpretations as to who or what the term “H?nay?na” refers to. The Chinese monk Yijing who visited India in the 7th century distinguishes Mah?y?na from H?nay?na as follows: 

Both adopt one and the same Vinaya, and they have in common the prohibitions of the five offenses, and also the practice of the Four Noble Truths. Those who venerate the bodhisattvas and read the Mah?y?na s?tras are called the Mah?y?nists, while those who do not perform these are called the H?nay?nists. 

According to Jan Nattier, it is most likely that the term H?nay?na post-dates the term Mah?y?na, and was only added at a later date due to antagonism and conflict between bodhisattvas and ?r?vakas. The sequence of terms then began with Bodhisattvay?na, which was given the epithet Mah?y?na (“Great Vehicle”). It was only later, after attitudes toward the bodhisattvas and their teachings had become more critical, that the term H?nay?na was created as a back-formation, contrasting with the already-established term Mah?y?na. The earliest Mah?y?na texts often use the term Mah?y?na as an epithet and synonym forBodhisattvay?na, but the term H?nay?na is comparatively rare in early texts, and is usually not found at all in the earliest translations. Therefore, the often-perceived symmetry between Mah?y?na and H?nay?na can be deceptive, as the terms were not actually coined in relation to one another in the same era. 

Although the 18-20 early schools of Buddhism are sometimes loosely classified as H?nay?na in modern times, this is not necessarily accurate. There is no evidence that Mah?y?na ever referred to a separate formal school of Buddhism, but rather that it existed as a certain set of ideals, and later doctrines, for bodhisattvas. More at: 

From analysing and perusing the above descriptions which only reflect the tip of the iceberg or even perhaps less than that; it is amply clear that given sufficient time and allowed to spread as the “Sanatana Dharma”, all these various diversities will either evolve themselves or will be made to result into various diverse classes wherefrom it may or will be difficult to classify them in no other terms than what Hinduism has been subjected to suffer the blames of casteism. Then these same adversaries will start criticising on one hand while busy in manipulating them for their vested interests on one or the other accounts as the modern day Hinduism is made to suffer as medieval, Idolators, heathens, pagans, polytheists, phallic or cow worshipers, primitive religion, superstitious soul searching religion, monstrous cult, barbarians and whatever else they could innovate to denigrate it and make a laughing stalk. It is a vast topic in its own right. Indian peninsula has witnessed a lot of various kinds of overseas visitors, rapacious cheaters, and profligates.

Casteism in India and the Fallacies of Hindu Religion 

Massive Dalit rally demands separate electorate for Dalits

By Mumtaz Alam Falahi, TwoCircles.net,

New Delhi: The National Confederation of Dalit Organisations (NACDOR), which has about 1200 Dalit groups under its umbrella, has demanded the Central Government to introduce separate electorate for Dalits, Adivasis and women to ensure their real representation in Lok Sabha.

At a massive rally organized in New Delhi on December 5 NACDOR also demanded constitutional amendment “to introduce reservation in Rajya Sabha and make this mandatory to elect members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as per their share in population in the state.” 

At the end of the daylong rally at Jantar Mantar, the group presented a charter of demands to the Prime Minister. 

Dalit massacres in Andhra

Out of 28 recorded heinous crimes against dalits, 24 done by Andhras. At least sixty killed, many raped, hundreds of houses burnt, lots of property looted and destroyed. 

Important to note that most of these are done by those in political power or their supporters/relatives. The perpetrators are mostly Kamma and some Reddy. The highest number of crimes were committed in the Coastal districts, Krishna, Guntur, Godavaris, Prakasam. 

Media won't report it : Women village leaders want quota within quota

Around 60 women village leaders Friday hailed the passing of the women's reservation bill in the Rajya Sabha but demanded a quota for Dalits and other backward classes (OBCs) for their proper representation. 

At a conclave organised here by international NGO ActionAid, the women, representing village councils in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, urged political parties to take note of the discrimination against women within the backward classes. 

Operation GreenHunt

All over the world, people are asking questions about the nature of India’s society and government, and about the war on the adivasis—the tribal peoples—that has recently been launched by that government with strategic assistance from the US and Israel. 

Most commentators admit that the Indian people suffered greatly under British rule. 

A nice factual report from How Many More Arrests Will Orissa See? 

Ranjana Padhi, Pramodini Pradhan, D Manjit 

Much before Operation Greenhunt, people’s movements have been facing repression on a sustained basis in Orissa. This state has seen struggles of different ideologies and political persuasions coming up as people’s lives, livelihood and natural resources are at stake. While the question of land for the adivasis remains unaddressed by the government, protesters are often met with bullets. 

Caste , higher education and dalits

The Senthilkumar Solidarity Committee, a group of Hyderabad intellectuals and activists, cry out against caste-ism in higher education this blog. Their cause began with the death of Senthilkumar at the University of Hyderabad. Senthilkumar, or Senthil for short, was a dalit (untouchable) student at the University of Hyderabad and was studying to be a PhD in physics. He was the first person in his entire Panniandi community to enter higher education. 

Social Boycott of Dalits in MP: Uncivil Society

(A Fact Finding Report issued by Nagrik Adhikar Manch and Yuva Samvad.) 

(The situation in the Gadarwara Sub Division of District.Narsinghpur (MP) has been in a state of constant flux since last 3-4 months. The Dalits living in the villages adjoining Gadarwara have been condemned to a life of fear and intimidation.Their human rights and dignity are being at stake. 

Don't do Intercaste marriage

Intercaste marriage is unusual, and the caste considerations are genuine.Because of this if you perform an honour killing(but only kill the low caste person) , it is perfectly justified. 2 

Why I support Mayawati

Answer:

Andhon mein kaana raja.

Reason: Others like Udit Raj could not make it big, and there is still time before I enter politics :-) . 

Lets see when will our media report this garland issue

Well so much furore is their over money garlands to mayawati.

Today another MP, Ijaj ali was welcomed with 1 lac rupee garland at patna airport(Amar Ujala report).If the story doesn't get main coverage, which i am quite sure it will not, decide for yourself as to why media runs a hate campaign against Mayawati. 

The strength of Mayawati and BSP

The strength of mayawati/BSP is the never ending criticism of her.Mayawati is the only politician against whom only negative propaganda is directed.Had the recent rally been for any other party, atleast the speech of the leader of the party would have been aired.But let alone the speech being aired, even excerpts of it could not make the news.The news to become was a garland. 

The curious case of mayawati,a maharally and mala(garland)

15th of march 2010,25th anniversary of BSP and 76th birth anniversary of late shri Kanshi Ram.

BSP organized a huge rally(maharally).More than 20 lakh people turned up for the rally.The city of lucknow was decorated like a new bride. 

Reservation Vs. Reservation

Well i have heard a lot of arguments against the reservation policy.But i have always wondered if those arguments are against the reservation or are a mere attempt of people to deny jobs to the SC/ST.

Well a lot of people might have started thinking bad about me.How can i speak such a crude truth.Well i have my grounds. 

Insensitivity of TOI and its reader

In today's TOI, there is a news on a stampede in a temple in U.P.Well 65 people died in that.But how come this news item is featuring in this Blog?

Well it is not because of the news, or even about the way it was reported.

It is because of the comments in the comments section of this article.Well the caste bias among Indians run so high that , even on a national daily(and the most read english daily) people could clearly follow untouchability. 

Baba Saheb's writings part 7b:

WHY SHOULD BEEF-EATING MAKE BROKEN MEN UNTOUCHABLES?

The curious may want to know what has led men to see in this world this dichotomy between the sacred and the profane. We must however refuse to enter into this discussion as it is unnecessary for the immediate purpose we have in mind.

Confining ourselves to the issue the next thing to note is that the circle of sacred objects is not fixed. Its extent varies infinitely from religion to religion. Gods and spirits are not the only sacred things. 1 

Baba Saheb's writings part 7:WHY SHOULD BEEF-EATING MAKE BROKEN MEN UNTOUCHABLES?

THE stoppage of beef-eating by the Brahmins and the non-Brahmins and the continued use thereof by the Broken Men had produced a situation which was different from the old. This difference lay in the face that while in the old situation everybody ate beef, in the new -situation one section did not and another did. The difference was a glaring difference. Everybody could see it. It divided society as nothing else did before. 

जाति पाति: आदर्श और हक़ीकत (पंजाब के सन्दर्भ में) 

Sardar Ajmer Singh (सरदार अजमेर सिंह) 

(यह आलेख आज़ाद भारत के पंजाब प्रांत में दलित/पछड़ा वर्ग एवं सिख के 'हम हिंदू नहीं' दृष्टिकोण का ब्राह्मणवादी आर्य समाज और इसके पोषक बन गए राजनीतिक दलों के बरक्स जो भी हुआ है, उसका ऐतिहासिक विवरण है। पंजाब की राजनीति को देखने, समझने और परखने का, पाठकों को, यह आलेख बढ़िया मौका प्रदान करता है। सरदार अजमेर सिंह द्वारा लिखी यह रचना उनकी पंजाबी में लिखी बहुचर्चित किताब 'बीसवीं सदी की सिख राजनीति - एक ग़ुलामी से दूसरी ग़ुलामी' से ली गई है, एवं अनुदित है - गुरिंदर आज़ाद [अनुवादक]) 

बेशक़ गुरु साहेबान (सिख गुरु) ने हिन्दू समाज की सबसे बड़ी लाहनत, जाति पाति प्रणाली का, सिद्धांत और अमल के स्तर पर ज़ोरदार खंडन करते हुए, सिख समाज में इसकी पूरी तरह से मनाही कर दी थी। गुरु काल के बाद धीरे धीरे सिखी के बुनियादी सिद्धांत कमज़ोर पड़ने शुरू हो गए। जिन हिंदूवादी अभ्यासों का गुरु साहेबान ने खंडन किया था, उन्होंने सिख धर्म और समाज को फिर से अपने क़ातिलाना शिकंजे में ले लिया। हिन्दूवाद के दुष्प्रभावों का सबसे गाढ़ा इज़हार सिख पंथ में जात पात प्रणाली की फिर से अमल के रूप में हुआ। ऐसे अनेक ऐतिहासिक प्रमाण और हवाले मिलते हैं जो उनीसवीं सदी तक सिख पंथ के फिर से जात-पात प्रबंध की मुकम्मल जकड़ में आ जाने की पुष्टि करते हैं। 

उनीसवीं सदी के दुसरे अर्ध दौरान बेशक़ सिंह सभा लहर द्वारा आरंभ सुधारमुखी गतिविधियों ने सिख समाज को हिंदूवादी प्रभावों से मुक्त करने में कुछ काबिले-तारीफ़ सफलताएं हांसिल की। लेकिन जात-पात का कोढ़ सिख समाज में इस कदर फ़ैल चुका था कि 'सिंघ सभा लहर' के आगूओं की इंक़लाबी कोशिशों के बावजूद सिख पंथ इस नामुराद रोग के असरों से मुक्त न हो सका। फिर भी सिंह सभा लहर द्वारा सिखी के मूल सिद्धान्तों और मौलिक परम्पराओं की फिर से स्थापति के लिए चलाई वैचारिक मुहीम का इतना असर ज़रूर हुआ कि पंथ के रौशन ख्याल हिस्सों में जात-पात को ख़त्म करने ले लिए न्या जोश और उत्साह पैदा हो गया और उन्होंने सिख समाज को इस हिंदूवादी लाहनत से जुदा करने के लिए तीखी वैचारिक मुहीम शुरू कर दी। नतीजतन, सिख पंथ में जात-पात की खुली तारीफ करने वाले तत्व, खासतौर पर सिखी में, ब्राह्मणवादी खोट मिलाने वाला मुख्य वाहक बना। महंत-पुजारी 'परिवार' सिखी सुधार लहर के हमले की सीधी मार तले आ गया और सिख पंथ के धार्मिक केंद्रों और अभ्यासों में जात-पातिए भेदभाव का खुला प्रदर्शन पहले जितना आम नहीं रहा। पर जहाँ तक आम सामाजिक जीवन का संबंध है, वहां जात पातिए भेदभाव और बाँट-अलगता जैसे की तैसी बरकरार रही। खासतौर पर ग्रामीण समाज में कथित ऊँची जात वर्गों के 'नीच' और 'अछूत' समझे जाते वर्गों के प्रति जातिय अभिमानी तरीकों और बर्ताव में कोई कमी नहीं आई। 

सच यह था कि सिख पंथ में से ब्राह्मण वर्ग जिस्मानी तौर पर भले ही गायब हो चुका था लेकिन सोच के स्तर पर वह सिख समाज में ज्यों का त्यों हाज़िर-नाज़िर था। रोज़मर्रा ज़िन्दगी में जात पातिए भेदभाव और विरोध-अलगता के हिसाब से हिन्दू और सिख समाज में कोई मूलभूत अंतर नहीं रहा। हाँ, गुरु साहेबान की इंक़लाबी विचारधारा की प्रेरणा और प्रभाव तले सिख लहर द्वारा अपने आरंभिक दौर में पूरे किये इंक़लाबी कार्यों की बदौलत सिख समाज में जात पातिए दर्जाबंदी की बुन-बनावट में ज़रूर बड़ा बदलाव आ गया था। जहाँ हिन्दू समाज में ब्राह्मण वर्ग का समाजी दर्जा सब से ऊँचा माना जाता है, वहां सिख समाज में धार्मिक और सामाजिक क्षेत्र में ब्राह्मण वर्ग के प्रभुत्व को पूरी तरह से नकारा है। 

लेकिन समय पड़ने से जैसे ही सिख समाज फिर से जात पातिए प्रणाली की जकड़ में आ गया तो वह वर्ग जिन्होंने खालसा पंथ के इंक़लाबी दौर में ज़्यादा गतिशील भूमिका निभाने का नाम कमाया था और जिन्हें रिवायती हिन्दू जात पातिए दर्जाबंदी में ब्राह्मण वर्ग से एक या दो दर्ज नीचे समझा जाता था, वह सिख समाज में ऊँचा सामाजिक दर्जा हासिल कर गए। इस तरह, ग्रामीण सिख समाज में जट्ट वर्ग ने और शहरी सिख समाज में खत्री-अरोड़ा वर्ग ने 'सवर्ण जातियों' वाला सामाजिक रुतबा हासिल कर लिया जबकि जात पात की जकड़ में आये वर्गों का पहले वाला दर्जा ही बरक़रार रहा। 'पछड़ी' समझी जाने वाली और अन्य जातियों के सामाजिक दर्जे में कोई बड़ा बदलाव नहीं आया। इस सामाजिक यथार्थ की राजनीतिक क्षेत्र में परछाईं पड़नी स्वाभाविक थी। ख़ास तौर पर ग्रामीण क्षेत्र में यह बात ज़्यादा चुभनिए रूप में सामने आई। 

गाँव की ग्रामीण ज़िन्दगी की सामाजिक एवं आर्थिक हक़ीक़त यह है कि ग्रामीण दलित वर्ग ज़मीन जायदाद से वंचित, सामाजिक तौर पर सबसे ज़्यादा लताड़ा हुआ, तीखी आर्थिक लूट-खसोट और चुभनिए सामाजिक ज़बर और दबाव का शिकार है। उसकी ज़िन्दगी में हिन्दू सवर्ण जातियों का बहुत सीधा दख़ल नहीं। खेती में मेहनत मज़दूरी करते और ग्रांव में आम जीवन बसर करते उसका ज़्यादातर सीधा वास्ता जट्ट से ही पड़ता है। इस तरह आर्थिक लूट-खसोट और सामाजिक ज़बर, दोनों ही पक्षों से उसका तुरंत विरोध जट्ट किसान से ही है। इस में सीधे रूप में हिन्दू सवर्ण जातियां कहीं भी नहीं आतीं (सिवा ग्रामीण बनिए के, जो दलित वर्ग की आर्थिक मजबूरियों का फायदा उठा के सूदखोरी आदि के ज़रिये उसकी आर्थिक लूट-खसोट में सहभागी बनता है). सो, यह सामाजिक आर्थिक फैक्टर ग्रामीण दलित वर्ग को राजनीतिक तौर पर अकाली दल जिसे कि ग्रामीण क्षेत्र में जट्ट किसानों की राजनीतिक जमात के रूप में ही पहचाना जाता है, के विरोध की तरफ धकेलते हैं। दूसरी तरफ, समूचे भारत में दलित वर्ग, जैसे पंजाब का दलित भाईचारा, भी कोंग्रेस पार्टी को अपना हितैषी पक्ष के रूप में देखता है। उसकी यह धारणा कई पक्षों के मिलेजुले प्रभाव का नतीजा है। 

सब से बड़ी बात यह है कि मोहन दास कर्मचंद गाँधी ने आज के इतिहास में छुआछूत विरुद्ध तीखी लड़ाई शुरू करने और भारत में युगों युगों से मानवीय हक़ों से वंचित किये हुए कर्मों के मारे करोड़ों जनों को भारतीय समाज और राज्य में बराबरी के मानवीय अधिकार उपलब्ध कराने का 'पूण्य' कमा के दलित वर्गों के सर पर अहसानों का कर्ज़ चढ़ा दिया कि कोंग्रेसी लीडर पचास सालों तक निरंतर इस कर्ज़े का सूद वसूल करते आ रहे हैं। कांग्रेस पार्टी की तरफ से दलित वर्ग को सरकारी नौकरियों से ले कर चुने हुए महकमों तक आरक्षण की सहूलियत और ऐसी ही और रियायतें देने से इस वर्ग की कांग्रेस पार्टी से सांझ और पक्की हो गई। इस के उलट, सिंह सभा लहर द्वारा शुरू सिखी सुधार लहर का यश घट जाने के बाद सिख लीडरों ने जात पात के खात्मे के कार्य को लगभग नज़रअंदाज़ ही कर दिया। भारत की आज़ादी के संग्राम के दौरान सिख लीडरों की तरफ से दलित वर्ग के हितों की पैरवी की शायद ही कोई उत्साहित उदहारण मिलती हो। आज़ादी के बाद बेशक़ अकाली लीडरों ने कांग्रेस पार्टी की दलित वर्ग को रिजर्वेशन देने जैसी नीतियों का खुल्लम-खुल्ला विरोध तो नहीं किया पर सिख समाज के अंदर ही कथित उच्च जातियां की इस मसले पर असली भावनाएं कभी भी गुप्त नहीं रहीं। उनकी जात-पातिए भड़ास अक्सर तहज़ीब की हदें पर पार करतीं और दलित संवेदना को रह रह कर घायल करती रहीं। इस से दलित वर्ग, डर और असुरक्षा की भावना से, कांग्रेस पार्टी का और ज़्यादा आसरा क़ुबूल करने की और धकेला जाता रहा। 

1966 में पंजाब के पुनर्गठन के बाद अकाली दल को राजनीतिक सत्ता की और बढ़ता देखके पंजाब का दलित वर्ग, ख़ास तौर पर इसके भीतरी ग़ैर-सिख हिस्से अपने आप को खतरे के मुहँ में आया महसूस करने लगे। इसी दौरान आर्थिक तौर पर ज़्यादा मालामाल और राजनीतिक तौर पर अधिक बलशाली हुए धनाढ्य किसान वर्ग में अहंकार का पारा ओर ऊँचा चढ़ चला और 'हरे इंक़लाब' के आरंभिक वर्षों दौरान गाँवों में जट्टों द्वारा दलितों की नाकाबंदी की घटनाएं आम हो गईं। इस तरह पंजाब के ग्रामीण क्षेत्र में जाति-पाति की लकीरों पर राजनीतिक धड़ेबंदी का रुझान और बल पकड़ गया जो अकाली दल के लिए एक बेहद घाटे वाली और कांग्रेस पार्टी के लिए बड़े राजनीतिक फायदे वाली बात थी। 

इसलिए, पंजाब में राजनीतिक सत्ता के ऊपर काबिज़ होने के लिए अपने सामाजिक आधार को ज़्यादा खुला करना और अपनी राजनीतिक हिमायत के घेरे को और ज़्यादा वर्गों तक फैलाना अकाली दल की यकदम राजनीतिक ज़रुरत थी। इसके लिए सचेतन सुघड़ रणनीति घड़ने और फिर उसका दृढ़तापूर्वक पालन और पैरवी करने का काम अकाली लीडरशिप का सब से अहम और तुरंत सरोकार वाला काम बनना चाहिए था। सचेत स्तर पर रणनीति घड़ने का मतलब था कि सिख धर्म के बुनियादी सिद्धांतों को मद्देनज़र रखते हुए अकाली दल के दूरअंदेशी उद्देश्यों और तुरंत करने वाले कार्यों में जंचने वाला तालमेल बिठाया जाता और सिद्धांतों पर अडिग रहते हुए राजनीतिक दावपेंचों के मामले में उपयुक्त लचक लाकर राजनीतिक पैंतरेबाज़ी का आकर्षक मॉडल ले करके आया जाता। ऐसा करने से पहले सबसे पहले ज़रुरत (और शर्त) यह थी कि सिख राजनीति के सामने इस गंभीर चुनौती को सचेतन क़ुबूल किया जाता और पैदा हुए नए हालातों और समस्याओं के सामने अकाली राजनीति की दरुस्त मार्ग-दिशा तय करने के लिए बौद्धिक स्तर पर गहरे एवं गंभीर यतन किये जाते। 

लेकिन अकाली लीडरशिप या सिख बुद्धिजीवियों के स्तर पर ऐसा कोई सचेतन यतन किया हुआ नज़र नहीं आता। इस महत्वपूर्ण मसले के बारे में अकाली दल या उसके अंदर गंभीर विचार -चर्चा छूने और विचार मंथन के ज़रिये सही निर्णय पर पहुँचने का, किसी भी तरफ से, कोई संजीदा कोशिश नहीं हुई। लेकिन समस्या क्योंकि ख़्याली नहीं बल्कि हक़ीक़त में थी और राजनीति की ज़रूरतें इसके तुरंत हल की मांग करती थीं, इस लिए इसे बिना गहरी सोच-विचार के, मौके पर जैसे और जो ठीक लगा वैसे हल कर लेने की अटकलपच्चू (random) पहुँच अपना ली गई। गहरी और गंभीर मसलों के प्रति अपनाई ऐसी बेकायदा पहुँच पर विवेक के मुक़ाबले अंतरप्रेरणा (instinct and/ or intuition) का तत्व ज़्यादा हावी हो गुज़रता है और फैसले लेते समय अक्सर दूरगामी उद्देश्यों और निशानों के मुक़ाबले सामने पड़े मतलब ज़्यादा वज़नदार हो जाते हैं। अकाली दल के मामले में ठीक यही बात हुई। 

पंजाब में कांग्रेस पार्टी सिख पंथ की अव्वल दुश्मन और अकाली दल की मुख्य विरोधी है। सही अर्थों में बात करनी हो तो पंजाब में सिख पंथ की असली दुश्मन ताक़त आर्य समाजी वर्ग था जो पंजाब के लगभग समूचे हिन्दू भाईचार को अपनी सांप्रदायिक विचारधारा मिलावटीपन चढ़ाने और अपनी सांप्रदायिक चालबाज़ी के गिर्द लामबंद करने में कमाल की हद तक सफल हो गया था। दरअसल पंजाब में कांग्रेस पार्टी आर्य समाज के एक राजनितिक विंग विचर रही रही। पंजाबी हिंदू वर्ग की असली वचनबद्धता आर्य समाजी विचारधारा से है और कांग्रेस पार्टी उसके लिए एक 'फ्रंट जत्थेबंदी' से ज़्यादा और कोई अहमियद नहीं रखती। पंजाब के हिंदू वर्ग और कांग्रेस पार्टी के आपसी संबंधों को समझने के लिए यह तथ्य बहुत ही महत्वपूर्ण है। 

यह कहना कि कांग्रेस पार्टी पंजाब के हिंदू वर्ग को बरगला रही है या अपने संकुचित राजनीतिक उद्देश्यों के लिए इस्तेमाल कर रही थी या है, सच्चाई को बिगड़े हुए रूप में देखना है। सिख पंथ के संबंध में पंजाबी हिंदू तबके और कांग्रेसी लीडरशिप की बुनियादी पहुँच में कोई टकराव नहीं। दोनों ही हिंदू मत को एक बानगी मानके चलते हैं। दोनों ही सिख धर्म को हिन्दू समाज में जज़्ब कर लेने के सांझे उदेश्य पर पहरा देते हैं। सो, इस दृष्टि से दोनों ही सिख कौम के प्रति बराबर दुर्भावना रखते हैं। भारत की आज़ादी की लड़ाई के दौरान पंजाबी हिंदू वर्ग के बड़े हिस्से राजनीतिक तौर पर कांग्रेस पार्टी से जुड़े होने के बावजूद गाँधी की विचारधारा से आर्य समाजी विचारधारा के ज़्यादा प्रभाव तले थे। लाल लाजपत राय से लेकर जगत नारायण तक, सभी आर्य समाजी 'परिवार' की सोच पर सांप्रदायिकता का एक-सामान गाढ़ा रंग चढ़ रखा था। भारत के बंटवारे से पहले सांप्रदायिकता की यह धारा मुख्य रूप से मुस्लिम भाईचारे के खिलाफ इंगित रही। वैसे बीच-मध्य जब भी सिख पंथ ने हिंदू वर्ग से अपनी अलग पहचान जतलाने की कोशिशें की तो उसे तुरंत ही आर्य समाजी वर्ग के क्रोध का सामना करना पड़ा। 

भारत की आज़ादी के बाद पंजाब में मुस्लिम फैक्टर नदारद हो जाने से इस सांप्रदायिक धारा का सारा कहर सिख कौम पर टूट पड़ा। भारतीय सरकार की बागडोर कांग्रेस पार्टी के हाथों में आ जाने से पंजाबी हिन्दू वर्ग, अपने सांप्रदायिक उद्देश्यों और हितों को पूरा करने के लिए, कांग्रेस पार्टी का और भी ज़्यादा जोशीला हिमायती बन गया। उधर कांग्रेसी शासकों को भी पंजाब में सिख कौम के संबंध में अपने फिरकापरस्त मंसूबों को अंजाम देने के लिए पंजाब के हिन्दू वर्ग के सहयोग और हिमायत की भारी ज़रुरत थी। विचारधारक समरसता के साथ ही यह एक परस्पर उदेश्य था जो पंजाबी हिंदू वर्ग और कांग्रेस पार्टी में मजबूत संयोग-कड़ी बना हुआ था। 

पंजाबी हिंदू वर्ग कांग्रेस पार्टी से एक तरफ से थोड़ी लाभकारी पोज़िशन में था। उस की सारी जान कांग्रेस पार्टी की मुट्ठी में नहीं थी। कांग्रेस पार्टी के पंजाबी हिंदू वर्ग की उम्मीदें और मांगों पर पूरा न उतर सकने की सूरत में, उसके लिए कांग्रेस का पल्ला छोड़ किसी अन्य राजनीतिक पाले में चले जाने का रास्ता खुला था। इसके विपरीत पंजाब में कांग्रेस पार्टी के लिए हिन्दू वर्ग की बाजू छोड़ के ज़िंदा रह पाना मुमकिन नहीं था। सिख कौम को ग़ुलाम बना के रखने और अकाली दल को राज्यसत्ता से पर रखने के लिए कांग्रेस शासकों को पंजाब के हिन्दू वर्ग का सहयोग हासिल करना निहायत ज़रूरी था। हिन्दू वर्ग के इलावा कांग्रेस पार्टी का पंजाब में सामाजिक तौर पर पछड़े वर्गों में भी मजबूत आधार था। इस तरह इन वर्गों की मिश्रित हिमायत के साथी ही कांग्रेस पार्टी अकाली दल को राज्यसत्ता से परे रखने के उदेश्य में सफल रही थी। सो अकाली दल के सामने कांग्रेस पार्टी की इस राजनीतिक किलेबंदी में दरार डालने की राजनीतिक चुनौती थी। केवल ऐसा करके ही वह अपने लिए राज्यसत्ता तक पहुँचने का रास्ता समतल कर सकता था। 

~~~ 

सरदार अजमेर सिंह पंजाब के एक जाने माने इतिहासकार हैं। ब्राह्मणवाद की गहन समझ रखने वाले अजमेर सिंह महसूस करते हैं कि पंजाब अपने असली इतिहास के साथ तभी बच सकता है, एवं उसका भविष्य सुरक्षित हो सकता है अगर वह अलग सिख स्टेट बने। पंजाब की तारीख़ का सिख परीपेक्ष्य में मूल्यांकन करने वाले शायद वह इकलौते इतिहासकार हैं जिन्होंने ब्राह्मणवाद की नब्ज़ को पकड़कर सिखों में घुस चुके ब्राह्मणवाद की निशानदेही की है। 

मनुस्मृति और जाति व्यवस्था 

क्या महर्षि मनु शूद्र विरोधी थे? या शूद्रों के सबसे बड़े रक्षक? जानने के लिए पढ़ें! 

BY SANJEEV NEWAR

भारत में आज अनेक संकट छाये हुए हैं – भ्रष्टाचार, आतंकवाद, कट्टरवाद, धर्मांतरण, नैतिक अध : पतन, अशिक्षा, चरमरायी हुई स्वास्थ्य व्यवस्था, सफ़ाई की समस्या वगैरह – वगैरह | पर इन सभी से ज्यादा भयावह है – जन्मना जातिवाद और लिंग भेद | क्योंकि यह दो मूलभूत समस्याएँ ही बाकी समस्याओं को पनपने में मदद करती हैं | यह दो प्रश्न ही हमारे भूत और वर्तमान की समस्त आपदाओं का मुख्य कारण हैं | इन को मूल से ही नष्ट नहीं किया तो हमारा उज्जवल भविष्य सिर्फ़ एक सपना बनकर रह जाएगा क्योंकि एक समृद्ध और समर्थ समाज का अस्तित्व जाति प्रथा और लिंग भेद के साथ नहीं हो सकता | 

यह भी गौर किया जाना चाहिए कि जाति भेद और लिंग भेद केवल हिन्दू समाज की ही समस्याएँ नहीं हैं किन्तु यह दोनों सांस्कृतिक समस्याएँ हैं | लिंग भेद सदियों से वैश्विक समस्या रही है और जाति भेद दक्षिण एशिया में पनपी हुई, सभी धर्मों और समाजों को छूती हुई समस्या है | चूँकि हिन्दुत्व सबसे प्राचीन संस्कृति और सभी धर्मों का आदिस्रोत है, इसी पर व्यवस्था को भ्रष्ट करने का आक्षेप मढ़ा जाता है | यदि इन दो कुप्रथाओं को हम ढोते रहते हैं तो समाज इतना दुर्बल हो जाएगा कि विभिन्न सम्प्रदायों और फिरकों में बिखरता रहेगा जिससे देश कमजोर होगा और टूटेगा | 

अपनी कमजोरी और विकृतियों के बारे में हमने इतिहास से कोई शिक्षा नहीं ली है | आज की तारीख़ में भी कुछ शिक्षित और बुद्धिवादी कहे जाने वाले लोग इन दो कुप्रथाओं का समर्थन करते हैं – यह आश्चर्य की बात है | जन्म से ही ऊँचेपन का भाव इतना हावी है कि वह किसी समझदार को भी पागल बना दे | इस वैचारिक संक्रमण से ग्रस्त कुछ लोग आज हिन्दुत्व के विद्वानों और नेतागणों में भी गिने जा रहे हैं | अनजान बनकर यह लोग इन कुप्रथाओं का समर्थन करने के लिए प्राचीन शास्त्रों का हवाला देते हैं जिस में समाज व्यवस्था देनेवाली प्राचीनतम मनुस्मृति को सबसे अधिक केंद्र बनाया जाता है | वेदों को भी इस कुटिलता में फंसाया गया, जिसका खंडन हम http://agniveer.com/series/caste-series/ में कर चुके हैं | 

मनुस्मृति जो सृष्टि में नीति और धर्म ( कानून) का निर्धारण करने वाला सबसे पहला ग्रंथ माना गया है उस को घोर जाति प्रथा को बढ़ावा देने वाला भी बताया जा रहा है |आज स्थिति यह है कि मनुस्मृति वैदिक संस्कृति की सबसे अधिक विवादित पुस्तकों में है | पूरा का पूरा दलित आन्दोलन ‘ मनुवाद ‘ के विरोध पर ही खड़ा हुआ है | 

मनु जाति प्रथा के समर्थकों के नायक हैं तो दलित नेताओं ने उन्हें खलनायक के सांचे में ढाल रखा है | पिछड़े तबकों के प्रति प्यार का दिखावा कर स्वार्थ की रोटियां सेकने के लिए ही अग्निवेश और मायावती जैसे बहुत से लोगों द्वारा मनुस्मृति जलाई जाती रही है | अपनी विकृत भावनाओं को पूरा करने के लिए नीची जातियों पर अत्याचार करने वाले, एक सींग वाले विद्वान राक्षस के रूप में भी मनु को चित्रित किया गया है | हिन्दुत्व और वेदों को गालियां देने वाले कथित सुधारवादियों के लिए तो मनुस्मृति एक पसंदीदा साधन बन गया है| विधर्मी वायरस पीढ़ियों से हिन्दुओं के धर्मांतरण में इससे फ़ायदा उठाते आए हैं जो आज भी जारी है | ध्यान देने वाली बात यह है कि मनु की निंदा करने वाले इन लोगों ने मनुस्मृति को कभी गंभीरता से पढ़ा भी है कि नहीं | 

दूसरी ओर जातीय घमंड में चूर और उच्चता में अकड़े हुए लोगों के लिए मनुस्मृति एक ऐसा धार्मिक ग्रंथ है जो उन्हें एक विशिष्ट वर्ग में नहीं जन्में लोगों के प्रति सही व्यवहार नहीं करने का अधिकार और अनुमति देता है| ऐसे लोग मनुस्मृति से कुछ एक गलत और भ्रष्ट श्लोकों का हवाला देकर जातिप्रथा को उचित बताते हैं पर स्वयं की अनुकूलता और स्वार्थ के लिए यह भूलते हैं कि वह जो कह रहे हैं उसे के बिलकुल विपरीत अनेक श्लोक हैं | 

इन दोनों शक्तियों के बीच संघर्ष ने आज भारत में निचले स्तर की राजनीति को जन्म दिया है |भारतवर्ष पर लगातार पिछले हजार वर्षों से होते आ रहे आक्रमणों के लिए भी यही जिम्मेदार है| सदियों तक नरपिशाच,गोहत्यारे और पापियों से यह पावन धरती शासित रही| यह अतार्किक जातिप्रथा ही १९४७ में हमारे देश के बंटवारे का प्रमुख कारण रही है| कभी विश्वगुरु और चक्रवर्ती सम्राटों का यह देश था | आज भी हम में असीम क्षमता और बुद्धि धन है फ़िर भी हम समृद्धि और सामर्थ्य की ओर अपने देश को नहीं ले जा पाए और निर्बल और निराधार खड़े हैं – इस का प्रमुख कारण यह मलिन जाति प्रथा है| इसलिए मनुस्मृति की सही परिपेक्ष्य में जाँच – परख़ अत्यंत आवश्यक हो जाती है | 

मनुस्मृति पर लगाये जाने वाले तीन मुख्य आक्षेप : 

१. मनु ने जन्म के आधार पर जातिप्रथा का निर्माण किया | 

२. मनु ने शूद्रों के लिए कठोर दंड का विधान किया और ऊँची जाति खासकर ब्राह्मणों के लिए विशेष प्रावधान रखे | 

३. मनु नारी का विरोधी था और उनका तिरस्कार करता था | उसने स्त्रियों के लिए पुरुषों से कम अधिकार का विधान किया | 

आइये अब मनुस्मृति के साक्ष्यों पर ही हम इन आक्षेपों की समीक्षा करें | इस लेख में हम पहले आरोप – मनु द्वारा जन्म आधारित जाति प्रथा के निर्माण पर विचार करेंगे | 

पाठकों से निवेदन है कि वे http://agniveer.com/series/caste-series/को पढ़ें ताकि ब्राह्मण, क्षत्रिय, वैश्य और शूद्र के सही अर्थों को समझ सकें| 

मनुस्मृति और जाति व्यवस्था : 

मनुस्मृति उस काल की है जब जन्मना जाति व्यवस्था के विचार का भी कोई अस्तित्व नहीं था | अत: मनुस्मृति जन्मना समाज व्यवस्था का कहीं भी समर्थन नहीं करती | महर्षि मनु ने मनुष्य के गुण- कर्म – स्वभाव पर आधारित समाज व्यवस्था की रचना कर के वेदों में परमात्मा द्वारा दिए गए आदेश का ही पालन किया है (देखें – ऋग्वेद-१०.१०.११-१२, यजुर्वेद-३१.१०-११, अथर्ववेद-१९.६.५-६) | 

यह वर्ण व्यवस्था है | वर्ण शब्द “वृञ” धातु से बनता है जिसका मतलब है चयन या चुनना और सामान्यत: प्रयुक्त शब्द वरण भी यही अर्थ रखता है | जैसे वर अर्थात् कन्या द्वारा चुना गया पति, जिससे पता चलता है कि वैदिक व्यवस्था कन्या को अपना पति चुनने का पूर्ण अधिकार देती है | 

मनुस्मृति में वर्ण व्यवस्था को ही बताया गया है और जाति व्यवस्था को नहीं इसका सबसे बड़ा प्रमाण यह है कि मनुस्मृति के प्रथम अध्याय में कहीं भी जाति या गोत्र शब्द ही नहीं है बल्कि वहां चार वर्णों की उत्पत्ति का वर्णन है | यदि जाति या गोत्र का इतना ही महत्त्व होता तो मनु इसका उल्लेख अवश्य करते कि कौनसी जाति ब्राह्मणों से संबंधित है, कौनसी क्षत्रियों से, कौनसी वैश्यों और शूद्रों से | 

इस का मतलब हुआ कि स्वयं को जन्म से ब्राह्मण या उच्च जाति का मानने वालों के पास इसका कोई प्रमाण नहीं है | ज्यादा से ज्यादा वे इतना बता सकते हैं कि कुछ पीढ़ियों पहले से उनके पूर्वज स्वयं को ऊँची जाति का कहलाते आए हैं | ऐसा कोई प्रमाण नहीं है कि सभ्यता के आरंभ से ही यह लोग ऊँची जाति के थे | जब वह यह साबित नहीं कर सकते तो उनको यह कहने का क्या अधिकार है कि आज जिन्हें जन्मना शूद्र माना जाता है, वह कुछ पीढ़ियों पहले ब्राह्मण नहीं थे ? और स्वयं जो अपने को ऊँची जाति का कहते हैं वे कुछ पीढ़ियों पहले शूद्र नहीं थे ? 

मनुस्मृति ३.१०९ में साफ़ कहा है कि अपने गोत्र या कुल की दुहाई देकर भोजन करने वाले को स्वयं का उगलकर खाने वाला माना जाए | अतः मनुस्मृति के अनुसार जो जन्मना ब्राह्मण या ऊँची जाति वाले अपने गोत्र या वंश का हवाला देकर स्वयं को बड़ा कहते हैं और मान-सम्मान की अपेक्षा रखते हैं उन्हें तिरस्कृत किया जाना चाहिए | 

मनुस्मृति २. १३६: धनी होना, बांधव होना, आयु में बड़े होना, श्रेष्ठ कर्म का होना और विद्वत्ता यह पाँच सम्मान के उत्तरोत्तर मानदंड हैं | इन में कहीं भी कुल, जाति, गोत्र या वंश को सम्मान का मानदंड नहीं माना गया है | 

वर्णों में परिवर्तन : 

मनुस्मृति १०.६५: ब्राह्मण शूद्र बन सकता और शूद्र ब्राह्मण हो सकता है | इसी प्रकार क्षत्रिय और वैश्य भी अपने वर्ण बदल सकते हैं | 

मनुस्मृति ९.३३५: शरीर और मन से शुद्ध- पवित्र रहने वाला, उत्कृष्ट लोगों के सानिध्य में रहने वाला, मधुरभाषी, अहंकार से रहित, अपने से उत्कृष्ट वर्ण वालों की सेवा करने वाला शूद्र भी उत्तम ब्रह्म जन्म और द्विज वर्ण को प्राप्त कर लेता है | 

मनुस्मृति के अनेक श्लोक कहते हैं कि उच्च वर्ण का व्यक्ति भी यदि श्रेष्ट कर्म नहीं करता, तो शूद्र (अशिक्षित) बन जाता है | 

उदाहरण- 

२.१०३: जो मनुष्य नित्य प्रात: और सांय ईश्वर आराधना नहीं करता उसको शूद्र समझना चाहिए | 

२.१७२: जब तक व्यक्ति वेदों की शिक्षाओं में दीक्षित नहीं होता वह शूद्र के ही समान है | 

४.२४५ : ब्राह्मण- वर्णस्थ व्यक्ति श्रेष्ट – अति श्रेष्ट व्यक्तियों का संग करते हुए और नीच- नीचतर व्यक्तिओं का संग छोड़कर अधिक श्रेष्ट बनता जाता है | इसके विपरीत आचरण से पतित होकर वह शूद्र बन जाता है | अतः स्पष्ट है कि ब्राह्मण उत्तम कर्म करने वाले विद्वान व्यक्ति को कहते हैं और शूद्र का अर्थ अशिक्षित व्यक्ति है | इसका, किसी भी तरह जन्म से कोई सम्बन्ध नहीं है | 

२.१६८: जो ब्राह्मण,क्षत्रिय या वैश्य वेदों का अध्ययन और पालन छोड़कर अन्य विषयों में ही परिश्रम करता है, वह शूद्र बन जाता है | और उसकी आने वाली पीढ़ियों को भी वेदों के ज्ञान से वंचित होना पड़ता है | अतः मनुस्मृति के अनुसार तो आज भारत में कुछ अपवादों को छोड़कर बाकी सारे लोग जो भ्रष्टाचार, जातिवाद, स्वार्थ साधना, अन्धविश्वास, विवेकहीनता, लिंग-भेद, चापलूसी, अनैतिकता इत्यादि में लिप्त हैं – वे सभी शूद्र हैं | 

२ .१२६: भले ही कोई ब्राह्मण हो, लेकिन अगर वह अभिवादन का शिष्टता से उत्तर देना नहीं जानता तो वह शूद्र (अशिक्षित व्यक्ति) ही है | 

शूद्र भी पढ़ा सकते हैं : 

शूद्र भले ही अशिक्षित हों तब भी उनसे कौशल और उनका विशेष ज्ञान प्राप्त किया जाना चाहिए | 

२.२३८: अपने से न्यून व्यक्ति से भी विद्या को ग्रहण करना चाहिए और नीच कुल में जन्मी उत्तम स्त्री को भी पत्नी के रूप में स्वीकार कर लेना चाहिए|

२.२४१ : आवश्यकता पड़ने पर अ-ब्राह्मण से भी विद्या प्राप्त की जा सकती है और शिष्यों को पढ़ाने के दायित्व का पालन वह गुरु जब तक निर्देश दिया गया हो तब तक करे | 

ब्राह्मणत्व का आधार कर्म : 

मनु की वर्ण व्यवस्था जन्म से ही कोई वर्ण नहीं मानती | मनुस्मृति के अनुसार माता- पिता को बच्चों के बाल्यकाल में ही उनकी रूचि और प्रवृत्ति को पहचान कर ब्राह्मण, क्षत्रिय या वैश्य वर्ण का ज्ञान और प्रशिक्षण प्राप्त करने के लिए भेज देना चाहिए | 

कई ब्राह्मण माता – पिता अपने बच्चों को ब्राह्मण ही बनाना चाहते हैं परंतु इस के लिए व्यक्ति में ब्रह्मणोचित गुण, कर्म,स्वभाव का होना अति आवश्यक है| ब्राह्मण वर्ण में जन्म लेने मात्र से या ब्राह्मणत्व का प्रशिक्षण किसी गुरुकुल में प्राप्त कर लेने से ही कोई ब्राह्मण नहीं बन जाता, जब तक कि उसकी योग्यता, ज्ञान और कर्म ब्रह्मणोचित न हों | 

२.१५७ : जैसे लकड़ी से बना हाथी और चमड़े का बनाया हुआ हरिण सिर्फ़ नाम के लिए ही हाथी और हरिण कहे जाते हैं वैसे ही बिना पढ़ा ब्राह्मण मात्र नाम का ही ब्राह्मण होता है | 

२.२८: पढने-पढ़ाने से, चिंतन-मनन करने से, ब्रह्मचर्य, अनुशासन, सत्यभाषण आदि व्रतों का पालन करने से, परोपकार आदि सत्कर्म करने से, वेद, विज्ञान आदि पढने से, कर्तव्य का पालन करने से, दान करने से और आदर्शों के प्रति समर्पित रहने से मनुष्य का यह शरीर ब्राह्मण किया जाता है | 

शिक्षा ही वास्तविक जन्म : 

मनु के अनुसार मनुष्य का वास्तविक जन्म विद्या प्राप्ति के उपरांत ही होता है | जन्मतः प्रत्येक मनुष्य शूद्र या अशिक्षित है | ज्ञान और संस्कारों से स्वयं को परिष्कृत कर योग्यता हासिल कर लेने पर ही उसका दूसरा जन्म होता है और वह द्विज कहलाता है | शिक्षा प्राप्ति में असमर्थ रहने वाले शूद्र ही रह जाते हैं | 

यह पूर्णत: गुणवत्ता पर आधारित व्यवस्था है, इसका शारीरिक जन्म या अनुवांशिकता से कोई लेना-देना नहीं है| 

२.१४८ : वेदों में पारंगत आचार्य द्वारा शिष्य को गायत्री मंत्र की दीक्षा देने के उपरांत ही उसका वास्तविक मनुष्य जन्म होता है | यह जन्म मृत्यु और विनाश से रहित होता है |ज्ञानरुपी जन्म में दीक्षित होकर मनुष्य मुक्ति को प्राप्त कर लेता है| यही मनुष्य का वास्तविक उद्देश्य है| सुशिक्षा के बिना मनुष्य ‘ मनुष्य’ नहीं बनता| 

इसलिए ब्राह्मण, क्षत्रिय, वैश्य होने की बात तो छोडो जब तक मनुष्य अच्छी तरह शिक्षित नहीं होगा तब तक उसे मनुष्य भी नहीं माना जाएगा | 

२.१४६ : जन्म देने वाले पिता से ज्ञान देने वाला आचार्य रूप पिता ही अधिक बड़ा और माननीय है, आचार्य द्वारा प्रदान किया गया ज्ञान मुक्ति तक साथ देता हैं | पिताद्वारा प्राप्त शरीर तो इस जन्म के साथ ही नष्ट हो जाता है| 

२.१४७ : माता- पिता से उत्पन्न संतति का माता के गर्भ से प्राप्त जन्म साधारण जन्म है| वास्तविक जन्म तो शिक्षा पूर्ण कर लेने के उपरांत ही होता है| 

अत: अपनी श्रेष्टता साबित करने के लिए कुल का नाम आगे धरना मनु के अनुसार अत्यंत मूर्खतापूर्ण कृत्य है | अपने कुल का नाम आगे रखने की बजाए व्यक्ति यह दिखा दे कि वह कितना शिक्षित है तो बेहतर होगा | 

१०.४: ब्राह्मण, क्षत्रिय और वैश्य, ये तीन वर्ण विद्याध्ययन से दूसरा जन्म प्राप्त करते हैं | विद्याध्ययन न कर पाने वाला शूद्र, चौथा वर्ण है | इन चार वर्णों के अतिरिक्त आर्यों में या श्रेष्ट मनुष्यों में पांचवा कोई वर्ण नहीं है | 

इस का मतलब है कि अगर कोई अपनी शिक्षा पूर्ण नहीं कर पाया तो वह दुष्ट नहीं हो जाता | उस के कृत्य यदि भले हैं तो वह अच्छा इन्सान कहा जाएगा | और अगर वह शिक्षा भी पूरी कर ले तो वह भी द्विज गिना जाएगा | अत: शूद्र मात्र एक विशेषण है, किसी जाति विशेष का नाम नहीं | 

‘नीच’ कुल में जन्में व्यक्ति का तिरस्कार नहीं : 

किसी व्यक्ति का जन्म यदि ऐसे कुल में हुआ हो, जो समाज में आर्थिक या अन्य दृष्टी से पनप न पाया हो तो उस व्यक्ति को केवल कुल के कारण पिछड़ना न पड़े और वह अपनी प्रगति से वंचित न रह जाए, इसके लिए भी महर्षि मनु ने नियम निर्धारित किए हैं | 

४.१४१: अपंग, अशिक्षित, बड़ी आयु वाले, रूप और धन से रहित या निचले कुल वाले, इन को आदर और / या अधिकार से वंचित न करें | क्योंकि यह किसी व्यक्ति की परख के मापदण्ड नहीं हैं| 

प्राचीन इतिहास में वर्ण परिवर्तन के उदाहरण : 

ब्राह्मण, क्षत्रिय,वैश्य और शूद्र वर्ण की सैद्धांतिक अवधारणा गुणों के आधार पर है, जन्म के आधार पर नहीं | यह बात सिर्फ़ कहने के लिए ही नहीं है, प्राचीन समय में इस का व्यवहार में चलन था | जब से इस गुणों पर आधारित वैज्ञानिक व्यवस्था को हमारे दिग्भ्रमित पुरखों ने मूर्खतापूर्ण जन्मना व्यवस्था में बदला है, तब से ही हम पर आफत आ पड़ी है जिस का सामना आज भी कर रहें हैं| 

वर्ण परिवर्तन के कुछ उदाहरण – 

(a) ऐतरेय ऋषि दास अथवा अपराधी के पुत्र थे | परन्तु उच्च कोटि के ब्राह्मण बने और उन्होंने ऐतरेय ब्राह्मण और ऐतरेय उपनिषद की रचना की | ऋग्वेद को समझने के लिए ऐतरेय ब्राह्मण अतिशय आवश्यक माना जाता है | 

(b) ऐलूष ऋषि दासी पुत्र थे | जुआरी और हीन चरित्र भी थे | परन्तु बाद में उन्होंने अध्ययन किया और ऋग्वेद पर अनुसन्धान करके अनेक अविष्कार किये |ऋषियों ने उन्हें आमंत्रित कर के आचार्य पद पर आसीन किया | (ऐतरेय ब्राह्मण २.१९) 

(c) सत्यकाम जाबाल गणिका (वेश्या) के पुत्र थे परन्तु वे ब्राह्मणत्व को प्राप्त हुए | 

(d) राजा दक्ष के पुत्र पृषध शूद्र हो गए थे, प्रायश्चित स्वरुप तपस्या करके उन्होंने मोक्ष प्राप्त किया | (विष्णु पुराण ४.१.१४) 

अगर उत्तर रामायण की मिथ्या कथा के अनुसार शूद्रों के लिए तपस्या करना मना होता तो पृषध ये कैसे कर पाए? 

(e) राजा नेदिष्ट के पुत्र नाभाग वैश्य हुए | पुनः इनके कई पुत्रों ने क्षत्रिय वर्ण अपनाया | (विष्णु पुराण ४.१.१३) 

(f) धृष्ट नाभाग के पुत्र थे परन्तु ब्राह्मण हुए और उनके पुत्र ने क्षत्रिय वर्ण अपनाया | (विष्णु पुराण ४.२.२) 

(g) आगे उन्हींके वंश में पुनः कुछ ब्राह्मण हुए | (विष्णु पुराण ४.२.२) 

(h) भागवत के अनुसार राजपुत्र अग्निवेश्य ब्राह्मण हुए | 

(i) विष्णुपुराण और भागवत के अनुसार रथोतर क्षत्रिय से ब्राह्मण बने | 

(j) हारित क्षत्रियपुत्र से ब्राह्मण हुए | (विष्णु पुराण ४.३.५) 

(k) क्षत्रियकुल में जन्में शौनक ने ब्राह्मणत्व प्राप्त किया | (विष्णु पुराण ४.८.१) वायु, विष्णु और हरिवंश पुराण कहते हैं कि शौनक ऋषि के पुत्र कर्म भेद से ब्राह्मण, क्षत्रिय, वैश्य और शूद्र वर्ण के हुए| इसी प्रकार गृत्समद, गृत्समति और वीतहव्य के उदाहरण हैं | 

(l) मातंग चांडालपुत्र से ब्राह्मण बने | 

(m) ऋषि पुलस्त्य का पौत्र रावण अपने कर्मों से राक्षस बना | 

(n) राजा रघु का पुत्र प्रवृद्ध राक्षस हुआ | 

(o) त्रिशंकु राजा होते हुए भी कर्मों से चांडाल बन गए थे | 

(p) विश्वामित्र के पुत्रों ने शूद्र वर्ण अपनाया | विश्वामित्र स्वयं क्षत्रिय थे परन्तु बाद उन्होंने ब्राह्मणत्व को प्राप्त किया | 

(q) विदुर दासी पुत्र थे | तथापि वे ब्राह्मण हुए और उन्होंने हस्तिनापुर साम्राज्य का मंत्री पद सुशोभित किया | 

(r) वत्स शूद्र कुल में उत्पन्न होकर भी ऋषि बने (ऐतरेय ब्राह्मण २.१९) | 

(s) मनुस्मृति के प्रक्षिप्त श्लोकों से भी पता चलता है कि कुछ क्षत्रिय जातियां, शूद्र बन गईं | वर्ण परिवर्तन की साक्षी देने वाले यह श्लोक मनुस्मृति में बहुत बाद के काल में मिलाए गए हैं | इन परिवर्तित जातियों के नाम हैं – पौण्ड्रक, औड्र, द्रविड, कम्बोज, यवन, शक, पारद, पल्हव, चीन, किरात, दरद, खश | 

(t) महाभारत अनुसन्धान पर्व (३५.१७-१८) इसी सूची में कई अन्य नामों को भी शामिल करता है – मेकल, लाट, कान्वशिरा, शौण्डिक, दार्व, चौर, शबर, बर्बर| 

(u) आज भी ब्राह्मण, क्षत्रिय, वैश्य और दलितों में समान गोत्र मिलते हैं | इस से पता चलता है कि यह सब एक ही पूर्वज, एक ही कुल की संतान हैं | लेकिन कालांतर में वर्ण व्यवस्था गड़बड़ा गई और यह लोग अनेक जातियों में बंट गए | 

शूद्रों के प्रति आदर : 

मनु परम मानवीय थे| वे जानते थे कि सभी शूद्र जानबूझ कर शिक्षा की उपेक्षा नहीं कर सकते | जो किसी भी कारण से जीवन के प्रथम पर्व में ज्ञान और शिक्षा से वंचित रह गया हो, उसे जीवन भर इसकी सज़ा न भुगतनी पड़े इसलिए वे समाज में शूद्रों के लिए उचित सम्मान का विधान करते हैं | उन्होंने शूद्रों के प्रति कभी अपमान सूचक शब्दों का प्रयोग नहीं किया, बल्कि मनुस्मृति में कई स्थानों पर शूद्रों के लिए अत्यंत सम्मानजनक शब्द आए हैं | 

मनु की दृष्टी में ज्ञान और शिक्षा के अभाव में शूद्र समाज का सबसे अबोध घटक है, जो परिस्थितिवश भटक सकता है | अत: वे समाज को उसके प्रति अधिक सहृदयता और सहानुभूति रखने को कहते हैं | 

कुछ और उदात्त उदाहरण देखें – 

३.११२: शूद्र या वैश्य के अतिथि रूप में आ जाने पर, परिवार उन्हें सम्मान सहित भोजन कराए | 

३.११६: अपने सेवकों (शूद्रों) को पहले भोजन कराने के बाद ही दंपत्ति भोजन करें | 

२.१३७: धन, बंधू, कुल, आयु, कर्म, श्रेष्ट विद्या से संपन्न व्यक्तियों के होते हुए भी वृद्ध शूद्र को पहले सम्मान दिया जाना चाहिए | 

मनुस्मृति वेदों पर आधारित : 

वेदों को छोड़कर अन्य कोई ग्रंथ मिलावटों से बचा नहीं है | वेद प्रक्षेपों से कैसे अछूते रहे, जानने के लिए ‘ वेदों में परिवर्तन क्यों नहीं हो सकता ? ‘ पढ़ें | वेद ईश्वरीय ज्ञान है और सभी विद्याएँ उसी से निकली हैं | उन्हीं को आधार मानकर ऋषियों ने अन्य ग्रंथ बनाए| वेदों का स्थान और प्रमाणिकता सबसे ऊपर है और उनके रक्षण से ही आगे भी जगत में नए सृजन संभव हैं | अत: अन्य सभी ग्रंथ स्मृति, ब्राह्मण, महाभारत, रामायण, गीता, उपनिषद, आयुर्वेद, नीतिशास्त्र, दर्शन इत्यादि को परखने की कसौटी वेद ही हैं | और जहां तक वे वेदानुकूल हैं वहीं तक मान्य हैं | 

मनु भी वेदों को ही धर्म का मूल मानते हैं (२.८-२.११) 

२.८: विद्वान मनुष्य को अपने ज्ञान चक्षुओं से सब कुछ वेदों के अनुसार परखते हुए, कर्तव्य का पालन करना चाहिए |

इस से साफ़ है कि मनु के विचार, उनकी मूल रचना वेदानुकूल ही है और मनुस्मृति में वेद विरुद्ध मिलने वाली मान्यताएं प्रक्षिप्त मानी जानी चाहियें | 

शूद्रों को भी वेद पढने और वैदिक संस्कार करने का अधिकार : 

वेद में ईश्वर कहता है कि मेरा ज्ञान सबके लिए समान है चाहे पुरुष हो या नारी, ब्राह्मण हो या शूद्र सबको वेद पढने और यज्ञ करने का अधिकार है | 

देखें – यजुर्वेद २६.१, ऋग्वेद १०.५३.४, निरुक्त ३.८ इत्यादि और http://agniveer.com/series/caste-series/ | 

और मनुस्मृति भी यही कहती है | मनु ने शूद्रों को उपनयन ( विद्या आरंभ ) से वंचित नहीं रखा है | इसके विपरीत उपनयन से इंकार करने वाला ही शूद्र कहलाता है | 

वेदों के ही अनुसार मनु शासकों के लिए विधान करते हैं कि वे शूद्रों का वेतन और भत्ता किसी भी परिस्थिति में न काटें ( ७.१२-१२६, ८.२१६) | 

संक्षेप में – 

मनु को जन्मना जाति – व्यवस्था का जनक मानना निराधार है | इसके विपरीत मनु मनुष्य की पहचान में जन्म या कुल की सख्त उपेक्षा करते हैं | मनु की वर्ण व्यवस्था पूरी तरह गुणवत्ता पर टिकी हुई है | 

प्रत्येक मनुष्य में चारों वर्ण हैं – ब्राह्मण, क्षत्रिय, वैश्य और शूद्र | मनु ने ऐसा प्रयत्न किया है कि प्रत्येक मनुष्य में विद्यमान जो सबसे सशक्त वर्ण है – जैसे किसी में ब्राह्मणत्व ज्यादा है, किसी में क्षत्रियत्व, इत्यादि का विकास हो और यह विकास पूरे समाज के विकास में सहायक हो | 

अगले लेखों में हम मनु पर थोपे गए अन्य आरोप जैसे शूद्रों के लिए कठोर दंड विधान तथा स्त्री विरोधी होने की सच्चाई को जानेंगे | 

लेकिन मनु पाखंडी और आचरणहीनों के लिए क्या कहते हैं, यह भी देख लेते हैं – 

४.३०: पाखंडी, गलत आचरण वाले, छली – कपटी, धूर्त, दुराग्रही, झूठ बोलने वाले लोगों का सत्कार वाणी मात्र से भी न करना चाहिए | 

जन्मना जाति व्यवस्था को मान्य करने की प्रथा एक सभ्य समाज के लिए कलंक है और अत्यंत छल-कपट वाली, विकृत और झूठी व्यवस्था है | वेद और मनु को मानने वालों को इस घिनौनी प्रथा का सशक्त प्रतिकार करना चाहिए | शब्दों में भी उसके प्रति अच्छा भाव रखना मनु के अनुसार घृणित कृत्य है | 

प्रश्न : मनुस्मृति से ऐसे सैंकड़ों श्लोक दिए जा सकते हैं, जिन्हें जन्मना जातिवाद और लिंग-भेद के समर्थन में पेश किया जाता है | क्या आप बतायेंगे कि इन सब को कैसे प्रक्षिप्त माना जाए ? 

अग्निवीर: यही तो सोचने वाली बात है कि मनुस्मृति में जन्मना जातिवाद के विरोधी और समर्थक दोनों तरह के श्लोक कैसे हैं ? इस का मतलब मनुस्मृति का गहरे से अध्ययन और परीक्षण किए जाने की आवश्यता है | जो हम अगले लेख में करेंगे, अभी संक्षेप में देखते हैं – 

आज मिलने वाली मनुस्मृति में बड़ी मात्रा में मनमाने प्रक्षेप पाए जाते हैं, जो बहुत बाद के काल में मिलाए गए | वर्तमान मनुस्मृति लगभग आधी नकली है| सिर्फ़ मनुस्मृति ही प्रक्षिप्त नहीं है | वेदों को छोड़ कर जो अपनी अद्भुत स्वर और पाठ रक्षण पद्धतियों के कारण आज भी अपने मूल स्वरुप में है, लगभग अन्य सभी सम्प्रदायों के ग्रंथों में स्वाभाविकता से परिवर्तन, मिलावट या हटावट की जा सकती है | जिनमें रामायण, महाभारत, बाइबल, कुरान इत्यादि भी शामिल हैं | भविष्य पुराण में तो मिलावट का सिलसिला छपाई के आने तक चलता रहा | 

आज रामायण के तीन संस्करण मिलते हैं – १. दाक्षिणात्य २. पश्चिमोत्तरीय ३. गौडीय और यह तीनों ही भिन्न हैं | गीता प्रेस, गोरखपुर ने भी रामायण के कई सर्ग प्रक्षिप्त नाम से चिन्हित किए हैं | कई विद्वान बालकाण्ड और उत्तरकाण्ड के अधिकांश भाग को प्रक्षिप्त मानते हैं | 

महाभारत भी अत्यधिक प्रक्षिप्त हो चुका ग्रंथ है | गरुड़ पुराण ( ब्रह्मकांड १.५४ ) में कहा गया है कि कलियुग के इस समय में धूर्त स्वयं को ब्राह्मण बताकर महाभारत में से कुछ श्लोकों को निकाल रहे हैं और नए श्लोक बना कर डाल रहे हैं | 

महाभारत का शांतिपर्व (२६५.९,४) स्वयं कह रहा है कि वैदिक ग्रंथ स्पष्ट रूप से शराब, मछली, मांस का निषेध करते हैं | इन सब को धूर्तों ने प्रचलित कर दिया है, जिन्होंने कपट से ऐसे श्लोक बनाकर शास्त्रों में मिला दिए हैं | 

मूल बाइबल जिसे कभी किसी ने देखा हो वह आज अस्तित्व में ही नहीं है | हमने उसके अनुवाद के अनुवाद के अनुवाद ही देखे हैं | 

कुरान भी मुहम्मद के उपदेशों की परिवर्तित आवृत्ति ही है, ऐसा कहा जाता है | देखें –http://satyagni.com/3118/miracle-islam/ 

इसलिए इस में कोई आश्चर्य नहीं होना चाहिए कि मनुस्मृति जो सामाजिक व्यवस्थाओं पर सबसे प्राचीन ग्रंथ है उसमें भी अनेक परिवर्तन किए गए हों | यह सम्भावना अधिक इसलिए है कि मनुस्मृति सर्व साधारण के दैनिक जीवन को, पूरे समाज को और राष्ट्र की राजनीति को प्रभावित करने वाला ग्रंथ रहा है | यदि देखा जाए तो सदियों तक वह एक प्रकार से मनुष्य जाति का संविधान ही रहा है | इसलिए धूर्तों और मक्कारों के लिए मनु स्मृति में प्रक्षेप करने के बहुत सारे प्रलोभन थे | 

मनुस्मृति का पुनरावलोकन करने पर चार प्रकार के प्रक्षेप दिखायी देते हैं – विस्तार करने के लिए, स्वप्रयोजन की सिद्धी के लिए, अतिश्योक्ति या बढ़ा- चढ़ा कर बताने के लिए, दूषित करने के लिए| अधिकतर प्रक्षेप सीधे- सीधे दिख ही रहें हैं | 

डा. सुरेन्द्र कुमार ने मनु स्मृति का विस्तृत और गहन अध्ययन किया है | जिसमें प्रत्येक श्लोक का भिन्न- भिन्न रीतियों से परीक्षण और पृथक्करण किया है ताकि प्रक्षिप्त श्लोकों को अलग से जांचा जा सके | उन्होंने मनुस्मृति के २६८५ में से १४७१ श्लोक प्रक्षिप्त पाए हैं | 

प्रक्षेपों का वर्गीकरण वे इस प्रकार करते हैं – 

– विषय से बाहर की कोई बात हो | 

– संदर्भ से विपरीत हो या विभिन्न हो | 

– पहले जो कहा गया, उसके विरुद्ध हो या पूर्वापार सम्बन्ध न हो | 

– पुनरावर्तन हो | 

– भाषा की विभिन्न शैली और प्रयोग हो | 

– वेद विरुद्ध हो | 

इसे और अच्छी तरह से समझने के लिए, मनुस्मृति के गहन और निष्पक्ष अध्ययन के लिए डा. सुरेन्द्र कुमार द्वारा लिखित मनुस्मृति (प्रकाशित-आर्ष साहित्य प्रचार ट्रस्ट,दिल्ली) अवश्य पढ़ें | 

डा.सुरेन्द्र कुमार ही नहीं बल्कि बहुत से पाश्चात्य विद्वान जैसे मैकडोनल, कीथ, बुलहर इत्यादि भी मनुस्मृति में मिलावट मानते हैं | 

डा. अम्बेडकर भी प्राचीन ग्रंथों में मिलावट स्वीकार करते हैं | वे रामायण, महाभारत, गीता, पुराण और वेदों तक में भी प्रक्षेप मानते हैं | 

मनुस्मृति के परस्पर विरोधी, असंगत श्लोकों को उन्होंने कई स्थानों पर दिखाया भी है | वे जानते थे कि मनुस्मृति में कहां -कहां प्रक्षेप हैं | लेकिन वे जानबूझ कर इन श्लोकों को प्रक्षिप्त कहने से बचते रहे क्योंकि उन्हें अपना मतलब सिद्ध करना था | उनके इस पक्षपाती व्यवहार ने उन्हें दलितों का नायक जरूर बना दिया | इस तरह मनुविरोध को बढ़ावा देकर उन्होंने अपना और कई लोगों का राजनीतिक हित साधा | उनकी इस मतान्धता ने समाज में विद्वेष का ज़हर ही घोला है और एक सच्चे नायक मनु को सदा के लिए खलनायक बना दिया | 

इसी तरह स्वामी अग्निवेश जो अपने आप को आर्यसमाजी बताते हैं, अपनी अनुकूलता के लिए ही यह भूलते हैं कि महर्षि दयानंद ने जो समाज की रचना का सपना देखा था वह महर्षि मनु की वर्ण व्यवस्था के अनुसार ही था | और उन्होंने प्रक्षिप्त हिस्सों को छोड़ कर अपने ग्रंथों में सर्वाधिक प्रमाण (५१४ श्लोक) मनुस्मृति से दिए हैं | स्वामी अग्निवेश ने भी सिर्फ़ राजनीतिक प्रसिद्धि पाने के लिये ही मनुस्मृति का दहन किया | 

निष्कर्ष : 

मनुस्मृति में बहुत अधिक मात्रा में मिलावट हुई है | परंतु इस मिलावट को आसानी से पहचानकर अलग किया जा सकता है | प्रक्षेपण रहित मूल मनुस्मृति अत्युत्तम कृति है, जिसकी गुण -कर्म- स्वभाव आधारित व्यवस्था मनुष्य और समाज को बहुत ऊँचा उठाने वाली है | 

मूल मनुस्मृति वेदों की मान्यताओं पर आधारित है | 

आज मनुस्मृति का विरोध उनके द्वारा किया जा रहा है जिन्होंने मनुस्मृति को कभी गंभीरता से पढ़ा नहीं और केवल वोट बैंक की राजनीति के चलते विरोध कर रहे हैं | 

सही मनुवाद जन्मना जाति प्रथा को पूरी तरह नकारता है और इसका पक्ष लेने वाले के लिए कठोर दण्ड का विधान करता है | जो लोग बाकी लोगों से सभी मायनों में समान हैं, उनके लिए, सही मनुवाद ” दलित ” शब्द के प्रयोग के ख़िलाफ़ है | 

आइए, हम सब जन्म जातिवाद को समूल नष्ट कर, वास्तविक मनुवाद की गुणों पर आधारित कर्मणा वर्ण व्यवस्था को लाकर मानवता और राष्ट्र का रक्षण करें| 

महर्षि मनु जाति, जन्म, लिंग, क्षेत्र, मत- सम्प्रदाय, इत्यादि सबसे मुक्त सत्य धर्म का पालन करने के लिए कहते हैं – 

८.१७: इस संसार में एक धर्म ही साथ चलता है और सब पदार्थ और साथी शरीर के नाश के साथ ही नाश को प्राप्त होते हैं, सब का साथ छूट जाता है – परंतु धर्म का साथ कभी नहीं छूटता | 

संदर्भ- डा. सुरेन्द्र कुमार, पं.गंगाप्रसाद उपाध्याय और स्वामी दयानंद सरस्वती के कार्य | 

अनुवादक- आर्यबाला 

Original post in English is available at http://agniveer.com/manu-smriti-and-shudras/